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Æ S o o
Abstract
This thesis seeks to examine and critique the transcendental feminist methodology 
and Trinitarian theology of Elizabeth A. Johnson. We will focus on four central, recurring 
themes that emerge out of her corpus, paying particular attention to how she assimilates 
these in She Who Is. They are: Johnson’s feminist methodology and epistemology, her 
transcendental anthropology and epistemology, her panentheistic, relational ontology and 
her feminist ‘Trinitarian’ God-talk.
The thesis will consist of four chapters, which will focus on these four main 
themes, and a conclusion. Chapter one will look specifically at the Johnson’s modern, 
Catholic reformist feminist methodology and epistemology, which prioritise both the 
category of experience and the ontological principle of relation. The chapter will 
conclude with a brief summary of a few feminists who have defined their theological 
positions in direct opposition to Barth’s view of Trinitarian revelation and language, and 
compare them to Johnson. Chapter Two will deal specifically with Johnson’s embrace of 
Karl Rahner’s transcendental metaphysics and her attempt to integrate this anthropology 
and ontological epistemology with feminist anthropology and epistemology. We will also 
highlight the various ‘dilemmas of difference’ Johnson faces in her use of conflicting 
appeals to experience.
Chapter Three will analyse and critique her panentheistic, relational ontology with 
specific attention paid to her re-schematization of traditional Trinitarian theology and 
Christology. Barth’s theology is used in part to critique Johnson’s assertions at this point. 
In Chapter Four, we analyse Johnson’s ‘analogical’ and ‘symbolic’ approach to God-talk 
to determine whether it is safeguarded from univocity, as she intends. We also raise the 
question of whether she is kept from the potential equivocity that threatens her agnostic 
approach. In conclusion, we will summarise our response to the naturally emerging 
questions of the thesis, assess Johnson’s approach overall and raise whatever questions 
we believe still remain.
Declarations
(i) I, Cherith Fee Nordling, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 
106,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work 
carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application 
for a higher degree.
Date 3^ o S  Signature of candidate
(ii) I was admitted as a research student in September 1999 and as a candidate for the 
degree of PhD. in Divinity in 1999; the higher study for which this is a record was 
carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1999 and 2003. ^ ^  ^
Date 4 ^  /M  ûJ ^-2  Signature of candidate
(iii) I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution 
and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD. in the University of St. 
Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for 
that degree.
Date ^  3» Signature of supervisor
Unrestricted Copyright Permission
In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I understand that I am 
giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of 
the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the 
work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be 
published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bonaflde library 
or research worker.
Table of Contents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
INTRODUCTION 4
I. Thesis Concerns and Justification 4
Distinction in Relation 6
II. Thesis Aim and Design 9
Scope 12
CHAPTER ONE: 13
RE-SCHEMATIZING THEOLOGY FROM BELOW: JOHNSON’S REFORMIST 
APPROACH 13
I. Feminist Methodology: Starting with the Female Subject 14
A. Perspectives on the Divine-Human Relation 14
B. Who Speaks First? 18
A Gendered Hermeneutic of Suspicion 20
The Hermeneutic o f ‘Revelation’: Women’s Experience Over Text and Tradition 26 I
II. Catholic Reformism’s Quest for Propriety in God-Talk 33 |
A. The Priority of Ethics Over Dogma 33
B. The Modern Inversion of Historical ‘Relations’ 39
III. Feminist Theology’s ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 43
A. Affirming Women in the Relational Imago Dei 44
B. Feminism’s Vis-à-vis 50
‘N o’ to the God of Classical Theism 50
‘N o’ to Karl Barth 53
IV. Summary and Critical Questions 63
Johnson vis-à-vis Barth 63
Johnson’s Catholic Reformist Challenge 66
CHAPTER TWO: 71
IN RELATION TO THE ‘UNKNOWABLE’ GOD: JOHNSON’S 
TRANSCENDENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY 71
I. Finitum Capax Infiniti’ - Johnson’s Transcendental Approach 71
A. First Principle: There is general, over-arching philosophy of being and knowing 
which governs divine and human reality. 73
B. Second Principle: Grace creates in human nature the possibility for and knowledge 
of the mutually conditioned, divine-human ‘relation’, 82
C. Third Principle: In grace, we are ‘always and from the beginning redeemed sinners’.
89
D. Fourth Principle: Divine ‘incomprehensibility’ equals Neo-Kantian ‘unknowability’ 
and experience of the ‘Nameless’. 94
E. Fifth Principle: Positing God as Nameless, Unknowable Being safeguards God’s 
radical otherness while God is simultaneously experienced as an element of human 
existence. 99
II. Problems with Appealing to ‘Experience’
A. Conflicting Appeals
Gendered v. Transcendental ‘Experience’
The Ambiguous, Experiencing ‘S elf
B. The Feminist Dilemma of Difference 
Dominating Appeals
Internal Conflicts
101
102
102
108
113
113
115
III. Summary: Critical Concerns at Johnson’s Critical Juncture’ 121
CHAPTER THREE: 130
RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY AS TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY’ 130
I. The Ontological Priority of ‘Relation’
Panentheism
Infinitum Capax Finiti - Kenosis Reconceived
B. The Relationality o f ‘Being’
‘Like a Trinity’
Being as ‘Spirit’
C. Relational Symbols 
Triune Sophia 
Sophia and the World
a. Maternity-Generativity
b. Friendship - Perichoresis
II. Dogmatic Implications
A. Trinitarian Critique
A Basic Articulation o f Trinitarian Doctrine 
Trinitarian Doctrine or Relational Ontology?
No ‘Persons’ in Relation 
Blurring the God-World Distinction 
No Love, No Freedom, No Integrity
B. Christological Critique
130
133
135
137
141
147
149
149
156
156
157
159
159
161
172
180
183
188
191
Constructing the Christological Ladder 
Chalcedonian Implications
a. Immanence with Integrity
b. Salvation through the Person and Work of Christ
c. God the Self-Giving Servant 
Adoptionism and Docetism 
Concluding Comments
CHAPTER FOUR: 
‘RELATIONAL’ GOD-TALK?
191
197
198 
200 
203 
205 
207
210
210
L Agnostically Naming the ‘Nameless’ 210
A. Proceeding ‘Analogically’ Under the Sign of Not-Knowing 210
Assessing Johnson’s Fia Analogia 21 0
“Aquinas on Johnson” 21 7
a. Does Aquinas consider all God-talk to be analogical as Johnson claims? 217
b. What impact does Johnson’s interpretation of the analogia entis have on her 
attempt to remain free from univocity? 223
B. Symbolic, Metaphorical God-Talk 228
Tillich and the Instrumentalist Use o f the Symbol 228
McFague’s Influence 234
II. Addressing the Problem of Distinction: Irigaray in Conversation with Barth 
and Johnson 241
A. Loss of the ‘Other’ and God-Talk as Projection: Irigaray and Barth 241
B. Otherness, Projection and the Question of Distinction: Irigaray and Johnson 246
CONCLUSION
A. Inherent Conflicts
B. Beyond’ Barth’s Critique of Experience?
C. Theology as the Language of the Church in Trinitarian Participation
D. The Church’s Life and Language Grounded In Christ’
E. Inadequate Christology
F. The Oppressive Potential of Experiential God-Talk 
Bibliography
261
262
266
269
272
274
277
283
Introduction
/. Thesis Concerns and Justification
This thesis examines and critiques the transcendental feminist methodology and 
Trinitarian theology of Elizabeth A. Johnson, C.S.J.. In so doing, we acknowledge from 
the outset that there are both advantages and disadvantages in writing a dissertation on 
the work of a living theologian, due to the fact that her theology is still in a state of flux.
The primary justification for this study comes from the tremendous degree of 
influence that Johnson has had on Western (particularly North American) contemporary 
Roman Catholic theology and Christian feminist theology over the past twenty years. 
This is due in no small part to the significant body of literature she has produced.^ 
Recently described as ‘the leading feminist voice on the contemporary theological 
scene’,^  she is one of the most erudite and influential representatives of ‘Catholic, 
liberation, feminist reformism’ (hereinafter generally referred to as ‘Catholic feminist 
reformism’). A respected scholar, teacher and leader both within the academy and thb 
Catholic religious community,^ Johnson is considered a staunch member of the ‘loyal
‘ Most of Johnson’s works will appear in footnotes throughout the thesis in addition to the bibliography. 
She has written substantively on the doctrine o f God, symbolic language, and christology. Her other works 
include writings on marlology, women and the Church, pneumatology, cosmology and eco-feminism, 
eschatology and community.
 ^This cite is from the promotional cover o f Things New and Old: Essays on the Theology o f Elizabeth A. 
Johnson, ed. Phyllis Zagano and Terence W. Tilley (New York: Crossroads, 1999). This book provides a 
complete bibliography o f her academic and popular writings, speeches, audiotapes and book reviews 
through 1999. Johnson, who has received numerous awards for her books and articles, has also served as 
president o f the Catholic Theological Society o f America.
 ^ In Introducing Contemporary Theologies: The What and the Who o f  Theology Today (Australia: E.G. 
Dwyer, 1997), Neil Ormerod states, ‘Johnson would hardly strike one as a radical figure. She is a Catholic 
nun working in a well-reputed Catholic university. Moreover, her books and articles reflect a profound, if  
critical, respect for Catholic tradition. There is no knee-jerk rejection of figures from the past, such as 
Augustine and Aquinas, because of their obvious patriarchal bias. Rather there is a critical retrieval o f their 
positive insights, and the active utilization o f these insights within a developing feminist perspective. Still 
her work is deeply unsettling in the biases she uncovers and the strategies she develops to overcome them’ 
(185).
opposition’.'* In other words, she seeks to remain within the Roman Catholic tradition 
while calling for its reform in the particular light of liberation feminism and its critique of 
ecclesial/social sexism and patriarchal, religious ‘idolatry’.
The principle form of ‘idolatry’ Johnson has worked to reform has been the 
Church’s doctrine of and language for the Triune God -  Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This 
‘literal’ view is judged to be oppressive, both in terms of its theistic understanding of the 
divine-world relation -  i.e., one that considers God to be wholly distinct from and 
immanently, relationally independent of the world in Triune aseity -  and its inherent 
attribution of male ‘gender’ to God. Catholic patriarchy allegedly promotes a classical 
‘theistic’ view of God as disengaged from the social concerns of the oppressed, the 
ecological concerns of creation and unjust human relationships. This view of God fails to 
uphold the feminist values of equality, reciprocity and mutuality which she contends are 
essential to women’s experience and to the very nature of God. Hence traditional 
Christian doctrine and language for the Trinity is considered to function negatively 
toward creation and God.
Johnson’s first theological ‘battles’ were waged primarily in the arena of 
Christology as she assessed the implications of Jesus’ humanity for women. Since then, 
she has worked to reconstruct the doctrine of God in toto. The result is her major treatise, 
She Who Is: The Mystery o f God in Feminist Theological Discourse f  in which she deals
Luke Timothy Johnson positively uses this term to refer to Johnson and others who have stayed in the 
Church while ‘negotiating the tensions between Christian faith and feminist commitment’. See “What Are 
They Saying About God? -  Something Fundamental is Afoot,” Commonweal (January 1993): 17-22,17.
 ^ (New York: Crossroads, 1992). This book will hereafter be abbreviated SWI .For a selection of critical 
reviews o f this work, see Amy Plantinga Pauw, “Braiding a New Footbridge: Christian Wisdom, Classic 
and Feminist,” Christian Century (November 17-24, 1993): 1159-1162; Cynthia L. Rigby, a review o f She 
Who Is: The Mystery o f God in Feminist Theological Discourse, by Elizabeth A. Johnson, Koinonia 5 (Fall 
1993): 255-59; Mary Aquin O’Neill and Mary McClintock Fulkerson, a review of She Who Is: The Mystery 
o f God in Feminist Theological Discourse, by Elizabeth A. Johnson, Religious Studies Review 21 (January
with feminist theological anthropology, Trinitarian panentheism and God-talk. Here she 
argues that the feminist reformist agenda is taking place at a critical, historical juncture 
between traditional Christian doctrine and, after two centuries of development, ‘human 
experience’ as the theological aprioril Thus ‘women’s search for less inadequate ways 
of speaking about God today intersects with other theological efforts to rethink the 
inherited doctiine of God, which itself has already been in a crisis of reformation for 
some time’.^
Hence, assuming the necessary ‘reformation’ of Christian doctrine ‘from below’,
Johnson asks ‘what is the right way to speak about God?’® In feminist terms, ‘what is a 
proper view of the God-world relation, and accompanying God-talk, that takes women’s 
relational experience into account as source and norm?’ Hanging in the balance is not 
only the right re-ordering of relationships but the future of the Christian faith: ‘The 
intellectual vitality of the feminist theological agenda is matched and even outpaced by 
its existential importance. What is at stake is ... indeed the very viability of the Christian 
tradition for present and coming generations’.^
Distinction in Relation
Johnson’s goal as a Christian feminist theologian is to articulate a theology of 
divine-cosmic relationality, which she does in the form of a relational ontology expressed
1995): 19-25; Sonya Quitslund, a review o f She Who Is: The Mystery o f God in Feminist Theological 
Discourse by Elizabeth A, Johnson, Journal o f Ecumenical Studies, 31 (Winter-Spring 1994): 190-92;
Mary E. Hines, Mary Rose D ’Angelo and John Carmody, “Three Perspectives,” a symposium review of 
She Who Is: The Mystery o f God in Feminist Theological Discourse, by Elizabeth A. Johnson, Horizons 20 
(Fall 1993): 339-344. ;
 ^SWI, 15,19. I
 ^SWI, 19 (emphasis added). 1
® SWI, 18. In “The Right Way to Speak About God: Pannenberg on Analogy,” Theological Studies 43 I
(1982): 673-692, Johnson opens by citing Pannenberg: “A crucial, if  not the most basic question o f |
theology is the question about the right way to speak o f  God.” From Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions j
in Theology 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), 211. |
'^SWI,\5. \
through female ‘Trinitarian’ metaphors. She offers her relational ontology through the re- 
schematisation of aspects of Christian doctrine which she contends maintain too radical a 
distinction between God and human -  particularly women’s -  relational experience. Her 
earliest writings, which raise the question of God and God-talk from experience, set out 
her position in opposition to that of Karl Barth -  precisely because she considers Barth to 
maintain too radical a distinction at this point.
In Catholic feminist reformism, God’s relation to humanity and to creation at 
large, and vice versa, is governed by the feminist a priori of mutual interrelatedness. The 
universal structure of ‘relational being’ not only prescribes the conditions for the divine- 
human relation, but also serves as a predefined, a priori category of human knowing. 
Hence Johnson’s theology relies on the assumption that we can know God more or less 
directly, albeit symbolically, through experience as transcendental experience of ‘the 
divine’.
Moreover, this ontological priority of relation, which constitutes the heart of 
divine reality, is considered to be essential to women’s relational experience.*® Thus 
women have unique epistemic access to divine relationality and experiential access to its 
‘true’ creaturely form and content. Generally, this ontological assumption requires the 
rejection of any kind of traditional theism that upholds God as ‘wholly other’ in free 
(unnecessary) asymmetrical relation to creation. Certain feminists, including Johnson, 
generally attribute this theistic view to Karl Barth. They consider Barth’s theology to be a
*® Elizabeth A. Johnson, Women, Earth, and Creator Spirit (New York: Paulist, 1993), 32 and passim. This 
presupposition is not only basic to Catholic feminism but also to pragmatic feminism (Rebecca Chopp, The 
Power to Speak: feminism, language, God [New York: Crossroads, 1989]), lesbian feminism (Carter 
Heyward, The Redemption o f  God: a theology o f mutual relation [New York; University Press o f America, 
1980]), process feminism (Sheila Greeve Davaney, Divine Power: A Study o f Karl Barth and Charles 
Hartshorne [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986]), and poststructuralist feminism (Mary McClintock Fulkerson, 
Changing the Subject: Women’s Discourses and Feminist Theology [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994]).
reactionary, conservative revivification of pre-modern thought, one which fails to take 
seriously either human experience or a non-oppressive, relational view of God.**
Nevertheless, Johnson recognises that God’s distinction from the world is a 
priority in the Christian tradition. Because she intends that her theology be ‘recognizable 
within the contours of Christian faith’, she attempts to honour that distinction both in her 
doctrine of God and her God-talk, which she contends is in agreement with Thomistic 
analogy. Johnson maintains that the ‘divine mystery’ of God as ‘wholly other’ exists in 
mutually interdependent but also free and asymmetrical relation to the world -  and can 
only be known in and through it. Thus, Johnson recognises the value of Barth’s emphasis 
on God’s Triune relation to the world. However, she still considers theology ‘from 
below’ to be the only viable expression of the ‘truth’ of the God-world relation, for it can 
only be ‘known’ from human experience. Hence, Johnson believes her theology moves 
beyond Barth and his concerns. As a feminist she focuses specifically on women’s 
ontological being and experience as source and norm for theological truth in this present 
age.
** If feminists have dismissed traditional Christianity and Barth, Linda Woodhead notes that the neo­
orthodox tradition ‘which continues to take its inspiration from Karl Barth’ has itself little engagement 
with feminist academic theology. See “Feminist Theology -  Out of the Ghetto,” in Is There a Future fo r  
Feminist Theology?, ed. Deborah F. Sawyer and Diane M. Collier (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1999), 198-206, 199. There are exceptions, however. In Katherine Sonderegger’s essay, “Barth and 
Feminism” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
258-273, she discusses the ‘marriage’ potential between Barth and feminist theology, noting positive 
examples by American feminists like Serene Jones, Deborah Hunsinger, Ellen Charry, Letty Russell, and 
we would add, Cynthia Rigby and Sonderegger herself. See Serene Jones, “This God Which is Not One: 
Irigaray and Barth on the Divine,” in Transfigurations: Theology and the French Feminists, ed. C. W. 
Maggie Kim, Susan M. St. Ville and Susan M. Simonatis (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 109-141: Deborah 
Van Deusen Hunsinger, Theology and Pastoral Counseling (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995): Ellen Charry, 
By the Renewing o f Your Minds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Ch. 1: Letty Russell, Human 
Liberation in a Feminist Perspective (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 159ff.: Cynthia Rigby, “The 
Real Word Really Became Real Flesh: Karl Barth’s Contribution to a Feminist Incarnational Christology.” 
Unpublished Ph.D. Diss., Princeton Seminary, 1998. See also Dan Migliore, “Sin and Self-Loss: Karl Barth 
and the Feminist Critique of Traditional Doctrines of Sin,” in Many Voices, One God Being Faithful in a 
Pluralistic World, ed. Water Brueggemann and George Stroup (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1998), 
139-154.
5^7,231.
'^5'ir/,231.
“Forging Theology: A Conversation With Colleagues,” in Things New and Old (see n. 2) 106-107 
(emphasis added).
Rahner is the principle theologian o f transcendental Thomism (which assimilates both Kant and Hegel) 
in the twentieth century. Given his profound influence on contemporary Catholic theology, he has been 
likened on the one hand to a ‘twentieth-century Aquinas’ by Anne Carr, in “Karl Rahner,” in A Handbook 
o f  Christian Theologians, ed. Martin Marty and Dean Peerman (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 520. On the
Johnson offers a panentheistic, feminist concept of God in mutual interrelation 
with the world. The result is ‘a model of free, reciprocal relation; God in the world and 
the world in God while each remains radically distinct’.*^  However, ‘the absolute 
difference between Creator and creature is encircled by God who is all in all’.*^ She 
believes that this concept upholds divine and human distinction while allowing women to 
speak of God from their transcendental self-awareness and experience. Thus, her 
concomitant concern is to develop a form of Trinitarian God-talk to accompany this 
relational ontology. She describes her efforts as follows:
In She Who Is 1 draw on themes and ideas from Thomas Aquinas to explore a feminist theology of 
God. ...I also make ontological claims and draw references about the way things truly are, but 
these are not beholden to any complete metaphysical system. They may in truth be compatible 
with many systems. With regard to the Trinity I play with multiple models, convinced that pushing 
only one alone inevitably leads to a regrettable univocity in speech about the divine. ...Using an 
entirely different conceptuality, a contemporary reading of Aquinas with Rahnerian and feminist 
presuppositions, 1 have also suggested Trinitarian language with a profoundly relational cast....*'*
U. Thesis Aim and Design
This thesis aims to carefully explicate and critique Johnson’s relational ontology -  
which includes her theological anthropology and epistemology, her doctrine of God and 
her understanding of the divine-human relation. We are particularly interested in how she 
expresses these in Christological and Trinitarian terms.
The primary, non-feminist influence on Johnson’s philosophical and theological 
assumptions is the transcendental Thomism of Karl Rahner.*  ^ Johnson explains that she |
---- - --
has ‘imbibed’ Rahner’s theology to the point that she takes his assumptions for granted 
and does not spell them out.*® Thus, part of the task of this thesis is to trace the elements 
of Rahner’s thought that permeate Johnson’s theology and methodology in combination 
with her feminist, relational approach. Also, in forming our critique, we will occasionally 
draw in aspects of Karl Barth’s theology of Trinitarian revelation and the place of human 
experience in the knowledge of God. Not only is Barth’s theology foundational to Rahner 
and to Johnson, but Johnson sets up her theology in contrast to a particular reading of 
Barth. Hence, his theology is used in part to critique her assertions.
In her project of theological ‘reformation’, Johnson seeks to integrate feminist 
methodology and epistemology, transcendental Catholic anthropology, epistemology and 
ontology, and a relational metaphysic culled from a variety of sources. Due to the nature 
of this effort and how she develops her arguments, certain questions naturally emerge. 
First, are her methodological, philosophical principles and presuppositions internally 
consistent? Second, are they compatible with her Roman Catholic Christian tradition to 
which she seeks to remain loyal? And third, are they inherently plausible?
Specifically, what affect do her metaphysical principles have on the divine-human 
distinction and freedom that she believes is fundamental to Christian faith and God-talk? 
Finally, can Johnson the feminist avoid the methodological and epistemological pitfalls 
of modern theology that may inadvertently support the theological and social oppression 
she so deplores?
Given the breadth of Johnson’s writings, we are confronted with the difficult task 
of adequately distilling her thought. We will focus on four central, recurring themes that
other, he has been referred to as ‘Catholic theology’s Friedrich Schleiermacher’, in A Map o f Twentieth- 
Century Theology, ed. Carl Braaten and Robert Jenson (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 277.
*® “Forging Theology,” (seen. 14) 100-1.
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emerge out of her corpus, paying particular attention to how she assimilates these in She 
Who Is. They are: Johnson’s feminist methodology and epistemology, her transcendental 
anthropology and epistemology, her panentheistic, relational ontology and her feminist 
‘Trinitarian’ God-talk.
Thus, the thesis will consist of four chapters, which will focus on these four 
themes, and a conclusion.
Chapter one will look specifically at Johnson’s modern. Catholic reformist 
feminist methodology and epistemology, which prioritise both the category of experience 
and the ontological principle of relation. The chapter will conclude with a brief summary 
of a few feminists who have defined their theological positions in direct opposition to 
Barth’s view of Trinitarian revelation and language, and compare them to Johnson.
Chapter Two will deal specifically with Johnson’s embrace of Karl Rahner’s 
transcendental metaphysics and her attempt to integrate this anthropology and ontological 
epistemology with feminist anthropology and epistemology. We will also highlight the 
various ‘dilemmas of difference’ Johnson faces in her use of conflicting appeals to 
experience.
Chapter Three will analyse and critique her panentheistic, relational ontology with 
specific attention paid to her re-schematization of traditional Trinitarian theology and 
Christology. Barth’s theology is used in part to critique Johnson’s assertions at this point.
In Chapter Four, we analyse Johnson’s ‘analogical’ and ‘symbolic’ approach to 
God-talk to determine whether it is safeguarded from univocity, as she intends. We also 
raise the question of whether she is kept from the potential equivocity that threatens her 
agnostic approach.
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In conclusion, we will summarise our response to the naturally emerging 
questions of the thesis, assess Johnson’s approach overall and raise whatever questions 
we believe still remain.
Scope
There are a couple of things that limitations on space do not allow. First, elements 
of Johnson’s theology deemed extrinsic to the topic will not be covered. For example, 
although she develops the image and content of her God-symbol from a selective reading 
and feminist reinterpretation of the Wisdom/Sophia tradition, the constraints of our thesis 
only permit us to highlight her interpretation and briefly point out the already existing 
critique of such ‘exegesis’.*^
Second, the thesis will not consider in depth the extensive feminist debates 
surrounding gender and identity construction. Rather, we shall limit our discussion to 
Johnson’s feminist use of gender in her epistemology, her explication of ‘ideal’ humanity 
and her justification for gendered God-talk.
Suffice to say, a thorough examination o f the scholarly literature around the theme o f Wisdom is 
immense and is outside the scope o f  this thesis. An impressive and wide-ranging survey o f the 
contemporary, rhetorical critical understanding o f the Scriptural figure o f Wisdom, as well as its Hellenistic 
contextualization, and contemporary Wisdom Christology, can be found in SWI, 288-290n22-53, and 
Harold Wells, “Trinitarian Feminism: Elizabeth Johnson’s Wisdom Christology” in Theology Today 52 
(October 1995): 332-337. Interestingly, Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza considers Johnson to have carefully 
appropriated and refined Fiorenza’s own critical-constructive and theoretical approach o f Wisdom 
Christology. See In Memory o f Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction o f Christian Origins (Tenth 
Anniversary Addition) (New York: Crossroads, 1994), xv, xxxvi. For an excellent critique o f Johnson’s 
interpretation, see the article by New Testament scholar Karen Jobes, “Sophia Christology: The Way of  
Wisdom?” in The Way o f  Wisdom: Essays in the Honor o f Bruce K. Waltke, ed. J. I. Packer and S. 
Soderlund (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 226-250.
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Chapter One: 
Re-schematizing Theology From Below*: Johnson’s Reformist 
Approach
In Elizabeth A. Johnson’s exposition of the doctrine of God, which she conceives 
as ‘Trinitarian’ and ‘panentheistic’, and in her corresponding theological speech, she 
expresses the desire to maintain the distinction and freedom in the God-world relation 
that she understands to be necessary for a Christian articulation of this relationship. At 
the same time, she argues that her interpretation of the tradition at this point coincides 
with the feminist values that promote human worth and distinction in relationships -  
equality, mutuality and reciprocity. In short, Johnson contends that divine and human 
distinction and freedom are of fundamental, ontological importance and can be sustained 
within a relationship of mutual coinherence. This thesis seeks to examine Johnson’s 
relational ontology, her methodological presuppositions and her feminist God-talk to see 
what implication they have for her commitment to maintaining a radical distinction 
between God and the world that honours personal difference and freedom in continuity 
with the Christian tradition.
The purpose of this first chapter is to set forth, and offer a critique of, Johnson’s 
particular philosophical and methodological context -  ‘Catholic reformist feminism’ (or 
‘Catholic reformism’) -  out of which she attempts to speak of the God-world relation. 
The focus will be primarily on Catholic reformism’s characteristically modern shift away 
from the traditional view of revelation ‘from above’ as articulated boldly in the last 
century by Karl Barth, where the Christian God makes Godself personally known to
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humanity through faith. In its place Johnson and her colleagues have put forth the equally 
bold modern assumption that the human subject has the capacity to perceive God directly 
-  ‘from below’ as it were. At the end of the chapter, we will identify a specific subset of 
feminists who reject Barth’s method and view of divine-human distinction and freedom. 
In so doing, we will ask where Johnson’s theological approach seems to fit within this 
spectrum.*®
I. Feminist Methodoiogy: Starting with the Femaie Subject
A. Perspectives on the Divine-Human Relation
Accuracy in thinking about God’s transcendence and presence in creation has 
always been an essential priority in Christian doctrine and speech. If we do not 
distinguish conceptually and really between God and human creatures, we cannot 
understand this relation as a real relationship between radically distinct ‘others’ - an 
essential aspect of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Nor, when speaking of God, can we 
know if we are describing anything other than the content of our experiences, which, 
according to this tradition, are not divine.*®
For much recent feminist theology, however, this distinction has not been a 
priority.^® Ironically, while distinction, difference and personal freedom in relation to
*® An extended treatment of Western feminism’s theological, philosophical, linguistic and socio-political or 
socio-pragmatic theories and methodologies is not intended. Here the concern is merely to highlight the 
basic themes o f modernism as they play out in Catholic reformism. For an overview o f American Catholic 
feminism, see Rosemary Rader, “Catholic Feminism: Its Impact on U.S. Catholic Women,” American 
Catholic Women, ed. K. Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 182-219; and Mary Jo Weaver, New 
Catholic Women: A Contemporary Challenge to Religious Authority (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 
For a discussion o f the development o f Christian/reformist, womanist and post-Christian feminist 
theologies, see Linda Hogan, From Women’s Experience to Feminist Theology (SheflEield, England: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1995).
*® Paul Molnar begins with this same point in “Can We Know God Directly? Rahner’s Solution From 
Experience,” Theological Studies 46 (1985): 228-261.
®^ We make the necessary caveat regarding the ability to speak o f ‘feminist theology’ at all and what that 
term might mean. While there is no generic ‘feminist theology’, there are basic unifying tenets common to
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other persons are vitally important aspects of women’s ‘full humanity’, they have not 
been stressed as equally imperative aspects of the divine reality -  indeed, they have 
received a somewhat ‘negative press’! Particularly when divine difference and distinction 
are tied to God’s sovereignty and Lordship (generally viewed as ‘male-derived’ concepts 
of power used abusively throughout Church history), they are widely perceived as a 
direct threat to women’s human value and personal freedom.^* Furthermore, the doctrine 
of God’s aseity antecedent to and independent from his creation is widely perceived as a 
primary source of patriarchal oppression in the Church.^  ^ Thus ‘classical theism’ is 
alleged to promote a view of God as existing in solitary, remote and dispassionate 
disengagement from the human and cosmic struggle. Ultimately, ‘his’ identity and 
authoritarian voice are indistinguishable from the ego-identities and voices of men in 
positions of ecclesial and societal authority. The result is that in most distinctly feminist 
descriptions of the divine-human relation, these aspects of identity, distinction and 
personhood generally do not belong to God; God is not perceived as a distinct, personally 
revealing and encountering ‘Other’.
most Western feminism which include (1) the right of women to define and determine themselves 
autonomously rather than heteronomously, (2) the identification o f equality with worth and with personal 
identity, and (3) the ascription o f the status o f oppressors to men by virtue o f their gender. In Karen Offen’s 
words, it follows that ‘to be a feminist is necessarily to be at odds with male-dominated culture and 
society’. “Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach,” Signs 14 (1988): 152. Whereas these 
tenets generally shape the Western feminist theological worldview, the third tenet is generally redefined in 
terms of who constitutes ‘the oppressor’ in, e.g., Womanist, Mujerista and lesbian feminist theologies.
See, e.g., the essays in Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion, ed. Carol Christ and Judith 
Plaskow (San Francisco: HarperSan Francisco, 1979), the Introduction to which begins: ‘Feminists have 
charged that Judaism and Christianity are sexist religions with a male God and traditions o f  male leadership 
that legitimate the superiority o f men in family and society’ (1).
In Womanspirit Rising, Plaskow and Christ credit Rosemary Radford Ruether with first articulating the 
theory o f how sexism in the Christian tradition is influenced by the dualisms and hierarchical mentality o f  
the classical world (4-5). Johnson restates this theory throughout her work. See, e.g., SWI, 50-54,230-231.
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Hence, most feminist theological methodology operates from the conviction that 
women must serve as their own experiential source of divine and human truth^^ No jI
longer bound by the authority of Christian Scripture and tradition -  themselves thought to j
I
be male bastions -  feminist theology maintains that correct God-talk nevertheless 
continues to be a matter of projecting a finite (gendered) image onto infinite being/'* This 
time, however, the image -  or imago Dei -  is female, based upon women’s self­
experience and self-perception. In other words, if women can find the answer to the 
question of God within their own experience, they can image God accordingly and live in 
ethical correspondence to that ‘truth’. Hence feminist God-talk generally develops from a 
particular form of anthropological, transcendental or spiritual female self-expression.
In an effort to break down what are considered the foundations of theological, 
hierarchical dualism that support ecclesiastical sexism, virtually all feminist theology 
operates from the principle of mutual relationality. This relational concept extends to 
every kind of human relation, be it with non-human creatures and the environment, with 
other human beings, or with the divine. However, while distinction is maintained as an 
essential aspect of the first two relations (environment and other human beings), there is 
often an intentional blurring of the Creator-creature distinction. The more ambiguous this 
distinction, the better the chance that the Creator cannot be viewed as ‘over’ -  and thus 
‘against’ -  creation and hence will not be considered an oppressive image. Thus, the
^  See Catholic reformist Mary Catherine Hilkert, “Experience and Tradition,” in Freeing Theology: The 
Essentials o f Theology in Feminist Perspective, ed. Catherine Mowry LaCugna (San Francisco: HarperSan 
Francisco, 1993), 59-60.
^  See Rosemary Radford Ruether, '"’'Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics” in The 
Image o f God: Gender Models in Judeo-Christian Tradition, ed. Kari Elisabeth Borreson (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1991), 267-291,286.
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prevailing concept used to describe the divine-human relation as non-threatening, and 
mutually beneficial, is that of ‘participation in the divine’/®
Women’s understanding of such participation, however, is increasingly difficult 
to determine, since it has had two major influences: the ever-deepening immanence of 
twentieth-century liberal, correlational and process theologies (notably Bultmann, Tillich 
and Hartshorne in reaction to Barth), as well as a rising pantheism within certain feminist 
circles/® But this difficulty is also due in no small part to the intentional ambiguity of 
feminist descriptions of divine reality. However, such ambiguity is to be welcomed over 
the God of ‘classical theism’, which in certain feminist circles is especially equated with 
the &//^revealing Triune God of Barth’s theology. At present, says process theologian 
Bernard Loomer, ‘an ambiguous God is of greater stature than an unambiguous deity’
Thus, in reaction to a Christian view of the divine-human relation caricatured as a 
belief in ‘the lonely, spectral father-god, aloof, above, and indifferent’,^® Catholic 
‘reformism’ describes this relation in terms of a relational ontology that incorporates the 
values of mutuality, reciprocity and equality. This is particularly the case with Elizabeth
This is what Linda Woodhead calls the enduring meta-narrative of the ‘New Spirituality’. Often 
presented as an enlightened version o f Christianity, it is a totalising philosophy ‘which explains everything 
-  God, the world, humanity. At its simplest, the New Spirituality is a holistic spiritual vision. It asserts that 
we are entering a New Age in which a perennial but long-forgotten truth will be remembered: that all that 
is, is spirit. Material things, including human beings, are seen as manifestations of this spirit, and so 
ultimately one. The goal of life is to realise this oneness or ‘connectedness’ by looking within to the spirit 
which lies at the heart of all things, and which is one’s own tme se lf . Woodhead argues that Johnson’s 
transcendental, relational ontology is an example o f feminist participation in this meta-narrative. See 
“Spiritualizing the Sacred: A Critique o f Feminist Theology,” Modern Theology 13 (1997): 191-212,204.
®^ This is also inherent in most Goddess and/or Gaia ‘thea-logies’ based on circular and/or evolutionary 
cosmologies and accompanying birthing imagery, e.g. those o f Ruether and Starhawk. Colin Gunton 
describes this pervading ‘immanentism’ as the general assumption that the world can be understood from 
within itself and not from any being or principle supposed to operate from without. Yesterday and Today: A 
Study o f Continuities in Christology, 2nd. ed. (London: SPCK, 1997), 2-3.
Cited by James J. Buckley, “Revisionists and Liberals,” in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to 
Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, 2"** edition, ed. David F. Ford (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 
332.
®^ “Trinity and Feminism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Theology, ed. Susan Frank Parsons 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 135-150, 139.
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Johnson’s panentheistic doctrine of the Trinity and the God-world relation. Though her 
doctrine has a Thomistic cast shaped by the transcendental philosophy and anthropology 
of Karl Rahner. Under the influences of Pannenberg, Bultmann and Tillich as well, it is 
hardly surprising to find Johnson rejecting Barth’s theological method out of hand as not 
sufficiently grounded in experience.^® Furthermore, Barth’s view of the Triune God in his 
aseity is not mutually relational enough for her, and, she suspects, hides an inherent 
subordinationism.®®
In this context Johnson seeks to expound a doctrine of the God-world relation and 
corresponding God-talk that is sensitive both to feminist concerns as well as to the 
foundational Christian assertion that there is true, necessary distinction between God and 
humanity. Her own approach attempts to satisfy both concerns by finding a ‘middle’ 
theological ground. In her words, ‘Insofar as some form of freedom-ln-relation is a 
hallmark of the feminist ideal as well as of mature human personhood, a model that 
combines the core insights of both theism and pantheism is sought, one that safeguards 
the radical distinction between God and the world while also promoting their mutual, if 
asymmetrical, relationship’.®*
B. Who Speaks First?
It is not surprising that a feminist reformist like Johnson would specifically reject 
Barth’s thought in toto in the development of her own, since for both theologians 
theology and method are inextricably linked. What we say about God depends on what 
we believe is possible to say and why. This in turn influences what we say about
®® “The Legitimacy o f the God Question: Pannenberg’s New Anthropology,” The Irish Theological 
Quarterly 52 (1986): 289-303.
®® SWI, 205-7.
®‘ 5'r/,231.
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everything else. For Barth, the premier critic of a theology of experience, theology is first 
a matter of revelation as talk by God about God in the Being-Act of His Word, Jesus 
Christ, and then is a matter of a posteriori human reflection upon that Word. In its 
capacity as witness-bearer to God’s real and personal Triune Self-revelation, theology 
speaks ‘second’, as it were. It is the language of the Church ontologically grounded in 
and participating in the koinonia of the Triune God.
For Johnson and her colleagues, on the other hand, theology is first ‘self-talk’; 
talk about our humanity and the world in which we find ourselves from our self­
perspective. Secondly, it is talk about God. At this point in Johnson’s quest to speak 
about ‘divine mystery’, she considers it imperative that women speak first from their 
particular human experience and that theology speak ‘second’ in alignment with 
women’s self-talk.®® This means that truthful God-talk requires rethinking the doctrine of 
God from an anthropological starting point and then rethinking both in the light of 
women’s co-equal humanity.®® In her words, this epistemological and hermeneutical 
starting point ‘from below’ is the only ‘adequate pattern’ presently available.®'*
®® Johnson makes this case in “The Legitimacy o f the God Question.” See n. 11 above. Francis Martin 
reflects on this prevailing socio-religious and philosophical worldview: ‘What foundationalism is to 
epistemology individualism is to social theory -  both begin with the subject and make the subject the norm 
o f what is true and right’. The Feminist Question: Feminist Theology in the Light o f Christian Tradition 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1994), 294. This book will hereafter be abbreviated TFQ.
®® SWI, 19. See also Anne Carr, Transforming Grace: Women’s Experience and Christian Tradition (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 144.
®'* Johnson believes that the appeal to experience has been at least ‘implicit’ in the major theological 
articulations o f Christian history (SWI, 123, 61). Rosemary Radford Ruether concurs. See Sexism and God- 
Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1983), 12, 13. The inherent problems with 
this gender-based perspective should perhaps be noted from the outset. If Johnson’s starting point is a valid 
one, then ‘what’s fair for the goose is fair for the gander’; i.e., one can certainly have two competing 
gender-based ‘Christian’ theologies with no external arbiter o f ‘truth’. If the external criterion o f gender 
can be applied to judge Christian theology as ‘true’ or ‘right’, then the possibility exists o f establishing 
competing claims based on countless other external criteria as well. This raises tremendous tensions for the 
ontological claims inherent in Johnson’s Catholic reformism.
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A Gendered Hermeneutic of Suspicion
The placement of women at the centre of theological inquiry and making their 
experience the final criterion and norm for theological reflection, critique, reconstruction 
and praxis characterises Catholic reformism as a modern liberal and feminist theology.^^ 
Born out of an Enlightenment emphasis on human autonomy and the individual as the 
arbiter of truth and praxis, Western feminism originally maintained that the experience of 
the female subject was determinative for true knowledge and a proper view of reality. 
This meant the rejection of male normativity as the experiential basis for understanding 
God, humanity and the cosmos. Despite recent challenges from postmodern, post* 
structuralist and certain process feminist theorists and theologians, this appeal to 
women’s experience remains foundational for Catholic reformism in general and for 
Johnson in particular.^® Johnson and her colleagues consider this gendered appeal to 
experience to be a social and theological Teveler’, one that deconstructs existing 
theological and social dualisms.^’
Johnson and her Catholic reformist colleagues employ a feminist hermeneutic of 
suspicion to uncover sexism (understood as a primarily male phenomenon) and its false
Theorist/theologian Sheila Briggs reflects on the general methodological use o f experience: 
‘[EJxperience is an extremely useful concept because o f its fluidity, which allows us to talk about an 
inherently ambiguous and indeterminate set o f connections. It allows us to join the inside with the outside, 
our mental worlds with the external universe, our personal meanings with the socially constructed universe 
which confronts us. Obviously, the interest in making such connections is a modem one, where there is no 
single divinely ordained order that can legislate with absolute authority these connections as a given’. 
Briggs, “A History o f Our Own,” in Horizons in Feminist Theology: Identity, Tradition and Norms, ed. 
Rebecca S. Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 168. Barth cites his 
contemporary, G, Wobbermin (Systematische Theologie, Vol. 2, 1921, 455) as typical o f this modem, 
existential ‘Cartesianism’: ‘The I-experience establishes for man the surest certainty for reality that he can 
conceive o f or that is possible for him at all. It is the presupposition ... o f all validation o f reality with 
reference to the external world’. Church Dogmatics 1.1, 2“® Ed. trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1975), 195. This translation will be used throughout the thesis, hereafter abbreviated ‘C.£>. ’.
These challenges shall be raised in the course o f  this study.
We shall argue, however, that this appeal reinforces such dualisms, as they seem to be essential to a 
gendered feminist construction o f divine and cosmic reality. See n. 16 above.
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ordering and articulation of reality. Assuming that there is always an oppressive 
hierarchy in operation, the hermeneutic of suspicion enables the critique of any ideology 
by asking whose interests are being served in an existing system.^* On the ‘interested’ 
assumption that, in Rosemary Radford Ruether’s words, what is is not what should be in 
regard to women, men and their relational worlds. Western feminism interprets women’s 
historical ‘experience’ to be one of oppression and marginalization by men.^^ It is 
precisely women’s reflection on this ‘cognitive dissidence’ [sic] of what ‘is’ and ‘should 
be’ that functions as the starting point for any feminist theology.'*® Women analyse their 
social, historical contexts and experiences and make a subjective judgment as to what is 
‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘evil’ and ‘redemptive’, based on their current situation.'** From this 
analysis, says Mary McClintock Fulkerson, feminist theological practice makes ‘the
In “Hermeneutics o f Suspicion,” Dictionary o f Feminist Theologies, ed. L. Russell and J.S. Clarkson 
(Louisville: Westminster, 1996), 140, Amy-Jill Levine notes that true ideological critique insists on the 
acknowledgement that ‘interpretation is not innocent but interested’; the possibilities o f domination exist 
within any interpretive move. Interestingly, feminist theology seldom acknowledges its own interest as 
‘dominating’, particularly when its rhetoric is shaped by a unique, narrative form o f victimisation. Francis 
Martin, Linda Woodhead and Angela West identify the ‘dominating dualisms’ inherent in the feminist 
worldview and their negative effect. See, respectively, TFQ, chapters 3 and 5; “God, Gender and Identity,” 
http://www.lcm.f2S.com/FemTheo/Readings/gender/htm; and Deadly Innocence: Feminism and the 
Mythology o f Sin (London: Mowbray, 1995).
E.g., the first o f Elizabeth Schiissler Fiorenza’s four principles of biblical hermeneutics is that of 
suspicion. In Pamela Dickey Young’s formative study of women’s feminist experience as theological 
source and norm, she specifically describes this as ‘the experience of questioning all that we have been told 
about being women’. See Feminist Theology/Christian Theology: In Search of Method (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1990), 55. Though a liberation feminist. Young nonetheless challenges the equating o f  
Christian theology with liberating praxis. Says Young; ‘We only know what Christian praxis is by 
reflecting on what Christian witness is’. Unfortunately, Young uses the same method she critiques 
elsewhere.
'*® Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, xi. One assumes that Ruether is referring here to Leon Festinger’s 
psychological theory of ‘cognitive dissonance' -  that we experience psychological conflict or dissonance 
by simultaneously holding mutually exclusive, incongruous beliefs.
Sexism and God-Talk, xi-xii. As we shall see, Barth challenges the assumed neutrality or ‘critical 
distance’ involved in such ‘abstract’ cognitive consideration which pretends that the philosopher or 
theologian is disengaged from practical action and participation.
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judgment that historical subjects “women” are not yet fully produced as creatures of God 
and that such is a wrong to be redressed’.'*^
This discernment is not a given, however. It requires an a priori 
‘conscientization’'*^ or self-awareness whereby women perceive the truth about 
themselves, God and cosmic interrelatedness. Women’s conscientization involves 
accepting a set of universal beliefs about human worth, women and justice as given but 
not yet appropriated.'*'* These beliefs function as ontological principles, methodological 
principles, ‘guiding practices’, ‘quasi-transcendentals’'*® or any combination thereof. This 
means that while the process of discerning whether or not a given text or socio-religious 
system promotes women’s full humanity may require an activating event (i.e., asking the 
‘right’ question or experiencing oppression), the underlying truth content is given to 
women prior to, even independent o f  such an event. In short, women have a kind of 
immanent pre-knowledge about what ‘should be’ that recognises its presence and 
absence.'*®
'*^  Changing the Subject (see n.lO) 358. Johnson follows this line precisely. SWl, 18. To this end Catholic 
reformism specifically functions as a ‘sociocritical hermeneutic’, defined by Anthony Thiselton as ‘an 
approach to texts (or to traditions and institutions) which seeks to penetrate beneath their surface-function 
to expose their role as instruments o f power, domination or social manipulation'. New Horizons in 
Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 379. Original emphasis.
“*^ This term, developed by Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, means learning to name and change the world. 
Only by seeing oneself as subject and therefore as separate from the world, says Freire, can one ‘decode’ 
and then transform it. In TFQ, 158, Martin both challenges whether this process actually modifies the 
consciousness o f the thinking subject and asks just who it is that defines the norms by which one 
consciousness is considered better than another?
'*'* M. Shawn Copeland describes how the ‘religiously, intellectually, and morally differentiated’ feminist 
consciousness can uncover ‘how any symbol, idea, or social system’ may become ideological. “Black, 
Hispanic/Latino, and Native American Theologies,” in The Modern Theologians (see n. 28) 357. See also 
Sandra Schneiders, Beyond Patching (Mahwah, N. J.: Paulist, 1989).
'*® They function, says Rebecca Chopp, both as moral values and as core ideas around which new narratives 
o f God and the world are formed and contested. “Feminist and Womanist Theologies,” 394-95.
'*® Bultmann assumed this kind o f interpretive pre-knowledge and pre-judgment when looking for ‘deeper’ 
meaning in the transcendentally ‘real’ realm of the Self. Bultmann, however, considered the interpreter’s 
pre-understanding not to be a matter o f  prejudice, but a way o f raising the ‘right’ questions based on ‘right 
conceptions’ and ‘adequate presuppositions’. With Bultmann, and influenced by Rahner, Johnson assumes 
Heidegger’s principle o f pre-apprehension/pre-conception {Vorgriff) in her transcendental anthropology
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Johnson describes the ‘conscientization’ process -  women’s self-empowerment in 
rejecting inherited constructions of female identity as they become aware of and actualise 
their self-worth ~ as one of conversions^ Conversion is not merely freedom from 
oppression, discrimination and violence but freedom for  self-definition, self-affirmation, 
and self-determination -  i.e., recognising their full humanity and exercising personal 
freedom in every sphere.'** As active subjects, women ‘tap into the power’ of the self, 
‘name’ themselves as good and equal imago Dei and then actualise this identity in their 
external relations.'*  ^The goal is for women to ‘discover’ or ‘construct’ their own reality 
and identity -  thereby gaining access to their full humanity.®®
and epistemology. See Anthony Thiselton’s discussion of this concept and other liberation Catholic 
approaches thereto in Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description 
(Carlisle: Paternoster, 1980), 107-114.
In Persons in Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1996), 19-22, Alan Torrance refers to the parallels between Kierkegaard and Barth at this point, where each 
argues that the possibility and condition o f recognising something new as an act of knowledge -  
particularly God -  is inseparably given in the event and not brought a priori to the event. Arguing that the 
‘Moment o f Truth’ (where the ‘new’ is apprehended) always gives its own possibility of recognition, 
Kierkegaard’s ‘Climacus’ opposes the Socratic belief that ‘new’ truth can be construed from pre-set forms, 
concepts or ideals immanent in the mind of the ‘pupil’ and subsequently birthed by the ‘teacher’ (i.e., 
through the process o f ‘conscientization’). Thus, there can be no formal predetermination for knowing God 
separate from the material content given in the reality of God’s Self-revelation (the Word o f God).
'*^  This concept of conversion laid down by Ruether in Sexism and God-Talk (159-183) is fundamental to 
feminist liberation theology and reflects the influence o f Valerie Salving’s key article, “The Human 
Situation: A Feminine View,” in Womanspirit Rising, 25-42. Johnson also articulates the conversion 
experience in line with Elizabeth Fox-Genovese as a dialectic o f contrast (sexism v. women’s human 
dignity) and confirmation (of women’s inherent goodness). See Genovese, Within the Plantation 
Household: Black and White Women o f the Old South (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1988). As we shall see in chapter 2, in response to accusations that she simply creates another 
dominating category or ‘universal subject’, Johnson argues that in order to create the possibility for 
meaningful feminist dialogue, she uses ‘conversion’ as an ‘interpreted experience’ common to all women. 
SWL 61-2.
^  Ress, “Conscientization,” 56.
Women become aware that they are not ‘nonpersons or half persons or deficient persons, but genuine 
subjects o f history’. SWI, 63,67. Who they are ‘equal to’, God, men or both, will be raised in chapter three.
Architects and builders start with ideas and build with raw materials. Discovers, however, happen upon 
pre-existing reality. Johnson interchangeably speaks o f women doing both. Alvin Plantinga’s term for the 
former is ‘Enlightenment Humanism’ or ‘Creative anti-Realism’: We human beings ‘are ourselves 
responsible for the structure and nature o f the world; it is we, fundamentally, who are the architects o f the 
universe’. The Twin Pillars o f  Christian Scholarship (Grand Rapids, MI: Calvin College and Seminary 
Press, 1990), 14-16.
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Kant’s methodological influence at this point is straightforward. Knowledge is the 
exclusive product of the free, thinking subject who, in isolation from the object, not only 
determines what something is but judges its truth content.®* Appealing to universal a 
priori categories, the mind imposes ‘form’ on the ‘content’ we sensorially perceive; thus 
we have ‘knowledge’. In other words, proper ‘objects’ don’t reveal themselves to but 
rather are actively created by the mind; hence ‘reality’ is entirely constructed by the 
knower in the thinking, knowing process.®  ^ Certain Neo-Kantians extended this idea 
further and proposed an even more constructivist approach by suggesting that the mind 
creates its own objects ex nihilo, supplying them with both form and content.®®
Equating this creative power over reality with language (‘language not only 
expresses the world but helps to shape and create if),  Johnson believes that women’s 
diminishment has been ‘aided and abetted by male-centered language and symbol 
systems, key reflections of the dominant group’s power to define reality in its own
®* As Louis Dupree expresses it: 'Religion has been allotted to a specific field of consciousness ruled by 
methods o f its own, but the final judgment on truth has been withdrawn from its jurisdiction and removed 
to the general domain o f epistemic criteriology'. Martin, 175, citing Dupre from “Notes on the Idea of  
Religious Truth in the Christian Tradition,” The Thomist 52 (1988): 509.
®^ This includes not only the structures o f the phenomenal world, but those such as space and time, object 
and property, truth and falsehood, possibility and necessity. They are, says Plantinga, ‘contributions from 
our side’, somehow owing their basic structure ‘and perhaps their very existence to the noetic activity of  
our minds’. The Twin Pillars, 14.
®® In extending Kant’s assumptions that the mind actively shapes and conceptualises the phenomena set 
before it such that we can know an object only insofar as it is already an object o f thought, neo-Kantians 
Cohen and Natorp rejected the assumption that it was necessary to postulate the prior ‘givenness’ o f 
sensations to thought (assuming that Kant, and arguably Schleiermacher, confused consciousness in the 
psychological sense with consciousness as the ground o f knowledge in a purely logical sense). ‘Objects’ do 
not appear as the initial referents o f thought but as the stated goal o f thought; hence the object, as the 
product of thought, replaces the Kantian ‘thing” . Objects are not ‘given’ -  consciousness forms them. 
Thinking is thus ‘objectifying’ but not in the merely individualistic, subjective sense. Thinking, Cohen 
believed, apprehends Being. Thought constructs objects on the basis o f universal laws, such that ‘any 
assertion gains its status as true solely by virtue o f its systematic position in a body of universal laws that, 
in turn, require each other on methodological grounds’. Thus, ‘the principle o f law has replaced sensory 
data as evidence for object validity o f any cognitive judgement . . .T o  know is to objectify in accordance 
with the principle of law'. Cohen and R. A. Johnson, cited by Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 209-10. As we 
shall see, Johnson’s ‘thought’ apprehends God such that God is dependent on the thinking subject in order 
to be ‘discovered’ and ‘known’ according to the universal ‘law’ o f ‘being’.
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terms’.®'* Women have been ‘robbed’ of the power of naming themselves, the world and 
God. Having instead ‘to receive the names given by those who rule over them’, women 
live in a world ‘created’ to some degree by their oppressors.®® The feminist quest is to 
create a more ‘just’ and ‘truthful’ world by gaining the power to ‘name’ or ‘recreate’ the 
world based on what it deems to be ‘right’ based on the primary category of gender.®® As 
Rebecca Chopp explains, ‘Women compose their lives. The naming of experience is the 
activity of constructing an agent who is responsible for her reflection, her practice, and 
her spirituality. Women name their experiences and thus narrate the meaning of these 
experiences in new ways’, particularly when integrating the ‘pure idea of God’ with 
feminist values and the stories of the Judeo-Christian tradition.®’
Ideally, states Johnson, the truly human self ‘ is rightly structured not in dualistic 
opposition to the other but in intrinsic relationship with the other’, whether that ‘other’ is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  I
®“* SWI, 27, 26 (emphasis added). See the collection of articles entitled The Power o f Naming, ed. Elizabeth *1
Schiissler Fiorenza (London: SCM Press, 1996), and Plantinga, The Twin Pillars, 14-16.
®® SWI, 26-27. I
®® In the game o f social construction, says Craig Gay, words like ‘true’ and ‘right’ are actually emptied o f |
all but rhetorical force, since behind them is no universal reality or warrant to which they appeal. Here, |
‘[wjhat passes for “reality” in society ... is something that we determine and construct .... Together with |
others we decide, more-or-less deliberately, how our world is to be understood and interpreted, and who we |
are and how we fit into the world, what is important and why, and conversely, what it is safe to ignore and |
neglect. This socially constructed “reality” is held together, furthermore, by way o f a whole host o f |
assumptions that we take largely for granted, assumptions which provide a framework for making sense o f 1
our natural and social environments. Taken together these assumptions form the stock of knowledge that i
enables us to know and to tell each other who we are and what in the world is “real”’ (‘“Gender” and the J
Idea of the Social Construction of Reality’, Ct'ux [March 2000]: 4). Gay refers to the basic premises o f i
Peter L. Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s seminal work. The Social Constmction o f Reality: A Treatise in |
the Sociology o f  Knowledge (New York: Penguin, 1967). In Karl Mannheim’s work regarding the 
sociology o f knowledge, however, he posits that there is no objective reality in the sense that ‘no human 
thought ... is immune to the ideologizing influences o f its social context’. This situation can be mitigated 
by the systemic analysis o f as many as possible o f  the varying socially grounded positions, thus providing 
for an accumulation of perspectives, e.g., the collected wisdom o f a tradition. This accumulated wisdom 
(e.g., the creedal confessions of the Church) is greater than the wisdom of any one individual. The Social 
Construction o f Reality, 9. lam  grateful to my colleague Laura Smit for this discussion.
®’ Chopp comments that Catholic feminist methodology consistently follows some form of narrative of the 
Christian story, noting that differences in approach are mainly distinguished by the degree to which 
tradition is considered normative. “Feminist and Womanist Theologies,” in The Modern Theologians (see 
n. 28) 392-3. Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, xii.
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divine or human.®* In other words, we should not find any oppositional dualism in a 
properly articulated feminist anthropology/theology of mutual interrelation. 
Paradoxically, Johnson describes her gendered theology as eliminating the kind of 
oppositional ‘either-or’ thinking endemic to the androcentric construction of reality.®^  
However, as Linda Woodhead observes, women’s identity is always a matter of self-talk 
and that self-talk is always gendered self-talk.®® Thus, women’s primary identity is 
always a gendered identity. Ironically, as already noted, this means that the dualisms that 
Johnson supposedly abhors and negates are actually essential to her feminist worldview 
and reformist project and will continue to be as long as feminist theology emphasises that 
experience determines knowledge and that gender determines what valid experience is.
The Hermeneutic o f ‘Revelation*: Women’s Experience Over Text and Tradition
Since what has been said to this point seems, at face value, to be wholly 
incompatible with historic Christianity, the logical next question is, 'how does Johnson 
attempt to embrace both her experiential starting point and Christian theology?' The 
answer can be found in the volume Freeing Theology, a prime example of Catholic 
reformism’s effort to correlate themes within biblical and Christian tradition with 
women’s experience.®* In this collection of essays each author presents an aspect of 
Christian doctrine from the standpoint of Catholic tradition and then reinterprets it
®* SWI, 68 (emphasis added).
®® SWI, 69.
®® See Chopp, “Feminist and Womanist Theologies,” in The Modern Theologians (see n. 28) 391; Susan 
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family ((San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1989. Prudence Allen 
historically traces these and other ‘gender’ dualisms in The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution 
750 BC -A D  1250 (Montreal: Eden, 1985). For a full treatment of the question o f ‘gender difference’ in 
terms of gender identity, relations and cultural/theological representations, see Graham, Making the 
Difference: Gender, Personhood and Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996).
®* Seen. 24.
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according to the tenets of feminism.®  ^Given the Catholic reformist conclusion that when 
it comes to ‘God’ and the divine-human relation ‘what is is not what should be’, women 
must give definition to the concept and actuality of God. Hence the attempt is to integrate 
both worldviews, says editor and contributor Catherine Mowry LaCugna. She argues that 
these feminists demonstrate what it means to recover, challenge, and, indeed, ‘create 
tradition through reinterpretation’ based on the foundation of women’s experience.®®
In the ‘creative’ process, however, these two theological worldviews do not hold 
equal weight. The ‘consciously fem inisf theological point of view takes precedence, 
transforming both the treatment and the content of the traditional subject matter. Women 
are in authority over Christian texts and tradition, determining their truth content in 
relation to women’s experience and values, which function as the more foundational 
reality. "^  ^ In other words, there is a mandatory capitulation of text and tradition to the 
externally derived source and set of criteria of feminist experience.^^ For instance, in
®® LaCugna, “Introduction,” in Freeing Theology (see n. 24) 3. ‘Each chapter ... [shows how] the subject 
matter was approached and understood within the Catholic tradition and then ... how feminist principles 
transform the theological treatment of the subject matter, often down to its most basic concepts and 
methods’. Nevertheless, says LaCugna, the essays aim ‘as much as possible’ toward continuity with 
Christian tradition. These women generally incorporate the anthropological theologies of Rahner, 
Pannenberg and Bultmann, the praxis-oriented political and liberation theologies of Schillebeeckx, Metz, 
Sobrino and Gutierrez, and the symbolic theology o f ‘being’ found in Rahner and Tillich. Foundational to 
all is Schleiermacher’s grounding o f  religious knowledge in human experience. For a comparison of this 
approach to other Catholic methods and doctrines, see Francis Schiissler Fiorenza, “Systematic Theology: 
Tasks and Methods,” in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, vol. I, ed. Francis Schüssler 
Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991,1-87.
®® Problematically, Dei Verhum actually never asserts that revelation occurs within human experience, a 
claim, says Hilkert, that has created a tension within Roman Catholicism since the Modernist crisis at the 
beginning o f the twentieth century. Nonetheless, she argues like Johnson (who even defines experience 
similarly to Rahner in SWI, 293, Ch.7n2), that Rahner and many other theologians ‘have pointed out that a 
dialogical and relational understanding o f revelation does implicitly locate the revelatory dynamic of call 
and response in human consciousness’. Hilkert, “Experience and Tradition,” 64-65 (emphasis added). How 
is this ‘call’ differentiated from the ‘voice’ o f our own consciousness? What ‘thematically’ identifies it as 
that o f the Triune God?
®^* Anne Carr, “The New Vision o f Feminist Theology -  Method,” in Freeing Theology (see n. 24) 5-30.
®® According to Fulkerson, the feminist critical principle always has ‘primary weight’ when correlated with 
Christian tradition. Changing the Subject (see h.lO) 36. Linda Woodhead also asserts that for feminists, this 
commitment always serves as ‘a more basic commitment than their commitment to Christianity, even as
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these essays Joann Wolski Conn states that the ‘object’ of spirituality is not a ‘Thou’ but 
the experience of self-transcendence toward ultimate being; we reach out toward others 
from ‘the unrealised dimensions’ of our own capacities within the horizon of whatever 
we imagine or judge to be of ultimate value. Ethicist Lisa Sowle Cahill explains how 
natural theology grounds feminist ethics in experiential morality; God’s will for persons 
is revealed in creation as ‘an ongoing process of discovering God in human life’. Susan 
Ross asserts that feminist sacramentalism also involves rethinking from women’s 
experience; the Catholic ‘sacramental principle’ affirms that ‘all of created reality reveals 
God’. LaCugna argues for an understanding of the immanent Trinity from God’s 
economy in human experience as salvation history. Johnson reconstructs Christology 
from the ‘below’ of women’s shared experience in divine being and ‘the feminist model’ 
of inclusion and reciprocity.®®
As Johnson explains elsewhere. Catholic reformism asserts that traditional views 
of revelation, like Barth’s, falsely propose ‘too radical a distinction between God and 
human experience’.®’ Among the more ‘viable’ models found in contemporary theology 
used by these reformists are revelation as ‘historical event’, ‘inner experience’,
their sole incontestable and un-revisable commitment. When this is the case, the feminist critique of 
Christianity easily ceases to be a creative dialogue between Christianity and feminism and becomes a rather 
formalistic exercise in weighing up Christianity against an externally imposed, externally derived and 
unquestionable standard’. In Martin’s terms, feminist consciousness and spiritual awareness become the 
‘genus’, and Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc. are the ‘species’ whose specificity is governed by a feminist 
worldview. Woodhead, “Spiritualizing the Sacred,” Modern Theology 13 (April 1997), 192; Martin, TFQ, 
163.
®® Schneiders, “The Bible and Feminism -  Biblical Theology,” 31-58; Conn, “Toward Spiritual Maturity -  
Spirituality,” 235-259 (237, 239); Cahill, “Feminism and Christian Ethics -  Ethics,” 211-234 (212, 213); 
Ross, “God’s Embodiment and Women -  Sacraments,” 185-209 (186, 193); LaCugna, “God in 
Communion With Us -  The Trinity,” 83-114; Johnson, “Redeeming the Name of Christ -  Christology,” 
115-138, in Freeing Theology (see n. 24).
®’ Johnson, “The Legitimacy o f the God Question,” 289, endorsing Pannenberg’s critique o f Barth.
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‘dialectical presence’, ‘new awareness’ or as ‘symbolic mediation’,®* Each is basically a 
method of interpretation that assumes that the text, tradition or symbol must be 
interpreted from a particular (‘mediatory’) stance and that the context and keeper of the 
critical controls is the community’s common religious life.®® When the ‘interpreting 
community’ is women and men struggling against sexism, then interpretation is guided 
by ‘a liberating impulse” ® and feminist vision -  i.e., ‘the new community of the reign of 
God, in which women are valued as genuinely human subjects in a community of mutual 
relationship’ This becomes the context and criterion for textual and symbolic 
interpretation, rescuing the Bible (and God) from ‘bondage to patriarchy’ through 
feminist exposure of ‘hidden’ or ‘suppressed’ meaning.’^  If rescue is not possible with a
®* SWI, 77. Johnson refers here to the five options set forth in Avery Dulles’ Models o f Revelation |
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992). i
®® SWI, 77. What we mean by ‘mediatory’ is that tlie theologian somehow stands outside both culture and j
faith and through her own unaided resources, mediates between them. j
’® SWI, 77. In Consider Jesus: Waves o f Renewal in Christology (New York: Crossroads, 1991), 84-87, I
Johnson characterises liberationism as (1) conscious o f the social nature o f human existence, (2) concerned *
with praxis, (3) recognizing the suffering o f an oppressed group, (4) impelled by a realised eschatology, (5) |
using social analysis to (6) change unjust situations. Despite feminist critique against white, academic |
women’s construals of oppression, the methodology o f liberation theology is generally consistent j
regardless o f the oppressed people group. See, e.g., Copeland, “Black, Hispanic/Latino, and Native j
American Theologies,” in The Modern Theologians (see n. 28) 358. I
’* Johnson, “Feminist Hermeneutics,” Chicago Studies 27 (1988): 123-35, 129. This article is an |
endorsement o f the Biblical liberationist hermeneutics o f Ruether, Schüssler Fiorenza and Letty Russell. |
Whereas for Barth, ‘Interpretation means saying the same thing in other words’ (CD. 1.1, 345), for |
Johnson and her reformist colleagues, ‘interpretation’ arguably means saying something different in the I
same words derived from Scripture and tradition. As Ruether explains: ‘Either we must discard the *
authority o f the Bible all together, or else we must claim the right to interpret Biblical ideas in a way that |
appropriates, not only changes in past tradition, but also new insights today as well’. “Imago Dei, Christian 
Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 287. See also Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memoiy o f Her: A 
Feminist Theological Reconstruction o f Christian Origins (New York: Crossroads, 1983).
“Feminist Hermeneutics,” 127, 129, 131-2. This has been the feminist assumption since Joan Arnold 
Romero’s early explication of contemporary theology in contrast to Barth: ‘God needs to be liberated from 
our theology. Theology is not a tabernacle to contain the One who is Ahead, but it is a sign on the way, and 
thus is provisional ... the theological task is less the consolidation o f  the tradition by looking back than the 
building of a new vision’. “The Protestant Principle: A Woman’s-Eye View of Barth and Tillich,” in 
Religion and Sexism: Images o f Women in Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. Rosemary Radford Ruether 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 319-340, 338-9. Though Romero fails to acknowledge it, Barth too 
asserts that theology should follow a ‘path’ like any other critical discipline. The path or ‘way of 
knowledge’, however, should be appropriate to and governed by its Subject matter -  God -  not human 
subjectivity or methodological procedures borrowed from other disciplines. Barth, CD 1.1,3-44.
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particular text, then ‘the judgment simply has to be made that this is not the truth which 
God wished to have written down fo r  our salvation\^^ The same approach applies to 
Christian tradition, i.e., doctrine, creed and magisterial authority. Johnson’s primary 
hermeneutical query reveals the underlying criteria: ‘[I]f something consistently results in 
the denigration of human beings, in what sense can it be religiously true?” '*
Thus, on the one hand, the Biblical text has the quality of a neutral object set 
between competing value systems and moral judgments.’® On the other hand, the text is 
judged to be either intrinsically oppressive or ‘incorrectly’ and oppressively interpreted.
The latter causes feminists to ask how such a text ‘which is not just accidentally but 
intrinsically oppressive’ can function normatively for a faith community.’® Nonetheless, 
affirms Sandra Schneiders, modern feminism has the capacity to analyze, critique, and 
evaluate not only the Christian tradition but also all ‘ideas, social structures, procedures i
and practices, indeed the whole o f experienced reality\^^ Women’s task is to reinterpret
’® Interestingly, this same source provides the liberating narratives essential to feminist interpretation prior 
to the application of a feminist hermeneutic. In other words, this good news has ‘always been there’ 
without being practically applied to women. Johnson herself admits that this liberating news ‘flashes out’ ;!
from the Scriptures in certain instances’, and that ‘egalitarian impulses are discernible’. “Feminist i
Hermeneutics,” 131-2,134 (emphasis added). ^
’'* SWI, 30.
’® Martin cites Meir Stenberg’s assessment of this method (reminiscent o f Feuerbach): ‘the text comes to I
figure as a kind o f glorified Rorschach ink blot on which to project one’s ideology, among other forms o f :
licensed desire.” TFQ, 206-7. Common sense assumes that by putting the text solely in the hands o f the 
interpreter, there would be as many readings as there are contexts within and from which it can be read, 
e.g., feminist, anti-feminist, apartheid or traditional Christian readings! Technically this might be the case, 
but feminist ‘moral aspiration’ and ‘ideological consciousness’ adjudicates all readings according to their 
presuppositional, universals truths.
’® Sandra Schneiders asks these questions in “Feminist Ideology Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics,”
Biblical Theology Bulletin 19 (1989), 3-10. Martin states that this approach is a little like asking, “How can 
Das Kapital be interpreted to serve as the charter for the free enterprise system?” TFQ, 207-8.
”  Beyond Patching, 16 (emphasis added). In Thiselton’s discussion o f understanding and pre­
understanding in Schleiermacher, he describes how the kind o f ‘psychological hermeneutics’ found in 
feminism involves the penetration into the inner consciousness o f the author, moving from the geneml to 
the particular, i.e., that an understanding o f the author’s life and consciousness depends on an 
understanding o f  human life and existence as a whole. Thiselton refers to T. F. Torrance’s article on 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, in which he emphasises that hermeneutical success depends on the ‘art’ o f  
the interpreter to ‘recreate’ in herself ‘“the basic determination o f consciousness [she] finds in the author...
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the texts so that the texts reflect the ‘right’ experiences in the ‘right’ way. Thus, asserts 
Johnson,
[R]eligions die when their light fails, that is, when they lose the power to interpret convincingly 
the full range o f present experience in the light of their idea of God. If God is worshiped as the 
guiding reality, the source and goal o f all, then truth is tested by the extent to which the idea of 
God currently available takes account o f accessible reality and integrates the complexity o f present 
experience into itself. If the idea o f God does not keep pace with developing reality, the power o f  
experience pulls people on and the god dies, fading from memory.’*
Catholic feminism’s three-fold methodological pattern of deconstruction, critical 
assessment and reconstruction helps to determine whether the tradition is ‘keeping 
pace’.’® First is deconstruction guided by the hermeneutical question "cui bono?^ i.e., who 
benefits from this articulation or arrangement of reality and its symbolic representations 
when the hidden dynamic of domination is exposed? This assumes that symbols are never 
ideologically neutral but function as agents of personal and communal transformation.*® 
Hence the criterion by which theological statements and ecclesial structures are judged 
for ‘truth or falsity’, ‘adequacy and inadequacy’ and ‘coherence and incoherence’ is their 
alignment with the feminist critical principle of women’s full humanity.** Next is the 
search and retrieval of ‘dormant theological themes’, ‘neglected history’ and ‘lost 
wisdom’ from Christian symbols. Biblical texts or dogma filtered through the ‘lens of 
women’s flourishing’. If the first question is 'who currently benefits by tradition?’ the 
second question is ‘can tradition be altered both in form and content specifically to
the key to the interpretation of a text, whether o f Plato or St. Paul, is self-understanding.’” The Two 
Horizons, 103-107, citing Torrance, “Hermeneutics according to F. D. E. Schleiermacher,” SJT 21 (1968): 
257-67,261.
’* Johnson, SWI, 15, restating Pannenberg.
’® SWI, 11, 28-33. See also Carr, “The New Vision o f Feminist Theology.” 5-29. For feminist assessments 
of this method, see Pamela Dickey Young, Feminist Theology/Christian Theology.
*® SWI, 4-6, 36-38.
** SWI, 30. What if two differing cultures (say, a white female academic and a twelve-year-old Thai girl 
sold into prostitution by her mother) held two logically incompatible claims about God to endorse the full 
humanity o f women. Would they both be true? What are the criteria for ‘full humanity’ in the feminist 
principle? Ruether espouses an egalitarian ideal, but is that the same as Johnson’s universal, transcendental 
ontology/anthropology? What if  other feminists do not agree with her?
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benefit those who have been marginalised?’ If the answer is positive, then the final step 
of reconstruction begins by revising traditional doctrines, symbols and practice and/or 
introducing new ones.*’
Johnson acknowledges the difficulty of critiquing the tradition while correlating 
women’s experience with it: ‘The feminist perspective, which honors women’s humanity, 
women as imago dei, finds this classical tradition profoundly ambiguous in what it has 
meant for female well-being. It has aided and abetted the exclusion and subordination of 
women, but also sustained generations of foremothers and foresisters in the faith’.*® 
Though ‘ambiguous’, she still contends that Christian doctrine contains the fullness of the 
religious heritage for women precisely as human.
In sum, Johnson’s understanding of women’s true value is derived from the 
sources she deems patriarchal and in need of reform. In other words, though Scripture 
and tradition supposedly only become ‘authoritative’ when approved by feminist criteria, 
they are also the a priori sources from which the Western feminist ideal originates.*'* She 
also attempts to integrate two different critical approaches in feminist hermeneutics to the 
Biblical text. One critique is aimed mainly at the interpretation o f the text by appealing to
*’ SWI, 29-30. States Bultmann: ‘It will be clear that evety interpreter brings with him certain conceptions, |
perhaps idealist or psychological, as presuppositions o f  his exegesis ... But then the question arises, which |
conceptions ... which presuppositions are right and adequate? ...Your own relation to the subject-matter j
prompts the questions you bring to the text and elicits the answers you obtain from [it]’. Jesus Christ and j
Mythology (London: SCM, 1960), 48, 51. Original emphasis. In the end, says Kant, ‘The final purpose even J
of reading the holy scriptures, or o f investigating their content is to make [human beings] better,”’ which |
essentially gives license to the knower to “do with [the text] what we like’. Kant, Religion, 102, cited by R. |
R. Reno, “Feminist Theology as Modern Project,” in This is My Name Forever: The Trinity & Gender |
Language fo r  God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2001), 161-189, 172.
*®g'IPY,9. j
*'* Ruether admits to this circularity when, after judging all categories o f classical theology ‘distorted’ by j
androcentrism, she nonetheless considers some categories ‘usable’ when ‘corrected’ by feminist |
interpretation and notes that this occurs unconsciously among post-Christian feminist thinkers like Mary |
Daly. Ruether, Sexism, 38. As Colin Gunton aptly points out, however, a starting point that emphasizes the |
difference between contemporary and traditional understanding tends to saw off the branch on which it is j
seated. Yesterday and Today, 5. *
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all or part of it as a transcendent source of judgment (an authoritative canon within the 
canon). The other critique views the text itself as patriarchal and thus in need of 
correction based on the criterion of praxis or a prior ruling principle (a normative canon 
outside the canon).*®
Finally, while ‘developing reality’ is supposedly aware of its socio-historical 
location and ideological influence, the ‘idea of God’ determined from within this context 
is one that Johnson considers universally binding. Though she acknowledges the need (be 
it agnostic, pluralistic and postmodern) for a plurality of divine names, all are judged for 
their truthfulness based on how they reflect this binding concept.
IL Catholic Reformism’s Quest for Propriety in God-Taik
A. The P riority  o f  Ethics O ver D ogm a
Since Johnson is intent on maintaining God-talk as a value, then at issue is where 
priority for such talk is to be found. She sums up the Catholic reformist question in this 
way: ‘Is the God of the Jewish and Christian tradition so true as to be able to take account 
of, illumine, and integrate the currently accessible experience of women?’*® This is a 
thoroughly modern, Kantian question as well as the fundamental reformist one. Kant 
properly surmised that God could not be known like other ‘things’ as a legitimate ‘object’ 
of human knowledge and that awareness of God was a matter of ‘faith’. Kant further 
claimed that faith belonged to the sphere of moral sensibility or conscience. 
Schleiermacher followed Kant’s lead but in turn located that awareness in the experiential
*® For a full treatment of these approaches as modem and feminist, see Thiselton, New Horizons, especially 
chaps. 11 and 12, and Francis Martin, TFQ, chap. 7, and Martin, “Feminist Hermeneutics,” in This is My 
Name Forever (see n. 83) 108-135.
*® SWI, 15-16. So says Ruether: ‘Religious traditions fall into crisis when the received interpretations o f the 
redemptive paradigms contradict experience in significant ways.’ Sexism, 15-16.
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sense of ‘God-consciousness’ as a dimension of human existence. In (adapted) 
Schleiermacherian terms, humans have the natural capacity for awareness and 
recognition of ‘the divine’ or ‘the Infinite’ through the fundamental feeling of ‘absolute 
dependence’.*’ Non-objective and indeterminate, this feeling is ‘named’ by the human 
subject according to available predispositions and cultural norms.** This led 
Schleiermacher to conclude that every event and object is potentially a locus of ‘natural 
revelation’ as a ‘sign’ or symbolic form of the Infinite.*® Thus theology becomes a matter 
of critical reflection on the symbolic forms in which the intuited sense of God comes to 
expression in a particular community. Rather than speech about God referring to a divine 
‘personal other’ or an object of knowledge, speech represents the subjective experience 
and values o f the knower or the knowing community.®®
*’ Schleiermacher’s influence here is foundational, though perhaps it reflects less of his original thought 
than its historical reconfigurations. Nevertheless, along this trajectory, knowledge -  particularly one’s 
knowledge of ‘God’ -  is grounded in and through human experience. In Schleiermacher’s original 
epistemology, immediate self-consciousness is to be conscious of being in relation to God: ‘[Tjo feel 
oneself absolutely dependent and to be conscious o f being in relation to God are one and the same thing; 
and the reason is that absolute dependence is the fundamental relation which must include all others in 
itself. This last expression includes the God-consciousness in the self-consciousness in such a way that ... 
the two cannot be separated from each other ... and if  we speak o f an original revelation o f God to man or 
in man, the meaning will always be just this . . . ’. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 4.4, ed. H. R. 
Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960), 17-18.
** ‘[Ajny possibility o f God being in any way given is entirely excluded, because anything that is outwardly 
given must be given as an object exposed to our counter-influence, however slight this may be. The 
transference o f the idea o f God to any perceptible object, unless one is all the time conscious that it is a 
piece o f purely arbitrary symbolism, is always a corruption, whether it be a temporary transference, i.e. a 
theophany, or a constitutive transference, in which God is represented as permanently a particular 
perceptible existence’. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 4.4, 18. Martin quotes Ingolf Dalferth: ‘The 
problem with [Schleiermacher’s] approach is the identity o f the Whence o f our existence in different 
cases.... That we could not exist without god does not imply that the god without whom we could not exist 
is God or that it is the same god for all o f us’. TFQ, 171.
*® ‘Every finite thing ... is a sign o f the Infinite’. Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 88, cited by Hart in “Revelation,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Karl Barth (see n. 11) 40.
®® In Johnson’s words, the symbol of ‘God’ derived fi"om the ‘faith community’ is its ‘ultimate reference 
point’ implicitly representing what it takes to be the highest good and profoundest truth. SWI, 4. This is 
precisely what led Feuerbach to conclude that God-talk is finally talk only about humanity, which Barth 
identified as the ultimate judgment on modem, natural theology.
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If what is known of God cannot be described with any objective accuracy or 
adequacy, its form and content must be shaped by the epistemic subject, both 
cognitively/noetically and linguistically. Thus ‘God’ is ‘known’ and spoken of 
symbolically, metaphorically and non-authoritatively. Kant considered Christian symbols 
to fail at precisely this point in that they had become authoritative ‘modes of 
representation’ rather than symbolic expressions of moral truth as an element of human 
reason. Like Catholic reformists, Kant considered ‘faith’, or ‘that constellation of 
historically particular and culturally specific words and practices that make up the 
Christian form of life’, to be in error by making these words and practices authoritative.®' 
When they are absolutised and given a noetic actualization, they are falsely assumed to 
be saying something about what cannot be known. In contrast, ‘religion’ belongs to the 
domain of the subject as ‘the disposition of moral rectitude’ that gives final authority to 
our moral sensibility. Faith’s content may aid to enliven our moral sense, but it can never 
be the inner meaning or destiny of the human condition nor can it be intrinsic to our 
relation to God. This is to confuse the means with the end.®’ Tradition must be freed from 
the constraints of what it ‘actually says’ by applying the ‘inner light of truth’ inherent in 
the subject.®®
®' Gunton notes that Christian ‘traditionalists’ (like Barth) are often accused by proponents o f natural 
theology o f accepting the ‘authority’ o f creed and Scripture and then theologising as if  there were no 
problems with this authority, while those who make this accusation falsely consider themselves ‘free’ o f  
any kind o f  similar ‘authority’. Becoming and Being: The Doctrine o f God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 118.
®’ Kant, Religion, 153, cited by Reno, “Feminist Theology,” 174.
®® As such, the question driving feminist theology is not the postmodern one -  ‘whether or not authority?’ -  
but rather the modern one -  *whose authority?’ Woodhead draws here with Kant’s thought: ‘[OJne can find 
in Kant’s work the same understanding o f Christianity as a set o f beliefs standing over against the 
individual, and the same criticism o f the illicit authority conferred on these beliefs by scheming and self- 
serving priests’. Picking up Romantic and then feminist overtones through the next two centuries, 
Christianity is further criticised for suppressing imagination and individual creativity, discouraging 
embodiment and claiming absolute truth through law and dogma. The main contribution o f feminist
35
This religious worldview grounds three related assumptions for Johnson and her 
approach to theology as symbolic God-talk: First, Christianity is a religious symbol 
system; second, ‘no human concept, word, or image, all of which originate in experience 
of created reality, can circumscribe the divine reality, nor can any human construct 
express with any measure of adequacy the mystery of God’; and finally, that language for 
God must rely on ever-changing symbols, metaphors and/or analogies in order to be free 
from rigidness and idolatry.®'* Hence women look for internal clues for how they 
experience and interpret reality and then use them to construct a vision of a moral 
universe that promotes women’s well-being and values choosing corresponding religious 
symbols.®®
R.R. Reno describes the basic modern syllogistic structure of modern theology as 
follows: ‘Moral aspiration X is the unquestionable good of human life. God is good and 
surely seeks to promote the unquestionable good of human life. Therefore, whatever 
promotes the unquestionable good of human life is of God, and what does not is not of 
God’.®® This derives directly from Kant’s Religion Within the Limits o f Reason Alone and 
reflects his critical principle of morality -  the full humanity of persons. What is ‘of God’
thought, says Woodhead, is its emphasis on ‘patriarchy as ‘the villain o f the piece’. “Spiritualizing the 
Sacred,” 194.
®'* Johnson, “The Incomprehensibility o f God,” 441; SWI, 7, 10, 192, Despite the fact that the terms 
‘analogy’, ‘metaphor’, ‘symbol’ and ‘image’ hold specific meanings for certain o f the theologians with 
whom Johnson aligns herself, she uses them synonymously, a practice Janet Soskice considers a key 
‘defect’ in current religious language. E.g., Johnson states, ‘I hold vigorously to the idea that theological 
language always and everywhere proceeds by way o f analogy -  or symbol or metaphor ~  and this 
undergirds my use of Sophia’. “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 110. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious 
Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), x.
®® Like Barth, Woodhead contends that by reducing Christianity to a set o f dogmas over against the 
individual, feminist theology ignores the discourses of Christianity itself and the language of the Church 
which show the inseparability o f God, the believer, the Church and its teachings (“Spiritualizing the 
Sacred,” 194). Barth’s deliberate movement away from this kind o f subject-centred idealism, says John 
Webster, is what makes his theology difficult for liberal Protestantism and Catholic revisionism/reformism 
to assimilate. See John Webster “Introducing Barth,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (see n. 
11) 11.
®® “Feminist Theology as Modern Project,” in This is My Name Forever, 162,165.
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is measured against the bar of the ‘unquestionably good’. But what constitutes the 
‘unquestionably good’ and what establishes the criterion? Though Kant’s moral interests 
differ from those of Johnson and Ruether, the logic remains the same. Inherited speech 
about God is subjected to moral critique; What is consistent with one’s ethical vision is 
what reflects the heart of true ‘religion’, or the inner kernel of universal truth in the text. 
Johnson states this clearly in terms of epistemic access, ethical vision and the 
corresponding reformation of language as epistemic discourse:
When the liberating vision of a community o f equal and mutual disciples is endorsed and practiced 
... language generated by women’s experience can interweave with ancient [Biblical] symbols and 
their hidden recognition o f women’s creative power and goodness to shape new building blocks 
for emancipatory discourse about the mystery o f God.®’
Ironically, the only normative limit Kant placed on his critical principle of ‘full 
humanity’ was that one’s moral action must be ‘only according to that maxim by which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ .®* Modern liberals 
did just that, adhering to the principle with full integrity. However, by using men’s 
experience as foundational, the universal law became oppressive and dominating rather 
than good for all according to feminist critique. Why? Precisely because it functioned as 
a universal without taking women’s experience into account. Hence women have been 
controlled by someone else’s view of what is good and what serves as source and norm 
for understanding and defining human reality.®® This brings to the fore the powerful and 
pervasive Kantian conviction that any act of knowledge in which the subject is 
‘receptive’ is a diminishment of the subject; hence modernity’s tendency to equate
SWI, 103.
®* Martin, TFQ, 294.
®® In “What is Enlightenment,” Kant’s classic defence o f intellectual freedom, he states, ‘Enlightemnent is 
man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use o f his understanding 
without direction from another’. See Kant’s Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals and What is 
Enlightenment?, 2nd ed., revised, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1990), 83.
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100authority with domination and thus to give priority to the hermeneutic of suspicion. 
This conviction seems to underlie feminist theological interpretation and reconstruction 
in general.
The only recourse Catholic reformism has as a modern theology is to exercise the 
same privilege -  i.e., to establish a new universal for the good of women, men and 
creation -  only after replacing the pre-existing (male) subject and the norm of experience 
with their own universals of ‘women’ and ‘experience’.'®' While acknowledging that any 
absolute or universal claims are forbidden according to the tenets of pluralism and 
postmodernism, reformists also claim that their way of knowing and being leads to a 
deeper, universal truth regarding the relationality of all being previously hidden or 
suppressed.'®’ In Johnson’s postmodern battle against universals (to counter imperialist 
anthropologies) she ultimately uses universalising categories motivated by a ‘pragmatic, 
common sense concern’ for women’s justice. In short, she necessarily ends up using an 
oppressive methodology to fight oppression.
As Francis Martin suggests, the reformist conviction of ‘suppressed truth’ 
deriving from the Enlightenment identification of causality with domination results in
‘®° This seems remarkably similar to the traditional interpretation o f the defining problem in Genesis 3.
'®' Despite the appeal to ‘women’s’ experience, it is actually the experience o f the autonomous relational 
self -  i.e., the individual in relation. Whereas feminism attempts to reconstruct the basis for one’s ‘right’ to 
full co-equal humanity within the larger context o f relationality, it still starts with the individual, i.e. human 
beings are constituted and endowed with rights prior to any relationship. Traces o f Kant’s self- 
determination and moral autonomy, Hobbes’s notion of autonomous freedom as a ‘state o f nature’ and 
Locke’s emphasis on natural freedom as ‘self-evident’ are common in feminist ‘relational’ rhetoric. 
Making an interesting case for social but rtot interpersonal ‘rights’ is John Hardwig’s “Should Women 
Think in Terms o f Rights?” in Feminism and Political Theory, ed. C.R. Sunstein (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1990), 53-67,
i®2 3 i_3 3 . “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 95-96. As Colin Gunton notes, ‘The contradiction at the
heart o f postmodernism, that it seeks to free modern culture from the repressive and ‘totalizing’ discourse 
o f  modernism by means o f  a totalizing discourse -  for it claims to account for everything -  is even more 
repressive, however, because it is insidious. That is to say, it is a claim which pretends not to be one, and 
because it cannot be disputed within the terms o f the assumptions it makes, it is either self-defeating or self­
validating.’ Yesterday and Today, 217.
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what he considers not only the most pervasive and destructive of feminism’s 
presuppositions but, sadly, exactly that which feminism tries to combat as a political, 
social and religious ideal.'®® This prioritising of the ‘interested ethic’ over any other 
criterion for theological ‘truth’ highlights Catholic reformism’s primary commitments to 
a political or sociological ideal over theological authority. As Johnson passionately 
argues, right speech for God is profoundly substantive, reflecting both Uhe truth of divine 
mystery’ and 'the quest for a more just and peaceful order among human beings’.'®'*
B. The M odern Inversion o f  H istorical ‘R ela tion s’
At the beginning of this chapter we identified two primary characteristics of the 
modern methodology of Johnson and her Catholic reformist colleagues. First, they start 
anthropologically ‘from below’ to ‘discover’ theological truth by making the female 
subject the source and norm for what is true and ‘right’. Second, the limits of knowledge 
of the Transcendent are determined by the human capacity for knowledge of the divine.'®® 
Both characteristics, as we shall see, are shaped by the over-arching principle of 
relational being derived from a contemporary understanding of the analogia entis as 
human participation in divine being. These foundations set the methodological pattern 
and epistemological parameters for human knowledge of and relation to God.
This pattern is governed by two sets of relations. The first set deals with the 
relations between knowing and being and between possibility and actuality, where in
TFQ, 184-185.103
'®'*5'1F7, 18-19.
'®® For a concise summary of how and why contemporary Catholicism employs modern liberal Protestant 
strategies, see Neil Ormerod, Introducing Contemporary Theologies; The What and the Who o f Theology 
Today (Australia: E.G. Dwyer, 1997), 27-41, and David Tracy, “The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: 
Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Postmodernity,” Theological Studies 50 (1989): 548-570.
39
each case, the former precedes the latter, thus inverting the traditional order.'®® The 
second set concerns the relations between the knower and what is known and between 
what the knower knows and how language communicates that knowledgeF"^ Modernism 
inverts the order of knowing and being so that questions of epistemology precede 
ontology, i.e., epistemology becomes the ‘gateway to the real’.'®* ‘Things’ are constituted 
by our mental or conceptual activity that we impose on the world by way of our linguistic 
or symbolic activity, our decisions, etc. Hence, ‘possibility’ becomes the leading category 
for interpreting the world, which inverts the pre-modern understanding that actuality 
precedes possibility (i.e., where, and who, we come from determines who we are).
This ‘self-liberation’ from the tradition and turn toward the open future as a realm 
of endless possibilities dislodges Catholic reformist methodology from any historical 
continuity with the Christian tradition. From this ‘liberated’ position, Johnson advocates 
the agnostic dualism between the phenomenal world versus the ‘unknowable’ noumenal 
realm -  which places the knowing subject squarely in the centre of what is known and 
how it is articulated. God is essentially ‘unknowable’ and thus limited to our symbolic 
expressions. Simultaneously, God cannot be limited by or to any of them.'®® Thus, 
Johnson clears the slate of traditional God-talk in favour of newer ‘symbols’.
'®® I am using Christoph Schwôbefs description of these inversions found in “Theology,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (see n. 11) 17-36.
'®’ I am indebted to Francis Martin for this description. His study of Catholic feminist method set forth in 
TFQ, particularly chapters 5-8, and “Feminist Hermeneutics,” in This is My Name Forever, 108-135 has 
helped to shape my own thought in this section.
'®* Schwôbel, “Theology,” 29.
'°® There is no understanding of God as a supra-cognitive personal reality distinct from and impinging upon 
human existence. Revelation o f God is conditioned by the self-knowledge and self-description o f an 
‘other’. This implies that God either has no active agency as a personal ‘other’ or ‘se lf  who can create and 
determine his own relational reality or that it is justifiable for women to determine the reality of this ‘other’ 
despite feminism’s universal claim to the contrary. What ultimately defined Cohen and Natorp’s 
constructivist position, says Hart, is their conclusion that while God was a necessary or valuable human 
idea, there was no suggestion o f God being a personal reality or ‘other’ in relation. “Revelation,” 39.
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In the inversions of knowing over being and possibility over actuality, says 
Christoph Schwôbel, the human subject becomes the ‘place’ where the possibility of 
knowledge is found and where its actuality of being is determined; even the subject’s 
own being is determined by its possibility of k n o w i n g . I n  other words, the ‘privileged 
subject-matter of knowledge’ is not the external world but the subject itself who must in 
turn possess the conditions for the possibility of knowing the external world. Starting 
‘from below’ (methodologically) with the human subject (anthropology), knowledge of 
God depends on the possibility inherent in the human being (the epistemological 
‘gateway’). Schwôbel describes this as a necessary correspondence between modem 
presupposition and method:
[T]he epistemological question is radicalized to become the question of the constitution o f  
subjectivity ... This also explains the modern preoccupation with matters of method: one must 
have clear and distinct foundations of knowledge in order to proceed on the way to knowledge. 
The possibility o f proceeding on this path determines the reality o f the world.'”
As a result priority is necessarily given to epistemic over noetic discourse. What
do we mean by this? Noetic (first level) discourse, as described by Kenneth Schmitz, is
an original, spontaneous, yet receptive discourse under the influence of the concrete
situation that ‘has its own integrity and can find expression in various ways’.”’ Language
pre-exists both the communicator and the recipient as non-private, existing in the public
domain and held in common by them.”® There is a ‘communication event’; in its
Schwôbel, “Theology,” 29-30.
'” Schwôbel, “Theology,” 30.
' '’ “Neither With Nor Without Foundations,” Review o f Metaphysics 42 (1988): 15.
” ® Wittgenstein and Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka argue that the idea of ‘private language’ with ‘private 
meaning’ is incoherent. Wittgenstein asserts that for terms to be meaningful they must adhere to public 
rules o f meaning. Meanings cannot change privately but must necessarily be grounded and perceived 
within a public process. Thus the meaning of terms is their use in the public domain. The Hintikkas believe 
that language can be argued to be the universal medium o f reality (thought processes and interpretative 
possibilities being linguistically constituted). If our cognition is language-bound, however, it logically 
cannot be private. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (New 
York: Harper, 1969); Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). I
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actualisation language ‘says something about something’.”" Epistemic (second level) 
discourse, on the other hand, is concerned with the manner in which truth is mediated. At 
this level, certain cognitive values are selected as foundational presuppositions; these in 
turn provide the hermeneutical framework for discourse, establishing a selective ‘canon’ 
or over-arching principle by which to measure all truth claims.”® Again, this assumes 
there to be a ‘prior knowledge’ inherent in the subject that gives precedence to his/her 
way of knowing what is ‘true’ or ‘real’ over what is known and how it is 
communicated.”® Thus feminist theology asserts that language represents the process 
whereby concepts are imposed upon private, pre-linguistic experience in an attempt to 
understand and communicate it.”’
When revelation is disconnected from God as the Subject of his own Being-Act, it 
becomes the cognitive, moral and linguistic domain of (in this case) the female subject. 
The relation between God (what is ‘known’) and God-talk (how it is communicated) is 
experientially derived and symbolically articulated. At issue is whether God is not 
ultimately dependent upon and/or indistinguishable from creaturely existence and noetic
am indebted to Alan Torrance for this discussion in Persons in Communion, 96-98, and his article, “The 
Self-Relation, Narcissism and the Gospel o f Grace,” Scottish Journal o f Theology 40 (1987): 481-510,493- 
4.
” " Schmitz, “Neither With Nor Without Foundations,” 19.
” ® Rather than noetic discourse being the basis for epistemic discourse, says Schmitz, the foundations are 
rather ‘the implicit preferences or explicit epistemological decisions taken in favor o f a project ordered 
toward methodologically justified truth -  a truth justified insofar as the method, horizon, canons and 
relevant evidence permit’. “Neither With Nor Without Foundations,” 23. Alasdair MacIntyre challenges 
this premise in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).
” ® Here again once sees the influence o f Heidegger and Bultmann. For Heidegger in particular, the hidden 
meaning behind language or the text was ‘Being’. Martin, “Feminist Hermeneutics,” 119.
” ’ Woodhead strongly criticises this view for ignoring the complex ways in which knowledge is acquired 
and the ‘textualised’ nature of the process which takes place in being members o f communities shaped by 
texts and traditions: ‘contrary to the belief o f much feminist theology, we do not have pre-social, pre- 
linguistic and pre-cultural ‘experiences’ and then shape tradition, texts and community out o f them. I do not 
spin God out o f my own private experience o f the divine; I know God because he was manifest in Jesus 
Christ, and because the scripture, tradition and community which formed me bear witness to Him’. 
“Spiritualizing the Sacred,” 198.
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thought in this feminist system. Certainly the Christian texts cease to be an instance of 
intersubjective discourse as the language of the Church.”* The ‘interested’ 
reader/interpreter is ultimately in control of the text and its meaning and so controls the 
‘possibility’ and the determination of what constitutes accurate knowledge of God.
III. Feminist Theoiogy’s ’Yes’ and ’No’
The final question that needs to be examined in this chapter is the relationship of 
Elizabeth Johnson to the larger spectrum of feminist theology. What is it that Catholic 
reformists and certain other feminist theologians have in common by way of affirmation: 
their “yes”? At the same time we must note their common “no” -  their rejection of the 
distant, indifferent, father-god from ‘above’ (the god, says Janet Soskice, feminists 
equate with Christianity and love to hate).”® A convenient way to do the latter is to see 
how several prominent feminist theologians stand in relation to a common theological 
opponent, Karl Barth. Barth is viewed as representative of this concept of God. He also is 
accused of devaluing women in his view of the divine-human and human-human relation. 
Finally, he rejects the natural theology that shapes most feminist approaches, giving 
epistemological and methodological primacy to women’s (or any human) experience. To 
a very limited degree, this thesis will engage in aspects of Barth’s theology. In the 
process, we will show whether this as a valid feminist interpretation and criticism of 
Barth. At issue, however, is where Johnson generally fits within the feminist spectrum 
given her stated theological commitment to the Christian tradition. The remainder of the
” * Martin’s critique in chapters 6 and 7 of TFQ is extremely helpful in this discussion, and draws from a 
wide range o f linguistic theories and debates. See also Torrance, Persons in Communion, 28-36, who 
discusses this in relation to Barth’s approach to language and ‘commandeered’ theological speech.
119 “Xrinity and Feminism,” 139.
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thesis will examine what precisely she affirms and denies in her panentheistic, 
‘Trinitarian’ doctrine of the God-world relation.
A. Affirming Women in the R elational Imago Dei
The interpretive concept or paradigm used by Catholic reformists like Johnson to 
define human identity and experience (in its fullest sense) is nothing less than the concept 
of woman as imago Del This is a familiar strategy in feminist theology when using 
Christian categories to talk about humanity. It aligns the feminist critical principle -  the 
promotion of the full humanity of women -  with the imago Deif°  Whereas historically 
the term imago Dei implies that God is the antecedent to which the human image 
corresponds, an experiential starting point ‘from below’ requires looking first at the 
human image and then deducing (or projecting) the character of ‘God’. Hence Catholic 
reformists look first at the female image and ask about God as a corresponding concept. 
In this way women discover their ‘full measure of human equality and their Christian 
identity as imago Dei, imago Christi, temple of the Spirit’.” ' In sum, their particular way 
of being in the world gives them epistemological access, as well as concrete content, to 
what constitutes humanity as imago Dei.
Women as imago Dei is the ‘centre o f gravity’ for feminist theological reform and discourse. SfVI, 62. 
Carr states that Ruether aligns the feminist critical principle with ‘the ancient principle o f  the imago dei or 
Christ as the goal of humanity’, “The New Vision o f Feminist Theology,” 14. This ‘ancient principle’, 
however, is not grounded in the Genesis creation account (Gen 1-2) or the particular life of Jesus Christ 
who bears the imago Dei in his humanity and divinity (Rom 5:15; 1 Cor 15:44b-49; Col 1:15).
Johnson, Friends o f  God and Prophets: A Feminist Theological Reading o f  the Communion o f  Saints 
(London: SCM, 1998), 34-5, 27; SWI, 17-18, This hermeneutical ‘lens’ focuses Church’s sin of sexism and 
its collusion in the ‘sinful distortion of existence’. Thus Johnson defines Christian reformism as the a priori 
‘reflection on God and all things in the light o f God that stands consciously in the company of all the 
world’s women, explicitly prizing their genuine humanity while uncovering and criticising its persistent 
violation in sexism, itself an omnipresent paradigm o f unjust relationships’. SIT/, 8.
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Johnson’s primary feminist presupposition is that the female imago is inherently 
r e la t io n a lFeminist theological reflection assumes that the cosmos and the divine exist 
in interdependent relationship grounded in being. It further assumes that the human 
image precedes and ‘names’ the divine image - e-ven i f  divine being precedes and enables 
human being. In short, to understand women as the image of God, Johnson and her 
feminist colleagues begin with the female subject when drawing the theological- 
hermeneutical circle of inquiry. Assuming that God is -  and, in a reversal of the imago 
DeU looks and acts like women in their relationality -  the question of God is nevertheless 4
raised farther along the circle: t
What kinds o f beings are we who have shaped this dissident world and imposed it on one another, j
often lying to and deluding others and ourselves in the process? This reflection on what kind of ]
beings we are ... can then shape our reflection about our relation to the community o f beings i
around u s ... Finally we ask about deity as the underlying source of life and renewal of life o f this 
whole process.
‘The genius of feminist theology has been to see that for the traditional eschatological dream to become 
historical reality at all, the liberation of women as genuine human persons in communities o f mutuality is 
essential’. SWI, 32. Anne Hunt believes the ‘extraordinary novelty’ and the ‘fundamental raison-d’être^ of 
Johnson’s ‘relational’ approach to trinitarian doctrine ‘paves the way to recognizing women as imago DeV. 
What Are They Saying About the Trinity? (New York: Paulist, 1998), 29, For a recent discussion of the 
historical concepts o f the self in terms o f trinitarian theology and the image o f God, see Stanley J. Grenz, 
The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology o f the Imago Dei (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2001), particularly chapters two and three.
Ruether, Sexism, xi. Does this mean that in Ruether’s initial assessment all human beings -  including 
women -  are (self-) deceptive, delusional and imposing (as well as the ‘underlying deity’)? If so, it is ironic 
to say the least that she believes these human beings to have the capacity to develop a positive 
constructivist approach toward ‘shaping reality’. This points to another internal inconsistency within 
Catholic reformism. There is a constant denial o f the Fall as a theological and ontological reality, especially 
as it concerns women. However, there is also a constant recognition of sexism as ‘sin’ — even ‘falling short 
o f the glory o f God’ -  in terms o f functioning as less than one’s  ^imago DeT or ‘full humanity’. E.g., 
Johnson interprets Irenaeus’ axiom ’'"Gloria Dei vivens homo'"' to mean that the glory o f God is every human 
being, fully alive. Negatively, ‘[w]herever women are violated, diminished ... God’s glory is dimmed and 
put at historical risk; hence sexim is religiously unconscionable’ {SWI, 14-15). And yet, she also states that 
‘feminist theology repudiates an interpretation o f the death o f Jesus as required by God in repayment for 
sin. Such a view today is virtually inseparable from an underlying image o f God as an angry, bloodthirsty, 
violent and sadistic father, reflecting the very worst o f male behavior. Rather, Jesus’ death was an act of  
violence brought about by threatened human men, as sin, and therefore against the will o f a gracious God’. 
(158; emphasis added). In political and liberation theologies, including feminist versions thereof, Johnson 
argues that ‘salvation’ has nothing to do with atonement for sin. Here the Christian understanding of the 
person and work of Jesus Christ as redeemer and reconciler are completely separated and redefined. This 
will be discussed further in the next two chapters.
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In response, Johnson, Ruether and their colleagues answer the question regarding 
women’s ‘kind’ of being in two primary ways; first, they are inherently relational, and 
second they are divine image-bearers. These ontological and epistemological assumptions 
set the terms for both transcendent and created reality. Specifically, women ‘name’ 
themselves and then God from the overarching principle of mutual interrelation, which 
Johnson claims, is ‘inscribed at the heart of all reality
Johnson also argues that the imago Dei is an essential definition befitting all 
humankind based on her thoroughly essentialist position,'^^ The Scriptural interpretation 
of the Genesis creation narrative and its centrality to Christian anthropology underscores 
an ‘intrinsic relation’ between all human beings, so that the portrayal of male and female 
as created in the divine image and likeness, each as themselves and both together,
Johnson, Women, Earth, and Creator Spirit, 32. Generically, ‘mutuality’ and ‘connectedness’ are among 
what Rebecca Chopp calls feminism’s ‘leading principles’. ‘Connectedness’ signifies the interconnected 
matrix o f reality in which we always exist, and is used to speak about structural and relational ‘sins’ of 
injustice and inequality that manifest systemically. ‘Mutuality’ goes further to include all interpersonal 
relationality, divine and human. The term “mutuality” suggests that to be connected, to seek connections, to 
build communities, is a transformation of suffering into flourishing, o f evil into good. Whereas historically 
this ‘trait’ has been considered inherent to and/or socially determined for women, feminists seek to make it 
a foundational value in human nature. See Chopp, “Feminist and Womanist Theologies,” in The Modern 
Theologians (see n. 28) 396.
This view o f an essential ‘human nature’ is critiqued in feminist and womanist thought by Elaine 
Graham, Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Paula Cooey, Janet Jakobsen and Sheila Greeve Davaney among 
others, each asserting that women do not ‘possess’ a common nature or an individual identity that is 
essential, unified and stable; i.e., they are not ‘selves’ with an unchanging core that undergoes experiences. 
States Graham, ‘[M]any critical studies o f gender display a scepticism concerning a universal or supra- 
cultural ‘human nature’ that endures throughout history and social conditioning. Although certain 
biological imperatives may persist -  reproduction, nourishment, survival -  these are always already 
intertwined with cultural elaborations; we cannot extricate ourselves from our present context and 
formulate a metaphysical model o f human nature. So whatever human nature may be, even if  there are 
universal common elements, they remain inaccessible to our understanding beyond the medium of our own 
culture and interpretation’. Graham, “Gender, Personhood and Theology,” SJT48 (1995): 341-58, 354. On 
the other hand, argues Davaney, neither are women ‘the curiously similar disconnected subjects of much 
postmodern lore’, but are rather ‘synthetic selves’ whose identities emerge out o f the commingling o f  
multiple and varied, contradictory influences. Davaney’s de-centered historical and process approach can 
be found in “Continuing the Story, But Departing the Text: A Historicist Interpretation o f Feminist Norms 
in Theology,” in Horizons in Feminist Theology (see n.36) 198-214. For Fulkerson’s poststructuralist 
critique of the modern feminist enterprise as a whole, see Changing the Subject (see n.lO).
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‘intended the compliment for women and men equally’ (Gen 1:26-27).^^  ^Furthermore, 
their reciprocal relation is the basis for understanding a community of mutuality.*^’ Hence 
for women to bear the imago of the divine is to be autonomously equal to but different 
from men in mutual relation Assuming that the imago Dei identity has already accrued 
to men, she states that women too ‘are really and fimdamentally human, with a nature 
that is essentially human nature, intrinsically belonging to the human race, created in the 
image and likeness of God’/^ ^
While Johnson identifies this as the ‘original’ Judeo-Christian understanding, she 
argues against the Hellenistic influence on Roman Catholic history and with it a 
hierarchical, gender dualism. In this view, reality is divided into two separate and 
opposing spheres and promotes a two-tiered vision of reality, privileging the elite half of 
a pair and subordinating the other such that [her] value is only as it serves the higher.'®  ^
Besides becoming the foundation for theological and social sexism, it encouraged a
Johnson, “The Greater Glory o f God: Woman Fully Alive,” in A Spirituality fo r  Contemporaty Life, ed.
David Fleming, (St. Louis: Review for Religious, 1991), 76. Johnson recognises no prizing of men over 
women in this text. God made homo {yer and mulier) in the divine image. In fact, she affirms that it is 
precisely Jesus’ identity (and solidarity) as homo -  et homo factus est -  that gives the incarnation its i
universal, salvific relevance. The inclusive homo signifies that divine incarnation means becoming human, j
not male. Tt is a mistake akin to heresy to locate the imago Christi in sexual similarity to the human male j
Jesus. Being conformed to Christ is not a sex-specific gift. It consists rather in embodying Jesus’ j
compassionate, liberating manner life and the paradox o f his dying and rising through the power of the j
Spirit’. “A Theological Case for God-She: Expanding the Treasury o f Metaphor,” Commonweal 120 I
(1993): 9-22, 10. Ironically, Johnson appeals to Jesus’ ‘generic’ humanity (which she freely admits j
includes his maleness) rather than accounting for his ‘gendered’ particularity in his own historical context j
which includes his radically positive treatment o f women. In this case, it appears that particularity is a j
threat. His gender as an aspect of his humanity is completely minimised in her Christology while female j
gender is maximised in Johnson’s description of Jesus as ‘Sophia’s Child’. I
SWI, 70; “The Greater Glory,” 76. |
Says Marcia Riggs, ‘We are created in the image of God in particularity and difference, and we affirm j
that image in others by respecting (not denying) difference ... equality in feminist and womanist thought is I
a relational concept, and the term is replaced by concepts such as partnership, mutuality, and solidarity. I
Equality thus refers to relationships that empower groups of people who have been considered unequal on J
the basis o f differences’. “Equality,” in Dictionary o f  Feminist Theologies, 84-5. |
Johnson, “The Greater Glory”, 68. This is paradoxical, to say the least, since the feminist argument is j
that women’s experience provides the criteria for what it means to be fully human in contrast to what has |
been lacking from male normativity. How then, can men be considered to have attained ‘foil humanity’? j
Johnson, Women, Earth, 10-11. i
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subtle drift toward the view of two separate human natures.* '^ Where theology (and 
liberalism in particular) actually held to a view of one, essential ‘human nature’, such 
nature was understood in terms of male experience, making ‘the independent, solitary 
self the human ideal. The result is that a ‘deep ambiguity’ has ‘afflicted’ the doctrine of 
imago Dei in its failure to account for women’s coequal humanity and inherent 
relationality.’®^
Johnson combats this ‘bipolarity’ by positing ‘one human nature celebrated in an 
interdependence of multiple differences’.’®® Her ‘multipolar’ approach seeks to avoid 
using universalising descriptions that level out genuine particularity and at the same time 
to downplay any particular characteristic (e.g., gender) as more important or more 
fundamental than another. In her words, she hopes to ‘to reorder the two-term and one- 
term systems into a multi-term schema ... which allows connection in difference rather 
than constantly guaranteeing identity through opposition or uniformity’.’®'’
This emphasis on relationality is not at the expense of women’s autonomy or self- 
determination, however.’®® Every woman has the task of ‘centering herself, affirming 
herself, and choosing her own life’s directions’, thereby ‘cultivating’ the generally 
undeveloped sense of herself as an active subject and counteracting ‘culturally induced
’®’ Not only has Catholic feminism judged sexism in all its forms to be ‘sinful’, (e.g. Elizabeth Schiissler 
Fiorenza, “Feminist Spirituality, Christian Identity, and Catholic Vision,” in Womanspirit Rising, 140; 
Ruether, Sexism, 160, 164), but so has the Second Vatican Council. Section 29 of the “Pastoral Constitution 
on the Church in the Modern World” states that ‘every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural, 
whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language, or religion is to be overcome and eradicated 
as contrary to God’s intent’. Cited by SWI, 276nl7.
’®^5'r/,9-10, 70.
’®® SWI, 155.
’®'’ Johnson, “The Maleness o f Christ,” in The Special Nature o f Women? Consilium 6, ed, Anne Carr and 
Elizabeth Schiissler Fiorenza (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991): 111. Each humans has his or 
her own unique mix o f determinations, such as sex, race, historical and social location, etc.
’®® Johnson considers the notion o f relation as the principle of self-distinction to thwart the tendency toward 
pantheistic absorption which she views as stereotypical o f ‘the feminine’ in theology. SWI, 232.
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habits of drift and self-denigration’ that come from being defined off the (male) other.
In short, her self-exercised autonomy is foundational to her experience of full and healthy 
humanity. Nonetheless, women’s autonomy as subjects is not to be understood in 
individualistic, liberal terms. Rather, Johnson describes the ideal human experience as 
‘relational autonomy’ or of the ‘self-in-relation’; this autonomous distinction-in-unity 
simultaneously honors the inviolability of the person while understanding them to be 
essentially constituted to be in mutual relation.’®^ The pattern of mutuality and reciprocity 
between these ‘relational selves’ is marked by ‘equivalence between persons, a 
concomitant valuing of each other, a common regard marked by trust, respect, and 
affection in contrast to competition, domination, or assertions of superiority’.’®®
In sum, feminist theologians generally affirm the ontological priority of relation. 
Relationality is viewed as constitutive of women’s being, either emanating from or 
participating in ‘divine’ being as inherently relational. Thus, some concept of ontological 
relation informs the divine-human relation. Drawing the hermeneutical circle from below, 
this concept is derived from women’s experience as essentially relational and essentially 
good.’®^ Theologically, this feminist affirmation is a direct challenge to what is perceived 
to be the Christian God of ‘classical theism’; the poorly relational God who, when ‘he’ is 
described in relational terms, is considered dominating and oppressive. To the God who
'®® SWI, 226. This assumes that the ‘Western’ process o f psychological individuation belongs universally to 
the gendered experience o f ‘femaleness’ in every culture.
’®^ ‘Neither heteronomy (exclusive other-directedness) nor autonomy in a closed egocentric sense but a 
model o f  relational independence, freedom in relation, full related selfhood becomes the ideal’. SWI, 68.
’®® SWI, 68. See also Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology Models of God in Religious Language 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 6. Looking closely at the source and criterion for this kind o f ideal, 
mutual human being in relation, however, we are not led to a common male and female experience but to 
women’s  experience as opposed to men’s  ‘wrong’ experience. Even the appeal to ‘inherent relationality’ as 
constitutive o f humanity is revealed through women’s ‘way of being’, again in opposition to men. The 
difficulty stems from trying to talk about essential humanity when appealing to gendered experience as 
source and norm.
’®® As has been shown (and will be again in the next chapter), this essentialist position is not accepted by all 
feminists.
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in freedom is Lord, King and Sovereign over all he has made, feminist theology issues a 
resounding “NO”!
B. Feminism’s Vis-à-vis
‘No’ to the God of Classical Theism
Feminist theology -  as relational ontology -  considers the crux of the matter to be 
transcendence versus immanence. In other words, it has to do with God’s being and self- 
determination in freedom and distinction from  creation and God’s presence to and with 
creation. This is perceived as a fundamental dualism -  the disengaged God ‘out there’ 
versus the involved God ‘in here’ -  rather than as a mutually coherent description of the 
mystery and holiness of God who, while wholly for, remains wholly other than, his 
creation. Divine ‘transcendence’ is perceived as the culprit behind Roman Catholic 
theology’s dualisms of matter/spirit and nature/grace which in turn promote an inherent 
gender dualism.’'’”
From Johnson’s perspective, it is the God of ‘classical theism’ -  which she and 
certain colleagues are inclined to identify as the God of Karl Barth -  which has elevated 
transcendence to such a degree that the ‘God out there’ has overwhelmed any sense of 
God as immanently for, with, even in creation. ‘Classical theism’ purportedly promotes a 
view of God as the Supreme Being who made all things and rules all things but is 
essentially unrelated to, unaffected by and independent from creation. Hence God
‘Humanity is detached from and more important than nature; man is separate from and more valuable |
than woman; God is disconnected from the world, utterly and simply transcendent over it, as well as more 1
significant than it’. Johnson, Women, Earth, 10-11. She claims that such an arrangement only benefits men j
‘o f the ruling classes’. Does she mean that men of lower classes and different races are on equal, oppressed |
footing with women and so are not oppressors? Is she implying, e.g., that when one South African woman J
is raped every twenty-six seconds (Time Magazine, Nov 1,1999), the perpetrators are all men o f the ‘ruling I
class’? Paradoxically, as Johnson argues for the dismantling o f these ‘dualisms’, she also needs them order |
to define her oppositional stance. jI50 j
remains disconnected from human experience. Immanence slips from view as stress is 
placed on God’s absolute transcendence and all-pervasive, dominating power to which 
human beings owe submission and awe.
Transcendence also corresponds to divine Lordship, an idea utterly rejected by 
feminists as antithetical to the mutuality at the heart of true relation.’'” The same 
hermeneutic of suspicion that judged women’s experience to be one of oppression has 
judged the God of ‘classical theism’ to be the paradigmatic non-relational, oppressive 
Sovereign.’'’^  Johnson and others argue that the historical focus on God’s triune being in 
se apart from the economy of salvation has both perpetuated this view and encased God 
in static, complex, over-literalised patriarchal images,’'’® Given that God’s transcendence 
is equated with spatial and relational distance, God is deemed incapable of the mutual 
reciprocity and equality at the heart of feminist relationality.
The humility of the Son in Phil 2:6-11 has no bearing on this concept, nor does the central affirmation of 
the Christian Church, namely, the lordship o f Jesus Christ at whose name every knee shall bow and tongue 
confess. Such a confession, says Elizabeth Achtemeier, is now understood ‘as a distortion of the biblical 
witness! ’ (“Female Language For God: Should the Church Adopt It?” in The Hermeneutical Quest, ed. D. 
Miller [Allison Park: Pickwick, 1986], 97-114,110).
’'’® SWI, 19-20; Friends of God aW Prophets, 16-21., 105-108 and passim. Johnson follows Vorgrimler’s 
definition of theism in Herbert Vorgrimler, “Recent Critiques of Theism,” in A Personal God? (Consilium 
103), ed. Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas van lersel (New York: Seabury, 1977) 24. This resembles 
Moltmann’s opposition to “monotheism.” As Janet Martin Soskice observes, however, this definition more 
accurately describes the God of ‘deism’, a view already rejected by Christianity. “Turning the Symbols,” in 
Swallowing a Fishbone? Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity, ed. Daphne Hampson (London: SPCK, 
1996), 22. In The Domestication o f Transcendence: How Modern ThinMng about God Went Wrong 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1996),William Placher explains how this view of theism 
only gained prominence in the seventeenth century; thus current protest should not be directed against the 
Christian tradition but against ‘what modernity did to it’.
In Charles Marsh’s review of SWI, he states: ‘I found it odd that Johnson directed most of her polemic 
against classical theism and all of its invidious consequences ... rather than critically examine the very 
tradition that calls her own project into being’. “Two Models of Trinitarian Theology: A Way Beyond the 
Impasse?” Perspectives in Religious Studies 21 (Spring 1994): 59-67,62.
’'’® SWI, 19 -21, 40. She echoes Ruether, Sally McFague and Karen Bloomquist. See, respectively, Sexism 
and God-Talk, 23; “God the Father: Model or Idol?” in Metaphorical Theology, 145-192; “Let God be 
God: The Theological Necessity of Depatriarchalizing God,” in Our Naming o f God, ed. Carl Braaten 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 45-60.
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In an attempt to undermine all dualisms as inherently oppressive, feminist 
‘relationality’ rejects any kind of ‘theism’ that upholds God to be ‘wholly other’, i.e., 
having ontological distinction from and priority over creation without being necessarily 
related to it. Because of the assumptions involved, logically and practically this rejection 
of ‘classical theism’ also means a rejection of Barth’s theology of divine-human relation. 
Feminists are generally disinclined to view God as Barth’s self-revealing, triune ‘I’ 
whose aseity is complete, and completely free, in loving relation to humanity’s ‘Thou’. 
Knowledge of God begins with the finite ‘F who relationally/ontologically participates 
in, ‘moves toward’ and finds herself encompassed by the infinite or ‘divine’ which may 
or may not be described in personal terms.
Fortunately, says Johnson, ‘classical theism’ (the ‘inherited doctrine of God’) is 
inexorably deconstructing under the pressure of historical experience.’^ '’ First, nineteenth 
and twentieth-century atheism, then liberation theologies and now skeptical and/or 
nihilistic postmodern worldviews show that the traditional doctrine of God cannot 
withstand historical conditioning and contextualising.*'’® Traditional faith in God as 
‘Other’, having a reality and an identity distinct from human existence and experience, is 
no longer viable. Any claims to the contrary by appeals to ‘divine revelation’ (e.g.,
Johnson, “The Search for the Living God,” Grail: An Ecumenical Journal 10:3 (September 1994): 1-2;
SWI 7-8.
’'’® This requires theological contextualization and religious plurality/ambiguity of expression in terms of 
God-talk. SWI, 20. In “Between the Times: Religious Life and the Postmodern Experience of God,” Review 
for Religious 53 (1994): 6-28; and “The Search for the Living God,” 5-14, Johnson argues that in the 
postmodern situation four developments hold promise: suffering-based theology, feminist theology, 
interreligious dialogue, and the new dialogue between science and theology influenced by the approaches |
of Rahner, Moltmann, Kasper, Sobrino and Keck. |
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Barth’s thinking about God from  God) are naïve, irrelevant and ultimately 
‘inappropriate’.’'’®
The next chapters focus on Johnson’s own theological ontology, method and God- 
talk -  which she argues keeps divine transcendence and immanence distinct from human 
experience and also free from oppressive, dominating human systems. In Johnson’s 
panentheistic view, she first redefines transcendence and then argues that transcendence 
and immanence are ‘correlative rather than opposed’.’'’^  First, however, by way of 
comparison, we will look briefly at a few cases where feminist ontologies summarily 
dismiss Barth’s theology by re-working the categories of transcendence and immanence.
‘No’ to Karl Barth
If Karl Barth is well known for his emphatic ‘No!’ to Emil Brunner’s defense of 
natural theology (or some kind of human capacity for divine revelation), then feminist 
theology is becoming equally well known for its equally emphatic ‘No!’ to Karl Barth’s 
own theological method and content. Given that Western feminist theology is a 
wholeheartedly modern natural theology, this rejection of Barth’s thought is hardly 
surprising. Barth inverts the modern inversions on the presupposition that God is the 
divine Subject, the distinctly personal ‘Other’ whose Being and supremely free Actuality 
both precede and create the possibility and reality of his own Self-revelation. Barth 
maintains that the Triune God, witnessed to in the Scriptures, makes himself known to us, 
and in so doing also gives us true knowledge of ourselves, in a loving, miraculous and 
wholly personal divine-human ‘encounter’ with Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit.
’46 «Yhe Right Way to Speak About God: Pannenberg on Analogy,” Theological Studies 43 (1982): 673- 
692.
’'’^ 5W/,231.
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This creates numerous problems on the feminist front. Methodologically, most 
feminists reject Barth outright because he fails to comply with modern epistemological 
principles, primarily the control of the human subject over knowledge and truth. To think 
about God and then everything else from  God rather than from the ontic and noetic 
capacity of the human subject, i.e., orienting revelation and Christian speech ‘from 
above’ so that God is the primary Subject and Self-Revealer, is perceived as a threat to 
women’s freedom. Here freedom is understood as exercising the ‘rights’ of active 
subjects to think and speak from the foundations of their experience. The theological 
content of Barth’s view of the divine-human relation as a covenantal relation between 
Creator and obedient creature also tends to be an anathema to the feminist consciousness, 
which is conditioned to reject any form of submission as oppressive and life-destroying. 
Finally, Barth’s view of divine and human freedom determined by and realised in God’s 
free Self-gift of the Son and the Holy Spirit as an act of reconciliation, and the ultimate 
understanding of divine/human unity-in-distinction to be found in the person of Jesus 
Christ, the God-Man, are all alarming when interpreted through a feminist hermeneutic of 
suspicion that equates divine authority and freedom with (male) domination and rejects 
the notion of sin as an inherent human condition.
In short, Barth’s view of God and the God-world relation is generally considered 
lethal to women’s well being. Catherine Keller couldn’t make it plainer: ‘we no longer 
honor the binary of a subject dominating its object -  as supremely codified in Karl 
Barth’s “wholly other,” the subject in relation to whom we are all objects’.’'*® And yet the
’'*® Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then: A Feminist Guide to the End o f the World (Boston: 
Beacon, 1996). Jane Barter responds to feminist Beverly Harrison’s similar critique of Barth’s ‘masculinist 
universal generalisations’ in “A Theology of Liberation in Barth’s Church Dogmatics IV/3,” SJT 53 
(2000): 154-76.
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foundations of modem thought make this claim only partially true. Feminists may have 
rejected God as an independent and antecedent Subject in relation to whom they are 
objects, but the subject-object binary appears to remain in full force. This time, however, 
it is women who are the subjects while God is the passive object governed (dominated?) 
by the feminist universals of justice, being, experience and relationality.*'*”
Of the relatively few feminist theologians who have in fact engaged with Barth, 
most either state their case in direct opposition to him or else use him to represent what is 
formally and materially unacceptable from the Christian tradition to feminist theological 
epistemology and relational ontology. A brief survey of arguments by German Protestant 
feminist Dorothy Sôlle, process theologians Thandeka and Sheila Greeve Davaney, and 
Catholic reformist Rosemary Radford Ruether help to illustrate this point. For instance, 
Sôlle originally developed her theology in direct contrast to Barth (and Bultmann).*®” 
From her vantage point Barth’s God is nothing more than the projection of the 
disconnected, all-powerful male ego remaining ‘outside’ of human experience and 
suffering. Furthermore, Barth’s renewed concept of God as the transcendent, 
‘phallocratie’, patriarchal Lord of humanity only reinforces an oppositional and 
oppressive divine-human relation, belittling human beings by accepting them only when
In McFague’s Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), in 
which she brings together insights from process theology, feminist epistemology and ecology, McFague 
argues, as Johnson sometimes seems to, for a ‘subject-subjects’ model that extends to the created order ‘the 
practice of loving God and neighbor’ as subject, not merely objects fo r our use and control or means to our 
own end. This implies, however, that God is a Subject to be known and loved, something which McFague 
fails to recognise, and that the subject-subjects model in Christian theology is based, from both the biblical 
narrative and the tradition, on the priority of the relationality of the divine persons. See Kathryn Greene- 
McCreight’s critique of McFague in her review of Super, Natural Christians in Modern Theology, 15:3 
(July 1999): 369-371.
*®” Though Sôlle initially embraced Bultmann’s existential hermeneutic over Barth’s rebuke of the liberal 
correlation of theology and experience, she ultimately rejected both as ‘un-engaged’ with real questions of 
justice. Although her theological conditioning and political hermeneutic are informed by the Holocaust, she 
apparently ignores Barth’s practical and theological response to the same and his efforts of behalf the Jews.
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they acknowledge their worthlessness and impotence before him.’®’ This denies the 
essential goodness of human beings in the imago Dei, including their self-determination 
and immanent capacity for ‘saving’ love.’®^
Reconstructing the concepts of transcendence and immanence, Solle develops the 
idea of divine ‘transcendent immanence’. The Creator-creature distinction is abolished. 
‘God’ is simply the totally immanent, ‘mystical’ element of existence, defined as ‘loving 
interrelation,’ that somehow also remains radically, transcendently ‘free’.’®'* All creation 
is grounded in and embodies this transcendent immanence that is ‘one’ with ‘life’. The 
divine ‘difference’ of this life force is utterly commingled with any and all concrete 
reality.
Using a similar concept, process feminist Thandeka puts forth ‘the embodied 
self as the intersubjective source and domain of reality.’®® To retrieve the ‘self (the ‘site 
and sign’ at the centre of human meaning and agency) overlooked by Kant and Freud, she
’®’ Ruether, Women and Redemption: A Theological History (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 185.
’®^ Articulating the classic liberationist approach upheld by Ruether, Johnson, Schiissler Fiorenza, etc. al., 
Sôlle claims that human beings are called to redeem creation from ‘sin’. Here the cross is not a payment for 
sin but ‘the risk Jesus and all people take when they unmask the idols and announce the good news that 
God is with those who struggle for justice and communicate loving life’. Ruether, Women and Redemption, 
185-88, citing Sôlle, Suffering (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 145-50. ‘Original sin’ is not only rejected, but 
the ‘fall’ of Genesis 3 is ‘a good thing’, what Sôlle calls a liberation into knowledge, action and self- 
reliance. See Sôlle, The Strength o f the Weak: Towards a Christian Feminist Identity, trans. Robert and 
Rita Kimber (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984), 126 -29.
’®® Sôlle, The Strength o f  the Weak, 102. Sôlle concludes (137), ‘The most telling argument against our 
traditional God is not that he no longer exists or that he has drawn back within himself but that we no 
longer need him’.
’®'* Ruether, Women and Redemption, 188-9. ‘Transcendent immanence’ is therefore ‘radically free from 
our ideologies of domination’.
’®® ‘The human body is the magisterium of human knowledge as both teacher and student, subject and 
object of life’. Thandeka, “The Self Between Feminist Theory and Theology,” in Horizons in Feminist 
Theology, 79-98, 79. Thandeka aligns herself with the psychological intersubjectivist approaches of Robert 
Stolorow and George Atwood, the Jungian claims of Ann and Barry Ulanov and the developmental theories 
of Heinz Kohut and D.W. Winnecott. Thandeka (80) defines the embodied self as ''the fe lt  [but cognitively 
empty] congruence of mind and body with the surrounding environment as one moment o f lived 
experience'.
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reaches for the theology of Schleiermacher.’®® This necessitates a rejection of Barth’s 
view of the Triune God, revelation and the Creator-creature distinction. Barth’s 
Trinitarian ‘fallacy’ involved not only the absolute distinction but also the divide between 
God and sinful humanity which only God himself could mediate. Thandeka explains that 
this failed ‘trinitarian heresy’ and ‘speculative philosophy’ perpetuated by the likes of 
Hegel and Barth has made it terribly difficult ‘to establish an internally coherent, 
theoretically respectable position which affirms unity as well as difference as core to 
human experience’.*®’ Why? Because the Spirit is the (mediating) locus where difference 
and distinction between God and humanity is understood.
Schleiermacher provides Thandeka a way out of the ‘trinitarian’ impasse by 
affirming the experience of human ‘cohesion’ (the unmediated, indissoluble unity of 
finite and infinite) without appealing to God’s nature and revelation as its source.*®® 
Insisting with Schleiermacher that a mediating principle (i.e., the Holy Spirit) is 
unnecessary for knowledge and experience of infinite reality, Thandeka claims that we 
can know and experience ‘the divine’ as life itself. A ‘third’ element is only necessary if 
one believes like Barth that without the Spirit humans cannot hear the reconciling Word 
of God as distinct from their self-awareness, a premise that any intersubjective feminist 
theology ‘cannot affirm’.*®” Thus, in Schleiermacher’s theory of human experience, the 
nonsensate feeling (Gefiihl) of human self-consciousness provides a ‘theological’
*®® Thandeka, “The Self,” 85.
*®’ Arguing against Hegel’s Trinitarian dialectic and his view of the Holy Spirit (or self-consciousness) as 
mediator and bridge between theology and theory, Thandeka contends that this idea of a ‘bridge’ only 
reaffirmed the unreal split between Geist and body that Schleiermacher and intersubjective feminist 
theologians reject. Thandeka, “The Self,” 81-83.
*®® “The Self,” 79, 82-3, 93-6.
15” «Yjjg Self,” 95. To Barth’s question of Schleiermacher, “‘Rightly understood, is not everything 
revelation, and again rightly understood, nothingT” Thandeka says exactlyl Barth, The Theology o f  
Schleiermacher: Lectures at Gottingen, Winter Semester o f  1923-24, ed. Dietrich Ritschl, trans. Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), 236, cited in Thandeka, “The Self,” 94.
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category for describing the primordial place of mental and physical convergence with 
infinity, or what she calls the ‘embodied experience’ of the ‘inner other’ as an 
indissoluble part of one’s self.*®”
Davaney, on the other hand, credits Barth with reconceiving the ‘wholly other’ 
God as neither static nor impersonal but ultimately relational; a gracious, loving and 
dynamically related being for whom relationship is ‘the core of divine reality’.*®* 
Furthermore, Davaney acknowledges Barth’s positive association of divine power with 
love, knowledge and freedom manifest in God’s gracious and loving relationship with the 
world.*®^  Nevertheless, his theology and method create irresolvable tensions for Davaney. 
Why? Because Barth maintains that God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ is the 
presupposition, basis, content and criterion for all human God-talk and self-understanding 
(she sees this as ‘determinism in the strictest sense’). Not only does this set the controls 
for knowledge of God outside human experience, but God’s Being-Act in Jesus Christ is 
a matter of prior, divine, ontic independence and self-sufficient Lordship. Thus divine
*®” This ‘inner other’ is spoken of by Stolorow, Atwood and the Ulanovs. Thandeka claims that 
Schleiermacher ‘went looking for the embodied self most prized by feminist theory and theology ‘and 
found if . “The Self,” 94.
*®* Davaney undertakes a detailed analysis o f Barth and Hartshome in her Harvard dissertation. Divine 
Power. Though Barth ‘rightly’ rejects a static view of deity, Davaney believes his conception of divine 
power as the double form of divine self-determination and world-determination too closely aligns the idea 
o f ‘omnipotence’ with its ‘traditional’ conception.
*®^ Divine Power, 227. Though Davaney acknowledges that Barth and Hartshome connect power to 
knowledge and love and differentiate divine power from all forms of brute or evil force, she is concerned 
that neither takes evil seriously enough (226). In God’s Power: Traditional Understandings and 
Contemporaty Challenges (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1990), 97-113, much of which is a direct 
distillation of the first half of Davaney’s Divine Power, Anna Case-Winters rejects Barth for the same 
reasons. His rejection of natural theology ‘and any other position that implies that knowledge of God is a 
public and available possibility’ erroneously leads him to view God as Subject and ‘Lord’ with control over 
both the content and process of knowing. Case-Winters alleges that Barth maintains the ‘classic’ Calvinist 
sense of divine power as ‘the mode of domination and control’ that eradicates the creature’s true, reciprocal 
freedom. She uses Elizabeth Johnson’s argument to make a case for multiple God-concepts and names 
based on God’s essential unknowability. Lee Snook attempts to move beyond the presuppositional idea of 
power as coercion of the weak by the strong by considering two alternative forms found in American 
history -  the power of equality and of dissent -  and what he calls the power of ‘the Spirit’, in What in the 
World is God Doing?: Re-imagining Spirit and Power (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 95-98.
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power is God’s capacity to self-determine and, in and through that act of self- 
determination, to maintain all realities distinct from God.*®®
This stands in direct opposition to process feminism’s understanding of 
divine/cosmic mutual relationality and intersubjective co-determination. *®‘ Thus, while 
Barth’s Trinitarianism points to a more social interpretation of God’s internal being, his 
insistence on God’s ‘internal self-sufficiency’ undermines a genuinely social conception 
of the God-world relationship.*®® Even in God’s ‘powerlessness’ manifest in the humanity 
of the Incarnation, God remains intrinsically independent of and in control over rather 
than divinely dependent upon and conditioned by that external reality.*®® She sums this up 
in terms of process and feminist views of relationality: ‘[Wjhile Barth makes the notion 
of relationship central to his understanding of deity ... he does not conceive of [the God- 
world relationship] as entailing any of the social dimensions normally associated with 
relationship: reciprocity, mutual conditioning, and social interaction’.*®’ Davaney also 
believes Barth to fail on methodological grounds by not adequately accounting for the
*®® Divine Power, 58.
*®'* Divine Power, 25. Davaney’s concern (59) is that God (in divine self-determination) is only affected or 
conditioned by an independent, prior knowledge and will of the world rather than truly by the world.
*®® Divine Power, 230.
*®® Divine Power, 59. This means that the cross, rather than indicating true powerlessness or weakness on 
God’s part, underscores divine superiority separate from any creaturely reality. ‘God acts with equal 
omnipotence in all circumstances, in apparent impotence as well as strength, as object as well as subject, 
and as servant as well as Lord’. For Davaney, Barth’s assertion that God’s self-determination to ho for  
humanity, conditioned and determined by the world in Jesus, is meaningless if such worldly conditioning 
and determining are merely ‘secondary’ realities enclosed within God’s self-determination. Anna Case- 
Winters considers Barth to hold a docetic view; The Incarnation is merely ‘a divine deception’ in which 
God appears vulnerable but merely ‘puts on weakness as one would a garment’. G od’s Power, 112.
*®’ Davaney first considered Barth’s ‘failure’ to reconcile his ‘relational’ assertions with God ‘wholly 
otherness’ to be the result of trying to graft a traditional notion of omnipotence onto his own revolutionary 
concept of the relational God, but later saw it as a result of his attempt to apply the ‘concept’ of 
relationality to God and the world and still maintain their ontological distinction. This critique, however, 
fails to remember Barth’s essential criteria for knowledge of God -  which it is given in and never apart 
from God’s own Being-Act. This leads her to misunderstand him to use the overarching concept of 
‘relationality’ as a tertium quid governing both God and creation, something Barth attempts to avoid at all 
costs by acknowledging God’s being as setting the criterion and possibility for our knowing or relating to 
him.
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‘twentieth-century reality’ of historical conditioning -  the mediated, ‘socially 
circumscribed character’ of all thought and experience given shape, content, and value by 
culturally conditioned linguistic and symbolic forms.*®®
Ruether, whose assumptions are foundational to Catholic reformism, has 
repeatedly articulated her immanentist position in contrast to Barth’s theology ‘from 
above’ as a return to an understanding of God as ‘wholly other’ than one’s religious 
aspirations and experience.*®” Ruether specifically discusses Barth’s clash with the liberal 
foundations of feminist theology in terms of the analogia relationis v. the analogia 
entisF^ In short, Barth rejects her primary foundations; that the analogia entis expresses 
the reality of sharing in divine being, that in the Catholic view human goodness is 
distorted but not lost in the Fall, and that men and women are equal in ‘the original State 
of Nature’.*’* She in turn rejects Barth’s Reformed understanding of human depravity that 
both emphasises the radical distinction between God and humans which denies any 
shared ‘being’ between them, fallen humanity’s natural incapacity to know and please 
God, and its utter dependence on God for salvation. In Ruether’s view, women are
*®® Divine Power, 235-9. ‘[A]ll knowledge, truth, and value as well as the concepts and symbols that 
express them are relative to the context within which they emerge’ (236). Davaney draws this ‘conclusion’ 
from the ‘intellectual perspectives’ of Collingwood, Troeltsch, Berger and Luckman, Geertz and Kaufinan. 
*®” See Women and Redemption, 179-184, 275-281; *Jmago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist 
Hermeneutics,” 282-288; “Motherearth and the Megamachine: A Theology of Liberation in a Feminine, 
Somatic and Ecological Perspective,” in Womanspirit Rising, 43-52 (50). Barthian theology may have 
emerged from the Second World War ‘with heroic credentials’, says Ruether, but in its later forms of neo­
orthodoxy, it failed to adequately deal with the questions of historical relativism and social justice so 
essential to feminism. Women and Redemption, 180.
*’” In '‘'‘Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 280-283, Ruether describes Barth, 
Bonhoeffer and Brunner as all rejecting the analogia entis, or ‘the similarity of spiritual substance between 
humans and God’.
*’* These are foundational to Ruether’s feminist claims for equal rights and personal autonomy. Ruether, 
“Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 279.
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inherently good as participants in divine being who can ‘know’ and project their ‘image’ 
onto God as agents of their own redemption.*’^
Ruether criticises Barth’s use of Buber’s concept of the ‘I-Thou relationship’ and 
the analogia relationis as an analogical concept for interpreting divine-human distinction. 
She argues that Barth and others shifted focus away from Buber’s original concept of 
subject-subject equivalence, even when expressing subjective difference toward a 
hierarchical, subject-object relation (divine-human, male-female, mind-body, ruler- 
ruled).*’® In its true sense, which Barth distorted, the divine-human ‘I-Thou’, equally 
expressible as the human-divine ‘I-Thou’, is a relation of mutual equality and reciprocity 
between God and humanity who are equal but different in kind of being. Barth’s belief in 
the absolute gulf between the divine and the human, says Ruether, is what ‘establishes the 
most hierarchical model imaginable as analogue for male-female relations’.*’'* His 
‘defense’ of a hierarchy in the Trinity between Father and Son plays out in male-female 
(superior-inferior) relationality that ultimately suggests women are subhuman and do not 
truly ‘image’ God.*’®
Though Barth argued for the essential, equal and mutual humanity of women and 
men through the humanity of Jesus Christ, she believes his social ordering of creation 
renders it meaningless.*’® He justified the culturally and androcentrically conditioned
*’  ^Ruether, Women and Redemption, 275.
*’® Ruether, “Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 281.
*’“* Ruether, “Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 283.
*’® Ruether, “Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 282-3. Ruether believes that 
further attempts by the likes of Paul Jewett (Man as Male and Female: A Study in Sexual Relations from a 
Theological Point o f View (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975)) and Jürgen Moltmann (God in Creation: 
A New Theology o f Creation and the Spirit o f God (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985)) to articulate the 
essential equality of male-female relationship as imago Dei also fail because of their reliance on the divine- 
human inequality inherent in the analogia relationis.
*’® This is a valid and serious criticism of Barth’s theology. Though this thesis will not discuss this in any 
depth, we fully acknowledges the unfortunate, even dangerous inconsistency in Barth’s thought at this
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social roles of men and women by drawing a parallel between the divine-human and 
male-female ‘I-Thou’ rather than being controlled by the Incarnation and God’s Triune 
revelation at this point. He then exacerbated the problem by claiming that such social 
ordering was by divine, nonnegotiable decree.*”  Ruether’s only remedy, however, is to 
‘remove entirely any idea that the divine is superior to the human and the dominant side 
of the partnership’ and to adopt a modern liberal view that upholds the goodness and 
potential for good in human nature without the need for divine intervention ‘from 
above’.*’®
What consistent critiques do these feminists raise against Barth? First, Barth’s 
assertion that God is ‘wholly other’ and thus not necessarily related to humanity goes 
against the primordial grain of feminist epistemology and its conception of what a 
relational ontology involves.*’” Second, participation in the fellowship of the Triune God 
-  as exclusively through Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit and as an act of reconciliation -  
challenges the belief that humans are essentially good (i.e., sin is not a human condition) 
and as such can know and manifest the divine without the need for an external redeemer. 
Third, God’s revelation of himself is both transcendent and immanent -  the holy and 
wholly Other making himself known to sinful humanity -  which challenges the 
assumption that God can be discovered a priori by human beings from their own self­
point, as pointed out by Ruether and taken up by others like Paul Fiddes, “The Status o f Woman in the 
Thought o f Karl Barth,” in After Eve, ed. Janet Martin Soskice (London: Marshall Pickering, 1990), 138- 
155.
*”  Ruether, “Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 283, referring to Barth’s CD 
III.4. Mary Daly claims that Barth bought into the belief of Western religious consciousness that ‘the 
husband dominating his wife represents God himself. Daly, “After the Death of God the Father: Women’s 
Liberation and the Transformation o f Christian Consciousness,” in Womanspirit Rising, 53-73 (54, 55). 
Gerard Loughlin contends that Barth also fell prey to cultural ‘gender anxiety’ and ‘homosexual prejudice’. 
“Sex Slaves: Rethinking ‘Complementarity’ After 1 Corinthians 7.3-4,” in Is There a Future, 173-192.
*’® Ruether, “Imago Dei, Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 284.
*’” Piet Schoonenberg explains this dual necessary relationship in strictly modern Catholic terms in The 
Christ: A Study o f the God-Man Relationship in the Whole o f Creation and in Jesus Christ, trans. Dell 
Couling (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), 84.
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experience. Fourth, Barth’s view of God as the Subject of theology and the Creator and 
Lord of his creation is filtered through the a priori feminist assumption that authority 
inevitably equals dominating power. Hence, feminists are led to understand God’s self- 
determination and freedom as a threat to creaturely self-determination and freedom.*®” 
Finally, and along these same lines, Barth’s belief that in Jesus Christ God manifests 
Godself in/as a male human, from which Barth sets up a hierarchy of relation for male 
and female relations, invalidates his view of Jesus’ humanity as a model of new humanity 
for both men and women.
IV. Summary and Critical Questions
Johnson vis-à-vis Barth
By espousing a contemporary Trinitarian theology formulated within the debates 
of the last century, Johnson’s own theological approach cannot help but rely on Barth on 
the one hand and reject certain of his assumptions on the other. She relies intrinsically on 
Barth’s assertion that God’s Triune revelation and economic activity are wholly 
consistent with God’s immanent, eternal Triune being -  that the Triune God is God for us 
and with us. Yet her transcendental anthropology and relational ontology presuppose the 
human capacity to directly apprehend God to be for the world based on an 
interdependent, mutually conditioned divine-human relation. Following Karl Rahner’s 
lead, Johnson states that if the concept of God confesses the infinity and the 
incomprehensibility of holy mystery, then ‘it actually postulates thereby a history of our
*®” These issues are also raised by Romero in “The Protestant Principle,” 327.
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own concept of God that can never be concluded’.*®* Anyone who claims knowledge of 
God greater than this on the grounds of ‘revelation’ is ‘ignoring the situation of being 
created and forgetting this deep wisdom of the tradition. We are dealing here with 
mystery that goes beyond all thematizing’.*®^ Her own a priori assumptions, however, 
represent an elevated form of ‘thematizing’ about the mystery of God.
Johnson rejects her interpretation of Barth’s view of divine revelation and God’s 
subjective objectivity: ‘If liberal theology created too close an association between 
bourgeois culture and the idea of God, Barth’s response was every bit as problematic in 
the radical dissociation it presupposed between God and human experience’.*®® Her 
doctrine of God and Trinitarian symbol are offered in direct contrast to this view. She 
posits that from human, particularly women’s, experience, we know that God f s  never 
not related to the worM’.*®'* God and the world mutually indwell one another; God is 
inextricably bound to and mutually conditioned by human experience.*®® In this 
‘fundamental vision of mutual coinherence’, the ‘accent on divine relatedness to the 
world overcomes the isolation of the patriarchal God of classical theism’. ‘®®
*®‘ SWI, 7-8, citing from Rahner, “The Specific Character of the Christian Concept of God,” Theological i
Investigations 21 (23 vols. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961-1992; New York: Crossroads, 1980- |
1992), 89. This series will hereafter be abbreviated TI. i
'®® SWI, 112, We are also apparently dealing first with our pre-apprehension and then our concepts derived 1
from self-awareness and experience and not with an ‘Other’ through personal, divine encounter. |
*®® Those who have not dealt adequately with Barth frequently make this critique. For instance, j
‘traditionalist’ Paul Zahl states: ‘Barth did not start with Jesus. He started with the electing or sovereign *
God ... [and] God’s electing choice rather than God’s grace in Christ in particular. Barth’s God was too I
removed, too other. ... We are therefore neither Feuerbach’s disciples nor Barth’s’. A Short Systematic |
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 9. Alternatively, see e.g., Bruce McCormack’s seminal \
work on Barth’s early theology, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and I
Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), wherein McCormack specifically defines Barth’s ■;
theology as ‘Christocentric’ (453-55). McCormack also describes Barth’s electing grace only in and as I
Jesus Christ, in “Grace and being: the role of God’s gracious election in Karl Barth’s theological ontology,” ]
in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (see n. 11) 92-110. i
*®'* SWI, 236. '
*®® SWI, 230-32. ;
*®®51J7,231. i
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And yet, how is God related to the world? What constitutes the conditions of that 
relation, including the capacity of women’s finite experience to bind and condition the 
infinite? If women’s experience sets the criteria for understanding this ‘never-not- 
relatedness’, is God’s relation to the world (at least to humanity) a personal relation? If 
so, what is its source and norm? If one were to look at women’s relational experience in 
the twentieth century, for example, is relational experience derived from Chiang Ch’ing, 
the sadistic wife of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, who related to her ‘egalitarian’ fellow 
communists by having them brutally murdered on a whim, or is it the way Mother Teresa 
related to the untouchables of Calcutta?
Or is Johnson’s ideal of ‘relational autonomy’ the experiential model? If 
‘autonomous selves’ are deemed to be essentially constituted by equivalent, mutual 
relations, is this true in the divine-human relation -  that it is one of equivalenceT^^ While 
Johnson seems to imply that this is the case - analogically, through their proportional 
‘share’ in being, God and the world are in ‘mutual, if asymmetrical relationship’- ‘®® this 
would seem to require that God be considered a personal ‘other’; the free, active, divine 
Subject who, like the female subject, has the ‘relational autonomy’ to ‘name’ and express 
his own relational ‘reality’ in freedom?
Or is Johnson thinking in spacio-temporal terms? Are God and the world in a 
spatial and thus temporal relation to each other (like two objects on my desk)? If the 
relation is ontological, are, God and the world instantiations of being or is it a relation of
Johnson argues that this ideal is both from human experience and one that needs to be imposed on 
experience for it to come into being. This same ‘chicken and egg’ problem surfaces later when she speaks 
of relationality in terms of Trinitarian and human community.
232.
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priority, i.e., God as origin/Cause and the world as instantiation of being/effect?
Whichever it is, how does women’s experience tell us this?
Johnson’s theological proposal will attempt to address at least some of these 
questions of relation. Her proposal nevertheless rejects the view that God is the Self­
determining Subject in complete, relational Self-fulfilment as Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
who is also in free, loving, covenanting, personal relation to and with his creation in Jesus 
Christ by the Spirit. Why? For God to have both the freedom to choose to be related to 
creation and to choose the conditions of that relation seemingly cannot be divorced in 
feminist theology from God the Sovereign oppressor. It is presuppositional that any ‘Lord 
o f  must also be ‘Lord over’ as defined by the feminist view of classical theism. |
Johnson’s Catholic Reformist Challenge j
In the Catholic reformist feminist worldview, questions of human and divine j
freedom/distinction and appropriate God-talk begin with the ethical concern, ‘whose |
interests are being served?’ The ‘right’ answer is ‘women’s interests’ on the assumption {
that these interests serve all humanity. Certain a priori universal principles are |
consistently and unapologetically at work in this approach, establishing the criteria and j
setting the controls for what can be known about God, how it is known and how it can be |
:
communicated. Ultimately, the possibility of ‘knowing’ God rests with the inherent j
I
capacity of the human being to discern what is other than herself as a part of her I
existential reality. Invariably, these presuppositions have tremendous influence on I
Johnson’s understanding of the actuality and possibility of divine and human freedom I
and personal distinction. If revelation is no longer a matter of hearing the Word of the j
personal ‘T spoken to his human creation as present among them and accepted by them
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as his Word in faith, but rather a matter of interpretation based on women’s feminist 
‘consciousness’ of relationality, then the Christian ‘idea of God’ can only be retained if 
God’s relation to the world is reinterpreted on the basis mutual coinherence.'®” This 
principle governs the theological and ontological basis for speech about God from 
women’s essentially relational experience.
What kind of God promotes ‘justice for all’? One that is mutually, non- 
hierarchically and panentheistically related to creation (i.e., ontologically equal in 
relation, if not in substance). What then is the right way to speak about God? Speech that 
uses images from human experience where this kind of relationality has been lived out.
Where is the source and norm for such speech and experience? Women’s ontological and 
relational experience. What threatens the possibility of this kind of God-world relation is 
a distinctly personal God who exists in free, self-determining relation to creation and 
whose behaviour and character are revealed through male images and a male incarnation.
When God is ‘other’ on these terms, particularly as Lord, ‘He’ cannot be trusted to be a
God who will not dominate. This is the God of classical theism, and this is the God laid at i
1
the feet of Karl Barth. Both have been dismissed out of hand as irrelevant to what i
feminist consciousness has made known to be ‘true’. j
itIronically, Johnson, Catherine LaCugna and Anne Carr each acknowledge j
history’s indebtedness to Barth’s ‘stirring up’ of the doctrine of the Trinity as essential to i
‘®” For this reason, says Francis Martin, ‘feminist interpretation is not theology in any sense of the tenn 
[when read against the understanding of the early Christians]; there is no thinking with assent, if assent 
means consenting to the light of revelation. It represents a capitulation to the Enlightenment refusal to 
accept any interventions of God in this world. There is no revelation, and there is no body of texts that 
expresses the church’s interpretation of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ [as a matter of 
faith]’. TFQ, 205.
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their own Trinitarian understanding of the divine-human relation.'”” Despite this 
indebtedness, however, each rejects Barth’s view of revelation and divine aseity, opting 
instead for some form of relational ontology and modern methodology.'”' Apparently it 
follows that any theistic view which maintains that God in his Triune Being is absolutely 
and irrevocably distinct and ‘wholly other’ than (even if freely for) his creation also 
considers God a ‘solitary narcissistic being who suffers from his own completeness’ 
while limiting the freedom of his creation.'”^  If this is so, then feminism ought to have 
nothing to do with such a God. But is this the Triune God of the Christian tradition whom 
Barth understands to be God for us in every way? We shall see. Since Johnson claims to 
have moved beyond Barth and the challenges he raises, the question at stake is, How so? 
Furthermore, do Johnson’s panentheistic ontology and its female Trinitarian symbol fit 
‘within the contours of the Christian faith’ as she claims?
Johnson’s own challenge, as a feminist and as a Christian theologian, comes from 
setting for herself the task of maintaining radical divine freedom and God’s radically and 
asymmetrically distinct identity from her transcendental and feminist foundations of 
knowing, being and ‘meaning’. Her panentheistic theology, rising out of an over-arching 
metaphysical principle, also raises with it a number of questions, including whether her 
doctrine of the immanent Trinity safeguards divine aseity and if she deals adequately 
with a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Moreover, does her Christology take seriously the 
Incarnation as God with us and does her God-talk correspond to the language of God’s 
Self-talk? Is God a Subject who can speak for Godself as an essential element of
'”” E.g., Johnson, “The Incomprehensibility o f God”; LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life 
(San Francisco: HarperSan Francisco, 1991), 233.
'”' E.g., SWF, God For Us (see n. 191); Transforming Grace (see n. 34).
192 225, citing Walter Kasper.
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‘personhood’ and ‘persons in relation’ at the heart of Christian theology? Finally, is her 
God-talk consistent with the Church’s theological speech as possible only through its 
ontological and epistemic participation in the koinonia of the Triune God?
For Barth, these are the critical issues, and it is pertinent to look again at what he 
has to say about them in this context. This is especially so given that Johnson accuses 
Barth of presupposing so radical a dissociation between God and human experience, 
further implying that Barth’s God-talk is virtually meaningless since meaning is 
grounded in human subjectivity (we will take this up in chapter three). This, however, 
seems to be a weak critique of Barth due to a failure to engage his theology substantively 
or seriously. In one sense this is surprising, given the overwhelming influence of his 
theology on all subsequent Trinitarian thought, including Johnson’s. Barth also did more 
than any twentieth-century theologian to challenge the oppressive potential of God-talk at 
the political level and would certainly be sympathetic to feminist critiques of socio­
political oppression under the guise of Christianity.
Two things are true in Christian theology, and as such apply both to Johnson and 
Barth. First, Christian doctrine and speech prioritise accuracy in thinking about God’s 
transcendence and immanence in creation. We must distinguish conceptually and really 
between God and human creatures. Otherwise we cannot speak of this as a relation 
between two radically distinct and, indeed, different ‘others’. This belief is at the heart of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition’s belief in the God who spoke to Abraham, Moses and the 
prophets, and then spoke his own Word in his Being-Act in the human person .Tesus 
Christ in the power of the Spirit. Second, theology and method are inextricably linked. 
What we say about God depends on what we believe is possible to say and why, which in
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turn influences what we say about everything else. This relation, between knowing and 
being, is grounded in the divine-human relation as well.
The question is: who has priority? Who sets the criterion for understanding the 
distinction that exists? Johnson denies the priority Barth gives to God as both the Subject 
and Object of revelation (and with it Barth’s view that flnitum non capax infiniti). She 
also rejects Barth’s Chalcedonian view of the Incarnation as the place where perfect 
divine-human distinction and mutuality in relation are held together, opting instead for an 
abstracted concept of the Trinity.
Hence Johnson has the challenge of arguing that God has ontological priority 
while giving humankind noetic priority (as an existential experience of grace). From 
there she must further argue (1) that God does not become subject to our a priori 
categories or noetic capacities, (2) that we can distinguish -  from  our experience -  
between the finite and the infinite in our experience, and (3) that our speech about God is, 
in fact, analogical, not univocal (that it really refers to God as an Other and not to our 
self-projections) or equivocal (that it really refers meaningfully to God and is not simply 
agnostic nonsense). Johnson believes this is possible based on her understanding of the 
analogia entis interpreted through the grid of feminist relationality -  that we participate 
in the being of the relational God and that we can speak meaningfully of God out of that 
experience. She thus develops a panentheistic, relational ontology using metaphysical and 
Trinitarian categories. From here she argues that God can be best understood and spoken 
of as SHE WHO IS; Spirit-Sophia, Jesus-Sophia, and Mother-Sophia. These next two 
chapters follow her attempt to do so.
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Chapter Two:
In Relation to the 'Unknowable’ God: Johnson’s Transcendental
Epistemology
In She Who Is I draw on themes and ideas from Thomas Aquinas to explore a feminist theology of 
God. ...I also make ontological claims and draw references about the way things truly are, but 
these are not beholden to any complete metaphysical system. They may in truth be compatible 
with many systems.
The first purpose of this chapter is to set forth and evaluate the epistemological 
and ontological claims that Johnson makes based on the rather ambiguous metaphysical 
approach she describes above. These are set out as an arbitrary set of principles, carefully 
culled from her various writings, which lie at the heart of her ‘theological’ enterprise. The 
ultimate goal of the chapter is to highlight the questions these transcendental principles 
raise vis-à-vis her feminist worldview and her declared Thomism (for which radical 
distinction between God and the world is essential). At issue is whether her feminist 
methodology, outlined in chapter one as establishing the criteria for ‘truth’, is in fact 
compatible with either of these systems, or the compatibility of these systems with each 
other.
I. ‘Finitum Capax infiniti’ - Johnson’s Transcendental Approach
What might at first be taken for a rather ‘relaxed’, postmodern approach in the 
statement above -  i.e., the freedom to choose from among different views and concepts to 
ascertain ‘the way things truly are’ -  is in fact anything but. Johnson’s relational ontology 
and epistemology do not represent a random collection of ideas and inferences. Rather, 
she presents a carefully constructed worldview based on certain Western feminist and
193 “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 100-1 (emphasis added).
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Rahnerian, transcendental principles/^"^ As Johnson notes, these principles are not 
‘beholden’ to any complete metaphysical system -  in fact they represent two very 
different experience-based systems. Both systems, and the principles which govern them, 
have important implications for Johnson regarding divine-human distinction and the 
question of freedom that characterise her Christian tradition.
In Johnson’s transcendental framework, the most basic ‘theme and idea’ she 
draws from Aquinas is the following assumption: finitum capax infiniti (“the finite is 
capable of bearing, or has the capacity for, the infinite”). In an interpretation of the basic 
ontological relation of the analogia entis, Johnson presses this even further to state that 
female symbols of God are specifically capax Dei. Women, in a particular, 
epistemologically necessary way, bear, ‘image’ and have direct knowledge of the divine 
mediated through their own experience. Transcendentally, however, Johnson’s natural 
theology presupposes that all human beings are ‘spirit in the world’ and thus have 
epistemic access to knowledge of God through their own self-awareness. The basic 
theological structure of this participation in, and thus knowledge of, the divine through 
human experience is the relation between nature and grace. Put simply, the ontological 
question is ‘How is it that we participate in divine being?’, while the theological question 
is ‘What does it mean to be ‘graced’ as an aspect of our human ‘nature’?’
In the most general Thomistic sense, ‘grace’ is understood as God’s gift of the divine 
life itself bestowed on humanity. Aquinas, however, made a distinction between ‘created
Karl Rahner’s influence on twentieth-century contemporary Catholic theology (including his positive 
engagement with liberation and political theology) has been unquestionably profound. In this chapter I am 
indebted to Paul Molnar’s critique o f Rahner’s transcendental presuppositions in “Can We Know God 
Directly?” (see n. 20) and “Experience and the Theologr of the Trinity”: How Karl Rahner’s Method 
Affects His Understanding of Revelation, Grace and the Trinity,” in Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of 
the Immanent Trinity: In dialogue with Karl Barth and contemporary theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2002), 83-124.
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grace’ (the change wrought in the individual by the divine presence) and ‘uncreated 
grace’ (the inner life of the Triune God). He thus believed the fimction of grace to be 
two-fold: To heal human nature from sin and to elevate it to its final goal -  union with 
God through participation in the divine life. Hence, the Catholic axiom ‘grace supposes 
nature’ as ‘nature supposes grace’. Grace is considered absolutely essential to nature for 
without it the human person cannot achieve union with the divine. Nature, in turn, 
supposes grace to the extent and on the assumption that humans have a natural desire for 
direct union with God. In transcendental terms, we are radically oriented toward infinite 
or Absolute Being (‘God’) as constitutive of our human being; no finite reality can satisfy 
this divine aspiration.
Johnson espouses Rahner’s transcendental anthropology and epistemology, as 
follows:
... a human being is primordially ‘spirit in the world,’ ... dynamically oriented toward fathomless 
mystery as the very possibility of acting in characteristic human ways.... Human beings are 
dynamically structured toward God. ... the experience of God which is never directly available is 
mediated, among other ways but primordially so, through the changing history of oneself. ... 
Writes Rahner, “The personal history of the experience of the self is the personal history of the 
experience o f God”; “the personal history of the experience of God signifies, over and above 
itself, the personal history of the experience of the self.” Each mutually conditions the other.
Let us examine how this view, as a set of metaphysical and epistemological 
principles, under-girds Johnson’s relational ontology and makes it possible for her to 
equate it with Christian trinitarian theology.
A. First Principle: There is general, over-arching philosophy o f being and knowing 
which governs divine and human reality.
What is it that we actually apprehend which leads us ultimately to knowledge of 
divine and human reality? The short answer is Being. Philosophically, says Johnson,
Richard McBrien, Catholicism (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994), 176-182, 
196 65-6, citing Rahner, “The Experience of Self and Experience of God,” 7713:125.
73
‘being’ does not belong to any usual category of thought. It is an idea sui generis that 
points to the reality that undergirds all else, in virtue of which everything exists. When 
‘theological speech’ adopts this notion to refer to God, ‘it signifies that the mystery 
encompassing the world is more being-fiil than all finite creatures combined; in fact, God 
is the fire of sheer aliveness whose act of being overflows, bringing the universe into 
being and empowering it to be. This language carries the companion recognition that all 
things are on fire with existence by participation in God’s holy being’.
Johnson’s approach takes its basic form and content from Rahner, who posits that 
human knowing cannot be separated from human being (hence knowledge and speech 
about God are grounded in human experience): ‘Every possible object of cognition is 
already anticipated under the general aspect of being’.F u rtherm ore , as transcendent 
beings confronted by and responsible for ourselves, we are also naturally drawn beyond 
ourselves toward infinite ‘Being’ with the knowledge that such being is ‘God’.‘^  ^ Thus
Both quotes from SWI, 238. Classic articulations of this ontological equating of ‘being’ with God-talk 
are also found in Tillich, Systematic Theology 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963): 163- 
289, and Robert Scharlemann, The Being o f God: Theology and the Experience o f  Truth (New York:
Seabury, 1981).
Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 245-6n81 citing Rahner, “Philosophy and Theology,” 77 6:72.
In other words, the general philosophy of being is prior to and grounds the possibility of any and all 
theological claims. ‘There can ...be no existent thing that does not automatically and objectively fit into the 
context of being in general’. Rahner, Hearers o f the Word (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), 96. See 
also 779:127-44.
Johnson explains this as the bi-polar structure of human nature. There is an ordinary, objective 
(categorical) pole and a transcendent (pre-thematic) pole. Our pre-thematic je/^awareness, she says, is a 
kind of ‘presence to ourselves as a subject that accompanies and undergirds all our thoughts and actions’.
This self-awareness is assumed to be awareness of the presence of Infinite Being, as both revealed and 
concealed. Johnson, Consider Jesus, 38-41. Rahner, The Practice o f  Theology, 210. In McBrien’s words:
‘God is not “a” Being separate from the human person. God is Being itself, permeating the person but 
transcending the person as well ... [thus] there is no standpoint from which we can “look at” God 
objectively, in a detached manner, as it were. God is always present within us, even before we begin the 
process, however tentatively and hesitantly, of trying to come to terms with God’s reality and our 
knowledge of God. Accordingly, everything we say about God can be translated into a declaration about 
our existence. God is a constitutive dimension of our existence. To talk about God is to talk about 
ourselves’. Catholicism, 147. How does the finite person ‘know’ this infinite presence from his/her own 
being? According to Rahner, ‘A finite system as such can experience itself as finite only if in its origins it j
has its own existence by the fact that, as this conscious subject, it comes from something else which is not j
i
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theology does not govern our epistemology. Rather, natural theology is an inner factor in 
a general, all-encompassing philosophy of being which governs the ‘truth’ about God, 
humanity and their relation.^ ®® Rahner goes on to explain this in terms of the relation of 
nature and grace inherent in such a view: ‘“[J]ust as the concrete reality of grace includes 
nature as an inner moment within itself, philosophy is an inner moment of theology, a 
condition of the possibility of theology.’” ®^' Grace, first understood philosophically, 
presupposes nature and creates within it the necessary condition for knowing God
Hence Rahner’s neo-Kantian, transcendental reinterpretation of Aquinas’ 
analogia entis carries an epistemological emphasis on knowledge as the most distinctive 
feature of our human life:^ *^  ^ We are ‘the ones who know; indeed, we are the ones who 
know that we know. Consciousness, self-consciousness is the great thing that
itself and which is not just an individual system, but is the original unity which anticipates and is the 
fullness of every conceivable system and of every individual and distinct subject .,. human transcendence 
is not the experience of some definite, particular objective thing which is experienced along side other 
things. It is rather a basic mode of being which is prior to and permeates every objective experience’. 
Taken from Foundations o f Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea o f Christianity, trans. William V. 
Dych (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1978), cited in Colin Gunton, Stephen Holmes and Murray Rae, 
The Practice o f Theology: A Reader (London: SCM, 2001), 210.
As Johnson has previously argued, human thought constructs the inherently relational idea of ‘being’ as 
the all-inclusive category for reality at large, the ‘code word’ for creation and for God its source. 
Nevertheless, she relies on the realities of ‘being’ and ‘God’ as ‘given’ in that they exist prior to and 
outside of our concepts or language. Johnson does not explain how ‘being’ itself can ‘be’ inherently 
relational as an element of all created reality, animate and inanimate, sentient and non-sentient.
Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 245-6n81 citing Rahner, “Philosophy and Theology,” 77 6, 71- 
82; 72.
Geffrey Kelly explains: ‘By seeding Kant with insights from Aquinas, Heidegger and Maréchal, Rahner 
hoped to avoid the dead-end of Kant’s rejection of the possibility of theoretical knowledge of God on the 
assumption that all human knowledge is rooted in sensible intuition. Hence Rahner answered the Kantian 
question, and offered a new understanding of Aquinas, by proposing a transcendental understanding of God 
who is not known by man as an object o f reality, but as the principle of human knowing and reality. Kelly 
summarises, ‘Rahner’s aim in theology is, then, to deepen, enliven, and make explicit the primal, 
transcendental relationship with God in creation and incarnation that activates theological awareness and 
enriches one’s dialogue with the source o f all being and of all theological articulation of the significance of 
such relationship Karl Rahner: Theologian o f the Graced Search fo r  Meaning, ed. Geffrey Kelly 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 38-9, 156 (emphasis added). One feels compelled to ask how to have a 
relationship with ‘being’ as the activating agent of one’s own self-awareness? Despite Rahner’s and 
Johnson’s ‘personal’ language for the concept of being as divine mystery, this is not a description of 
personal encounter between an ‘F and a ‘Thou’.
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distinguishes Embedded in this principle is the foundational Kantian/neo-Kantian
presupposition that the human subject is at the centre of epistemology and revelation, 
setting the terms for what is both possible and actual in terms of God, humanity and their 
relation. As Johnson regularly emphasises, ‘all of our thinking moves from the world to 
God and can never move in the opposite direction. Revelation, by whatever model it is 
interpreted, in no way suspends this law, nor does it dissolve the ultimate mystery that is 
God’, whose essential unlikeness to the finite world remains complete.^ ®'*
The locus of our knowledge of God’s transcendence and immanence is our self­
experience. The history of such knowledge is our historical articulation of that 
experience. This assumption is so fundamental that Rahner actually describes theology in 
terms of one great epistemological moment of self-awareness:
[I]n the case o f God possibility and actuality can only be grasped in a single act o f knowledge. 
Thus from the point of view of ontology, the theology of creation, the theology of grace and 
existence (and all four in one) the question of God can apparently only be stated as one which has 
necessarily already been asked and which has the answer in itse lf ... Hence at the same time the 
question itself says both that God is, and also who God is ...but only as a question concerning the 
very ground sustaining the “question” which we ourselves “are”
This means that the human person is capable of transcending himself or herself in 
the knowledge of God, to whom his or her whole life is oriented; because ‘God’ is 
already present in the person (grace is inextricably bound up in nature).^ ®®
Fergus Kerr, “Rahner Retrospective’ III -  Transcendence or Finitude,” in New Blackfriars (September, 
1981): 370-379; 373.
Johnson, “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 111; “The Theological Case for God-She,” 10; “The 
Incomprehensibility of God and the Image of God Male and Female,” Theological Studies 45 (1984): 441; 
SWI, 104-112, and passim.
Rahner, TI 9:127-44 (emphasis added). Rahner goes on to state that God is revealed every time man 
inquires into anything that exists. Hearers o f the Word, 7-8. Assuming this is so, is God truly free if his 
essence necessarily arises only out of our inquiry?
^  By positing that ‘being’ or ‘Spirit’ is a ‘given’ to be necessarily apprehended as a matter of human 
experience, Rahner and Johnson both hold to the essential aspect of Schleiermacher’s theology, i.e., the 
claim that all humans (whether or not aware of it) are naturally fitted for an encounter with Infinity: We all 
possess the capacity for our experience of, engagement with and activity in the world to be shaped by a 
fundamental intuition of the determination of our being by that which lies beyond it -  what Schleierraacher 
referred to as the Universe, All, the Whole, God, and what Rahner and Johnson refer to as Divine Mystery,
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Johnson, too, asserts that human beings are ‘dynamically structured toward God’; 
thus ‘the human phenomenon ... cries out for the idea of God as the presupposition of its 
own intelligibility’ Although we directly apprehend divine and human reality from our 
own self-awareness, this ‘apprehension’ actually begins at a pre-cognitive level. It is 
grounded in an unthematic pre-apprehension iVorgrtff) of infinite Being as a constitutive 
element of our humanity.^ ®® God is not given to us as a thematized concept, an objective 
‘substance’ of ‘being’ or a personal ‘other’. Rather, we experience God prior to God’s 
being ‘explicitly named’ or objectified within our thematic, conceptual structures. Thus 
we derive the ‘concept from the pre-conception, the name from the experience of the
Infinite Horizon of Being, Absolute Being, ‘the Transcendent’. See Trevor Hart’s discussion in 
“Revelation,” The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (see n. 11) 38-9.
^  With Rahner, Pannenberg and Bultmann, Johnson contends that the question of the legitimacy of God is 
ultimately a human question and answer. As Bultmann declares, ‘Man’s life is moved by the search for 
God because it is always moved, consciously or unconsciously, by the question about its own personal 
existence. The question of God and the question of myself are identical’. Christ and Mythology, 53. 
Pannenberg argues that it is the reality and ‘destiny’ of human beings to be images of God. Thus we can 
conclude, says Johnson, that humans are ‘on the way to their goal of frill humanity [as image of God] in 
communion with the all-encompassing God. This goal ... is already constitutive of human existence’. Like 
Rahner, Pannenberg contends that human beings are in fact ‘a phenomenon [creation] of spirit... Spirit is 
the presence of power and meaning as a constitutive condition which makes [human being] possible... The 
concept of spirit, therefore, sums up the theological depths of the anthropological phenomenon’. 
“Legitimacy of the God-question,” 300, 302. Interchanging ‘Being’ with Spirit, Johnson states: ‘Wherever 
we encounter the world and ourselves as held by, open to ... or yearning for something ineffably more than 
immediately appears ...there the experience of the Spirit transpires’. SWI. 139, 124-5. And yet, says 
Charles Marsh, ‘Johnson does not tell us why this dimension of ‘more’ should be named “Spirit” ... or why 
modernity’s various non-theological and anti-theological accounts of the “more” are not to be preferred’. 
“Two Models,” 62,
Here Rahner has brought Maréchal’s interpretation of Aquinas in critical dialogue with Kant and 
Heidegger, positing congruence between Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, or being-in-the-world and 
Aquinas’ concept of the dynamism of the human mind in making judgments on or about the world. For 
Heidegger, one attains awareness of the self by posing the fundamental question of being in a sensate 
world. Using the concept of Vorgriff as human pre-apprehension of being, Heidegger contended that the 
question of human being/meaning must somehow be directed by a Vorgriff of the w orld’s horizon. Rahner 
believes that putting that judgment through Aquinas’ process o f ‘abstraction’ demands an application of a 
universal, conceptual form which places the knower into a real contact with absolute being, and so he 
redefines Vorgriff to  mean the human pre-apprehension of the infinite horizon of being (‘God’). Kelly, Karl 
Rahner, 7. Fergus Kerr, however, takes issue with Rahner’s reinterpretation of Heidegger’s original 
understanding and use of Vorgriff, concluding that ‘one thing is for sure ... the doctrine of man as 
transcending his situation in the world towards the absolute which is implicitly God is not a doctrine that 
comes from Heidegger’. “Rahner Retrospective,” 376.
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nameless’ Human existence Is primarily a process of being and becoming under the 
attractive force of the primal, creative offering of God’s own ‘self, an offering which is 
always dependent upon the cognition of the human subject to freely recognise and name 
it.
In terms of the God-world relation or the relation between nature and grace, 
creation literally becomes the overflow of divine being as it takes finite form; creation 
derives its symbolic or ‘analogical’ existence from the pre-existent ground of Being.^ '*^  
Says Johnson, ‘God imparts the divine being to created nature: to Jesus in the incarnation 
and to the rest of humanity in the gift of grace, in radical proximity. God communicates 
himself {sic) in his own person to the creature so absolutely that no third thing comes 
between God and the creature^ Or, as Rahner states: ‘If the creation of what is not 
divine is understood dogmatically at the outset as a factor and condition for the 
possibility of God’s absolute self-communication, in which absolute love gives itself and 
not something other than itself, creation as the freely uttered word of the unfathomably 
incomprehensible is then seen as the beginning and the “grammar” o f the divine self- 
expression communicated into the void’.^ '^  Humanity becomes the event of God’s free, 
unmerited, and absolute self-communication.^^^
Johnson tries to explain this in terms of the general concept of the analogia entis, 
which operates from an a priori of ‘efficient causality’ (‘a production out of a cause’). 
Traditionally Aquinas’ theory of analogical predication rests on an interpretation of the
Rahner, “The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology,” 77 4:50. ‘Naming’ or conceptualising God 
from our experience is a crucial but secondary aspect of our primary transcendental orientation.
5'IF/, 238.
SWI, 239,206 (emphasis added).
77 9:127-44 (emphasis added). This, says Rahner, is the beginning of Trinitarian self-revelation, rather 
than the Incarnation.
Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 116.
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doctrine of creation that sees all things as brought into being and sustained by God as the 
‘primary cause’ of the world.^ *'^  He argues, ‘Whatever is of a certain kind through its 
essence is the proper cause of what is of such a kind by participation’; hence, as the 
primary, creating and sustaining Source of being, God gives a share in being to creation 
as God’s ‘proper effect’?'^ Reinterpreting Aquinas’ familiar analogy of this relation, 
Johnson states: ‘[T]he whole world exists by being lit with the fire of being itself, which 
people call God. Every creature that exists does so through participation in that fire, the 
mystery of divine being. The free overflowing of the fire of being who shares this gift 
with creatures, without necessity or pressure, sets up the relationship of participation’.^ '*^ 
Through participation, human creatures share in being as secondary causes, 
‘moved movers’ to whom God gives form and power to act in freedom and autonomy 
and as agents through whom God also acts in the world. '^^ Moreover, creation -  the 
experience of human beings in particular -  is necessary for God to symbolically, 
‘analogously’ express himself as Godfi^ Citing Rahner, Johnson asserts: ‘We exist 
analogously, in and through being grounded in holy mystery, which always surpasses us.
‘Whatever is o f a certain kind through its essence is the proper cause o f what is o f  such a kind by 
participation. ... God alone is actual being through divine essence itself, while other beings are actual 
beings through participation’. Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3, chap. 66.7, cited by Johnson in “Does 
God Play Dice? Divine Providence and Chance,” Theological Studies 57 (1996): 10.
Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?” 10-11. Trying to maintain divine-human distinction, she interprets 
Aquinas to say that God {esse) ‘creates the world by giving a share in that being to what is other than 
G odself. This would mean, however, that ultimate Being somehow creates the world by giving a share o f  
being to what is other than being, something she surely does not ontologically intend to say, since all things 
participate in being In order to be.
Johnson, 5 ^ /, 114.
Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?” 11-12. This allows Johnson to claim that even in her transcendental 
theology, it is not as if  God and creatures stood as uncreated and created instantiations o f commonly held 
‘being’.
‘In itself, the immediacy o f  God is hidden away in our unthematic subjectivity, but this closeness o f God 
as the ground and goal of human existence as spiritual, self-transcending reality emerges naturally and 
spontaneously through human experience. Thus we must engage in the task o f self-description (as a 
phenomenology o f the Spirit) to bring our unthematic experience to light as existential analogies o f being’. 
Rahner, “The Christian Understanding o f Redemption,” cited in Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 
129.
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Holy mystery “always constitutes us by surpassing us and by pointing us toward the 
concrete, categorical realities which confront us within the realm of our experience. 
Conversely, then, these realities are the mediation of and the point of departure for our 
knowledge of God.”’^ '^  We are fundamentally free and historical in that participation. In 
fact, freedom, or human transcendence of the world, is realised only in historical 
experience. Fundamentally, historically free in ‘the freedom of the Cause of our own 
cause’, as we grow in self-knowledge through experience, we also grow in knowledge 
and experience of God.^ °^
This means that God’s Being or ‘Spirit’ exists in real relation to creation. 
Correspondingly, human beings exist in mutual inter-relatedness to God and the cosmos 
as ‘spirit in the w o r l d I n  this lengthy but revealing quote, Johnson summarises this 
understanding and makes the necessary link for women which highlights its appeal as a 
feminist natural theology:
[A] human being is primordially ‘spirit in the world’, that is, an embodied subject whose capacity 
for radical questioning and free and responsible action reveals that person is structured toward an 
ever-receding horizon. This capacity shows that human beings are dynamically oriented toward 
fathomless mystery as the very condition for the possibility o f acting in characteristic human 
ways... Accordingly, the experience o f  God, which is never directly available, is mediated, among 
other ways but primordially so, through the changing history o f  oneself. Rather than being a 
distinct and separate experience, it transpires as the ultimate depth and radical essence o f every 
personal experience ... In the experience o f ourselves at these depths, at the prethematic level 
whence our own mystery arises, we are also grasped by the holy mystery o f God as the very 
context o f our self presence. ... [Citing Rahner] “the personal history o f the experience of God 
signifies, over and above itself, the personal history o f  the experience o f  the self.” Each mutually 
conditions the other. ... [Women’s conversion is] experienced not as giving up oneself but as
SWI, 116, citing Rahner, Foundations o f  Christian Faith, 73. According to Thomistic scholar Battista 
Mondin, Aquinas holds that on the ontological level participation in the perfection ‘being’ is analogous, 
where the first analogate (God) possesses being essentially and therefore by identity (not participation) and 
the second analogate (human) ‘has a limited degree o f  this analogous perfection (though not identical) and 
is therefore said to participate in it. The Principle o f  Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 66.
Johnson, 5 r / ,  65.
SWI, 143. See chapters 1-4 o f Foundations o f Christian Faith for Rahner’s discussion o f humans as 
‘spirit in the world’, as well as John Haught, What is God? How to Think About the Divine (Dublin: Gill 
and Macmillan, 1986).
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tapping into the power o f oneself... in the ontological naming and affirming o f ourselves we are
engaged in a dynamic reaching out to the mystery of God in whose being we participate.
In sum, rather than our personal self-experience ‘being a distinct and separate
experience’ from God, it actually becomes our experience of God. In this way, God’s 
‘self-identity and action are mutually bound and conditioned by the self-identity and 
personal history of every human being. As Rahner has emphasised, “‘in any act of 
cognition it is not only the object known but also the subject knowing that is involved. It 
is dependent not only upon ... the object, but also upon the essential structure of the 
knowing subject ... they mutually condition one another.’” This is true even and 
especially when God is the ‘object’ and human beings are the knowing subjects. God’s 
very existence is given in human existence; hence the history of human self­
transcendence is the mutually conditioned history of the self-communication of God to 
humanity.^ '^' In short, God is dependent on the created nature of the human subject to 
make himself known.
The implications of this are enormous for Christian theology, since it reveals an 
essentially non-‘personal’ view of God. The experience of God transpires as the ultimate 
depth of an individual’s self- experience (in fact, every individual’s self-experience). This 
is not an experience between distinct, separate ‘others’ -  there is no encounter between 
an ‘F and ‘Thou’. God is not the divine ‘Other’ who creates, speaks with and relationally
^  SWI, 65-67 (emphasis added). Kerr argues, however, that in an effort to show the sufficiency o f finitude 
for living and understanding within our social and physical world, there has been an increasing desire 
(since Nietzsche and Wittgenstein forward) to move away from this kind of thinking and ‘to reclaim 
humanity from the power o f that ancient and enticing idea that we can transcend our situation in the world’. 
“Rahner Retrospective,” 377-8.
Rahner, “Reflections on Methodology in Theology,” cited by Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 
245.
Furthermore, this connection is so intrinsic that adjustments in the experience o f one reality necessarily 
affect experience o f the other. Johnson, SWI, 65-6. Rahner, “The Experience o f Self and Experience o f  
God,” 7713:125.
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keeps covenant with humanity, ultimately encountering them in the Incarnation and in the 
revealing, empowering presence of the Holy Spirit.
Additionally, the ‘personal’ distinction of the human being is lost. Here the 
implications are enormous for feminist theology. If, for instance, it were possible to say 
upon encountering Elizabeth Johnson that one did not have a distinct and separate 
experience of her apart from one’s self-experience, but rather, that experience of 
Elizabeth Johnson transpired as self-experience, would this not imply an ultimate 
intermingling? The result would be the loss of each person’s distinctive and particular 
‘human being’. It would be logically impossible to determine the difference between 
them, or to speak of them as distinct, separate subjects (or objects in relation). This 
distinction, however, is fundamental to the humanity and personhood of each one.^ ^^
B. Second Principle: Grace creates in human nature the possibility for and knowledge o f 
the mutually conditioned, divine-human ‘relation \
What exactly constitutes the a priori condition for mutual relation and direct 
knowledge of God such that human beings become the ‘grammar’ and ‘event’ of divine 
self-utterance in their self-experience? In other words, how does ‘grace suppose nature’ 
and ‘nature suppose grace’ in this context? 1
For Rahner and Johnson, one must view God and humanity, grace and nature, 
being spiritual and being human all together because through creation, as the locus of the
IGod-world relation, they are together. The idea of God’s remoteness comes from 1
considering grace as extrinsic to nature or something ‘material’ that is ‘poured into’ |
ireceptive souls. Hence these theologians seek to restore the intrinsic, ‘original unity’
Ironically, in psychology, this pathological phenomenon is central to issues o f co-dependence and 
inadequate child development leading to a host o f adult personality disorders.
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between God’s grace and human existence by reintegrating the ‘supernatural’ world 
‘above’ with the natural world ‘below’. In so doing, they place themselves in direct 
opposition to the traditional Catholic view of the relationship between nature and grace. 
In the traditional view, grace is viewed as totally separate from nature and beyond human 
experience like a superstructure laid very carefully on top of one’s conscious spiritual and 
moral life with as little inter-penetration as possible.^^® The tradition also maintains that 
apart from grace there is absolutely nothing good in the human being. Although human 
nature has a potentia obedientialis or a natural openness toward God as its destiny, its 
orientation and openness toward grace is nevertheless inherently negative. Ultimately, 
this lack of grace in nature is considered to be ‘a deprivation because of a decree of God’, 
and/or ‘an event in the past (Adam’s sin)’, and since we only experience ourselves in 
nature our experience is non-revelatory.^^^
Dissatisfied with this view, Rahner argues for a change in the understanding of 
both grace and nature, a change that Johnson wholly endorses. No longer is ‘supernatural 
grace’ viewed as an ontically present but inactive, non-existential ‘state of grace’ that 
leaves human beings essentially unchanged as complete, closed systems.^^ ® Rather, they 
argue, if Catholic theology considers grace not only to be ‘pardon for the poor sinner’ but 
also ‘sharing in the divine nature’, then the idea of grace as a ‘created state’ in the order 
of being cannot be maintained. Grace must not be thought of as separate from nature and 
thus ‘materialistically’ given or ‘infused’ in human nature as a ‘physical accident’. 
Instead, ‘uncreated grace’ (the essence of grace or the inner life of God) is considered
Rahner, Nature and Grace: Dilemmas in the Modern Church, trans. Dinah Wharton (1964), cited by 
Kelly, Rahner, 96-110.
Nonetheless, humans are justified and can do ‘just works’ through faith in the Church’s teaching o f the 
existence and ‘extrinsic’ application o f grace. Nature and Grace, cited by Kelly in Rahner, 97-98.
Nature and Grace, cited by Kelly in Rahner, 101.
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part and parcel of the ‘gift’ of being human.^^  ^Grace is not external to being human or 
beyond human consciousness as a superstructure built upon a hypothetical ‘pure nature’. 
Nor is grace separate fi’om God or mediated by anything other than God as Spirit to 
human beings as ‘spirit in the world’. In Johnson’s words, in grace we are not dealing 
with some ‘third thing’ apart fi*om the inclusive gift of the Spirit. We are ‘graced’ through 
participation in God’s own gracious being as an element of human selfhood and 
existential transcendence.'^^"
Thus grace and nature are united in human experience such that grace is both 
God’s self-communication to us and the ‘natural’ effects of that communication: ‘From 
the very first this grace cannot be conceived as separable from God’s personal love and 
human beings’ answer to it’.^ '^ By positing this relationship between God and the human 
addressee as a necessary one, God’s grace becomes ‘the divinizing condition’ of a 
person. As such it presupposes and incorporates into itself (Godself) the whole reality of 
this person as the condition o f its (God’s) own possibility Ultimately, ‘^ God in his own 
proper reality makes himself the innermost constitutive element o f  man" as grace, which 
unites itself with nature through the ‘supernatural existential’ of being human.''^  ^ What 
exactly does this mean?
Variations on this same theme can be found in Henri de Lubac, The Mystery o f  the Supernatural (New 
York: Herder, 1967); Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience o f Jesus as Lord, trans. John Bowden 
(New York: Seabury, 1980); Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought o f  
St. Thomas Aquinas (N&w York; Herder, 1971).
Johnson, SWI, 214-15, 124.
Kelly, Rahner, 102.
Kelly explains that somehow, '‘while remaining wholly other, God’s presence in grace becomes 
intertwined with the entire process o f the creative transformation o f the se lf . Rahner, 43.
Rahner, “The Christian Understanding o f Redemption,” TI 21, 250; “A Summary o f the Notion o f  
Revelation,” in Foundations o f Christian Faith, 170-172; “The Scholastic Concept o f Uncreated Grace” 
and “The Relationship Between Nature and Grace,” in, TI 1:319-346, 297-318. Because ‘grace’ as God’s 
own being is not static and disparate from nature in this view, it does not fall into categories like 
‘prevenient’, ‘efficacious’, even ‘common’. He also absolutely avoids clearly defined moments when grace 
is accepted or rejected by people or ‘making distinctions based on speculation’ as to whether a person
84
In Rahner’s interpretation of the analogia entis, we are ‘naturally’ oriented toward 
God (our potentia obedientialis) in that we are radically open to and capable of receiving 
grace.^ "^' This radical capacity is ‘the supernatural existential’ which modifies or 
necessarily conditions the basic structure of the human person and permeates the whole 
of their existence and experience, acting as the catalyst toward union with ‘the divine’. 
This is not grace itself, but only God’s ‘offer of grace’, which enables human beings to 
freely accept or reject grace whether they are conscious of experiencing it as grace or 
not.^ "^ In other words, as a constitutive element of human being and as God in God’s self­
communication, grace ‘supernaturally’ transforms the ‘essential structure’ of the human 
spirit toward God.
Thus grace modifies nature as a precondition of its own possibility, and nature 
presupposes grace in its existential reality. This means that human nature is actually
remains in pure nature or fallen nature or whether he or she is elevated to the ‘supernatural’. Rather, God is 
ever present in enhancing one’s freedom, uplifting consciousness, provoking awe, unrest, and ‘movements 
o f love’, all o f which lead to a deepening experience of both God and the self. Kelly, Rahner, 43.
Barth considers this to fly in the face o f the biblical view. The Word o f God does not rely in any way on 
an expectation of finding ready recipients o f His gracious offer o f forgiveness, suggesting that they can 
meet God part way in his offer o f grace. The doctrines o f sola gratia and justification by faith through 
grace assume that God covers the whole distance himself and then meets only opposition. ‘When the Word 
becomes incarnate, the human response is to crucify him in an act o f supreme defiance which epitomizes 
the general truth about man’s so-called capacity for God. It is precisely because God can rely upon this 
response that he is able to turn the tables on man and transform his typical act o f rebellion and hate into the 
very fulcrum of his own redemption. Thus, according to Barth, what is required is no mere rejigging or 
repolishing or repairing o f human nature; but rather the crucifixion o f  the flesh, and the raising up o f a new 
creature’. Trevor Hart, “The Capacity for Ambiguity; Revisiting the Barth-Brunner Debate,” Regarding 
Karl Barth (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 163.
Kelly calls the supernatural existential a ‘short rubric’ for humanity’s relationship with God by virtue of  
their human existence as never apart from grace. Kelly, Rahner, 110. Others argue that this concept is 
highly unstable, however: ‘If the theologian emphasizes the universal aspect denoted by the term 
existential, the concept may easily fall into intrinsicism and become little more than another religious a 
priori [sic] like Schleiermacher’s God-consciousness. If one puts forward the supernatural aspect, [it] may 
easily fall into extrinsicism and become little more than another theological assertion about the 
transcendence o f God’s self-revelation’. Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, I tf’* Century Theology: God 
& the World in a Transitional Age (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1992), 246-7.
Kelly notes, however, that ‘Although Rahner insists that this “supernatural existential” is not grace 
itself, it seems clear that he looks on this aspect o f God’s impacting on one’s being human as a necessary 
preamble to the actual moment of graced relationship between God and God’s people. Hence the terra 
“existential,” borrowed from Heidegger, indicates that what God effects in the human soul is intrinsic to the 
whole structuration of one’s humanity’. Rahner, 110.
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never ‘pure’. It is ‘nature superformed’ (though not necessarily justified) by the 
supernatural grace offered to it. Thus, grace and nature, God and humanity are united, 
even ‘ assimilated’
[I]t is not at all a bad thing that in this analysis o f human being as potentia obedientialis [as 
essentially open to the divine life] there has been no “chemically pure” description o f pure nature, 
but mixed in with it there are traces o f elements o f historical nature, that is nature possessing 
grace’. The nature o f a spiritual being and its supernatural elevation are not like two things laid 
one beside the other, or one against the other, which must either be kept separate or the one 
exchanged for the other. The supernatural elevation o f a human being is the absolute (although 
unmerited) fulfillment o f a being ... The “definition” o f the created spirit is its openness to infinite 
being; it is the creature because o f its openness to the fullness o f reality; it is a spirit because it is 
open to reality as such, infinite reality. ... We experience our nature where we experience grace; 
grace is only experienced where by nature there is spirit’
Johnson reiterates this concept in her description of Rahner’s view of God’s 
trinitarian Self-communication:
Rahner’s fundamental insight, worked out in categories o f transcendental theology, springs from 
the Christian experience o f Jesus in the Spirit interpreted as the very self-communication o f God. 
In incarnation and grace God imparts the divine being to created nature: to Jesus in the incarnation 
and to the rest o f humanity in the gift o f  grace, in radical proximity. God communicates himself 
(5 /c) in his own person to the creature so absolutely that no third thing comes between God and 
the creature. Rather, God himself is the gift.^ ^^
This ultimately goes beyond the concept of the analogia entis, which rationally 
assumes knowledge of God as first cause through ‘efficient causality’. Instead, to know 
God’s ‘gracing presence’ as ‘uncreated grace’ requires an a priori ‘quasi-formal 
causality’ as the basis for the entitative modification of the human being. This causal
Contrary to the tradition and the Fathers, Rahner presupposes that the ‘conjunction o f the Holy Spirit in 
particular with man is a proper and not merely an appropriated relationship’. Thus grace is not ‘accidental’ 
but constitutes humans “‘as subjects fit to receive the substantial gift o f the divine essence ... it assimilates 
man to God’s nature considered as the principle o f his possession of himself in Trinity; and thus it at once 
becomes the causa formalis o f all the properties o f man’s supernatural elevation.’” Rahner, cited by 
Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 238-9. This position is utterly rejected by the tradition (as 
pantheism) for lack o f a necessary God-world distinction.
Nature and Grace, cited by Kelly, 104-107. The word quasi is meant to remind us that this forma 
remains absolutely transcendent and free despite the necessary ‘assimilation’ o f nature and grace that 
makes knowledge, conversion and forgiveness possible. Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 240. 
While Rahner does not see this ‘mix’ as a problem, Moinar, however, argues that the inability to 
distinguish between human nature and ‘actual nature’ (grace) results in the greatest possible loss according 
to Christian tradition -  that of divine and human distinction. “Can We Know God Directly?” 238. 
^^^SWI,2Q6.
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concept provides the formal basis of the human being’s analogia entis and the foundation 
of his/her relation with God/^" It is by quasi- formal causality (‘taking up into the 
ground’) that we are essentially enabled to know ‘the supernatural mysteries’ (e.g., the 
hypostatic union, the beatific vision, and the supernatural bestowal of grace) in our self­
experience. The ‘proper affect’ of quasi-formal causality is that we are assimilated to ‘the 
Spirit’ and thus have a direct apprehension of the divine in this life.^ "" This means that 
God needs an addressee and recipient of his grace to realise himself. As God’s self­
communication, says Rahner, grace ‘must always presuppose as a condition of its own 
possibility someone to whom it can address itself and someone to whom it is not 
owed’.^ '*^
Rahner restates this premise from the side of creation: ‘ [T]he creation, considered 
as the constitution of the non-divine ‘out of nothing,’ is revealed as the prior setting and 
condition for the supreme possibility of [God’s] imparting himself Ultimately, then, 
mutual conditioning is not a free choice by God but a necessity in order for God to be 
God. Human existence is to be in order for God to be which radically undermines the
Our ‘entitative divinization’ allows us to directly apprehend God in this life, bringing ‘the beatific 
vision’ into lived experience as a matter o f  ‘created grace’ without altering the ‘uncreated grace’ o f God’s 
transcendence, immutability and freedom. Furthermore, argues Rahner, if  (a) grace and glory are two 
stages of the one process of divinization, and (b) as classical theology has always held, in glory God 
communicates God’s self to the supernaturally elevated created spirit in a communication not of efficient 
causality (something distinct from God) but rather the quasi-formal causal communication o f  God, then (c) 
this can also be applied to grace. From here, he claims, ‘the bridge to the mystery o f the incarnation and the 
Trinity is easier to find’.
Moinar argues that this is really no different than the object o f one’s initial dynamism o f spirit which 
recognizes ‘being’ in general. “Can We Know God Directly?” 239.
242 “Philosophy and Theology,” TI 6:73. Moinar discusses the implications o f the freedom o f grace and of 
God himself given these assumptions in “Can We Know God Directly?” 245-6n81,
“Christology in the Setting o f Modem Man’s Understanding o f  Himself and His World,” 77 11: 215-29; 
220.
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concept of autonomy and freedom in relation for either God or human beings as distinctly 
themselves in that relation/'*^
This lack of distinction is apparently does not present a problem for Rahner: 
‘There is no particular difficulty for a metaphysics of knowledge in seeing that 
transcendence ... the natural openness to being as a whole, is not clearly distinguishable 
in reflection afterwards from the supernatural transcendence, by grace, of the Spirit’. 
Neither is it problematic for Johnson, who fully endorses Rahner’s transcendentalism at 
this point. In fact, it is a necessary principle for her own panentheistic, relational 
ontology. Our existential experience is essentially identical to, mutually conditioning and 
conditioned by God’s ‘graced’ revelation. ‘Rather than a distinct and separate experience, 
[experience of God] transpires as the ultimate depth and radical essence of every personal 
experience’.^ '*" We are ‘grasped’ by the ‘the holy mystery of God’ (or ‘divine being’ or 
‘Spirit’) ‘as the very context of our self-presence’ at the pre-thematic depths of our own 
personal ‘mystery’
While not problematic for Rahner and Johnson on one level, this lack of 
distinction is nevertheless a serious concern in Christian theology. It is precisely the 
ability to distinguish between what is God and not God that rests at the heart of the 
Christian faith. Hence, this ought to be of great concern for Johnson as a Christian and as 
a feminist. Given her commitment to uphold the value of women’s distinction, one would 
assume that women’s particularity would be threatened, either by her universally 
normative principle or by the idea of God as ontologically indistinguishable.
^  Taken to its limits, is Johnson actually arguing that God was not in a truly actualised sense until creation
w asl
Nature and Grace, cited by Kelly, 103 (emphasis added). 
SWI, 65.
SWI, 65.
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c. Third Principle: In grace, we are ‘always and from the beginning redeemed sinners \ 
Since grace is never ‘conferred’ as a gift separate from human nature nor is 
human nature and freedom to be conceived of totally apart from grace, Rahner argues 
that new meaning must be given to the Catholic axiom simul Justus et peccator based on 
this existential adjustment, '^*® If grace and nature are this inextricably bound together, 
however, is there a place for ‘sin’ or a ‘sinful nature’ in this view?
Johnson deals with sin both from a liberal feminist standpoint (in generally 
systemic terms) and from a natural, transcendental standpoint that again follows Rahner’s 
lead. First, Johnson wholeheartedly endorses the position taken by Catholic feminists 
regarding human nature, the imago Dei and the doctrine of atonement as set forth by 
Rosemary Ruether in her explanation of the ‘necessary’ shift fi*om ‘otherworldly’ to ‘this-
worldly’ redemption:
Feminists reject the classical notion that the human soul is radically fallen, alienated from God, 
and unable to make any move to reconcile itself to God, therefore needing an outside mediator 
who does the work o f reconciliation for us. Instead the human self is defined through its primary 
identity as image o f God. This original goodness and communion with its divine “ground of  
being” continue to be “our true nature?"" [Despite the seriousness o f evil and its human element] 
... this does not change our potential for good. We are alienated or out o f touch with this potential, 
but experiences o f consciousness-raising ... begin a process of conversion, getting back in touch 
with a better self and reconstructing personal and social relations. An external redeemer is not 
necessary for this process o f conversion, since we have not lost our true self rooted in God.^ **^
Johnson affirms that we are essentially ‘good’ in our ‘graced’ nature and are thus
inclined toward ‘the highest good’ (God). In transcendental terms, God leaves us free to
follow the strivings of our natural inclination that aims us toward the ever-receding but
all-encompassing horizon of divine ‘love’ and ‘goodness’ and correspondingly influences
As human freedom is always modified and qualified by grace, so too, says McBrien, grace is operative 
only insofar as it interacts with, and radically transforms human nature. Catholicism, 183.
Ruether, Women and Redemption, 275. Thandeka articulates this same position from a process 
standpoint, using the category o f grace. Tntersubjective theology [neo-Schleiermacher] calls our experience 
of this infinite moment o f our life grace. Grace is the liberation of the self from the confines o f conceptual 
schemes, socially constructed identities, public policies ... These human-imposed restrictions of the self are 
sin’. “TTie Self Between Feminist Theory and Theology,” 96 (emphasis added).
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our own actions.^"" Women, however, are still ‘getting in touch’ with their essential 
goodness as, through a process of conscientization and conversion, they exercise their 
freedom as self-determining agents. ‘In this situation grace comes ... not as the call to 
loss of self but as empowerment toward discovery of self and affirmation of one’s 
strength, giftedness, and responsibility’.^ "' Sin, then, is not a human ‘condition’ but rather 
‘an exercise in human freedom’ against God’s self-communication of love and mutuality, 
hence against oneself and others. In short, it is tied to destructive human choices and their 
systemic consequences.^"'^
Rejecting Pannenberg’s equating the doctrine of sin ‘interpreted in a thoroughly 
Augustinian-Lutheran trajectory’ with the ‘centrality’ of the structure of human existence 
as ‘alien to the mentality of other Christian traditions’ and lacking ‘the universality of the 
more basic argument for the legitimacy of God-talk’, Johnson opts for Rahner’s 
understanding of original sin.'^ "" Rahner defines ‘sin’ and the phenomenon of ‘guilt’, 
respectively, as ‘an actualization of transcendental freedom in rejection’ and ‘closing 
oneself to the offer of God’s absolute self-communication’.^ "'* Though we are radically 
threatened by guilt, we are not subject to ‘original sin’ as the transmission of the ‘moral 
quality’ of Adam’s actions, ‘whether this be through a juridical imputation by God or
Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?” 12-13.
Johnson, SWI, 64. Johnson describes this ‘coming into being of suppressed selves’ as a ‘deeply religious 
event’, an experience o f the ‘redeeming’ God o f the oppressed. Johnson follows Valerie Saiving’s long­
standing analysis that the classical understanding o f conversion as ‘the process of disowning oneself or 
divesting oneself o f ego in order to be filled with divine grace’ does not apply to women. Whereas the 
pride-filled, ruling male needs ‘a decentering work o f grace’, the marginalized female finds that grace 
enables her to assert her selfhood and worth.
Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, “Our Companions Enfolded in the Love o f Spirit-Sophia: Mariology and the 
Communion o f Saints in the Theology o f Elizabeth A. Johnson,” in Things New and Old, 84.
Johnson, “The Legitimacy o f the God Question,” 300-301. Johnson refers to ‘other Christian traditions’ 
without identifying them, distinguishing between them or explaining what makes them ‘Christian’ or not 
from her fi’ame of reference.
"^'* Rahner, Foundations, 115, 93.
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through some kind of biological heredity’.'^ "" In other words, there is no human 
transmission of personal sin since this would violate and negate both Adam’s free, 
personal transcendence (which by its very nature is non-transmittable) and our own. We 
are free in our most human moment to choose for or against God’s self-communication 
in/of of grace, because we are ‘the event of God’s free and forgiving self­
communication’ The supernatural existential establishes the dynamic quality of our 
‘nature’ as open toward God’s ‘self-communication’ prior to sinP’
As Rahner explains, our whole spiritual life takes place ‘within God’s will for our 
salvation, God’s prevenient grace, God’s call making itself heard; all this is going on, 
perhaps unrecognized in our conscious sphere of existence’. Preaching is merely the 
awakening and making explicit of what is already there in the depths of human beings, 
not by nature but by grace ... sinners and unbelievers too, as their very sphere of 
existence which they can never escape from’.^ "® Because of this, and our freedom to 
‘transcend’ evil, Johnson ‘repudiates’ the doctrine of atonement as the death of Jesus 
required by God in repayment of sin, a death that he sought or intended ‘in a masochistic 
desire for victim status’.'*"® Rather, Jesus’ death was contrary to the desire of God; ‘an act 
of violence brought about by threatened human men, as sin, and therefore against the will 
of a gracious God’.^ "" An ‘historical reading’ of Jesus’ ministry thus indicates that he did
Rahner,Foundations, 111.
Rahner, Foundations, 116. Contrary to Barth, as we shall see, Rahner and Johnson claim that when we 
are at our most ‘human’ we are utterly free to choose for or against God’s self-communication.
Rahner, Foundations, 123.
Nature and Grace, cited by Kelly, 104-105.
Johnson, Friends o f God, 43; SWI, 158. Although ‘brokenness and sin are everywhere’, and we are all 
‘equally involved’ in it, ‘[sjuch a view today is virtually inseparable from an underlying image o f God as 
an angry, bloodthirsty, violent and sadistic father, reflecting the very worst kind of male behaviour’.
Johnson, SWI, 158. Harold Wells, who is generally supportive o f Johnson’s theology, states that this 
charge overlooks two things: ‘First according to these same sources it was Christ who “emptied him self... 
and became obedient to the point o f death, even death on a cross” (Phil. 2:7-8), who “gave himself for me”
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not ‘come to die’ in a preordained act of vicarious satisfaction. Instead, ‘his execution 
was part of his free, larger commitment to the flourishing of life in solidarity with 
others’.^ "' The cross then is viewed as ‘a dialectic of disaster and powerful human love 
through which the gracious God of Jesus enters into solidarity with all those who suffer 
and are lost’.^ "^
If we never exist apart from grace, then even in our sin we remain open to the 
possibility of God’s grace as conversion and forgiveness.^"® The absolutely gratuitous 
nature of God’s self-communication is ‘prior to any and every sinful rejection of God by 
a finite subject’ and as such triumphs over such rejection.®"'* This is not merely forgiving 
grace (as a kind of secondary priority) but is the a priori grace of God’s free love which 
God makes the intrinsic principle and the ‘object’ of human actualization.®"" In an essay
(Gal. 2:20). What is taught here is the free and willing self-giving of Christ for us. Second, the charge 
overlooks the unity o f Christ with the will o f the Father, the deep inner communion o f Jesus-Sophia with 
Mother-Sophia, thus seeming to forget the equality o f the divine persons that Johnson has so emphatically 
asserted and to ignore the communicatio idiomatum that she affirms elsewhere’. “Trinitarian Feminism,” 
341-342.
®"* Johnson, “Jesus and Salvation,” Proceedings o f the Catholic Theological Society o f America 49 (1994), 
1-18, 15. This view does not consider the possibility o f  Jesus’ free act in the crucifixion because it rejects 
the possibility o f or need for God’s free act o f atonement. Absent is any sense o f God’s freedom, 
particularly freedom-in-relation, in the event o f the cross. Wells also takes issue with Johnson at this crucial 
point: ‘Does she not run here the danger here o f replacing a theology of grace with one of moral 
admonition? Or is this a theology o f easy grace, without wrath or judgment?’ “Trinitarian Feminism,” 341- 
342.
®"® Johnson, SWI, 159 (emphasis added). By contrast, the ‘contingent historical narrative’ o f liberation and 
political theologies ‘discloses the hope that God intends to put an end to all the crosses o f history’ through 
his participation in the pain o f the world. Nevertheless, the cross remains ‘but its symbolic nexus’ changes. 
‘It stands in history as a life-affirming protest against all torture and injustice, and as a pledge that the 
transforming power of God is with those who suffer to bring about life for others’. “Jesus and Salvation,” 
15; “The Maleness o f Christ,” 112. And yet, she does not indicate how the transforming power o f God is 
with those who suffer or how it brings about ‘life’.
®"® The call o f God to conversion and forgiveness would be meaningless, says McBrien, ‘unless there were 
some basis in the human person for responding to the call. Grace supposes even in the sinner the capacity 
to receive it’. Catholicism, 182.
®"^* Rahner, Foundations, 123.
®"" ‘In the one and only concrete, real order o f human existence, what is most intrinsic to man is God’s self­
communication at least as an offer, and as given prior to man’s freedom as the condition o f its highest and 
obligatory actualization ... This is so because in the concrete order man is himself through that which he is 
not, and because that which he himself is, inescapably and inalienably, is given to him as the 
presupposition and as the condition o f possibility for that which in all truth is given to him as his own in
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on the symbolic nature of Mary as the ‘first disciple’ whose life is characteristic of ‘the 
Church’ as a graced people, Johnson makes the same connections fi'om the same 
presuppositions:®""
Every human being is surrounded from the beginning o f life and before the exercise o f freedom  
with God’s redemptive love and fidelity. God’s universal salvific will implies not only a design on 
God’s part but an actual effect in human existence which would be different if  grace were not so 
continually offered, ... [In relation to ‘original sin’] “sin” refers not simply to a condition that 
precedes in time the giving o f grace, but further to a condition that “coexists dialectically with the 
offer to human beings o f salvation and grace.” Human beings always originate from both Adam 
and Christ, in sin and grace, and have to ratify one or the other in situations o f freedom  -  but not 
as if  it were an equal contest. Grace is always and everywhere more powerful than sin. And not as 
i f  sin first established itself and grace were given as a subsequent repair -  we are “always and 
from the beginning redeemed sinners.”®"®
If, states Johnson, we are in the realm of Christ’s redemption (as an expression of 
grace) from the first moment of our existence, then simply put, ‘grace is more original 
than sin’ and more or less eradicates its effects on our human nature.^^^ We are 
nevertheless responsible to act out that grace in ways that eradicate sin’s historical 
effects. As we are ‘assimilated to’ and have direct apprehension of God, we participate in 
the ‘salvific’, ‘gracious’ Being and action of God through our own being and action.®"®
absolute, free and unmerited love: God in his self-communication’. Expressing this again in terms o f nature 
and grace, Rahner explains that ‘God wishes to engage in self-communication, to pour forth the love which 
God is. That is the fimt and the last o f  God’s real plans and hence o f God’s real world too ... God creates 
human beings ... in such a way that they can receive this love ... and that they can and must at the same 
time accept it for what it is [the unexpected, unexacted g ift].... As unexacted, not only because they do not 
deserve it as sinners, but further because they can also embrace it as unexacted when, already blessed in 
this love, they are allowed to forget that they were sinners once’. Foundations, 123, 124; TI 1: 309-17 
(1961), cited by Kelly in Rahner, 111 (emphasis added).
®"" An article o f this kind regarding the being and identity o f  the Church is paradoxical to say the least, 
when such ‘graced nature’ and ‘being’ belongs unconditionally to all o f humanity.
®"® Johnson, “Tlie Symbolic Character o f Theological Statements about Mary,” Journal o f Ecumenical 
Studies 22 (1985): 312-35, 331-32. Here she cites Rahner (emphasis addai). In this study Johnson 
explicitly states that while Mary is a symbol o f redeemed humanity, she is not the archetype or prototype. 
The prototype is ‘Jesus Christ crucified and risen from the dead’ (326).
268 Symbolic Character,” 331,
®"® Thus we come full circle back to the inextricable bond between grace and nature, God and humanity, 
and with it a critical blurring of divine-human distinction. In chapter three we will look more fully at the 
ramifications o f ‘salvation’ without a theology o f atonement.
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D. Fourth Principle: Divine ‘incomprehensibility’ equals Neo-Kantian ‘unknowability’ 
and experience o f  the ‘Nameless \
After arguing for direct apprehension of God through human experience, Johnson 
simultaneously makes what sounds like a contradictory claim -  that God is ultimately 
‘unknowable’. This fundamental agnosticism is extremely problematic for distinguishing 
between divine and human reality and identity. Nevertheless, it is also fundamental to 
Johnson’s view of ‘naming’ the divine. It stems from her Rahnerian presupposition that 
God is essentially ‘nameless’.®®" Methodologically, this means that although we always 
stand directly before God, we do so as before the unknown, ‘nameless’ ground of Infinite 
Being. Without question our experience of the ‘nameless’ is experience of God.®®' What 
is at question is how we interpret this experience: indeed, whether we interpret this 
experience correctly, thus accurately (however inadequately) explicating our implicit, un­
objectified knowledge of the true God.®®®
Basically, Johnson and Rahner equate what Aquinas and the Christian tradition 
describe as ‘divine incomprehensibility’ (that God is beyond human understanding with
®®" Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 230nl3.
®®' ‘Because o f the finitude of our knowledge in the absolute and infinite breadth o f our transcendence, God 
is the one who is forever unknown . . .[God is] the infinite who, in his infinitude, can be known by man only 
in the negation implied in the ultimate limit o f all finitude’. Rahner, Hearers o f the Word, 83, 81.
®®® Moinar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 230. Grace gives us epistemic access to a transcendental 
revelation o f God through our own experience that also corresponds to a rational understanding o f God 
through what Rahner calls ‘natural’ and ‘categorical’ revelation (distinguished as such to preserve God’s 
freedom in creation). According to Rahner, categorical revelation is the mediated or indirect revelation that 
we thematize in our own time and place in history. Categorical revelation takes ‘thematic’ form in a myriad 
of ‘categorical’ ways in history and among these categories is ‘Christianity’. Christian revelation, however, 
is only ‘a species, a segment o f the universal, categorical history o f revelation’ though it is ‘the most 
successful instance o f the necessary self-interpretation o f transcendental revelation’. Johnson and Kelly 
applaud Rahner for undermining the ‘imperialism’ and ‘theological arrogance’ o f Christianity’s claim that 
God’s revelation began only with Judaism, was limited to the God o f Abraham and Jesus and was perfected 
only in the Christian church. All experience is a primary mediation o f divine presence and absence. 
Religious communities simply thematize the Spirit’s offer o f grace through their own diverse narratives and 
rituals. Rahner, Foundations o f  Christian Faith, 153-61, 170-75. Johnson, SWI, 124; Kelly, Karl Rahner, 
128.
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Kantian ‘unknowability’ (that God is beyond human knowledge). The Christian belief 
that God is essentially greater than we can ever understand is reinterpreted to mean that 
God is essentially unknowable and ultimately ‘nameless’ apart from human experience 
and naming. This move intentionally bypasses even the possibility that God has revealed, 
named and made himself known in human history as God through Jesus Christ and the 
Spirit. In fact, says Johnson, the ‘idea of divine incomprehensibility is not watered down 
with the advent of God in Jesus Christ’; moreover, it ‘would be a serious mistake to think 
that what the Jewish and Christian traditions confess to be God’s self-revelation through 
powerful acts and inspired words in history removes the ultimate unknowability of 
God’.^ ^^  Though she affirms God’s utter transcendence (and immanent presence) as 
historically central to Judeo-Christian faith, we ‘can never wrap our minds completely 
around this mystery and exhaust divine mystery in words or concept s’ j
i
Certain Catholic reformists like LaCugna argue that ‘it is never altogether i
!Iaccurate to say that God is incomprehensible or ineffable; these and similar words do not 1
iso much tell us something about God as indicate the limits of human language and |
knowledge’ Johnson, on the other hand, claims that when it comes to the concept of j
Ironically, Johnson defends this interpretation from  Scripture. SWI, 106-107 (emphasis added),
274 104-105. As historical ‘defenders’ of this common truth Johnson lists such diverse theologians
as Anselm, Luther, Simone Weil and Sallie McFague, comparing as similar things ‘Luther’s stress on the 
hiddenness o f God’s glory in the shame o f the cross’ as the atoning self-sacrifice for sinfiil humanity, and 
‘McFague’s insistence on imaginative leaps into metaphor since no language about God is adequate and all 
o f it is improper’. McFague would not consider Luther’s language to be inadequate or improper, but false, 
as any language would be that assumes a real knowledge o f God, i.e., the Incarnation, or that perceives the 
human condition as ‘sinful’ and in need o f atonement.
LaCugna argues that apophasis and analogy is based on what we do know and can say about God, 
however inadequately, because o f God’s own self-revelation in human history. From her own interpretation 
of Augustine and Aquinas she contends that theological concepts, systems, and language about God ‘must 
correspond to the fact that we do know the essence o f God, though always indirectly, by means o f  the 
manifestations of God’s being in the works o f creation and the personal self-revelation o f God in Christ and 
the Spirit’. God For Us, 332.
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God as mystery, then (per Augustine) ‘5'/ comprehendis, non est Deus '^}^^ Revelation is 
the history of a deepening awareness of God as incomprehensible mystery. Revelation 
does not mean that mystery is overcome by gnosis ‘bestowed by God’. God’s unveiling is 
always a simultaneous, historically conditioned veiling, which is not from capricious 
hiddenness on God’s part or as a result of the sinful condition of humanity; rather it is 
proper to God as ‘wholly other’ Even Aquinas, she claims, did not consider ‘the 
situation brought about by what is referred to as divine revelation’ to alter this essential 
‘unknowability’.^ ’  ^Even ‘and especially in’ revelation he considered God to be ‘blessedly 
present but conceptually inapprehensible, and so God ... outside all classes and 
categories and finally beyond the possibility of being imagined or conceived
Interpreting Augustine, the Fourth Lateran Council and Aquinas as all saying the 
same thing, Johnson explains that God is ultimately nameless since no name can truly 
express the divine nature.^®” In defense of speaking of the nameless God on the basis of
105.
SWI Following Barth’s language o f  God’s being as veiled and unveiled, Rahner argues that 
incomprehensibility is not one o f  but the attribute o f God’s attributes. Johnson echoes this by stating that 
God as mystery is not something to be cleared up but rather it ‘belongs to the very essence o f God as God 
so to b e \  See Rahner’s own discussion in Foundations, 44-89; and “The Human Question o f Meaning in 
the Face o f the Absolute Mystery o f  God,” T I28: 92, 94. Jhis understanding o f  God’s being as essentially 
veiled from human comprehension for Barth, however, does not mean that God is unknowable. In God’s 
unveiling in Jesus Christ, God has freely determined to be known and to elect humanity for himself and 
himself for humanity. Here he has spoken his definitive Word in, as and among humanity -  that God with 
us is God fo r  us. This knowledge o f God in Jesus Christ leads us to knowledge o f  true humanity as well.
Johnson and Rahner use the term veiling to constitute unknowability, which seems to depend on human 
self-knowledge as the vehicle for assuming toward (?) or ‘knowing’ God.
Aquinas states that even when we ‘see’ God in heaven, God’s actual, infinite, incomprehensible being 
will be beyond our created understanding. Johnson, SWI, 109. j
5117,105,109. I
^  Thus she contends that the Christological and Trinitarian formulations o f the first ecumenical councils i
mistakenly gave the impression that revelation cleared up pre-Christian ignorance rather than maintaining 1
God’s essential incomprehensibility (i.e., unknowability). Augustine supposedly highlighted the 
inadequacy o f dogmatic, creedal assertions by insisting that all speaking o f the ineffable God must be born 
out o f silence and ignorance and return there. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) emphasised that |
“‘between Creator and creature no similarity can be expressed without implying that the dissimilarity J
between them is ever greater.’” This understanding received “paradoxical clarity” in the thirteenth century ]
concept o f theological speech, not as univocal or equivocal, but analogical, finding its paradigmatic |
i
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transcendental Thomism, she interprets Aquinas’ via analogia to be characterized ‘by a 
powerful apophatic element, a theological agnosticism more pervasive than has usually 
been acknowledged’/^' Even for Aquinas, she declares, ‘the situation brought about by 
what is referred to as divine revelation’ does not change the agnostic character of human 
speech about God. Even when speaking of the Trinity, our knowledge and language
Iproceed ‘under the sign of not-knowing’ that she interprets Aquinas to have laid down j
!earlier in De Deo Uno. This is ‘true for all human knowing of divine mystery, whether j
!that knowledge arises from traces of God in creation or from the revealed word’.
IWhat we receive from early Christian theology, then, ‘is a pattern of positive fIjaffirmation coupled with agnosticism of definition, both essential to the truth of God’.^ ®^ j
1Though she admits that ‘revelation gives certain key images not attainable through |
natural reason, as well as the gift of a clearer intellectual light by which to understand 
them, it does not unveil the divine nature or give human words precision: ‘Even in faith
expression in Aquinas. Johnson, SWI, 106-109, 113, 115, citing Augustine, De Trinitate, 7.4.7., ‘Z)5 806’ 
found in The Christian Faith: in the Doctrinal Documents o f the Catholic Church, J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, 
ed. (New York: Alba House, 1981), 109, and Summa Theologiae I q. 12-13.
SWI, 108-109.
SWI, 109-110. This interpretation, however, ignores Aquinas’ argument that the Trinitarian names are 
actually ‘proper’ names given by God and not subject to the same rules o f analogy when speaking o f God 
in his unity. In De Deo Uno Aquinas contends that how we name God in his unity corresponds with how 
we know God from reason and the natural world (such that knowing precedes naming). In De Deo Trino, 
however, he argues that we cannot know God on this basis. By natural reason we can only know what 
belongs to the unity o f the essence, not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Aquinas goes on to 
assert that the divine names Father, Son and Spirit derive from God’s nature, not God’s economic Self­
revelation (though he presupposes this revelation from Scripture). In other words, the persons and their 
names belong to God ‘m divinis\ They are given to us by God in his revelation and known by faith as a way 
o f hjowing what is otherwise unknowable ‘from below’. ST, la q.32, A.I.
283 1 1 1 , She makes this assertion despite, for instance, that while Aquinas exclaims in the Summa that
‘God surpasses the power of a limited intelligence by very excess o f truth’, he nonetheless prefaces this 
statement with the claim that God is ‘in himself supremely knowable’. Johnson cites Maimonides {De 
Potentia 7, 5) as a ‘marvellous illustration’ o f how negation evokes a sense o f the unknown God. Yet it is 
precisely at this point that Aquinas seriously criticises Maimonides’ negative theology in favor of the via 
analogia which he claims prevents God-talk from bordering on or blending into agnosticism by following 
any negation with a supereminent ‘yes’. As Thomistic scholar Mondin emphasises: ‘It is ...clear that in 
Aquinas the negative way is not a form o f agnosticism but a way o f expressing the transcendence of God’s 
perfection, which is recognized to be beyond any concept many may form either from material or spiritual 
beings’. The Principle o f Analogy, 99. Summa Theologiae 1 ,13, 2.
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we remain united to God as to an unknown’/®'' This leads Johnson to summarise Aquinas 
as positing that ‘Ultimately, the highest human knowledge about God is to know that we 
do not know, a negative but entirely valid knowing pervaded by religious awareness’ 
which Johnson and Rahner refer to as the ‘burning experience of agnosticism’/®^
Such negation does not lead to an agnostic void but simply to an ‘agnosticism of 
definition’. Since God is ‘given’ as an element of human being/knowing, this negation, 
argues Johnson, compels human affirmation to transcend itself toward its term, 
transcending self-awareness to awareness of the divine: God who always ever greater, 
divine mystery beyond knowing and naming. Returning to Rahner’s transcendental 
concepts of Vorgriff, she argues that this ‘knowing’ is accomplished ‘in a judgment of the 
human spirit that affirms God to be inconceivable while at the same time intuiting that 
the perspective opened up by the intelligible contents of a concept gives a view of God 
that is trustworthy ... God is darkly surmised while remaining in essence conceptually 
inapprehensible\^^^ Moreover, divine ‘inapprehensibility’ is at the heart of theology 
insofar as it is the very condition for the possibility of the human spirit’s self-
284 1 1 0 . Johnson does not tell us, however, what those key images are, or how, in her theology where
reason and revelation are two sides o f the transcendental coin, ‘revelation’ (grounded in human self- 
awareness) can give clearer intellectual light than human rationality (also grounded in human self- 
awareness!), Perhaps we are to assume that her interpretation o f Sophia is one o f  those key images.
®^^ SWI, referring to Aquinas, In Boethius de Trinitate 1, 2, ad I; De potentia 1, 5, ad 14. Some of her 
Thomistic contemporaries disagree. Francis Martin specifically argues against Johnson’s presumption that 
the theologians she cites share her equation that ‘incomprehensible always means completely unknowable’ 
is something that contradicts the witness o f believers. He goes so far as to say that her use of the notion of 
incomprehensibility ‘is like that o f  Lindbeck’s Crusader who proclaims Christus est Dominus! while 
splitting an infidel’s skull -  the phrase is correct, but its actual use falsifies it’. Martin, TFQ, 263. We 
would also ask how it is, if  Johnson ultimately affirms that she knows that she cannot not know divine 
being, that she can write a book about ‘the right way to speak about God’ {She Who Is) and argue her case 
from a ‘truthful’ transcendental feminist anthropology that assumes a direct correlation between human 
knowing and divine and human being?
286 114 (emphasis added). We ‘intuit’ being in general ‘from wonder that anything exists at all’ and
the ‘metaphysical shock’ of realising the possibility o f ‘nonbeing’ (237). Here Johnson also states that our 
concept o f God confesses the incomprehensibility/unknowability o f holy mystery. Such talk o f an 
‘inapprehensible concept’ is not only ironic given Johnson’s rather creative anti-realist position but seems 
logically impossible. How we can construct a concept that is inherently beyond our apperception?
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transcendence in knowledge and love. Without the incomprehensible God as the horizon 
and ultimate fulfillment, ‘the human project itself would meet an impenetrable limit such 
that the human spirit would shut down, having no further depths to plumb’.
E. Fifth Principle: Positing God as Nameless, Unknowable Being safeguards God’s 
radical otherness while God is simultaneously experienced as an element o f  human 
existence.
Johnson ceases to hold with the traditional view of ‘no real relation’ between God 
and the world (foundational to Aquinas’ understanding of the analogia entis and via 
analogia). Here ‘classical theism’ contends that the world exists always and everywhere 
outside of divine being -  making panentheistic, mutual indwelling an ontological 
impossibility.^®® Though she appreciates the non-coercive aspect of divine freedom 
inherent in this doctrine, Johnson finally rejects Christian theism at this point, stating that 
‘no amount of explanation suffices to overcome the instant and deep impact on the 
human spirit today of talk about God who has no real relation to the world’.^®® God’s 
freedom in this way simply fails to be theologically compatible with an a priori of mutual 
interrelation as the most foundational reality of all.
Nevertheless, Johnson acknowledges that she must develop a theology of the 
God-world relation that keeps a radical, asymmetrical distinction between them if she is 
to remain in continuity with the Christian tradition. Hence she turns again to the concept 
of ‘incomprehensibility as unknowability’ -  even in faith we remain united to God as to 
an unknown (despite our mutual, panentheistic interrelation!). She posits that if God 
ultimately cannot be known, or understood, then it is because God is radically ‘Other’,
2®’ 5 r / ,  111.
SWI, 230. 
^ '^^SWI,221.
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and vice versa. She supports her claim philosophically and theologically by tracing what 
she considers the compatibility of the idea of divine incomprehensibility with ‘otherness’ 
in early Greek philosophy and the biblical tradition. The philosophical idea of God’s 
inaccessibility to human conceptualisation is ‘rooted in the idea that the origin of all 
things must be totally different from the everyday world of multiplicity and change. 
Because finite and transitory structures cannot be traced back to their origin, the 
incomprehensibility of the one source is assured. This affirmation o f  radical otherness 
became wedded to Christian thought regarding the unknown God still present in the 
world and history’ By making the following affirmation, Johnson believes she 
safeguards God’s transcendence even while experiencing God in her self-experience:
The holiness and utter transcendence o f God present throughout all creation has always been an 
absolutely central affirmation o f the Jewish tradition and its grafted branch, Christian faith. God as 
God, ground, support, and goal o f all, is illimitable mystery who, while immanently present, 
cannot be measured, manipulated or controlled. The doctrine o f divine incomprehensibility or 
hiddenness is a corollary o f this divine transcendence. In essence, God’s unlikeness to the corporal 
and spiritual finite world is total. Hence human beings simply cannot understand God.^ '^
290 107 (emphasis added). Johnson draws support for this position both from Rahner {Foundations,
75-89) and Piet Schoonenberg, The Christ, and “God as Person(al),” in A Personal God? {Consilium 103), 
ed. Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas van lersel (New York: Seabury Press, 1977). Schoonenberg emphasises 
the relation between the scholastic concept o f participation and modem forms o f panentheism. As Rahner 
discusses the concept o f ‘radical distinction’ between absolute Being and ‘creatureliness’, however, there 
are points o f seeming contradiction considering his assertions that creation is the necessary and mutually 
conditioned grammar o f  God’s self-utterance. Furthermore, his philosophical discussion arguably 
‘categorises’ God as the infinite, absolute Ground who supposedly fits ‘no categories’. It is the category o f  
finite ‘creatureliness’ that presupposes radical difference and radical dependence on God from the side o f  
creation, and, by these same principles, presupposes that God as absolute and infinite must be absolutely 
different. In short, Rahner sets the categorical parameters and conditions for God’s ‘non-categorical’ 
otherness based on his a priori ontological principles -  because God is infinite Ground and thus 
‘independent’ o f creation, God must be radically, unloiowably ‘other’ or God would be the object o f our 
knowledge and comprehension. Objective knowability does not fit the conditions o f the category o f  
absolute Ground, so even as we name and objectify God through our metaphysical and conceptual 
reflection, God’s difference is insured according to his over-arching principle o f causal relation. ‘As a 
spiritual person, man implicitly affirms absolute being as the real ground o f every act o f knowledge and of 
every action, and affirms it as mystery. This absolute, incomprehensible reality, which is always the 
ontologically silent horizon of every intellectual and spiritual encounter with realities, is therefore always 
infinitely different from the knowing subject. It is also different from the individual, finite things known. It 
is present as such in every assertion, in all knowledge, and in every action’. Foundations, 77. |
SWI, 104-105. j
1 0 0  i
Î
In short, by (paradoxically) categorically asserting that God is outside all 
categories, Johnson grounds her claim that God is ‘radically other’; asymmetrical related 
to but distinct from creation. She agnostically asserts that what she cannot ultimately 
‘know’ in a Kantian sense must be God, and ‘God’ automatically ‘escapes’ her 
thematizing or categorising. The assumption of this infinite, qualitative difference 
between God and the world is foundational to her methodology and relational ontology: 
‘I stretch the Thomistic pattern into the shape of panentheism, while maintaining its 
presupposition of God’s otherness’.
Meanwhile, however, experience or awareness of God is so foundational that it is 
considered concomitant with one’s self-experience or self-awareness. This primordial 
human experience of God’s ‘radical otherness’ coupled with a fundamental agnosticism 
about this experience creates the possibility -  even the necessity -  of interpreting this 
experience in multiple ways. And yet, this is precisely where Johnson begins to run into 
difficulty in her approach.
II. Problems with Appealing to ^Experience'
The first section of this chapter outlined the transcendental principles that Johnson 
relies on in her theology of experience. As we will observe in the next chapter, she tries 
to wed these to her feminist relational principles in order to describe the God-world 
relation in female, panentheistic terms. In the remainder of this chapter, however, we will 
show how Johnson’s transcendental theology actually comes into conflict with her 
feminist principles. Though the latter also support a theology of experience, they do so 
based exclusively on women’s gender rather than the all-inclusive category of human
^  “Review Symposium,” 343.
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experience. This creates an inherent contradiction in Johnson’s approach. She also 
continues to face critical questions of distinction as she appeals to ‘concomitant 
experience’ of both God and women, as we shall see.
A, Conflicting A ppeals
Gendered v. Transcendental ‘Experience’
With such a thoroughgoing transcendental epistemology, it is ironic that Johnson 
would begin her relational ontology/doctrine of God by arguing (1) for the right way to 
speak about the ‘mystery of the God recognizable within the contours of the Christian 
f a i t h u s i n g  (2) a particular ‘interpreted’ experience of ‘conversion’ (women’s self- 
affirmation as imago Dei), and, (3) most significantly, by appealing to a particular 
gendered experience as the source, criterion and validation of ‘the way things truly are’.
Johnson acknowledges, at the beginning of She Who Is, the tremendous 
difficulties that she faces in developing a feminist doctrine of God and God-talk -  
difficulties that are inherent in her reformist agenda:
This project is fraught with complexity. Not only is the referent o f the word God utterly 
incomprehensible, the fathomless mystery that surrounds the burning mystery o f our own lives, so 
that it is impossible to do justice to the subject. Not only are Scripture and tradition historically 
ambiguous monuments to patriarchy’s view o f its own rightness, so that the contribution o f the 
Christian heritage cannot be simply presumed or easily retrieved while at the same time it 
continues to be a source o f life for millions. But women’s interpreted experience is as diverse as 
concrete women themselves so that “the” perspective o f women is not a unity nor immediately to 
hand.’I 294
This appears to be so severe (and ultimately so self-contradictory) that one 
wonders how Johnson believes God-talk of any kind to be possible. Here are her 
assumptions: (1) That the referent we name from our experience is utterly 
incomprehensible; (2) That Scripture and tradition, Christianity’s historical sources and
293 SWL 8.
10, 29 .
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criteria for knowing and naming that referent, are ‘ambiguous monuments’ in need of 
reform (despite being the source of life for millions); (3) Scripture and tradition are to be 
rejected because they represent patriarchy’s view of its own ‘rightness’ based on 
(inadequate) male experience', (4) Women, on the other hand, are in the position to judge 
this as ‘wrong’ based on the ‘rightness’ of their own experience-, (5) Women’s experience 
is not uniform, however, and so cannot in fact be used universally to refer to God or to 
draw inferences about women’s ontology or existential experience/^^
Johnson holds these assumptions loosely, however, or uses them to her advantage 
when she deems it necessary. Ultimately, however, when it comes to experience as the 
epistemological source of divine reality, Johnson reveals that some experience is valid 
and some is not. This is the fundamental assumption of feminist hermeneutics. On the 
other hand, Johnson has made abundantly clear that to be human is to experience the 
divine, and to name one’s experience is to name ‘the wholly other, blessedly present but 
conceptually inapprehensible’ (who is also the God of the Christian faith!)^^  ^This raises 
numerous problems. How can she have both a feminist and a transcendental 
anthropology and epistemology when the appeal to gendered experience judges certain 
transcendental experience as invalid for knowing and speaking of God?
When delineating her anthropological position, Johnson considers herself an 
essentialist. In short, she repudiates any claims to an ontologically gendered ‘type’ of
Hence Francis Martin asks what reformists like Johnson fail to ask in the form o f self-critique; ‘If the 
text itself, or the traditional interpretation o f it, is the product o f a totalising and power-laden form of 
discourse, where is the norm by which this new understanding can prove itself to be free from the same 
kind of power-discourse? May it not be a means by which a new elite, through the use of power, imposes 
itself on the rest o f humanity, even in the name o f liberation?’ “Feminist Hermeneutics,” 123.
SWI, 6 1 ,105.
Serene Jones classifies Johnson among those feminists who rest on the ‘rock’ of essentialising 
methodology by employing a universalising and/or ahistorical fi-ame of reference to structure accounts of 
human experience. “Women’s Experience Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Feminist, Womanist, and
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human being but rather makes a transcendental appeal to an essential humanity. Each 
individual is constituted by multi-polar variables (physical, social, historical, etc.). In this 
model, Johnson claims to be Toath to stereotype any characteristic as intrinsically 
masculine or feminine’. She further acknowledges that it is ‘short-sighted’ to single out 
sexuality or gender as more fundamental than any of the other constants that make up the 
‘multi-polar identity’ of a human being and claims to reject an ideal homo in favour of 
‘diverse ways of being human’.
Thus, there is both a transcendental appeal to essential humanity, and an appeal 
to the transcendental human experience o f the divine as constitutive of each person’s 
essential and existential humanity. By making a transcendental appeal when arguing for 
an essential humanity and access to the divine, Johnson objectifies as ‘common’ certain 
ontic and noetic possibilities as constitutive of all human experience as human. As such, 
the transcendental appeal is not to any actual description o f  experience but to the 
conditions o f its possibility as a universal, ‘human’ experience.^^  ^For her then to use the 
term to make claims for a unique kind of transcendental experience through gendered 
appeals appears suddenly to make ‘transcendental’ experience private, self-contained and 
immune from justification.
This is unavoidable, however, given the priority of Johnson’s commitments. For, 
despite her essentialist claims, she strives to make theological, sociological and structural 
reforms as a feminist first. Thus, she is compelled to look for an ideal homo of ‘human
Mujerista Theologies in North American,” in Horizons in Feminist Theology, 34. Johnson agrees with 
Jones’s assessment in “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 95, noting that it is motivated by ‘common sense 
concerns for justice’. Such essentialist claims come under the most severe criticism from postmodern, post- 
structural and ‘context-specific’ feminists. Chopp, “Theorizing Feminist Theology,” in Horizons in 
Feminist Theology (see n. 126) 223.
^  Women, Earth, 25; “The Maleness o f Christ,” 111.
See George Schner’s discussion o f the same in “The Appeal to Experience,” Theological Studies 53 
(1992): 40-59, 51.
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beings’ as a model for restructuring relational communities; but it is not based on women 
and men together. Rather, she considers women’s ^moral development and psychology-, 
women’s ways of knowing-, women’s ways of loving', women’s ways of living bodily' to 
be marked specifically ‘by an intrinsic connectedness quite different from the male ideal 
in classic and contemporary culture’ The Western male ideal is ‘deficiently human' 
while women’s patterns of affiliation and mutuality (i.e., that which is consistent with 
divine being) are ‘constitutive o f their e x i s t e n c e 'Women’s experience is given 
primacy as ‘constitutive of the mature person’. Hence gender and sexuality become 
value-laden, despite all ‘essential’ or ‘transcendental’ claims to the contrary.
This goes far beyond women’s ‘ways of being’ as socially constructed. Johnson 
borders on making ontological claims about female ‘goodness’ that supersede the 
inherent human goodness presupposed in her natural theology.®®^  By positing a ‘better’ 
kind of human being, and putting herself in a position to judge the essential ‘goodness’ of 
another, Johnson recreates the most insidious form of sexism -  one based on a claim to 
ontological superiority.®®® Despite Johnson’s claim that by grace we are all intrinsically, 
transcendentally open to divine mystery in a way that is concomitant with all self­
experience, men’s self-understanding and relationality is finally considered to be 
distorted. Hence men are dependent on women for what is not intrinsically available to 
them. Their difference is not only ‘wrong’, but they are necessarily and relationally 
subordinated to women’s ontological and existential reality and epistemic access to
®oo 68, 71. Here Johnson echoes Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) and Jean Baker Miller, Toward 
a Psychology o f Women (Boston: Beacon, 1976).
®°' Johnson, SWI, 68, 225 (emphasis added).
®®^ Angela West beautifully exposes this assumption in Deadly Innocence.
®°® Daphne Hampson is explicit: ‘Feminists claim that their way o f conceiving reality, their way of 
understanding the self in relation to others, is ethically superior to the oppositional stance o f  male thought 
and behaviour’ {Theology and Feminism [Oxford, Cambridge, MA: 1990], 150).
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‘truth’. Does this mean that their nature, as transcendental awareness and self-experience, 
is not graced}
As Johnson develops her relational ontology, she makes two significant claims:
(1) ‘In the perspective I am delineating two options are ruled out: reverse sexism, which 
would place women in dominant positions to the diminishment of men, and a sameness, 
which would level out genuine variety and particularity, disrespecting uniqueness;®®'* and
(2) ‘Discourse about God from a perspective of women’ experience ... prizes a genuine 
dialectic between God and the world that safeguards difference while preserving 
connection’.®®^ Johnson is obviously aware of the disastrous effect it would have on her 
reformist efforts to accuse Christianity of sexism and then perpetuate a reverse sexism as 
the new ‘subject’.®®*^ And yet, in her use of dominating principles, has Johnson avoided 
this problem? By giving ontological and epistemological priority to women’s gendered 
experience, does she not place their experience in a dominant position?
Johnson argues that only by stripping Trinitarian theology of its ‘masculinity’®®’ 
will the Triune ‘symbol’ provide an ethical model for human community, relationality 
and ethics. While she opts for female language to balance out men’s assumedly gendered, 
transcendental self-experience (traditional God-talk), she claims that this not an
®°'* SWI, 32.
®®® SWI, 226.
®®^WJ,28,32, 54-56.
®®’ Including that o f Jesus - Johnson appeals to his generic ‘humanity’ while ironically arguing for women’s 
gendered distinction. Cf. “The Maleness o f Christ.” Catholic theologian Nancy Dallavalle argues that 
Johnson’s gendered image for God both undermines her argument for one essential human nature and 
perpetuates the ‘divine gender’ problems her Christology seeks to negate: ‘Since she has clearly and 
correctly rejected the hypostatic “leakage” o f Jesus’ biological sexuality to Christ, ... Johnson muddies her 
argument when she invokes Sophia as a kind o f corrective complement for Jesus’ human maleness, a 
characteristic she has already dismissed as irrelevant to the argument’. “Neither Idolatry Nor Iconoclasm: 
A Critical Essentialism for Catholic Feminist Theology,” Horizons 25/1 (1998): 25-27 (emphasis added). 
As Fulkerson asks Johnson: ‘By posing “She Who Is” do we really move beyond gender binaries? Or do 
we simply move beyond the obvious subordination o f the feminine to the masculine, thereby creating two 
competing (binary) equals?’ See Fulkerson’s review o f She Who Is: The Mystery o f God in Feminist 
Theological Discourse, in Religious Studies Review 2 \ (January 1995): 23.
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‘either/or’ but a ‘both-and’, ‘equivalent’ choice. Male metaphors are not inherently bad, 
‘for men too are in the image of God and may suitably serve as finite beginning points for 
the reference of God’.®®® Exclusive use of traditionally Christian Trinitarian language 
(specifically Father, Son and Holy Spirit), however, forms a ‘stranglehold’. It becomes a 
literal, patriarchal, ‘graven image, a finite representation set up and worshiped as i f  it 
were the whole o f  divine r e a l i t y ' Such speech ‘fails both human beings and divine 
mystery’. It is ‘an idol’ that perpetuates the devaluation and marginalization of women as 
less than co-bearers of the imago Dei (and explicitly not capax De/).®'®
All of Johnson’s assumptions are summed up in her defense of her gendered name 
for ‘divine being’:
‘SHE WHO IS: linguistically this is possible-, theologically it is legitimate', existentially and 
religiously it is necessary if  speech about God is to shake off the shackles o f idolatry and be a 
blessing for women ... With this name we bring to bear in a female metaphor all the power carried 
in the ontological symbol o f absolute relational liveliness that energizes the world’.®"
Despite Johnson’s affirmation of equivalent images, she argues that ‘extended
theological speaking about God in female images’ are a ‘condition for the very
possibility’ of equivalent imaging given that the scales have been historically weighted in
one direction for so long. In other words, female imagery needs to dominate our idea o f
God until such time as we create a conceptual ‘balance’, the by-product of which will be
®°® 5117, 33.
®°^  SWI, 39-40.
®'® SWI, 18-19, 36. According to Grace Jantzen’s definition, “idolatry” is always a name assigned by an 
outsider, as opposed to what is seen to be happening by the worshipping group. She also correctly notes 
that ‘to identify something as an idol, it is necessary first to know what God is. From a feminist 
perspective, the obvious question is who decides what is or is not divine and by what criteria’. “Idolatry,” 
Dictionary o f Feminist Theologies, 148. Ironically modern feminism also claims along Kantian lines that 
God cannot be ‘known’ and so generally judges ‘divinity’ by ethical criteria.
®" SWI, 243. Incredibly, this promotion o f  a gendered ideal is precisely what she accuses classical theism 
of affirming in her negatively gendered critique: ‘Is this idea o f [the independent God] not the reflection of 
patriarchal imagination, which prizes nothing more than unopposed power-over and unquestioned loyalty? 
Is not the transcendent, omnipotent, impassable symbol o f  God the quintessential embodiment of the 
solitary ruling male ego, above the fray, perfectly happy in himself, filled with power in the face o f the 
obstreperousness o f others? Is this not ‘man’ according to the patriarchal ideal?’ SWI, 21.
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relational transformation. For ‘only if God is so named, only if the full reality of women 
as well as men enters into the symbolization of God ... can the idolatrous fixation on one 
image be broken and the truth of the mystery of God, in tandem with the liberation of all 
human beings and the earth, emerge for our time’.®'^  In short, Johnson defends the value 
of her approach by appealing to a dominating reverse sexism as universally necessary for 
the moral good as it connects to the Absolute Good. While she does at least acknowledge 
that female imagery does ‘not necessarily lead’ to her ideals since it too can become 
idolatrous over time, in her judgment, the ‘benefits outweigh the dangers’.®'®
However, if knowledge of the divine is made on the basis of a transcendental 
appeal, then she cannot also claim that historical Christian doctrine is ‘incorrect’ on this 
basis since it derives from the transcendental conditions of all experience, which de facto 
includes the experience of the (male) historical community. ‘Experience’ and 
‘community’ coincide at this point. The appeal to experience is an appeal to the 
community and its tradition or inherent structure. Doctrine could only be denied if the 
transcendental conditions are denied. In George Schner’s study of the different types of 
appeals to experience in theological discourse, he points out that this would not only 
involve ‘the contradiction of denying what one is using for the denial’, but it also fails to 
remember ‘the social, mediated and linguistic character of the kind of consciousness’ to 
which Johnson is actually appealing.®'"
The Ambiguous, Experiencing ‘Self
SWI, 56.
®'® SWI, 45.
®'" “The Appeal to Experience,” 52.
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Despite Johnson’s continued emphasis on relationality, she maintains a 
foundational reliance on some form of the modernist ‘Cartesian self when she speaks of 
women in her transcendental anthropology/'^ She underscores that it is the autonomous 
female ‘self who is in relation and who determines her own self-reality and identity as 
well as the conditions of her relational ‘world’. This epitomizes the modern sense of the 
knowing and experiencing subject who is simultaneously an object for its own self­
reflection and self-determination and ‘identity’.®'*^ ‘Identity’ becomes a matter of ‘self­
talk’ which, concomitantly, is a matter of divine identity and God-talk.
This means that the female self, on the one hand, is understood to be 
ontologically, necessarily and interdependently related to God and the rest of the cosmos, 
while, on the other hand, she has the capacity (1) to be an object to herself, (2) to 
apprehend within her own self-awareness the Nameless mystery of relational being which 
is essentially unlike her, (3) to recognise that this mystery is the ‘God’ who created her 
and who exists in mutual coinherence with (while asymmetrically distinct from) her, and
®'^  In Changing the Subject (see n.lO), Fulkerson critically analyses this view o f the modern self and 
wholly rejects the notion in favour o f a poststructuralist understanding of the intersubjective character o f  
self-knowledge and its roots in social location. Noting feminism’s unique emphasis on relationality and 
particularity that extends this basic liberal notion o f the self, Fulkerson nevertheless criticises the inherent 
modernist appeal to an ‘essential woman’ that transcends all particularities. Even in anthropological 
theories like Johnson’s that seek to be ‘multipolar’ (integrating but not merging these particularities), the 
assumption is that there is a neutral, universal referent ‘woman’ who experientially shares with other 
‘women’ a common ‘humanity’ and experience o f oppression. Fulkerson states this Cartesian notion o f  
self-knowledge not only avoids ‘the theological wisdom that holds the self to be mired in self-deception, 
but such a view is the Cartesian subject’ (27). Anthony Thiselton also emphasises that Christian wisdom 
includes an account o f human nature that ‘accepts the capacity o f the self for self-deception and its 
readiness to use strategies of manipulation’. Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self: On Meaning, 
Manipulation and Promise (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 13. For Barth, this is definitive o f the 
human condition in need o f grace which makes impossible the discernment of truth through natural means. 
®'^  In other words, the female subject becomes her own self-referential ‘passive object of reflection’ and her 
‘self-knowledge’ is the attempt to describe an accurate mimesis o f her true self. ‘As she reflects upon 
herself, the subject grasps her own identity. The subject has as an object o f knowledge some idea or 
representation that is taken to be inherently true to her identity, her (deepest?) real se lf . Not only does this 
avoid the theological wisdom that holds the self to be mired in self-deception, argues Fulkerson, ‘but such a 
view is the Cartesian subject’ that feminism challenges as non-relational. Changing the Subject (see n.lO) 
27-28. See also Torrance, “The Self-Relation, Narcissism and the Gospel o f Grace,” 491n37.
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(4) to name this God as the Christian God or any other ‘symbol’ of her choice that 
promotes her ‘full humanity’. Is this a view of the experiencing ‘self constituted by its 
relations or of the self who is still deemed to have a level of autonomy for fear that too 
much interdependence is a loss o f ‘freedom’? Actually, it is both, and more.
Linda Woodhead points out that more complex views of the ‘self than simply 
‘modern’ or ‘Cartesian’ exist in much contemporary ‘theology’ or philosophy today, 
views that require further nuancing.®" Using Woodhead’s analysis, it seems that 
Johnson’s thought actually reflects three distinct forms of the ‘self (embedded in 
different cultural ‘strands’).®'® First is the ‘bestowed self, embedded in the authoritative 
strand of culture, oriented toward an authoritative source of morality and truth. Looking 
beyond the self to understand and perfect the self, the bestowed self considers human 
identity to be construed in terms of one’s network of relations which function as its 
authoritative site. Second, the liberal humanistic strand embeds the ‘rational self whose 
identity is construed in terms of possessing a rational nature and free agency. This 
bounded self-differentiated self thinks, knows and discerns the proper ‘laws’ that order 
all things and can locate itself within that wider order. While the rational self is sovereign 
within its own individual sphere, it considers this privilege to accrue equally and 
universally to all human beings. Third, located in the expressive strand -  which grounds
®" “Theology and the Fragmentation o f the Self,” InternationalJournal o f Systematic Theology 1:1 (March 
1999): 63-72. Woodhead’s analysis is actually a refutation o f the general assumption that the modern- 
postmodern self is ‘fragmented’ and destabilised, which she argues is based on a unilinear view o f history 
(as moving through identifiable stages or ‘catch-all periodizations’ - premodern, modem and postmodern), 
and the unsubstantiated but generally uncontested belief that there was a ‘premodern age’ peopled by stable 
‘selves’ and identities. Her goal is to preserve the insights o f the fragmentation thesis without its 
generalisations regarding modernity and current crises in identity. Alternatively, she recasts the 
fragmentation theory based on multiple theories and modes o f selfhood by generalising four ‘strands’ of 
modern culture categorised mainly by Tipton, Bellah, Taylor and then identifies the particular form o f  
‘selfhood’ embedded in that cultural possibility. “Theology and the Fragmentation o f the Self,” 51,57-59. 
®'® We are focusing on Johnson’s three most prominent ‘types’ (out o f Woodhead’s four).
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truth in subjective reality -  is the ‘boundless self. Unlike the bounded, rational self, it 
refuses to see itself as self-differentiated from God, other humans or the natural order.
Despite their surface differences, Woodhead observes that the boundless self is in 
essence the bestowed self. Nevertheless, the boundless self stands neither in relation to 
nor in isolation from God but rather (along with the rest of the natural world) is totally 
immersed in the divine as a part of her own essence. It is this individual but ontologically 
interrelated, boundless self that seems to be the human being Johnson envisions in 
panentheistic, divine-human and cosmic interrelation: ‘All creatures from the personal 
self to the nonsentient cosmos are mutually related and exist in an interplay of 
communion thanks to her presence. At the same time each individual is gifted with its 
own integrity, the Spirit being at once the source of individuation and community, of 
autonomy and relation’.®'^
In addition, the boundless self is also in essence the rational self While 
continuing to manifest the modern ‘turn to the subject’ and thus usurping those privileges 
formerly reserved for God, the boundless self simply takes further -  or takes over -  the 
rational selfs exaltation of human goodness, freedom and self-determination. In short, 
the boundless self completes the process the rational self begins: ‘Now the self is seen as 
omnipotent and as intrinsically good, the source of all value and the creator of all 
meaning. For the boundless self, morality becomes a matter of self-expression, and the 
self-referential notions of authenticity become the key virtues’.®^®
In its more religious renderings this strand o f selfhood speaks o f the self as having two modes: the 
everyday, phenomenal, limited self (the self with a small ‘s’), and the true, unfathomable Self, 
which is one with all (the self with a big ‘S’). For the boundless and sacralized self, the goal of
SWL 134.319
320 «xheology and the Fragmentation o f  the Self,” 63.
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human life is to break through the illusion, which is the ‘se lf  to the divine reality which is the
‘Self.®^*
Johnson describes us as being at our most human in these breakthrough moments, 
toward which we are dynamically oriented. Speaking metaphorically, she explains how 
we experience the Self of God in our self-experience: ‘The Pantheon, an ancient shrine 
now a Christian church in Rome, offers an architectural analogy. We are not capped off, 
so to speak, but like that structure have a hole in the roof that admits a ray of sun and rain 
and toward which our spirits, in the shadows, ascend’.®^® This transcendental metaphor, 
however, is central to her description of women’s interpreted experience o f mutual 
relationality in the imago Dei as specific to women’s way o f beingl This transcendental 
experience is gendered or sexually derived, and as such points to the larger truth of divine 
relationality. Women’s way of relating -  ‘marked by equivalence between persons, a 
concomitant valuing of each other, a common regard marked by trust, respect, affection 
in contrast to competition, domination or assertions of superiority’ -  shows this to be true 
of God: ‘God’s activity is discerned in divine, free, mutual relation rather than in divine 
distance, rule, and the search for submission’.®^® Thus, it appears that women’s 
relationality is given to them in their ontology, and they have transcendental access to 
this reality. What then of essential humanity, or transcendental anthropology, or all 
humans as ‘selves-in-relation’? The inner contradictions seem blatant and 
insurmountable.
®^' “Theology and the Fragmentation of the Self,” 63. This notion of the boundless self lends itself most 
easily to a spiritual rendering, the most striking o f which, argues Woodhead with Paul Heelas, is the New  
Age movement which explicitly celebrates self- divinization. See Heelas, The New Age Movement (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996).
SWI, 65.
®^® SWI, 68-9.
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B. The Feminist Dilemma o f  Difference 
Dominating Appeals
Johnson mentions above that one of the complexities she faces in developing 
God-talk based on women’s experience is that women’s experience and perspective is 
neither shared nor ‘immediately to hand’. Thus Johnson spends vast amounts of her book 
explaining what women’s relational experience is and how it expresses the relationality at 
the heart of all things. Again, Johnson’s efforts are feminist -  to show that it is ‘women’s 
way of being in the world’ that sheds light on this truth -  and thus the right way to talk 
about God is a ‘female’ way, despite her assurances that God is not gendered. 
Understandably, the question -  for feminists and non-feminists like -  is ‘what constitutes 
‘women’s’ experience?’ and what exactly is that an appeal to?
This question highlights another hidden irony, which is now an overt concern, in 
feminism’s historical appeals to experience. This stems from the fact that, whatever 
nuances the term has taken on over time, its original -  and continued appeals -  were and 
are both hermeneutical and rhetorical. Both of these forms, in their own way, gain their 
strength by appealing for a dominant position that is inconsistent with the other.®^ " For 
instance, when Johnson appeals to women’s ‘interpreted’ experience of conversion, it is 
an attempt at a rhetorical appeal. This is used to invoke a supposed common ground in 
which to place and reconcile differing opinions among feminists. And yet, ‘experience’ in 
this kind of appeal does not refer to anything nor does it add anything to the content that 
follows. Instead it derives from the need to give emphasis to what follows, i.e., it justifies
®^" For Schner’s identification o f the four general rules that govern the philosophical notion o f experience, 
regardless o f differing epistemologies or psychologies, see “The Appeal to Experience,” 46-51.
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her ability to describe her relational ontology as a feminist theology beneficial to women, 
men and creation/^®
By emphasising an ideology or ‘form of life’ (e.g., ‘women’s way of being’), 
however, rhetorical appeals implicitly call into question the authenticity or credibility of 
other conversation partners and their opinions -  including other women. Rather than 
simply naming the ‘authentic articulation’ of how an individual functions as a human 
being, it appeals to that ‘experience’ as the warrant for its acceptance as an authoritative 
norm or model for a form o f life over a particular community (in this case, ‘all 
humanity’).®^  ^This appeal, states Schner, is essentially a claim for the dominance of one 
opinion over another, for the right of the opinion to be heard and possibly determinative 
of thought, speech, or action,
not on the basis o f content or the logic used to construct the argument, but because of the genesis 
and possession o f the opinion by a particular person or group ... It carries a sophisticated, even if  
intuitive, awareness that opinions in their differing are the articulation o f differing principles, and 
that more is at stake than simple self-assertion. However, the appeal to experience can inaugurate 
a foreclosure on the necessary dialectic o f  opinions rather than initiate it. When the appeal is 
actually a demand for “my experience” to be dominant, to overcome and displace the other 
opinions o f the conversation, then the appeal to experience degenerates to an appeal to authority in 
the pejorative sense, resulting in an antinomy o f opinions at best, and an unmoving opposition at 
worst.® ’^
Not only is true distinction suppressed in this dominating appeal, its rhetorical 
nature results in what Schner calls ‘a rarefied abstraction’ which ‘would be 
asymptotically approaching emptiness in its efforts to be as common as possible’.®^® As a 
mere construct, such ‘experience’ is never really ‘at hand’ but requires mediation of some 
sort. Hence for Johnson to appeal to ‘women’s experience’ as a ‘given’ is to actually
®^ ®5IT7, 8.
®^® What is further masked in the rhetorical appeal is the fact that, as with any appeal to authority, one is 
simultaneously appealing to a tradition, its origins and connections. It displaces the authority o f the 
Christian tradition and rejects its legitimate difference. Schner, “The Appeal to Experience,” 46.
®27 «rpjjg Appeal to Experience,” 44,45.
328 («Yhe Appeal to Experience,” 49.
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disregard its constructed nature in favour of a (constructed) ‘universal’ reference to its 
unthematic, essential character derived ontologically as an aspect of ‘being’ Hence her 
methodology becomes as oppressive in her hands as she finds it to be in those of her 
patriarchal adversaries. It is precisely this problem that makes her postmodern colleagues 
nervous.
Interna! Conflicts
Johnson’s reformist approach is not just discordant with post-structuralist and 
process feminist approaches, or non-viable to post-Christian feminists. The more 
fundamental threat to her or any other feminist position is the postmodern and pluralist 
commitment to ‘multiplicity’ which supposedly rejects any absolute or universal claims 
(including its own!). According to this kind of sensibility, the kinds of claims that 
Johnson and feminist theology make in general -  i.e., claims grounded in a moral and 
political ideology -  cannot even be made, at least with any universal or persuasive 
appeal.
Whereas for almost half a century ‘women’s experience’ was used precisely to 
identify women’s difference in contrast to men, now the category itself is challenged or 
deconstructed by women on the grounds that as a general category experience fails to 
uphold difference?^^ In 1990 Pamela Dickey Young published the first full-fledged
329 the very point at which I am able actually to appeal to experience, I have achieved a level of 
awareness in which I implicitly know that I am appealing to something which I have constructed, which is 
therefore révisable, and subject to a request for justification o f some kind’ (Schner, “The Appeal to 
Experience,” 47). This underlies Martin’s criticism o f Johnson and Rahner’s appeal to ‘unthematic’ 
experience o f God. The more the experience o f ‘s e lf  becomes capable o f articulation, the more it becomes 
differentiated fi'om an experience o f God who cannot be both the correlate of one’s thematic self­
experience and be ‘wholly Other’. See TFQ, 181.
®®® For a broad sense o f the debate about women’s experience, see Anne Carr, Transforming Grace (see n. 
34) 117-33; Ann O’Hara Graff, “The Struggle to Name Women’s Experience: Assessment and 
Implications for Theological Construction,” Horizons 20 (Fall 1993): 215-33; Pamela Dickey Young,
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examination of Christian feminist methodology . In it she made a passing but prophetic 
statement: In the process of breaking free from sexism’s universalising systems, women’s 
‘experience’ becomes that of refusing to take at face value anyone’s definition of 
‘woman’.®®' Inevitably the same hermeneutic that challenged male normativity as 
definitive of women’s identity has come to challenge the normative definitions of other 
women, thus levelling a blow at the foundation of ‘women’s’ experience. Just whose 
experience are we referring to, and what constitutes that experience?
This is the ‘dilemma of difference’ faced by Johnson and her colleagues, presenting a 
‘revelatory’ quandary for Catholic reformism well articulated by Catherine Hilkert in 
Freeing Theology:
Does experience refer to an Individual interior awareness or feeling ...? Is revelation mediated 
through human experience, or are the two identical? Is revelation located in the ‘transcendental 
depths’ o f the human person and mediated through her historical and social existence? If the 
experience o f suffering and oppression o f women (and others) is the starting point for a 
liberationist approach to feminist theology, can we speak more fruitfully o f revelation as located in 
‘contrast experience’? Is revelation located only or primarily or in any privileged way in women’s 
experience? Further, what experience is considered revelatory: women’s historical experience o f  
marginalization; women’s experience as rooted in the body, imagination, and sexuality; women’s 
friendships; women’s mystical experience; women’s bonding in circles o f celebration, support, 
and activity for justice ...?®®^
Under the larger rubric of ‘feminism’ the questions are becoming even more 
fundamental: What defines ‘woman’, ‘oppression’, ‘liberation’, ‘experience’ and who 
within the discipline holds the controls over these terms?®®® As these notions are being
Feminist Theology/Christian Theology: In Search o f  Method (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990); Davaney, |
“The Limits o f the Appeal to Women’s Experience”; Fulkerson, Changing the Subject; Chopp, “Theorizing 
Feminist Theology”. ;
®®' Young, Feminist Theology/Christian Theology, 55. {
332 “Experience and Tradition,” in Freeing Theology (see n. 24) 77. Hilkert makes no attempt to answer any |
o f these questions despite their profrnind influence on the method o f Catholic reformism set forth in :
Freeing Theology. She simply asks in conclusion, ‘can the center hold at the intersection between Christian |
tradition and women’s experience?’ ;
®®® For a critique of the narrow definitions o f oppression as ‘patriarchal’, see Linda Moody, Women |
Encounter God; and Chopp, “Feminist and Womanist Theologies.” Asian feminist theologians alternatively 
place a unique value on suffering as identification with Jesus and argue that oppression is not necessarily a |
source o f struggle or liberation. Black womanist theologians challenge both the common denominator of
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deconstructed, so too ‘the whole edifice of feminist commitments and strategies’/®" Even 
‘feminism’ as a universal label is often repudiated and replaced by terms or 
categorisations like ‘womanist’ or ‘mujerista’ that reflect a particular community’s 
‘reality’ more accurately/®® In these debates, women’s difference assumes a higher 
priority over feminist ‘unity’ grounded in some common experience.
All of this leads to the question of whether there really is such a thing as 
‘feminist’ theology or are there only particular feminist theologies which can speak 
meaningfully only within their homogeneous groups?®®® If it is the latter, does feminist 
theology have a future? ®®® Once that point of experience is deconstructed because it is 
considered to be based on universal, abstract norms and foundations that are now 
declared illusions and dominating practices by other feminists, is feminist dialogue still 
possible? Chopp asks, ‘How will evaluative criteria and norms be established? How can
male oppression and the promotion of white, female experience, claiming an altogether different black 
experience of oppression at the hands o f both men and white women. Latin American and African women 
from non-dominant cultures and certain non-white North American women reflect upon their experience of  
oppression under the corrosive influences o f poverty and racism as well as sexism. See Chung Hyun 
Kyung, Struggle to be the Sun Again: Introducing Asian Women’s Theology (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis,
1990); Dolores Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge o f Womanist God-Tkr/A; (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 1993); Ada Maria Isasi-Diaz and Yolanda Tarango, Hispanic Women: Prophetic Voice in the 
Church (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988). Identifying oppression as ‘heterosexism’, lesbians argue 
that ‘gender’ difference is hegemonic in that it privileges heterosexuality. See Fulkerson, “Contesting the 
Gendered Subject: A Feminist Account of the Imago Dei,” in Horizons in Feminist Theology, 99-115.
®®" “Introduction,” Horizons in Feminist Theology, 4.
®®® Sheila Davaney reflects on the seriousness o f the situation: ‘What many thought was once an at least 
loosely unified feminist political movement and intellectual perspective has now emerged as multiple, 
contending, and not easily reconciled views and commitments. It is this fragmentation o f  feminism that has 
provided the central impulse for ... the critical evaluation o f our frameworks and assumptions’.
“Introduction,” Horizons in Feminist Theology, 4. Even Johnson acknowledges that the ‘naming any 
particular characteristic or way o f being in the world “female” are matters of intense study and debate’, 
though she continues to base her entire theology on them. SWI, 61.
®®® See Woodhead, “Feminist Theology -  Out o f the Ghetto?” in Is There a Future fo r  Feminist Theology?
198-206, 199; Johnson, Friends o f God and Prophets, 37; Anne Carr, “The New Vision o f Feminist |
Theology: Method,” in Freeing Theology (see n. 24) 14. i
®®’ In their essay, “From Isolation to Integration?” in Is There a Future fo r  Feminist Theology? 12, Diane |
Collier and Deborah Sawyer ask in this time o f ‘apparent crisis’: ‘[A]s we reach the new millennium, the |
question needs to be asked, has this project o f analysis and reconstruction based upon feminist principles I
run its natural course?’ I
1
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the emancipation of women and others be both argued and guided?’®®® What is it women 
seek to recover in rethinking and reconfiguring feminist assumptions and method, she 
asks, when gender is merely a construct and ‘women shatter into an endless plurality?’®®^ 
When the concept of woman or women has been lost to an understanding of the 
fragmented self, who, and what, are we talking about and what makes our assumptions 
‘feminist’?
To keep from fading under ‘the specter of relativism’ while avoiding 
foundationalism, a case is now being made for qualified, limited use of experience as an 
‘analytical category’ (Briggs),®"® a ‘regulative idea’ (Chopp),®"* or an ‘interpreted 
experience’ (Johnson) to mediate feminist ‘theological dialogue’. Dialogue becomes 
‘context-specific’, taking into account then one’s historical, socio-economic, geopolitical, 
cultural, ethnic, and religious contexts and interpretations. Though Johnson does not 
address how this can constitute meaning-fv\\ theological dialogue when there is no 
agreed referent under discussion (only each woman’s own ‘god’ in/from their own 
experience) she does, however, see another danger -  one that cuts at the heart of her 
feminist ethic. By emphasising ‘difference’ this way, one can unintentionally ‘over- 
contextualise’ and end up cutting ‘the nerve of common struggle’ that she believes 
currently unites women. If all generalisations are disallowed, she argues, then the ethical 
imperative ‘Resist domination!’ will be disabled, especially in the very cross-cultural 
situations where it is most necessary.®"^
®®® Chopp, “Theorizing Feminist Theology.”
®®® Davaney discussing Briggs, in “Introduction,” in Horizons in Feminist Theology, 13.
340 ,
341
‘A History o f Our Own,” 165-178. 
See n. 339.
®"^  Friends o f God, 39, Johnson cites Lisa Cahill who states that despite the immediate practical importance 
of recovering difference for these women who have been too quickly assimilated to a ‘white, middle class 
paradigm o f  women’s experience’, that “‘the eradication o f all unity worldwide among women or, for that
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In short, women need general categories to structure their frame of reference and 
their corresponding relational ethics. Because feminist ethics already relativises the 
authority of Church tradition, if feminism’s ethical ‘worldview’ is relativised by the 
special interests of postmodernism, then the moral foundations of Catholic reformism 
begin to crumble. Without the common experience of oppression, there is no Catholic 
feminist reformism. Thus Johnson is forced to appeal to some kind of ‘universal 
experience’. Ironically, on ‘ethical grounds’ she is forced to maintain a dominating 
methodology in an effort to build ‘solidarity’ while trying not to subsume the very 
difference she craves for women as they self-determine and distinguish themselves from 
other (male) dominating universals. From her methodological starting point, she has no 
choice, though she knows what is at risk: ‘It has seemed to me that without a measure of 
essential commonality to ground women’s human dignity, the call for justice for all 
women stands on shaky ground... One of theology’s current tasks is to work out the 
bases of respect for persons in such a ways that difference is honoured while solidarity 
comes firmly into view’.®"®
This problematic appeal is essential to Johnson and her feminist reformist 
colleagues. Without it they can neither maintain their feminist agenda (women’s 
emancipation) nor their reformist agenda (the reconstruction of Christian theology as text, 
symbol and meaning). As we saw in chapter one, their sociocritical hermeneutic attempts 
to penetrate beneath the surface-function of texts to expose their role as socially systemic
matter, among men and women, would have monstrous moral consequences.’” See Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, 
Gender and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 28-29.
®"® “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 95-96.
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instruments of power, domination or man ipu l a t i onTo  do so, however, requires an 
appeal to the same norm by which textual ‘deficiencies’ are judged and neutralised -  the 
elusive spectre o f ‘women’s experience’.
Hence, feminism ideologically claims to be able to judge all of reality but has no 
‘experiential’ reality by which it can be assessed in turn. Moreover, both the problem of 
sexism and women’s discovery of their own worth and voices are elements o f  this 
system. Women cannot step outside of it to appeal to a higher norm. Nor is there any 
realistic recourse to any norm outside the system that can be brought to bear in judging 
the feminist interpretation that results from using their critical norm. This leads Francis 
Martin to ask, “ where is the norm by which this new understanding can prove itself free 
from the same kind of power-discourse? May it not be a means by which a new elite, 
through the use of power, imposes itself on the rest of humanity, even in the name of 
liberation?’^ '*^
If there are as many interpretations as there are experiences, then feminist 
judgment over certain interpretations is theoretically as oppressive and dominating as any 
other judgment. On the other hand, if there are as many interpretations as there are 
experiences, then how might Johnson assume that these women are in fact speaking of
This involves an acceptance o f Saussure’s basic notions that language and culture are codes that need to 
be unmasked to expose their hidden ideologies that serve specific interests.
“Feminist Hermeneutics,” 123. Citing Carolyn Osiek’s commentary on Philippians where she argues for 
an interpretation that ‘may be more comprehensible to the contemporary feminist reader’ who might find 
some o f the original language o f Phil 2:5-11 ‘alien and offensive’, Martin asks, ‘Is comprehensibility to the 
“modem feminist reader” the basic category o f interpretation? The perception underlying this approach 
seems to be that the “meaning” o f the text lies in its acceptability to a particular liberationist position. This 
particular text may be difficult, but it is one thing to acknowledge its difficulty and another to say that the 
norm o f interpretation is the aptitude o f the text to be pressed into the service o f a preestablished agenda. 
Such a position capitulates to the very position that is being opposed: how does such an interpretive move 
differ from the alleged androcentric and power-based use o f  language that necessitates liberation in the first 
place? If there is no extra-contextual norm by which a preestablished position may be critiqued we are left 
with the notion that interpretation is but one more move in a competing power game, and that ‘’’truth” turns 
out to be “success”’ (125).
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the God of the Christian faith -  who is in fact the Self-naming Word who has made 
himself historically and particularly known in Jesus Christ by the Spirit to be this God 
and no other (Isa 45:18). Indeed, the assumption that we can give innumerable kinds of 
‘content’ to the same Absolute ‘Other’ and know that we are speaking about the same 
‘god’ -  and that this ‘god’ is the same god as the Triune God of the Christian faith who 
gives his own particular identity -  cannot help but raise a question of reference and of 
warrant forjudging the adequacy of any given experience.
Thus, it would seem that her guiding principles are both self-contradictory and 
lead to precisely the opposite conclusions that she wishes to come to.
///. Summary: Critical Concerns at Johnson's 'Critical Juncture'
In the previous section we critiqued Johnson’ foundational appeals to experience 
as the basis for the panentheistic, ‘Trinitarian’ theology or relational ontology that she 
espouses -  which will be set forth in detail in the following chapter. This final section 
serves to summarise the critical concerns that have been raised so far, particularly given 
Johnson’s contention that her theological proposition would be ‘recognizable within the 
contours of Christian faith’ As Johnson seeks to integrate the feminist ontological 
principle of divine-cosmic relationality with her interpretation of Rahner’s transcendental 
principle of self-experience as God-experience, she must deal adequately with questions 
of divine-human distinction and freedom. Out of these questions she must further address 
the issue of what constitutes theological language for the Christian community with 
whom she identities and to whom she offers her Trinitarian ‘analogue’.
SWLH.
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Johnson argues that while her feminist agenda is reformist, her theological 
identity remains Catholic. At the ‘intersection’ of these two worldviews, however, she is 
compelled to ‘reform’ the basic doctrines of the Christian tradition to correspond with her 
feminist values and God-talk. This two-fold agenda is inseparable, and enters the fray of 
contemporary methodologies which have already ‘rendered’ traditional Trinitarian 
theology problematic, if not obsolete:
Feminist theology’s critique o f traditional God language enters the history o f theology at a critical 
juncture. Under the impact o f modemity and postmodernity for the last two centuries, Christian 
speech about God has suffered a series o f shocks that have rendered it more and more problematic. 
In response, theology has been generating new language by a creative combination o f  
hermeneutical retrieval o f ancient texts and appropriate contemporary experience. Women’s 
search for less inadequate ways o f speaking about God today intersects with other theological 
efforts to rethink the inherited doctrine o f God, which itself has been in a crisis o f reformation for 
some time.. 347
In Johnson’s assessment, the last two centuries have served to shatter the graven 
image of ‘God-He’ that has accompanied the false God of classical theism. Given the 
present pluralistic spiritual climate -  and women’s ontological/epistemological access to 
‘truth’ -  she opens the feminist possibility of a ‘less inadequate way of speaking about 
God’ by asking what she calls ‘the critical question’ -  i.e., ‘what is the right way to speak 
about God?’ She does so, however, based on the competing principles of universal 
transcendentalism and gendered experience.^ "^ ® Perhaps this accounts for the irony at the 
heart of such a question: It is a value-laden, universally applicable, interested question 
and as such ought to offend postmodern sensibilities.
Johnson’s theology, however, is layered with these kinds of conflicting 
presuppositions, as we have seen. Women’s experience versus transcendental human 
experience, particular women’s experience versus universal women’s experience,
347
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rhetorical appeals to experience for the sake of a dominant position (with no clear 
content), hermeneutical appeals that are ethic and value-laden in a postmodern climate 
where no absolute ethic or value can be claimed -  all of these put Johnson in a precarious 
position as a postmodern Catholic feminist reformist.
They also put her in a precarious position in terms of tradition Christian theology. 
Paul Molnar, in his assessment of the implications of certain theological presuppositions 
held by Rahner and Johnson, reminds us that accuracy regarding God’s transcendence 
and presence in creation has always been and continues to be imperative in Christian 
thought.^ '*® Since Christian belief holds God to be both transcendent and involved in 
creation, we must distinguish between Creator and creature, both conceptually and really, 
so that what we are describing is a real relationship of utterly different, asymmetrical 
partners. Without this distinction, we are left only with our self-experiences and 
projections. Johnson argues that even with her methodology ‘from below’ she can 
maintain this essential distinction between Creator and creation and still honour women’s 
unique differences as revelatory of the divine. And this is precisely what seems 
problematic in her enterprise.
Central to Johnson’s transcendental method is the idea that women can reflect on 
themselves^ posit the absolute and come to a real knowledge of the Christian God’s 
transcendence and presence in their own historical experience. By presupposing that the 
‘nameless ground’ that we all necessarily experience as human beings is identical with 
God, she posits that both human pre-apprehension and cognitive experience lead us to
“Can We Know God Directly?” 228; Divine Freedom and the Doctrine o f the Immanent Trinity, 
specifically chapters one, two and four.
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knowledge and experience of the Triune God, more aptly described as ‘ Sophia’ 
Underlying this is the notion of a necessary mutual conditioning between Creator and 
creature -  God presupposes and incorporates into God’s own self our actuality as the 
condition for the possibility of God’s Self-communication. In reverse, God who is 
‘wholly other’ is nevertheless the constitutive, divinizing condition of essential humanity; 
God’s presence is necessary for transcendental humanity to realise itself.
Even with these kinds of foundational assumptions, Johnson maintains a basic 
agnosticism in order to reinforce the idea of God’s radical distinction. (Ironically, even 
this level of ‘unknowing’ provides more adequate insight than the Christian tradition, 
which in turn is in need of reform!) Especially in ‘revelation’ Johnson considers God to 
be ‘blessedly present but conceptually inapprehensible'. Johnson fails to acknowledge 
the logic problems with such statements, however. If God is truly inapprehensible, then 
we do not even have the capacity to perceive ‘God’, thereby eradicating the possibility of 
God-talk in toto. Furthermore, to argue that divine being is ‘outside classes and 
categories’ actually denotes a class, as does ‘beyond the possibility of being imagined’ or 
‘conceived’. Ironically, the assertion that God is outside all categories is not only a 
categorical assertion itself, but it is precisely the necessary, categorical assertion that 
grounds Johnson’s claim for God’s ‘radical otherness’. That which she cannot ultimately 
understand or ‘know’ in a Kantian sense she categorises as ‘divine mystery’ or ‘God’.
Again, the pattern here is the concept from the pre-conception, the ‘name’ o f divinity from the 
experience o f the ‘nameless’ and creation as the grammar o f trinitarian self-revelation. Thus, says Rahner, 
‘According to Church teaching, the world  in which we live is in fact supernatural, that is, a world which is 
ordered to the personal, Trinitarian God beyond the world’. This can only be true if  we confuse or identify 
divine revelation with human reason. In the end, declares Molnar, Rahner argues for an infinitely 
‘qualitative’ rather than essential difference between God and human beings, ultimately leaving us unable 
to distinguish God from ourselves both theoretically and practically. “Can We Know God Directly?” 
230nl3.
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Tf God is essentially incomprehensible, above all names and thought, beyond 
every ideal and value, a living God!’ -  how’, asks Johnson, Ms it possible to say anything 
at all about the divine?’ Is she in fact asking how we can name what we cannot conceive 
or even apprehend? If, instead she means incomprehensibility and rather than 
inapprehensibility here, then the question is rhetorical According to her tradition, 
ontological participation, negation and analogy ought to make it possible.
All of this leads to critical questions of distinction. If God in his revelation is 
subject to the a priori entitative restructuring of the human being through grace (or by the 
assimilation of ‘Spirit’ to created spirit) and the structures of human knowledge, is God 
truly free to reveal in whatever way God chooses? Does Johnson fail to distinguish 
between divine and human being and freedom simply by subsuming theology within the 
wider rubric of an all-encompassing philosophical principle of being, thus requiring 
God’s Being-Act to necessarily correspond to and be limited by something greater than 
or more foundational than God (Barth’s tertium quid)T^^ Is God’s personal being and 
Triune difference-in-unity truly separate from and other than the personal, existential 
experience of each human being, and if so, how so? Is there any possibility here of 
‘knowing’ God as Other? Or is Johnson simply pressing for a kind of repristination of 
Schleiermacher’s GefUhP. Finally, is Jesus Christ truly God incarnate in Johnson’s 
theology and as such the necessary Revealer and Reconciler of humanity to God and God
Molnar argues that by making experience the norm and insisting that metaphysics directs us to our 
inherently unthematic experience o f God, Johnson and Rahner ‘refuse to make the choice between 
philosophical reflection, i.e., being in general, and theological reflection, i.e., the triune God in whom we 
believe and who transcends such reflection. Thus, despite [their] attempts to maintain God’s freedom in se 
and in revelation, instead it obviates it, as well as any real distinction between philosophy and theology’. 
“Can We Know God Directly?” 228-9.
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to humanity. Or is he merely the ultimate expression of grace in transcendental humanity 
-  as well as a feminist symbol of solidarity with the oppressed?^^^
In describing the God-world relation, Johnson makes some very traditional 
sounding statements interspersed with some very non-traditional ones: That God is 
beyond any category of being; that God does not need the world such that creation is an 
ultimately free divine act in ‘asymmetrical relation’. On the other hand, God and the 
world are in real relation; God’s transcendence and immanence are ‘correlative’ such that 
divine transcendence is a ‘wholeness’ that includes ‘divine immanence’ given to the 
world as its own ‘inmost dynamism and goal’.^ ^^  The absolute difference of the world is 
encircled by God who is not the world, and yet as God and the world mutually co-inhere, 
even if God does not ‘need’ the world in a ‘hypothetical sense’, the world nevertheless 
‘makes a difference to God’ such that God would not be God without it. God is 
ultimately free, unattainable mystery who can be neither known nor named with any 
adequacy (and so remains distinct), yet human beings and creation in general are the 
grammar of divine utterance and as such are relational in a manner that corresponds both 
with Triune relationality and women’s way of being in the world.
Because theology is subsumed under the a prioris of the philosophical system and 
the tertium quid of relational being God is not free from but is restricted by the conditions 
of the system. In other words, for all of Johnson’s emphasis on God’s freedom, her 
discussion is not a posteriori reflection on God’s self-revelation but rather on women’s 
way of being that tells her that God must be this way -  relational in the way that women 
are and more. God is not free to establish his own conditions or to set the terms within
We will address this last question more fully in the final chapter. 
SWI, 231.
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human history regarding his Self-revelation, or to speak a word that contradicts Johnson’s 
word, because in the system, she speaks first. Authority ultimately lies with her and any 
other human subject as the fmower rather than with God who chooses to be known as a 
Subject prior to the human knower’s experience of God. In the end, the pattern is clear -  
finitum capctx infiniti and infinitum capax finiti. Johnson rejects Christian theism in 
favour of a feminist panentheism understood in terms of a transcendental and relational 
ontology. God and the world exist to some degree in a mutually co-inherent and 
deterministic relationship.^ '^* (We will look at Johnson’s panentheistic ontology in detail 
in the next chapter.)
Historically, however, Christianity has held an absolute distinction between what, 
or more importantly who^ God is and is not, specifically in theistic terms. Without this 
distinction, there is no real possibility of the Incarnation expressing a true identification 
of the man Jesus Christ with YHWH. Only this gives meaning to the Chalcedonian 
distinction and mystery of the two natures of Jesus Christ (that the Creator is also this 
creature). Nor is there any need to express a distinction between the Trinity ad intra and 
ad extra, or of having a doctrine of creation ex nihilo in which God does the creating and 
creatures are what results other than God.^^  ^ To paraphrase Claus Westermann’s 
description of Israel’s understanding of creation, God is outside or wholly other than 
creation. To be created means to be not-god; it means to be an ‘object’ outside and not
While she notes the positive contributions o f process theology at this point, though she sets herself apart 
from process thought because it fails to maintain a radical God-world distinction. T have long been 
fascinated by the aspect o f process thought that posits God as the “chief exemplification” of  
intersubjectivity, incomprehensible precisely in being so infinitely capable o f  self-realization. It is a 
brilliant move to understand God’s deity to lie not in separation and difference from the world, but in the 
most intense relationality o f all. This insight, as well as process metaphors o f God as the lure, and the 
fellow sufferer who understands, have surely fertilized my own thinking’. “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 
102.
Robert Jenson, “Creator and Creature,” International Journal o f Systematic Theology vol 4:2 (July 
2002): 216-221, 219.
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emanating from the divine. In this way, there is no mutual interdependence. There is no 
eternitas mundi as a necessary element or correspondent to God’s own being. Rather, 
God’s being and action as Creator are wholly free even as they are exclusively for  the 
world.^ ^® Moreover, to view God as the divinizing condition of a human person is 
precisely the kind of mutual conditioning or emanationism formerly rejected by the 
Church fathers in the doctrine of God’s Triune aseity and economic relation to the world, 
and is further rejected in Chalcedonian Christology and the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo
The problem with transcendental revelation being the ultimate criteria is that God 
cannot be different than what the human perceives God to be in her experience. She is the 
final authority of the definition and description of the ‘Other’, and defines the other from  
herself And yet, is this not the totalising narrative of modern sexism that feminism
Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11, trans. John Scullion (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 26, found in 
Martin, 182-3.
Rahner ties the doctrine o f creation ex nihilo to creaturely ‘dependence’ on the free, independent ground 
o f being for (according to Christian doctrine) ‘its ongoing being given to itself by a personal God who 
establishes it freely. This establishing then, does not have some material already at hand as its 
presupposition, and in this sense it is “out o f  nothing,” Basically creation “out o f nothing” means to say: 
creation totally from God, but in such a way that the world is radically dependent on God in this creation. 
Nevertheless, God does not become dependent on the world, but remains free vis-à-vis the world and 
grounded in himself. Wherever we find a causal relationship o f a categorical kind in the world, it is indeed 
the case that that the effect is by definition dependent on its cause. But strangely enough this cause is itself 
also dependent on its effect, because it cannot be this cause without causing the effect. This is not the case 
in the relationship between God and creatures, for otherwise God would be an element within our 
categorical realm o f experience, and not the absolutely distant term o f transcendence within which an 
individual finite thing is known ... For this reason, then, he cannot be in need o f  the finite reality called 
“world,” because otherwise he would not really be radically different from it, but would be part of a larger 
whole as in the understanding o f pantheism’. Foundations, 77-78. (Not surprisingly, this discussion is 
immediately connected to Rahner’s view on the genuine autonomy o f the creature and God, which Johnson 
regularly reiterates as a matter o f insuring women’s freedom from domination.) This directly challenges 
Rahner’s view o f creation as the necessary grammar o f God’s self-communication, that God needs a hearer 
to utter himself. More specifically, it directly contradicts certain of Rahner’s ‘symbolic necessities’ that 
apply equally to God and to creation. These ‘necessities’ include (1) the necessity for all beings to express 
themselves in order to realize themselves (including God, i.e., creation and the Incarnation are God’s 
necessary self-expression in order to be God), (2) the necessity for all being to be mutually conditioned and 
mutually conditioning, and (3) the necessity for all being to be explicable by man’s general metaphysics. 
The first o f these necessities conditions the rest (six in all) and is at the heart o f Rahner’s philosophy o f  
being and thus God’s Triune being and action. “The Ontology o f Symbolic Reality in General,” T I4: 235- 
45.
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eschews? The only way this is not problematic is to render God ‘person-less’ in any 
relational sense. But this means that God is merely the actus purus of ‘relational being’ or 
being itself m some abstract, category-defying (hence categorised) sense and so cannot be 
truly relational in an ‘I-Thou’ sense along the lines of any personal metaphors Johnson 
uses in She Who Is, or, as we shall see, in her ‘trinitarian’ description. Is this really how 
Johnson thinks of God in her relational ontology? Perhaps her use of the dogmatic 
categories of Trinitarian theology and Christology to describe She Who Is will better 
clarify her position.
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Chapter Three:
Relational Ontology as ‘Trinitarian Theology’
‘Using an entirely different conceptuality, a contemporary reading of Aquinas 
with Rahnerian and feminist presuppositions, I have ... suggested Trinitarian language 
with a profoundly relational cast’,^ ^^  states Johnson, resulting in ‘[a] model of free, 
reciprocal relation: God in the world and the world in God while each remains radically 
distinct’ This chapter analyses and critiques her relational ontology with specific 
attention paid to her re-schematization of traditional Trinitarian theology and 
Christology. Since Johnson sets up her theology in contrast to a particular reading of 
Barth, Barth’s own theology is used in part to critique Johnson’s assertions.
/. The Ontological Priority of 'Relation'
A. Reconceiving Divine Relationality
In She Who Is, Johnson asks about the right way to speak of God from women’s 
relational experience and values. The answer is given in part by redefining the 
ontological relation between God and the world in a way that prioritises mutuality and 
reciprocity while still maintaining their ontological distinction. In other words, Johnson 
wishes to reform certain aspects of Christian doctrine (the doctrine of God and God’s 
relation to the world) while holding on to others (Creator/creature distinction). 
Traditionally, Christian theology has maintained God’s absolute, radical freedom and 
asymmetrical distinction from the world. However, among the key doctrines which 
support this understanding are those Johnson believes need reforming.
358 , ‘Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 101.
SWI, 23\.
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For instance, the Christian tradition maintains that God does not need the world to 
be God; the Trinity’s relationality is complete in se. The koinonia of God the Father, Son 
and Spirit is wholly complete and relationally ‘Self-sufficient in love and freedom. 
Hence, creation is an absolutely free expression of divine love extended outward to what 
is not God. God’s being in se -  the eternal. Triune communion of Father, Son and Spirit 
in unique, distinct perichoretic relation (the ‘immanent Trinity’) -  is distinguished from 
God’s being ad extra -  God’s Self-revelation and redemptive action in history as the 
Incarnate Son sent by the Father through the eschatological Spirit (the ‘economic 
Trinity’). While God’s Triune aseity is wholly consistent with his Triune revelation in 
salvation history, the immanent Trinity is not reduced to, nor collapsed into God’s Being 
and action in the world.
The doctrine of creation ex nihilo maintains that the Triune God creates the world 
by his Word. He speaks and creation is. God does not share essentially in the world but 
freely sustains the world as the source of its life and being. The world neither is God nor 
is it in God; rather God and the world are wholly distinct in nature. The Creator’s 
difference from and identification with creation are uniquely expressed in the 
homoousion. In the Chalcedonian confession of the two natures of Jesus Christ, the 
Church affirms the Biblical witness of the eternal Son of God having come into the world 
by the Spirit as the unique and fully human person, Jesus Christ. Reflecting the same 
unity-in-distinction used to speak of the Trinitarian persons in perichoretic relation, in the 
historical person of Jesus Christ these juxtaposed realities are held in tension without 
‘confusion or change’ and without ‘separation or division’. This is the basis of Christian 
worship -  that Jesus Christ is Lord, Emmanuel.
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Given Johnson’s ‘entirely different conceptuality’, however, these patriarchal 
vestiges of ‘classical theism’ posit (1) too radical a distinction between God and the 
world, (2) too literal and exclusive a paradigm for understanding the Triune being of God 
and the God-world relation (in terms of its uniquely Christian content), and (3) too 
patriarchal and dominating a model of relationality to account for women’s experience. 
In sum, they create an ‘unbridgeable dualism’ that keeps ‘divine immanence’ at a 
‘virtually unreachable’ distance from the world. Hence Johnson must reform these 
doctrines in order to use Trinitarian and Christological language in her re-conception of 
divine relationality.
Therefore, giving ontological priority to the concept of relation, she begins by 
arguing that the ‘deepest core of reality is a mystery of personal connectedness that 
constitutes the very livingness of God’.^ ®° Assuming that no reality can be construed apart 
from its constitutive network of relationships, and that women’s way of being provides 
epistemic access to the ‘essence’ of all relational networks, Johnson brings the principle 
of relationality to bear on these doctrines. As she explains, she re-schematizes theology 
according to certain feminist and Rahnerian a priorm into an ontology that she believes 
still fits ‘within the contours of the Christian faith’
By employing trinitarian theology, and by consulting the experience o f women, I stretch the 
Thomistic pattern into the shape o f panentheism, while maintaining its presupposition o f the 
otherness o f  God, Precisely as Spirit, pervading the world with the power o f  being, the breath o f  
life, God also transcends the world, encompassing it in divine embrace. As far as I can see, divine 
autonomy in relation to the world is in no way compromised.^®^
SWI, 238,226.
SWI, 8, 226. She assumes that nothing she does or says threatens the Thomistic assumption that there is 
an infinite qualitative difference between God and the world.
Johnson, Review Symposium - Author’s Response, Horizons, 343.
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In sum, Johnson describes the concept of God and the God-world relation as an 
apotheosis of relationality. The remainder of this section analyses how she reworks these 
doctrines to support her foundational principle.
Panentheism
The first theological concept under ‘relational’ reconstruction is that of ‘no 
necessary relation’ between God and the world. The idea of ‘no real relation’ is a feminist 
theological anathema, deriving from a distorted, dominating male perspective.
From a feminist perspective the denial o f  divine relation to the world codified in the highly 
specialized scholastic language [of ‘no real relation’] reflects the disparagement o f reciprocal 
relation characteristic o f patriarchy in its social and intellectual expressions. If the ideal is the 
potent, all-sufficient ego in charge o f events and independent o f the need for others, then to be 
connected in mutuality with others introduces “deficiency” in the form o f interdependence, 
vulnerability, and risk. Genuine mutuality threatens any form o f domination, including the 
paternalistic ordering o f things. Thus it is not accidental that classical theism insists on a concept 
of God with no real relation to the world, even when this is interpreted as an affirmation o f divine 
transcendence. Unrelated to and unaffected by the world, such a theistic God limns the ultimate 
patriarchal ideal, the solitary, dominant male.^ ®^
Clearly, any good feminist theology mandatorily parts company with classical 
theism at this point.^ ®'* On the other hand, Johnson argues that pantheism is not an 
adequate alternative. If classical theism holds too radical a distinction, then pantheism 
threatens distinction -  at least women’s distinction. This model may initially hold 
promise in terms of mutual interrelatedness, but the dominant ‘divine other’ ends up 
engulfing women, submerging their individual identities and keeping them from free self- 
actualisation. Thus, it too is a ‘suffocating deception’.^ ®^
SWI, 225. 
^5"IP7,231. 
SWI, 23\.
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Hence Johnson’s panentheistic approach attempts to ‘safeguard the radical 
distinction between God and the world while also promoting their mutual, if 
asymmetrical, relationship’
All Christian speech about God ... affirms that God dwells intimately at the heart o f the world. 
But it is quite otherwise with the question o f whether the indwelling is reciprocal ... If theism 
weights the scales in the direction o f divine transcendence and pantheism overmuch in the 
direction of immanence, panentheism attempts to hold onto both in full strength ... Here is a model 
o f free, reciprocal relation: God in the world and the world in God while each remains radically 
distinct ... As a working paradigm panentheism would be false only if  God is dissolved into the 
world or the world identified with God in some monistic fashion. Otherwise it is a view that 
operates with a certain “logic o f the infinite,” as Karl Rahner observes, whereby connectedness 
between creatures and their Creator does not diminish the difference between them but rather 
enhances it in direct proportion to the strength o f their union ... The boundary between God and 
the finite world is only creation’s boundary, not God’s, if  God is incomprehensible mystery 
beyond every category.^®’
In this model, God ‘is never not related to the world’.^®® Divine immanence is 
equated with relational being indwelling the world such that it becomes the world’s 
inmost dynamism and goal.^ ®^  Even divine transcendence is described in inclusive 
language that incorporates created reality; it is ‘a wholeness that includes all parts, 
embracing the world rather than excluding it’.^ ’® Nevertheless, Johnson argues that the 
mystery of divine transcendence and immanence is such that created existence remains 
distinct, autonomous and free through its participation in divine being while there 
remains at the heart of all things ‘a constitutive presence of God’.^ ‘^
^®®5'IT/,231.
®^’ SWI, taken from 230-232 (emphasis added).
368 236. In the ‘Matrix’ o f God, says, Johnson, this relationship o f mutual indwelling is non-
hierarchical and reciprocal, but it is not strictly symmetrical, for the world is dependent on God in a way 
that God is not on the world’. Women, Earth, 42-43. Per Aquinas, however (ST, la, A8), ‘God is in all 
things; not, indeed, as part o f their essence, nor as an accident; but as an agent is present to that upon which 
it works’.
®^® SWI, 231. We shall see how Johnson develops this characteristically Rahnerian view in the next chapter. 
SWI, 231.
“Does God Play Dice?” 11.
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Infinitum Capax Finiti - Kenosis Reconceived
Johnson distinguishes her panentheistic position from both process theology and 
pantheism by assuming God’s ontological otherness. Hence she posits that a critical 
aspect of the principle of relationality is its dual function as a ‘principle of self- 
d is t in c t io n 'This distinction-within-relation keeps the ontological priority of relation 
without capitulating to an essential monism.^^  ^ How so? Through the process of divine 
kenosis. Just as the universe itself is capax infiniti and can reflect the image of God even 
as it is present in God/^^ conversely, God perdures capax finiti, ‘kenotically’ making 
room in itself for that which is ‘other’
Looking for spatial-temporal metaphors to express this relation, Johnson incorporates 
a Jewish idea into a Christian one. The Jewish notion of zimzum depicts God as self- 
limiting or imposing ‘boundaries’ on infinite being, as it were, to make room at some 
point in time for creation.^ ^® In the act of creating, God contracts or ‘infolds’ the divine 
being and constricts divine presence and power, in order to ‘make room’ for creation 
without swallowing it up. She then links this notion to the concept of kenosis, not from its 
primary reference in Jesus Christ, but as a general category (Jesus Christ is a 
‘paradigmatic enactment’ revealing the pattern of divine action ‘always and everywhere
SWI, 231-2.
Johnson believes she escapes any charge o f emanationism or monism by assuming the qualitative 
difference between God and the world grounded in the presuppositions o f efficient causality. “Review 
Symposium,” 343. In his review o f SWI, John Carmody expresses concern over Johnson’s seeming to posit 
an eternitas mundi while losing sight o f  the necessary and desirable freedom o f the divine aseity. “Review 
Symposium,” Horizons, 337. In a remarkably sexist response, Johnson argues that only men seem to find 
this view o f relationality a threat to divine independence. She defends her view by referring to the wisdom 
offemale social psychologists like Carol Gilligan and Jean Baker Miller (344).
Johnson, “The Cosmos: An Astonishing Image o f God,” Origins, Vol. 26, no. 13 (Sept. 12, 1996): 206-
12.
SWI, 236.
’^® Moltmann develops this concept in The Trinity and the Kingdom, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1981), 108-111; and God and Creation; A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, 
trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 88.
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operative’).^ ^^  In short, creation -  not Jesus Christ -  is the enactment of divine kenosis 
Furthermore, there has never been a ‘time’ when the ‘trinitarian relations’ did not choose 
to share the divine life and thus to create. Hence, although the world is not necessary to 
God in a ‘hypothetical’ sense, it does ‘make a difference to God. She would not be 
creator, vivifier, redeemer, liberator, companion, and future without it’.^ ^^  Ultimately,
God cannot be circumscribed over against the finite world, for this would be an unwarranted and 
indeed impossible restriction. Rather, the universe, both matter and spirit, is encompassed by the 
matrix o f the living God in an encircling which generates uniqueness, futurity, and self­
transcendence in the context o f the interconnected whole.... God’s generous self-emptying is the 
condition for the possibility o f finite existence in its own autonomy, while the difference between 
Creator and creature is embraced by the One who is all in all.^ ®°
Despite the fact that God is beyond every category, Johnson’s model presupposes 
that divine reality corresponds to the category of mutual interrelatedness. This does not 
just apply to God, however. Mutual relation requires reciprocal indwelling. Thus, while 
God ‘dwells’ intimately at the heart of the world, the world is likewise present in God: It 
is a ‘sacrament’.^ **
The intrinsic interrelatedness of God and the world ultimately leads Johnson to 
ask, ‘If the relational God and the world coinhere in mutual if asymmetrical reciprocity, 
is it appropriate to speak about God in the singular. . . S h e  answers with a conditional 
‘yes’, only, however, until ‘a new word emerges for the as yet unnamable understanding 
of holy mystery that includes the reality of women as well as all creation’. T h i s  word
SWI, 234.
SWI, 234. Johnson defends her thought by drawing from Simone Weil, Moltmann and William Hill.
SWI, 232.
SWI, 234.
SWI, 230-31; “Does God Play Dice?” 11. Moreover, the ‘incarnational and sacramental imagination’ 
behind this notion eschews any fundamental competition between God and the world, i.e., there is no sub­
ordination (SWI, 231). Johnson does not explain what she means by ‘incarnational’ and ‘sacramental’ in 
this context. However, there is no reference to the Incarnation o f God in Jesus Christ anywhere in her 
discussion o f the God-world relation. Whatever these terms mean, they are abstracted from that reality.
382 236 (emphasis added).
SWI, 42-43 (emphasis added).
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does not ultimately refer to God per se -  even as the source of relational Being - but to 
the larger ‘mystery’ of ‘relation’ itself -  inclusive of all finite and infinite reality, spirit 
and matter. Here Johnson strives for language to speak of an overarching concept that 
describes the matrix of all ‘relational being’ -  indeed, something more foundational than 
God alone.
B. The Relationality o f  Being’
Assuming that a Supreme Being with personal freedom, power and authority 
would invariably oppress (or be used symbolically by men to oppress), radical feminist 
Mary Daly several decades ago condemned all theologies that ‘hypostatize 
transcendence’. Daly rejected any theologian who would speak of God as an objective. 
Self-referential and all powerful Being.^ *"* Daly recommended two alternatives. First, 
women could speak about God as ‘ground’ and ‘power of being’ by adopting the theories 
of Tillich, Whitehead or James. Second, they could develop an entirely new language 
growing out of ‘awareness’ of ‘that reality which is both transcendent and immanent’ and 
which cannot be reduced to or adequately represented by such expressions as 'person, 
father, supreme being'
Johnson incorporates aspects of both alternatives. She agrees with Daly 
concerning the oppressive potential in thinking about God as an objective. Self-referential 
Other. Also like Daly, Johnson criticises classical theism for having ‘hypostatized’ and 
thus collapsed God’s transcendence, reducing ‘the infinite horizon of Being’ to a member 
of a genus, however exalted its membership. Whereas the mystery of God is beyond all 
images and conceptualisations, she argues, ‘in practice theism has reified God, reducing
Mary Daly, “After the Death o f God the Father: Women’s Liberation and the Transformation of 
Christian Consciousness,” in Womanspirit Rising, 53-62.
Daly, “After the Death of God,” 57-8.
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infinite mystery to an independently existing Supreme Being alongside other beings, a 
solitary, transcendent power who together with the world can be thought to form a larger 
whole’ Through the application of the feminist relational principle, however, the 
‘Supreme ruler’ is wrested from his monarchical throne and replaced with a new idea of 
God as mutually, inclusively interconnected with creation/^^ As women experience and 
name the divine, says Johnson, we find classical theism in its demise.^ ®®
Nevertheless, Johnson is an essentialist when it comes to speaking of divine as 
well as human reality. Both realities are understood in terms of her essential category of 
and language for being. Unlike feminist Carter Heyward who contends that any images of 
God as ‘wholly other’ or ‘being itself deny or displace God’s mutual relatedness to the 
world,^ ®^  Johnson finds the notion of being highly useful, even though it requires more 
precision or modification. In fact, Johnson argues that God is ‘radically’ and distinctly 
‘other’ as ‘being itself! Though she admits to a ‘legion’ of historical difficulties with the 
notion, its long philosophical and theological tradition ‘from Philo to the early Mary
SWI, 20.
This belief in cosmic interconnectedness is at the heart o f ecofeminism and is generally articulated in 
terms o f women’s embodiment, motherhood, and generativity. See Sal lie McFague, The Body of God: An 
Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993); Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gaia and God: An 
Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing (San Francisco: Harper, 1992); Johnson, Women, Earth, “The 
Cosmos: An Astonishing Image o f God,” Origins, 26: 13 (September, 1996): 206-12; and SWI, 170-187. 
This is precisely what Linda Woodhead calls the metanarrative o f the ‘New Spirituality’, generally 
described in terms o f ‘spirit’ or ‘being’, which she observes in Johnson and other feminists. See 
“Spiritualizing the Sacred,” 197. Also see Woodhead’s article, “Post-Christian Spiritualities,” in Religion 
23 (1993), 167-181, where she traces the development o f the New Spirituality since the inception o f  
Western feminism’s ‘second-wave’ in the 1960s. For an appreciation of the feminist regard for the created 
order and also a serious critique regarding created self-worship, see Loren Wilkenson, ““Post-Christian 
Feminism” and the Fatherhood o f  God,” Crux (March 2002): 16-30.
388 19-22; “The Search for the Living God,” 3-5. Johnson is susceptible to the same charge that
Daphne Hampson levels at Rosemary Ruether -  that concerned only with her idea o f God, she is not really 
a theist at all. Theology and Feminism, 29.
Carter Heyward, The Redemption of God: A theology of mutual relation (Washington, DC: 1982). 
Heyward claims more than this: The God o f theism is not only ‘cold deity’ incapable o f  love or friendship, 
‘he’ is the ‘keeper o f the ethical scorecard’, the unquenchable ‘narcissist’. King, Judge, ‘rapist’; in short, 
‘He is the first and final icon of evil in history’ (156).
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Daly’ shows it capable of describing what we intuit from e x p e r ie n c e .‘Being’, she says, 
is classical philosophy’s language for existence: ‘Human thought seeks out what it is that 
energizes all things to exist and arrives at the idea of being, a notion like no other’ In 
turn, ‘being’ is classical theology’s shorthand for speaking of divine mystery or what she 
commonly refers to as the ‘unknowable mystery of God’ or ‘incomprehensible 
liveliness’.E ncom passing  the formal and material, the infinite and finite, it serves 
Johnson well as an over-arching concept:
[T]he ontological language o f being has the advantage of providing an all-inclusive category for 
reality at large, leaving nothing out .... Connected to the idea o f God, language about being 
indicates that all things that exist are related to God as the source o f their existence, and hence to 
each other. It is thus a code word o f the universe’s status as creation. Predicated o f God, being 
symbolizes sheer livingness, which is also a going forth, an unimaginable act o f communion that 
issues in everything. It is thus a code word for God as source o f the whole universe, past, present 
and yet to come.^ ®^
Though Johnson often describes God as ‘being itself, she concedes that ‘being’ 
does not define ‘divine being’. Divinity isn’t captured in the category of being as its 
biggest and best instance. As ‘pure being’ God transcends any genus, concept, or 
category.^^"  ^In this sense, God is utterly unknowable and nameless. And yet, this does not 
keep us from knowing divine mystery in any sense. On the contrary. ‘Insofar as this 
consistent negation invalidates nothing except the limits of the affirmations we make 
about being, it actually can give off a little light. For the not-knowing that comes at the 
end of thought pursued to its limits is actually a deeply religious form of knowing’
SWI 237.
SWI. 237.
SWI, 238.
393 237. Contradictorily, Johnson first argues against any nominalistic concept of an objective
‘substance’ or monistic category linking God and creation and then tries to describe their relation in terms 
of this prevailing category.
SWI, 240.
395 240. ‘Lest we despair o f ever knowing the divine in any way at all’, Johnson claims that God is
ultimately known in human love: ‘In the end, we are united to God as to an unknown, savoring God only 
through love’ (108).
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Why? Because as we know and transcend our own ‘horizon’ we surmise that the ‘infinite 
horizon of being’ is God -  even the Triune God of the Christian faith.
‘Being’ is not only ‘the most foundational reality’ of all, but in its ‘pristine 
theological sense’ it inherently includes the category of relation -  divine, human and 
non-human. Not only do all created things share in being, the source of which is God -  
making being the essential, categorical link between divinity and created reality -  but 
God as Being ‘signifies ultimate reality as pure aliveness in relation, the unoriginate 
welling up of fullness of life in which the whole universe participates’. Ultimately, 
‘God’s being is not an enclosed, egocentric self-regard but is identical with an act of free 
communion’. Being related is at the heart of divine being -  it constitutes God’s very 
essence. As Johnson summarises, ‘ What the divine nature is is constituted by who God is 
in triune relationality without remainder’
How is this known? Not through faith in God’s own Self-revelation given in the 
Incarnation and through the Holy Spirit, not through the attestation of Scripture or the 
ongoing historical witness of the Church. Rather, Johnson argues again for an epistemic 
link between Christian theology and feminist experience. Relying upon the gender 
dualism she elsewhere shuns, Johnson looks to women’s experience to inform the ‘real 
relation’ between God and the world. In a scathing, commentary on male experience 
which seems to forget the Christian Trinitarian doctrine of mutuality, reciprocity and
396 238,240. One is inclined to ask how she gets all o f this out of the hypostatization o f the existential
predicate. In John Milbank’s essay “The End o f Dialogue,” in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The 
Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. Gavin D ’Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), 174- 
191, he argues that religions do not provide varying accounts of any ‘thing’ or aspect o f Being. They are 
different accounts of Being itself or o f “what there is.” As such an account, each religion has to reclassify 
other, incommensurable accounts when it encounters them, according to its own perspective’ (189). If this 
is so, how can Johnson’s feminist relational ontology be universally ‘true’ and applicable?
SWI, 228, 227. ‘Who’ does imply a Subject, however.
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equality that Johnson elsewhere argues so ‘vigorously' coalesces with feminist thought, 
she points to
another human experience that finds self-transcendence enacted precisely through affinity rather 
than quarantine; another interpretation o f the fullness o f being that includes rather than excludes 
genuine, reciprocal relations with others who are different; another pattern o f life that values 
compassionate connectedness over separation; another understanding o f power that sees its 
optimum operation in collegial and empowering actions rather than through controlling commands 
from on high. Women typically witness to deep patterns o f affiliation and mutuality as constitutive 
of their existence and indeed the very grain of existence itself. From this perspective the image of  
an unrelated or only superficially related God is a distortion.^®^
In short, any transcendental perspective on God but this one is the wrong one, for 
this experience points essentially to ‘the way things truly are’.
‘Like a Trinity’
Johnson argues that the right way to speak about God’s immanent presence 
(mediated by women’s experience) is to speak of God as a triune ‘mystery of relation’: 
‘At the heart of holy mystery is ... a threefold koinonia' I t  is her contention that 
Trinitarian language and symbol ‘vigorously coalesce’ with the feminist principle of 
relationality. Classical tradition insists on the radical equality of triune ‘persons in 
relation’. Their difference, however, is constituted by their ways o f being related. T h e  
idea of perichoresis underscores this affirmation of mutual coinherence and reciprocity.
398 225.Emphasis added. What exactly is this a distortion of? Transcendent reality, to which men and
women have equal access and interpretation? Or, is this a distortion of the God of Christian faith, in which 
case Barth would concur? As Janet Soskice observes: ‘The god whom feminist theology loves to [hate] is 
the lonely, spectral father-god, aloof, above, and indifferent. God of scripture is a God who creates freely 
from abundant love and who is present to this creation. Christian beliefs about Jesus develop this story o f  
love, concern and intimacy, and the Christian doctrine o f the Trinity concerns the way that God is ‘with us’. 
Rather it brings out the Christian conviction that God, the eternal creator is fully present to our human 
history -  even to the point of taking human flesh and dying on a cross -  and fully present to us now in the 
Spirit’. “The Trinity and Feminism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Theology, ed. Susan Frank 
Parsons (Cambridge: CUP, 2002), 135-150, 139.
SWI, 199, 191.
195.
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In this ontology of relation, ‘love’ moves in reciprocal patterns of giving and receiving."^®'
Hence Johnson states:
The ontological priority o f relation in the idea o f the triune God has a powerful affinity with 
women’s ownership of relationality as a way o f being in the world...the very essence o f God is to 
be in relation, and thus relatedness rather than the solitary ego is the heart o f all reality."®^
It is ‘from below’ that God’s ‘triune’ relationality is made apparent. The
relationality manifest in the world as capax infiniti -  specifically at the apex of women’s
relationality -  reveals what divinity looks like. Ultimately, however, the indirect,
symbolic character of ‘triune mystery’ can only be thought of symbolically. Hence
Johnson describes the trinity as ‘one core religious symbol’ in need of theological
reconstruction.'^®  ^ The question is how to portray divine relationality accurately. The
feminist answer is in women’s experience and symbols.
Johnson’s agnosticism prevails when it comes to actually ‘naming’ the Nameless
as the Triune God of the Christian faith. She argues that ‘the questions on the Trinity
placed later in the Summa proceed under the sign of not-knowing already laid down by
the earlier questions as true for all human knowing of divine mystery, whether that
knowledge arises from traces of God in creation or from the revealed word ... Even in
SWJ, 196.
402 SWI, 216. Ironically, when Johnson declines process theologian Joseph Bracken’s offer to ‘come over’ 
to his theological camp based on the number o f similarities between their theologies, she fails to account 
for her own ‘totalizing philosophical system’: ‘When a system is in such tight control, it itself seems to take 
the place of God, domesticating, encompassing, governing divine truth....From my perspective shaped by 
the notion o f God as relational Being itself, esse ipsum subsistens, this is not adequate to the being God o f  
God, nor to divine transcendence itself -  which o f course is always immanently related to the world that 
participates in divine being; nor does this necessarily lead to dualism. The imperial pressure o f a totalizing 
philosophical system indeed domesticates infinity, but I would argue that wildness is much more desirable’. 
“Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 102-3 (emphasis added).
*^®^ SWI, 12. In what seems an utter disregard for enormous differences in theological meaning and content, 
Johnson generalises the works o f Barth, Jüngel, Rahner, Moltmann, Boff, Kaufinan, McFague, Tillich, 
Pittenger, Gilkey, Hodgson, Panikkar, Lash and Letty Russell (SWI, 205-211), describing them as recent 
Trinitarian ‘trends’ all o f which reshape the Trinity by using theological terms to describe metaphysical 
concepts, '‘trying to make sense o f  this central but somehow esoteric symbol’ (209, emphasis added).
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faith we remain united to God as to an unknown’.'*®'* Thus, trinitarian speech is always 
indirect, having a metaphorical, analogical, or symbolic character, for the ‘triune God is 
not simply unknown, but positively known to be unknown and unknowable -  which is a 
dear and profound kind of knowledge’.'*®® In short, we cannot know and confess truthfully 
that God is the One God -  Father, Son and Holy Spirit -  which, in Barth’s words, is the 
grammar of the Christian faith.
It is ironic, therefore, that on the one hand, Johnson states in She Who Is that she 
is explicating ‘a theology of the triune God that sets out from the experience of the 
Spirit’,'*®® while on the other, she makes clear that she does not espouse a doctrine of the 
immanent Trinity. Thus, her ‘symbol’ does not describe ‘God’ in se but speaks only of 
God’s relationality indirectly through the world’s relation to God.'*®^
The symbol o f the Trinity is not a blueprint o f the inner workings o f the godhead, not an offering 
of esoteric information about God. In no sense is it a literal description o f God’s being in se. As 
the outcome o f theological reflection on the Christian experience of relationship to God, it is a 
symbol that indirectly points to God’s relationality, at first with reference to the world and then 
with reference to God’s own mystery. The Trinity is itself an analogy referring to divine 
livingness. ... God is like a Trinity, like a threefoldness o f relation.'*®®
The ‘trinity’, then, is not a description of God or even of God’s Triune being and
action in the world. It is a particularly ‘Christian’ description of the human experience o f
relationship to divine mystery. Three experiences in Christian tradition -  God (as ground
or Creator), Jesus (as God’s ‘envoy’ of solidarity) and the all-pervading Spirit -  allow
'*®'*5'If/, 110.
SWI, 205.
"°®5'lf/, 122.
'*®^ In SWI, Johnson entitles her doctrine o f God section “Speaking About God From the World’s History”. 
As she explains, ‘I am very wary o f any talk about the immanent Trinity without initial and continuing 
reference to the experience o f salvation through Jesus in the Spirit.... I also think one can never develop an 
adequate model of the immanent Trinity...’. “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 102-3. Catherine LaCugna 
says something similar in God For Us: ‘[T]he economy itself does not necessarily imply real distinctions 
“in” God that are o f a different ontological order than the distinctions in the economy. There may be such 
distinctions, and it may be a legitimate enterprise for a purely speculative theology to posit such intradivine 
distinctions, but there is no transeconomic perspective from which to posit their existence’ (226-7). This 
must pose a challenge for doing theology as doxology.
'*®8 204-5. Original emphasis.
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three kinds of ‘relations’ to be spoken of, each between God and the worldfi^ Johnson 
assumes there to be a kind of divine-world correspondence ‘economically revealed’ in 
human experiences of ‘salvation’. She bases this on Rahner’s axiom, ‘the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice-versa’.'**®
The ‘coalescence’ she finds between feminist thought and Trinitarian theology 
leads her to argue that God is ‘like a Trinity’, i.e., like the feminist principle of 
relationality, symbolised as ‘Sophia-God’:
Three experiences come to human beings from one God. Therefore three sorts o f relationships are 
possible with one God. Therefore three corresponding distinctions may be said to exist within one 
God.., The threefold, interwoven aspects o f encounter with the one holy mystery point to Sophia- 
God who is not a monolithic block but a living mystery o f relation, to us and to herself.'***
Again, Johnson’s ‘trinitarian description’ derives from human encounter with the
‘living mystery of relation' (‘who’ is in relation?) both ‘to us and to herself. When this
‘divine livingness’ -  that is ‘like a threefoldness of relation’ -  is symbolised in trinitarian,
perichoretic terms from the world, it
evokes a livingness in God, a dynamic coming and going with the world that points to an inner 
divine circling around in unimaginable relation. God’s relatedness to the world in creating, 
redeeming, and renewing activity suggests to the Christian mind that God’s own being is 
somehow similarly differentiated.'**^
'*°^  Johnson describes ‘salvation’ experience as an experience o f human love equated symbolically with the 
‘triune persons’: ‘There is a sense in which we have to be touched first by a love that is not hostile (the 
“third” person), before we are moved to inquire after a definitive historical manifestation o f this love (the 
“second” person), or point from there toward the primordial source o f all (the “first” person)’. SWI, 122-3. 
'**® Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970),21-24, 82-103, and 
passim. Johnson, SWI, 199-201. SWI, 209-211. This is also the heart of LaCugna’s argument in God For 
Us: The Trinity, its internal processions and their ad extra reality in Jesus and the Spirit do not come 
between our natural knowledge and the absolute mysteiy o f God. In grace, says Rahner, ‘God does not 
apply a saving ‘something’ to man, but gives his very self as our salvation in a most radical manner, so that 
God-in-himself and the God-of-our-salvation are strictly identical’. Hence ‘nameless’ Absolute Being is the 
same as the immanent Triune God, who -  based on an assumed essential correspondence in God’s being 
and action -  is the same as the ‘economic’ Trinity experienced historically. “Observations on the Doctrine 
o f God in Catholic Dogmatics,” TI 9:130; “The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology,” TI 4:69. 
Molnar critiques this method for assuming ‘that theology can be done seriously by substituting our 
experiences o f what we call God, i.e., the Unoriginate Origin, for the reality o f the triune God who 
transcends both the experience and the idea o f such an arche. The triune God in fact remained hidden for 
the tradition and was accessible only through faith’ (“Can We Know God Directly?” 249-50).
SWI, 198-9, 201.
SWI, 216.
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Moreover, relational being has a specific character -  one of radical mutuality and jI
equality that acknowledges no before/after, no superior/inferior, no |
domination/subordination. This egalitarian element is foundational to the relationality j
which is God and thus foundational to the divine-human relation. This means that there is IiÎ
no competition between God and the world. Rather, as Johnson frequently reiterates, j
‘friendship with God’ and human autonomy grow in direct and not inverse proportion. If |
God is creator, redeemer and lover of the world, then God’s own honor is at stake in I
human happiness. Where humans are diminished, God’s glory is diminished. In the |
occurrence of ‘full humanity’, claims Johnson, Irenaeus’ axiom is never truer -  Gloria j
.1,
Dei vivens homo. God’s glory increases in direct proportion to human flourishing."^^ And I
what promotes human flourishing? Whatever symbol effectively communicates this j
I
relationality by effectively connecting to experience. |
Johnson explains that Rahner’s axiom points to ‘the epistemological truth that it is j
given to us to point to the latter [the immanent Trinity] only through the former [the |
economic Trinity]’."^ " The ‘former’ economic Trinity is not the Father, Son and Holy 3i
ÎSpirit known analogously in human experience through the historical events of God’s }i
revelation. The ‘economic trinity’ is the three-fold experience of divine relationality. I
iJohnson abstracts the Trinity from its unique, concrete revelation of God within salvation |
history -  the very form and content of God’s Self-utterance as Father, Son and Holy ;
SWI, 14.
414 SWI, 199.
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s p i r i t " -  and states that the Trinity is ‘a legitimate but secondary concepf that 
synthesizes in a “short formula” the concrete experience o f salvation.
It is specifically the human experience o f salvation (‘the Christian experience of 
faith’) that is ‘the generating matrix for language about God as triune’."*^  On the other 
hand, Johnson also states that ‘God is God as Spirit-Sophia’ who ‘enters into holy souls 
and not so holy ones, to make them friends of God and prophets.,.’; ‘God is God again as 
Jesus Christ, Sophia’s child and prophet...’; ‘God is God again as unimaginable abyss of 
livingness, Holy Wisdom, unknown and unknowable’."'^  Is this God or are these 
secondary concepts describing ‘God’ as the source of salvation experience?
Apparently it is the latter, for her trinitarian analogue does not ‘name’ the Triune 
persons. Again, she does not take such a view of divine personhood and is not convinced 
that we can speak of the Triune God as such. Rather, because we cannot know God as 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit in his inner essence, the ‘secondary concept’ of the trinity 
can go by many names. In her own ‘naming’ process, Johnson draws from two dominant 
twentieth-century Trinitarian ‘models’; the ‘single subject pattern’ of Barth and Rahner 
and the ‘social trinity’ model of Moltmann and Boff.
Soskice also argues that the doctrine o f the Trinity arose from the practical and pastoral concerns o f the 
early church in its experience o f Jesus o f Nazareth and the Spirit. Soskice, however, makes the assumption 
with the early church that this was God present among them. States Soskice, in a manner reminiscent o f |
Barth: 'It was reasonable for Christians as well as their critics to ask -  “If there is only one God to whom i
we can pray, then who is this Jesus and how can we pray to him?” The Christian scriptures already posed 1
the problem. In identifying Jesus with the Lord who “Let light shine out of darkness” (2 Corinthians 4:5-6), |
Paul applied divine titles to Jesus which the devout Jew o f his day would have appropriately applied only to |
the God who created heaven on earth. ... In confessing belief in “One God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit,” |
the believer confesses the Trinity, or better, confesses a Trinitarian faith. The doctrine is best seen not as an i
additional conviction [“and by the way, I also believe in the Trinity”] ... It is a grammar o f Christian faith Ï
whose function was to safeguard what the early church took to be the central Christian witness’. “Trinity |
and Feminism,” 136. j
SWI, 198. This particular experience is described as women’s coming into a sense o f human value and I
dignity from one o f worthlessness (being from non-being). ;
SWI, 213-14.
"'®5If7,205.
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SWI, 208 (emphasis added). 
SWI, 208.
421 At least temporarily, in the first instance, until some ‘gender identity equilibrium’ is established, despite 
Johnson’s affirmation that there is no gender in God. SWI, 56-57.
131, 144-46, 233-36.
*^23 ‘Whatever is said about the Spirit is in fact language about the mystery o f  God’. SWI, 121.
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Though she favours Moltmann’s social trinitarian approach (though rejecting his 
concept of atonement), Boff offers ‘a more adequate pattern for ultimate realitÿ, a model
‘wherein there is total equality amid mutuality and respect for difference’."'^  Here, ‘the
1
triune symbol... is a model for the highest ideal for humanity. It lays the foundation for a II
liberated society of equal brothers and sisters, critiques patterns of unjust domination, and -|
offers a source of inspiration for change’."^ " Therefore, the model she develops must j
!reflect her ‘highest good’, i.e., the salvation experience that best images the ontological |
f
1priority of relation. Starting here, however, means she must begin with transcendental |
experience of the ‘Spirit’. |
Being as ‘Spirit’
Like Daly and most other feminists, Johnson rejects patriarchal and ruling terms 
for God."' '^ Unlike Daly, however, she adopts traditional metaphors like ‘Spirit’ and
‘Sophia’, as well as personal metaphors such as ‘mother’ and ‘friend’ given new meaning \
ifrom feminist colleague Sally McFague."^^ With this raft of metaphors Johnson attempts j
to speak of divine being in both ontological and relational terms. ;
Her primary theological term for relational being or ‘hypostasized transcendence’ 1
is ‘Spirit’. Logistically, she interchanges ‘being’ with ‘Spirit’ to speak of the being of I
God in and among the world, claiming that these terms refer synonymously."^^ ‘The one ]
-Irelational God, precisely in being utterly transcendent, not limited by any finite category, |
is capable of the most radical immanence, being intimately related to everything that j
exists’."^ " Hence, ‘the deity of God does not consist in being over against and superior to, 
but expresses itself in freely drawing near and being connected in mutual relation’ which 
is precisely ‘the way the Creator Spirit is present and active in the world’
In a sense, Johnson’s relational ontology, even when described in ‘trinitarian’ 
terms, constitutes a type of pneumatology."^^ She commandeers the Hegelian concept of 
Spirit and equates this concept with relational Being, also called ‘Spirit-Sophia’, ‘the 
Spirit of God’, ‘Spirit’ and ‘Creator Spirit’. The ‘Spirit of God’ is even the ‘triune Spirit’, 
not necessarily to be identified, however, with the Spirit of the Father and the Son. She 
then focuses on the Spirit’s immanent relationality: ‘[T]here is no possible aspect of the 
Spirit of God, either ad intra or ad extra, that can be spoken about without factoring in 
the idea of relation in an essential way. Can there be an unrelated Spirit, existing in 
splendid isolation? The history of theology shows that the notion has been and is 
unthinkable’ This leads her to the following immanentist conclusion:
Since what people call God is not one being among other beings, not even a discrete Supreme 
Being, but mystery which transcends and enfolds all that is, like the horizon and yet circling all 
horizons, this human encounter with the presence and absence of the living God occurs through 
the mediation o f history itself in its whole vast range of happenings. To this movement o f the 
living God that can be traced in and through experience o f the world, Christian speech 
traditionally gives the name Spirit, ...This nomenclature seems particularly effective in signifying 
divine elusiveness and the fact that no human concept can ever circumscribe it ... [T]he term’s 
elusive and dynamic qualities enable it to express human experience o f God who transcends all
SWI, 229. i
Johnson, Women, Earth, 27, 32, 40. Is this freedom not conditioned in an ontology o f mutual |
coinherence? Noting their multiple similarities process theologian Joseph Bracken finally asks Johnson, i
‘Who or What is meant by the term “Creator Spirit”? Is “Creator Spirit” the Holy Spirit or God as Spirit in 
a generic sense? Or perhaps “Creator Spirit” is all three divine persons acting in coordination to effect the 
creation, redemption and sanctification o f their creatures?’ “The Theology o f God o f Elizabeth A.
Johnson,” in Things New and Old (see n. 2) 23.
Gary Badcock concurs. See “Karl Rahner, the Trinity, and Religious Pluralism,” in The Trinity in a \
Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture and Religion, ed. Kevin Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids: :l
Eerdmans, 1997), 144-49. Amy Plantinga Pauw also speaks o f seeing Rahner’s ‘universal pneumatology’ j
(one which precedes Christology) at work in Johnson’s thought. “Braiding a New Footbridge: Christian I
Wisdom, Classic and Feminist,” The Christian Century (November, 1993): 1161. j
SWI, 148. Women, Earth, 44,58. '
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things while yet remaining in communion with all o f reality in a dialectic o f presence and absence 
that knows no bounds."^®
It is from this assumption that Johnson argues for a trinitarian description that 
starts from experience of ‘the’ Spirit. It does not require a threefold image or ‘triune 
prism’ (e.g., sun/beam/light; root/stem/flower, etc.) to understand the Spirit as the 
presence of divine being in the world."^  ^Nor is the Spirit manifest only in keeping with 
the divine character. ‘If we ask more precisely which moments or events mediate God’s 
Spirit, the answer can only be potentially all experience, the whole world ...in and 
through the world’s history: negative, positive, and ambiguous; orderly and chaotic; 
solitary and communal, successful and disastrous; personal and political; dark and 
luminous; ordinary and extraordinary; cosmic, social, and individual’."^®
At this point, other relational models, both for God, and for the God-world 
relation, help to give more concrete, embodied expressions of the Spirit’s mutual, non­
competitive coinherence with the world.
C. Relational Symbols 
Triune Sophia
In Johnson’s estimation, starting with experience seems to compel an adequate 
theology -  and a Trinitarian description -  to start with the Spirit. Starting with the Spirit 
also enables Johnson to start with human experience and to tie it directly to her symbol of 
choice -  Sophia. In rejecting classical Trinitarian language and with it a doctrine of
SWI, 124.
SWI, 123, 127.
SWI, 124 (original emphasis). One wonders how the brutal experience o f Stalinism and Nazism, or the 
Jewish, Armenian, and Cambodian holocausts, or, as Paul states, ‘sexual immorality, impurity and 
debauchery; idolatry and witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits o f rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, 
factions and envy; drunkenness, orgies and the like’, which he describes as contrary to the Spirit, can be 
considered experiences o f the Holy, transforming, life-giving, loving, patient, kind, good, peaceful, faithful, 
gentle, joyful Spirit o f God (Cf. Gal 5:16-25).
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distinctly divine Self-revelation, Johnson relies on her feminist reinterpretation of the 
Judaic Wisdom tradition that allegedly brings the Spirit and Sophia ‘practically to the 
point of identity’."^ ' In fact, she argues that Wisdom was the central Judeo-Christian 
symbol of the faith, not Yahweh or eventually Jesus Christ as the Logos."^^
Wisdom ‘does’ all the things Yahweh does -  She ‘creates, redeems, sanctifies, 
establishes justice, and protects the poor’."”  Most importantly. Wisdom disconnects 
God’s revelation from the ‘once-for-all sacred deeds of history’ in the Old Testament and 
from the particularity of Jesus Christ and the concept of atonement. As a ‘universal 
concept’. Wisdom, says Johnson, ‘does not find its center in the temple [the place of 
Yahweh, of Jesus Christ and of the Spirit, ultimately as the Church (1 Cor. 3:16-17; Eph. 
2:21-22)] but is given to anyone who searches out the order of creation in order to live in 
harmony with it’."”
431 9 4  ^ 146, 211-12; Women, Earth, 52; Friends o f God, 42-43; “Redeeming the Name of Christ,” 120-
122. Ironically, Johnson admits that here too she has had to critically revise the originally ‘intensely 
androcentric’ Wisdom tradition for it ‘to yield an inclusive vision o f wholeness that can benefit women as 
well as men, indeed the whole earth’. "Wisdom Was Made Flesh and Pitched Her Tent Among Us," in 
Reconstructing the Christ Symbol: Essays in Feminist Christology, ed. Maryanne Stevens (New York: 
Paulist, 1993), 96. While Johnson argues (SWI, 94) that ‘allusive’ OT and inter-testamental texts bring 
God’s Spirit and Sophia ‘practically to the point o f identity’, this description of the ‘horizon’ of mystery is 
actually a reiteration o f Rahner’s Vorgriff. For an exegetical argument against the equating o f Sophia with 
Yahweh, see Gordon Fee, “Wisdom Christology in Paul: A Dissenting View,” The Way o f  Wisdom (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 251-279.
Wisdom, she contends, was eventually sidelined by post-Enlightenment scholars in favour o f historical 
and prophetic books that emphasised a dominating form o f ‘Yahwism’. These scholars falsely ‘alleged’ that 
the centre o f Jewish religious experience was an encounter with the Holy God through God’s mighty 
historical acts. Friends o f God, 42. Karen Jobes directly refutes Johnson at this point, stating that ‘Jewish 
apologists presented the wisdom teaching o f Solomon in the Hellenistic marketplace o f  ideas to 
recommend that true wisdom was to be found in the knowledge of Yahweh, the One, True, Living God 
who had created all’, and ‘to exhort the Jewish people themselves to remain faithful to Yahweh while 
living in a society that was presenting seductively attractive alternative religions’. It was not to bring 
Yahweh under the larger universal o f Sophia. Jobes also specifically critiques Johnson’s Wisdom 
Christology, in “Sophia Christology: The Way o f Wisdom?” in The Way o f Wisdom, 232,243.
SWI, 133. “Redeeming the Name o f Christ,” 121.
"^ " ‘Its religious focus is not on personal sin and its overcoming or other intra-religious matters, but on 
walking the way o f righteousness in human responsibility for culture, with the goal o f a rightly ordered life 
amid the good things of this world’. Friends o f God, 42-43. However, the temple and the cross as sacrificial 
loci signify that God reconciles and re-orders the divine-human relation through Jesus Christ. Christians 
profess ‘Christ crucified’ as Lord and God. Otherwise, Johnson’s position would be virtually
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In short, this notion of God jointly grounded in Being-Spirit-Wisdom is 
simultaneously dislodged from its moorings in the specific Biblical revelation of Yahweh 
(T AM THAT I AM’) and Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Son (the T AM’ who is One with 
Yahweh and their Spirit). As the pattern unfolds, we see a ‘notion of God’ expressed 
pneumatologically and ontologically ‘in three-fold repetition’. According to Johnson’s 
‘trinitarian template’ :
6{pmf-Sophia who blows where she will, pervading the world with vitalizing and liberating power, 
brings divine presence in the world its widest universality. JbsMJ-Sophia, preaching the nearness of 
the reign o f God, embodying in his own relationships with the poor and outcast the compassionate 
love o f heaven for the earth, being crucified for it, and raised to glory in the Spirit as pledge o f the 
future o f all, brings divine presence in the world to the point o f its most precise particularity. Holy 
Wisdom, the unoriginate Mother o f  all things, upholding the world as the generating and 
continuously sustaining source o f the being and potential for new being o f all creatures, radicalizes 
divine presence in dark mysteiy.” ^
Thus, as Johnson starts with a general ontology and anthropology and moves 
toward a description of its source, she also moves in her Trinitarian description from a 
generalised, quasi-Hegelian understanding of ‘Spirit’ to its source."^  ^ In language that 
reflects the unity-in-distinction of Trinitarian doctrine, Johnson explains that the 
‘unknowable mother of all’ issues forth her word of Wisdom ‘as an eternal divine 
movement of self-distinction, which when posited externally, grounds creation, becomes
indistinguishable fi-om that o f Carter Heyward, who states: ‘A trinitarian faith rooted and grounded in the 
love o f God would never require that people be Christian in order to be saved ... And how do we live a 
trinitarian faith? In our struggles for mutual relation, we are breaking free from the self-absorbing and 
authoritarian religion that distorts the image o f what is most fully human and fully divine among us’. 
Saving Jesus From Those Who Are Right: Rethinking What it Means to be a Christian (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1999), 172.
SWI, 229 (emphasis added).
Ironically, this means that although she claims that the Spirit is her starting point (from experience), she 
needs the primordial reality o f the unoriginate Ground o f Being -  Mother-Sophia -  to ground the meaning 
or ‘character’ o f the Spirit, as it were. In this sense, she follows the traditional pattern o f Trinitarian 
procession, for which she criticises Barth and Rahner. Their interpretations, she claims, are ultimately 
contemporary repristinations o f the ancient Greek design o f Trinity where a single divine origin has two 
distinct but essentially interrelated issues; the Father is the principle of the godhead, and goes forth through 
the Word in the Spirit. When the first person is made the originating source who issues in the second and 
third persons as modalities o f his own being’, a ‘subtle subordinationism asserts itself, and true mutuality 
is questionable (SWI, 205-7).
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personally concrete in the incarnation, and takes shape in ongoing fragmentary 
anticipations of the world’s salvation’."”  Mother-Sophia, however, is specifically named 
for her relation to the created order, not as a reality-depicting metaphor based on any 
internal relation to an eternally pre-existent ‘second person’ in ‘the eternal movement of 
self-distinction’.
According to Johnson’s Christology, Wisdom becomes ‘personally concrete’ in 
Jesus-Sophia, the uniquely graced human who ‘walks in the way of the Spirit’ in 
solidarity with the suffering world. Sophia-Spirit, whose ‘essence might well be called 
connectedness’, becomes present in and ‘personally grounds’ her ‘envoy’, Jesus. This 
human, whom Johnson describes as a unique ‘Spirit phenomenon’,"”
connects God once for all to concrete embodiment, to the world ... in a way that can never be 
broken. Long-standing dichotomies are herein brought into mutual coinherence: creator and 
creature, transcendence and immanence, spirit and body ... Through his human history the Spirit 
who pervades the universe becomes concretely present in a small bit o f it."^ ^
Here it becomes apparent that Johnson has, as she says, fully ‘imbibed’ Rahner’s
Christology (as well as the far-reaching implications of his Trinitarian axiom). She then
extends it in keeping with her feminist commitments by integrating his Christology as
‘realised anthropology’""® with her feminist concept of divine relationality.
Following Rahner at this point, Johnson states that when humanity seeks to know and name and 
‘articulate the absolute point o f origin that is no point’, it first speaks of unoriginate being. ‘As Rahner 
observes, life-less identity [the distant, ‘solitary’ God o f classical theism] is not the most perfect way of 
being absolute’. SWI, 236-240,206. See Rahner, “On the Theology o f the Incarnation,” TI 4.114.
150-51.
151,169.
""® Rahner speaks o f Christology as ‘self-transcending anthropology’ and anthropology is ‘deficient 
christology’. Foundations, 284. Johnson attributes her Christology as having been fundamentally shaped by 
Rahner and Fannenberg. See “The Ongoing Christology o f  Wolfhart Pannenberg,” 9/2 (1982):
237-250, and “Mary and Contemporary Christology: Rahner and Schillebeeckx,” Église et Théologie 15
(1984): 155-182. For a concise, alternative analysis o f their Christologies, see Colin Gunton “Christology 
From Below,” in Yesterday and Today, 10-32. Gary Badcock explains that whereas Rahner considers the 
evolutionary pinnacle o f human self-transcendence to be the Christ-event (where both divine self­
communication and human self-transcendence reach their definitive expression), it is the mystery o f all 
human existence precisely as human. “Rahner, the Trinity and Religious Pluralism,” The Trinity in a 
Pluralistic Age (see n.427) 144-146.
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The homoousion is thus re-interpreted according to Rahner’s transcendental 
principle and considered to be the most radical form of creaturely self-transcendence. 
This means that the hypostatic union is fully realized when human knowledge of the 
created spirit regarding this unity with the Word transpires. ‘Hence’, says Rahner, ‘the 
hypostatic union necessarily fulfills its own being in what we call (in neo-Chalcedonian 
terminology, if you like) the inner divinization of the human nature of Christ in grace and 
glory’.""' This makes Jesus more than a ‘mere’ human being. He is the ultimate human 
being who comes into existence as God’s definitive ‘self-expression’: His ‘basic 
constitution’ is to have his origins in God radically and completely. Far from diminishing 
the genuineness of his humanity, however, this unity with God enhances it, since in 
relatedness to God the creature comes ultimately to its true reality.""^
Thus, Johnson views the ‘incarnation of Sophia’ as a metaphysical concept 
derived from transcendental principles more than as a contingent fact. In so doing, she 
presupposes this to be the ‘climactic moment’ in the essential, non-competitive unity 
between God and the world. Jesus’ human value is also in his victim status; out of his 
free and unconditional love for others (particularly the poor and the oppressed), he 
suffered in solidarity with them through his unjust crucifixion. In this way, he is the 
human exemplar of God’s care for and entry into the suffering of the world.
Given her feminist concerns, Johnson draws attention away from Jesus’ maleness 
and toward his generic humanity.""^ She notes that the Nicene creed explicitly affirms et
Rahner, “The Concept o f  Mystery in Catholic Theology,” 68 (emphasis added).
“Mary and Contemporary Christology,” 165.
443 «-pjjg Maleness o f Christ,” 111. ‘[T]he historical Jesus, who was indisputably a male human being, is 
interpreted as the incarnation o f the Logos, an ontological symbol connected with rationality and thus, 
according to Greek philosophy, with maleness. The Word made flesh is then related to human beings 
defined according to an androcentric anthropology that sees men as normative and women as derivative’. 
“Redeeming the Name o f Christ: Christology,” in Freeing Theology (see n. 24) 118. What Johnson never
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homo f  actus est -  ‘and became human’ or assumed human nature -  not et vir factus est, 
stressing male sexuality.""" (The irony in Johnson’s anti-sexist approach is that she more 
or less ignores Jesus’ gender, or worse, generalizes it under a general description of 
humanity that disregards particularity, precisely in order to stress women’s ‘particularity’ 
-  and then subsumes women’s particularity under general descriptions of experience!) 
She argues that if stress is placed on the latter {vir, or man), then the early Christian 
axiom -  ‘What is not assumed is not redeemed, but what is assumed is saved by union 
with God’ -  leaves the female half the human race unredeemably outside of God’s 
salvation.""^
The question is what relevance this axiom has for Johnson in terms of salvation or 
redemption through Jesus? The relevance lies in his being the paradigm of redeemed 
humanity. ‘On the assumption that there is but one history of the human race in which all 
human beings have solidarity, the destiny of one member of the human race can have 
universal significance for all the rest’.""® In Jesus Christ is actualized ‘the victorious 
fulfillment of human nature’.""’ ‘We experience the ‘risen Jesus’ as the ‘redeemed man’ -  
he was really redeemed insofar as his humanity has made the passage through death to 
the fullness of life by the power of the Spirit. The death and ‘resurrection’ of this real 
human actualises his free fidelity toward God and God’s abiding fidelity toward him and 
in him the whole human race.""®
addresses is how her own female ontological symbol connected with a feminist view o f relationality that 
sees women as normative and men as derivative is any different, barring the gendering substitutions.
""" Wells, “Trinitarian Feminism,” 336.
""® Johnson, “Redeeming the Name,” 119. The axiom attributes to Gregory o f Nazianzus.
""® “Mary and Contemporary Christology,” 166.
“Mary and Contemporary Christology,” 167.
""® “Mary and Contemporary Christology,” 163.
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When it comes to speaking of Jesus’ resurrected reality, however, she relies on 
the ‘humility of the apophatic approach’.""® The resurrection is an ‘unimaginable event 
enveloped in the mystery of God’, about which she is agnostic, and thus language about 
his resurrected humanity (in 1 Cor 15:35-45) ‘proceeds’, like all other divine mystery, 
‘under the negating sign of analogy’ What she does know is that while his life is 
hidden in God, '‘his presence is known only through the Spirit ... the inevitable 
limitations of Jesus’ humanity are completed in the wholeness of the human race 
anointed with the Spirit’."®'
In other words, though Jesus was a unique ‘Spirit phenomenon’, we are like him 
to the degree that we too are ‘spirit in the world’ and thus ‘other Christs’."®^ The Spirit of 
Sophia -  also called the Spirit of ‘Christ’ — was unique in this man but not unique to this 
man or from  him. Hence the Spirit of ‘Christ’ is greater than and not limited to Jesus- 
Sophia or to those ‘who know his story’."®® Fundamentally, ‘the nature of Christian
163.
"®®<S«Y, 163.
"®' SWJ, 163-4 (emphasis added). “Mary and Contemporary Christology,” 163.
"®^ Johnson incorporates aspects o f Spirit and Wisdom Christologies into her Rahnerian Christology, Their 
thrust is to minimalise the pre-existence o f the Son and his ongoing, new humanity (and priestly office) 
through the Incarnation, resurrection and exaltation. The Spirit o f  the risen Christ is equated with and 
collapsed into the risen Son, Jesus Christ. Alternatively, Gordon Fee argues that whereas the Spirit can be 
said to be ‘christocentric’ in Pauline theology, ‘such an understanding o f the relationship between Christ 
and the Spirit is a far cry from the “Spirit Christology” spoken o f so confidently by many’ (e.g., James D. 
G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975)). Fee adds: ‘that the risen Christ and 
the Spirit are clearly distinct from each other in Paul’s thinking is demonstrated from all kinds o f evidence’, 
the most significant being the combination o f Rom 8:26-27 and 8:34. ‘On the surface one could argue for 
“identification” in function; but what one gets rather is the clearest expression not only o f “distinction” but 
o f the fact that the risen Christ is not now understood by Paul to be identified with the Spirit’. God’s 
Empowering Presence (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers: 1994), 837-38.
"®® Wherever the Holy Spirit is sundered from the person o f Jesus Christ, argues Barth, thus dissolving the 
New Testament recognition o f their unity, ‘sooner or later He is always transmuted into quite a different 
spirit, the spirit o f the religious man, and finally the human spirit in general’. ‘If, then, we want truly and 
properly to understand the Holy Spirit and His work upon us, we can never try to understand them 
abstractly and in themselves. ... [W]e must never look at the subjective reality in which he might 
presumably or actually be seen experienced. We must look rather at the place from which He comes and at 
what He brings. ... We must look to the objective possibility o f our communion with Christ. In other 
words, we must look at Christ Him self. C.D. 1.2,251, 249.
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identity as life in Christ, the one anointed in the Spirit, cannot be restricted to the 
historical person Jesus nor to certain select members of the community but signifies all 
those who by drinking of the Spirit participate in the community of disciples. “Christ” is 
a pneumatological reality, a creation of the Spirit who is not limited to whether one is 
Jew or Greek, slave or free, male or female’."®" Moreover, the boundaries of the 
community of the saints are far from rigid and certainly include persons of persuasions 
other than Christian and even o f no religious belief who live according to the light o f  
their conscience" Thus, we do not participate ontologically in the life of Jesus Christ 
by the Spirit. Rather, we remember Jesus by example, and everyone who acts like him, 
whether they know it or not, are ‘in Christ’, because we are ‘in’ Spirit-Sophia -  the 
essence of divine relationality."®®
Sophia and the World
a. Maternity-Generativity
With the symbol of Sophia in place, and in the typically feminist move away from
God as ‘Lord o f  or ‘wholly other’, Johnson adopts the image of mother for God’s
relation to the world: ‘Holy Wisdom is the mother of the universe, the unoriginate, living
source of all that exists. This unimaginable livingness generates the life of all creatures,
"®" 162.
"®® Friends o f God, 96.
"®® Douglas Farrow notes that Johnson follows Strauss’s lead and basically loses her own hard-fought 
‘humanity’ to a general theory o f immanence: ‘Ancients and moderns are allied in misconstruing alienation 
between God and humanity in terms o f epistemological or ontological distance. Consequently they are 
allied also in constructing systems o f mediation which, even where christological, operate by denying 
Christ’s particularity. For the only way to overcome alienation, thus understood, is to eradicate distance and 
otherness: to unite, to homogenize, to divinize; in effect, to universalize the incarnation. And there is no 
way to do that without turning away from the human Jesus, or indeed from what makes us human. ... No 
doubt this calamity is what the serpent had in view from the beginning, when it first invited humans to 
introduce alienation by coveting equality with God. At all events, it is the predictable outcome o f the kind 
o f thinking which wars against divine transcendence by inventing a general theory o f immanence, a theory 
which plays itself out politically and culturally as an attempt to slake the unquenchable thirst for universal 
unity’. Ascension andEcclesia (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 255-56n2.
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? 457being herself, in the beginning and continuously, the power of being within all being’. 
Hence the ultimate metaphor for divine-cosmic interrelatedness is maternal generativity 
or pregnancy/birth.
This reality is the paradigm without equal for the panentheistic notion o f the coinherence o f God 
and the world. To see the world dwelling in God is to play variations on the theme of women’s 
bodiliness and experience o f pregnancy, labor and giving birth. ... they wonderfully evoke the 
mystery o f creative, generative love that encircles the struggling world, making possible its life 
and growth in the face of the power o f nonbeing and evil. As some of our poets now say, “in her 
we live and move and have our being” (gloss on Acts 17:28)."®®
This leads Johnson back to a radical view of interrelation and one that points to 
the essential relationality of being -  ‘the mother image points to an intrinsic relatedness 
between God and the world as a loving relationality that belongs to the very essence of 
being a mother and never ends’. In other words, God’s relation to the world belongs to 
her very essence."®®
b. Friendship -  Perichoresis
The other key model that Johnson uses is ‘friendship’, tied particularly to the 
Trinitarian concept of perichoresis -  friends encircling one another in the dance of 
relational inclusiveness."®® ‘Holy Wisdom, the horizon encircling all horizons, is a 
profound mystery of relatedness, whose essential livingness consists in the mutuality of 
friendship. The love of friendship is the very essence of God’."®' Why is this the best 
analogy to characterise the mutuality of the divine-world relation? Because friendship is
"®’ SWI, 179. Women, Earth, 57-8. 
"®® SWI, 234-35.
"®® Molnar states that whenever the world belongs to God’s essence, then God’s creative function has 
absorbed his essence in ‘typically Cartesian fashion. Pantheism always implies that God cannot exist 
without the world. Johnson’s position clearly bears that out’. “The Purpose o f the Doctrine o f the Immanent 
Trinity,” in Divine Freedom and the Doctrine o f the Immanent Trinity (see n. 195), 25.
"®® Friendship is consistently upheld as an ideal model o f community in feminist theology. See, for 
example, Johnson, SWI, 144-5 and passim; Friends o f God and Prophets, chapter 12 and passim; McFague, 
Models o f God: Theology fo r an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 157-67; 
Metaphorical Theology, 177-92: Sharon Ringe, Wisdom’s  Friends (Louisville: Westminster John Knox: 
1999), chapters 1 and 5.
"®' SWI, 218.
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‘the least possessive, the most mutual of relationships, able to cross social barriers in 
genuine reciprocal regard ... characterised by mutual trust’."®® As the ‘friend of the world’ 
God freely shares being, freely ‘gives’ to, in and of the world, we freely express that 
being and interrelatedness to God, one another and the cosmos. The importance of this 
metaphor is that it implies that friendship is reciprocal and mutual, from God’s side and 
ours. It is ‘the most free relation known to adult human beings’."®®
In other words, friends enter into relationship voluntarily, equally and mutually, 
both to give and to receive."®" Technically, there is no hierarchy in friendship and thus no 
possibility for domination of the ‘other’."®® If we are ontologically bound to God, then to 
characterise God as friend ‘equalises’ the relational partners. God may be asymmetrically 
‘other’ in absolute mystery, but ‘Lordship’ is eliminated while human autonomy and 
freedom are preserved."®®
When turning to trinitarian description, Johnson notes that classical theology’s 
‘hesitancy’ to use the friendship metaphor for the triune relations is because such a 
characterisation sets up 'so much mutuality that the persons become indistinct’."®’ 
Nevertheless, Johnson states that God’s ‘inner befriending is constitutive of “personal” 
distinctiveness’ -  ‘in love’ unity and differentiation are correlates rather than opposites."®®
"®® 5117,217. i
"®® SWI, 145. Johnson follows McFague here. j
"®" SWI, 217. Johnson seems to echo feminist theorist Marilyn Friedman’s description o f friendship, where i
its appeal as a feminist communal concept is based on ‘voluntary choice’. In other words, friendship allows 
the subject to be in control o f the choice of an ‘other’ with whom they relate. “Feminism and Modem I
Friendship; Dislocating the Community,” in Feminist and Political Theory, ed. Cass Sunstein (Chicago: j
University o f Chicago Press, 1990,143-158.
"®® Ironically, the voluntary aspect o f mutual friendship always seems to be emphasised in conjunction with |
statements about relationality as an essential human condition. How can one volunteer to be what one is |
essentially! •
"®® This conceptual outworking attempts to defend against what Francis Martin earlier described as the j
Enlightenment and feminist correlation of causality with domination.
"®’ 5IP7, 145.
"®®5IJ7,217.
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II. Dogmatic implications
A. Trinitarian Critique
Johnson bas argued that her alternative, feminist Trinitarian doctrine of God, 
shaped fundamentally by Rahner’s theology and metaphysics and further modified 
according to her feminist principle of relationality, remains faithful to the basic elements 
of the Christian faith. On the one hand, she states that her starting point is the ‘interpreted 
experience of the Spirit’ that allows her to ‘think through to the living triune Go<f."®® On 
the other hand, she validates this starting point based on its coherence with ‘the human 
experience o f salvation, without which there would be no speech about the triune God at 
all’.” ®
Again, on the one hand, ‘the triune God is not simply unknown, but positively 
known to be unknown and unknowable’ and on the other, ‘In knowing the God who is 
our origin, ground and goal, we do not know a shadow image of God but the real living 
God of Jesus Christ in their Spirit. The God who saves -  this is God’.” ' Tossed between 
the ‘simply unknowable’ yet ‘saving’, ‘living God’, ultimately she argues that all we can 
do is indirectly surmise a ‘threefoldness’ about God’s being from our ‘salvation 
experience’. In the end, the Trinity ‘is in no sense a literal description of God’s being in 
se" but ‘a symbol that indirectly points to God’s relationality, at first with reference to the 
world and then with reference to God’s own [utterly unknowable] mystery’.” ®
One encounters, therefore, a continual ambiguity in Johnson’s thought. She makes 
references to the ‘living’ Triune God -  the original content of which only comes from
"®® SWI, 122.
” ® SWI 122.
” ' SWI, 201; she is here citing LaCugna, “Reconceiving the Trinity as the Mystery o f Salvation,” SJT 38
(1985): 1-23,13.
” ®5W7, 204-5.
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Scripture and tradition, and ultimately from God’s Self-revelation as such. This assumes 
epistemic access through faith in and relationship with (indeed, ontological relation to) 
the living Triune God. She then disclaims any possibility of knowing God as such, and 
that what knowledge is available comes through ‘women’s experience’. This assumes 
that the concept ‘trinity’ is an abstract idea or symbol given wholly apart from God. It is 
instead a human concept externally applied to the idea o f  God. This ambiguity makes for 
a rather amorphous Trinitarian ‘dofctrine’.
In the context o f advancing an appeal to human experience and articulating her 
suspicion of any dichotomization between God and the world, Johnson argues for 
‘critically acceptable criteria to argue the credibility and universality of the question of 
God’.” ® In the process, she launches a two-fold attack on Karl Barth’s doctrine of the 
Trinity and corresponding God-talk.
First, she critiques what she perceives to be ‘the radical dissociation it 
presupposed between God and human experience’. Second, citing Fannenberg, she 
criticises Barth for his ‘retreat from engagement with contemporary criteria for the truth
473 wphe Legitimacy o f the God Question,” 290. Johnson cites Fannenberg’s critique o f Barth’s approach in 
“Types o f Atheism and Their Theological Significance”, in Basic Questions in Theology, Vol II, George H. 
Kehm, trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 184-200. Echoing von Hamack, Johnson considers 
Barth’s method to be, ‘the ultimate example o f pure subjectivism, open to the charge o f illusion’. See, e.g., 
Adolf von Hamack, The Beginnings o f Dialectical Theology, ed. James M. Robinson (Richmond: John 
Knox, 1968), 165-66, 174. George Hunsinger argues that Hamack’s perplexity with Barth was due in part 
to Barth’s failure at the time to distinguish between normative and valid claims. From C.D. IV.3 and other 
later statements in Church Dogmatics, Hunsinger believes that ‘what Barth wanted to say was something 
like this: All theological statements derived and grounded independently o f God’s revelation must be 
subjected to a process o f Aufhebung. In and o f themselves such statements can never be normative, and 
therefore theology can never build upon them or enter into synthesis with them, not even critically’. What 
truths are imbedded in such statements in abstraction from revelation can only be liberated ‘by a process 
which subjects the abstraction to a kind o f death and resurrection, or complete cancellation and then 
reconstitution on a higher or different plane. ... In short, theological statements independent o f revelation 
can never be normative and never be valid in themselves. But they contain elements o f truth which, once 
liberated, can fiinction as likenesses (but no more) to the truth o f God’s revelation’. “The Hamack/Barth 
Correspondence: A Paraphrase with Comments,” in Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl 
Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 333-35.
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of assertions into a “supranaturalistic wildlife sanctuary.”’ This served to restrict 
Christian speech to the ‘“self-inflicting isolation of a higher glossolalia,” and made it 
impossible to mount any public argument for the universal truth of Christian statements’. 
Third, she repudiates Barth’s grounding of faith ‘on pure decision in response to an 
announced authority without any appeal to reason or objectivity’.” "
Given that Barth is universally recognised as the primary influence of Rahner’s 
doctrine of the Trinity"’® -  on which she seeks to draw -  and given secondly that Barth’s 
exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity includes an extended analysis of Christian 
experience expressly located within the context of his doctrine of God, it would seem to 
be worthwhile considering where precisely their ways part and thus how valid these 
criticisms are. Furthermore, it is arguable that Johnson’s use of Rahner’s Trinitarian 
axiom -  which can be traced to Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity ~ creates much of the 
ambiguity in her own thought.
A Basic Articulation of Trinitarian Doctrine
‘The doctrine of the Trinity is what basically distinguishes the Christian doctriiie 
of God as Christian, and therefore what already distinguishes the Christian concept of 
revelation as Christian, in contrast to all other possible doctrines of God or concepts of 
revelation’."’® In short, there is no way to separate the formal content of the doctrine of 
the Trinity from the domain in which God has given himself to be known, experienced 
and worshipped as Father, Son and Spirit. As God makes himself known this way, he also
"’" All quotes in this paragraph are from “The Legitimacy o f the God Question,” 289.
"’® See, e.g., Alistair Heron’s reference in A Century o f Protestant Theology (Cambridge: Lutterworth, 
1980),177; Neil Ormerod, Introducing Contemporary Theologies (see n.3) 109; Ralph del Colie, “the 
Triune God,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, ed. Colin Gunton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 136.
"’® C.D. 1.1,301.
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establishes the community of faith -  those ‘born of water and the Spirit’, who are ‘given 
the Spirit of adoption’ and made one with the Father and the Son through the latter’s 
obedience (Jn 3:5; 17:11-25: Rom 3:21-26; 8:14-17: Eph 1:4-14; 4:4-7: Col 1:15-22).
These are the Scriptural and sacramental foundations (Mt 28:19), as well as the 
doxological content and ‘grammar’, of the Body of Christ. The Church is comprised of 
those who have heard and responded to the call o f  God -  the God who in love, has freely 
created, redeemed and restored them for eternal fellowship, making possible and actual 
their knowledge of him in Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit. Rooted and grounded 
ontologically ‘in Christ’, the Church responds in freedom, love and obedience as it is 
continually conformed to his image. In sum, the doctrine of the Trinity is the heart of the 
Christian faith as the life of the Christian community in participation with the Triune 
God. Creaturely talk about God thus begins with God’s free Self-determination to be who 
he is and is entered into by the Church, in doxology and thanksgiving, through its 
ontological participation in God’s Triune being.
For Barth, this doctrinal understanding is grounded from beginning to end in who 
God is and how God has revealed himself to broken humanity as such, restoring their 
humanity and communion with him in the process. For Barth, theology, or Christian faith 
and speech, are not first source but response -  witness to a personal encounter with God. 
It is only possible because God has first spoken and given himself to be known. From 
Barth’s viewpoint, the various nineteenth-century attempts to root and validate 
theological language in some aspect of human experience had simply engaged in 
Feuerbach’s damning reduction of theological statements to theological language. But 
theology is not primarily concerned to express or articulate the contents of experience.
162
God has spoken, and that speaking alone furnishes a basis upon which the Church may in 
turn talk about God, and thereby grants theology its raison d'etre. God, Barth writes, 
‘makes Himself present, known and significant to [men] as God. In the historic life of 
men He takes up a place, and a very specific place at that, and makes Himself the object 
of human contemplation, human experience, human thought and human speech’.” ’
Thus, Barth maintains that to speak of the Triune God of the Christian faith, and, 
secondarily, to speak of humanity’s relation to God, is to speak God’s own miraculous 
and mysterious Word -  ‘Jesus Christ, God in His gracious revealing and reconciling 
address to man’.” ® Specifically, God, who is only known by God, gives himself in the 
‘being-act’ of this Word, i.e., in the concrete particularity of Jesus Christ in whom 
humanity and divinity meet in utter uniqueness without confusion or commingling. This 
is not a word about a concept of God or ‘the divine’ in abstraction. Rather, it is God’s 
own particular Self-talk deriving from his own particular. Triune being as Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit. This particular Word tells us that while he is wholly other than us as 
Creator and Lord, God is also the one who freely chooses to be essentially fo r  us, 
encountering humanity in his own humanity in Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit. This
” ’ Hart, citing Barth, in “Barth, The Trinity and Pluralism,” 31. For concise summaries o f Barth’s 
Trinitarian theology, portions o f which I have incorporated here, see Hart, “Karl Barth, the Trinity, and 
Pluralism,” in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age (see n.427) 124-142; and Alan Torrance, “The Trinity,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (see n. 11) 72-91. For extended treatment on Barth by both 
Torrance and Hart, see Persons in Communion and Regarding Karl Barth, respectively. In addition to Hart 
and Torrance’s interpretations o f Barth, I am also indebted in particular to George Hunsinger, How to Read 
Karl Barth: The Shape o f His Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), and Disruptive Grace 
(see n.474); McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); T.F. Torrance Karl Barth: Biblical and 
Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990); John Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology: Human 
Action in Barth’s  (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain o f the
Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001); and Paul Molnar, 
Divine Freedom and the Doctrine o f the Immanent Trinity: In dialogue with Karl Barth and contemporary 
theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002).
” ® CD., 1.1,4.
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Word is absolutely unique from any other word spoken to or by humanity, since its origin 
is not in created reality.
As God the Subject gives himself as ‘object’ to be known by us, we discover that 
he is for us precisely as we discover our need of him. For in Jesus Christ, we are 
confronted both with who God is as Lord and as Saviour, and with who we are as sinners, 
judged and forgiven. For Barth, the paradox of the gospel of grace is manifest in the fact 
that this two-sided revelation can occur -  it requires that it be an act of God from first to 
last.”  ^Because God is holy, as sinful creatures our darkened minds cannot apprehend or 
comprehend God’s holy majesty. Furthermore, because God is wholly other than we are 
as creatures, God does not belong to the world of objects with which human 
apprehension and speech ordinarily have to do and to which they are fitted to pertain. 
God’s reality transcends creation in such a way that our human knowing could never 
aspire to lay hold of it and render it into and ‘object’. God is beyond human 
classification, understanding and description and so confronts us in absolute mystery."®® 
We possess no natural aptitude for knowing God, even through the analogia entisJ*^  ^
Thus, revelation is always necessary -  and miraculous -  wherever the distinction between 
God’s existence and fallen human existence is taken seriously.
It will thus ‘remain a miracle to all eternity o f  completed redemption’. C.D. 1.2, 245.
"®® At this point, Barth is in full agreement with his modem Kantian heritage and so in theory, with Johnson 
and Rahner, though Johnson and Rahner nevertheless proceed to subsume God within the categorical 
principles o f their metaphysics.
®' C.D. 1.1, 168; 1.2, 257. Though Barth initially stated that the Roman Catholic analogia entis is ‘the 
invention o f the Antichrist’ (C.D. 1.1, x) he later retracted that statement in light o f Gottlieb Sohngen’s 
account o f the analogia entis (C.D. II. 1). In fact, Barth later states that were it not for the analogia entis, ‘I 
at the same time allow myself to regard all other possible reasons for not becoming Catholic, as short­
sighted and lacking in seriousness’. It has been argued that Barth’s analogia fldei shares similarities with 
the analogia entis. See e.g., Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology o f Karl Barth, trans. E. T. Oakes (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1992).
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In becoming God for us, God heals the breach so that he can draw us into the 
circle of his own self-knowing. This means that revelation and reconciliation are two 
aspects of the same reality: they are both ways of referring to what happens and what 
must happen in order for humans to be drawn into a personal encounter with God and 
thereby, to know Him."®® Thus, ‘knowledge’ of God is not an objectifying ‘knowledge 
about’ God, Although it exists within a precise conceptual and verbal matrix, it is above 
all a self-involving and self-transforming communion with God as personal Other.
This gets to the heart of Johnson’s critique of Barth’s supposed dissociation 
between God and human experience. Barth would seem to anticipate the kind of criticism 
which Johnson and Fannenberg raise when he writes: ‘[T]o my regret I am continually 
hearing it said that I am putting revelation and faith up in the clouds so far as the believer 
is concerned’."®® Barth cites examples of Wobbermin’s accusation that, for instance, Barth 
was ‘teaching a fides quae creditor without regard for the fides qua creditor, the intimate 
personal experience of faith is to be completely eliminated.’” Wobbermin also asserts 
that for Barth, ‘The transmission of revelation is not thought of in such a way “that the 
nature of man is also taken into account.’”"®" Not so, says Barth. God’s making himself 
known to a human being and that human being’s encounter with God in that personal 
revelation of Jesus Christ as God is a wholly experiential reality -  and it affects every 
level of that person’s being. At issue is what kind of experience and what conditions that 
experience. This leads Barth directly to the individual’s communal identity and 
participation in the Triune God as the Church.
"®® Hart, “Revelation,” 42. 
"®® C.D. 1.1,209.
"®" CD. 1.1,209.
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[T]he Word o f God must be understood as an event in and to the reality o f man.... There can be no 
objection in principle to describing this event as “experience” and even as “religious experience.” 
The quarrel is not with the term nor with the true and important thing the term might finally 
denote, namely the real and supremely determinative entry of the Word o f God into the reality of 
man. But the term is burdened -  which is why we avoid it -  with the underlying idea that man 
generally is capable o f religious experience or that this capability has the critical significance o f a 
norm.. .Naturally experience o f the Word o f God always takes place in an act of human self- 
determination. But it is not experience o f the Word o f God as this act. ... Nor is there any place 
here for the view that this experience is a kind o f co-operation between divine-determining and 
human self-determining. ...I f  man lets himself be told by the Word o f God that he has a Lord, that 
he is the creature o f this Lord, that he is a lost sinner blessed by Him, that he awaits eternal 
redemption and is thus a stranger in this sphere o f time, this specific content of the Word 
experienced by him will flatly prohibit him from ascribing the possibility o f  this experience to 
himself either wholly or in part or from dialectically equating the divine possibility actualized in 
this experience with a possibility o f his own."®®
Both the content of the Word and fallen humanity’s inability to hear it lead Barth 
to conclude that experience of God is from first to last a gift of God to human beings. In 
the very act of acknowledging who God is and who they are as sinful creatures met by 
this loving God, the encounter changes them. ‘A new regenerate man will arise in the act 
of this acknowledgement as the man whom God has addressed and who hears God,’ says 
Barth -  the person who by faith given in the person of the Spirit has been brought to 
knowledge of Jesus Christ as the Son of God and as the ‘new human’. In this encounter, 
faith ‘conforms’ creatures to God, giving them eyes to see God and who they are in him. 
They are, in Barth’s terms, ‘bracketed’ by this real experience of knowing God by being 
known. This is a ‘mutual indwelling or union of the divine and human possibility’ in 
which the human creature is set free for real experience -  to be fully human in 
knowledge of and relation to God."®® This is to be set free for ‘epistemic participation’ by 
the Spirit in the incarnate Son’s epistemic communion with the Father."®’ It is also to be 
set free to live and articulate one’s witness as the Church in ontological participation with 
the Triune God, having been reconciled and reconstituted to God.
"®® CD. 1.1, 193,199.
"®® C.D. 1.1,246.
"®’ Torrance, “The Trinity,” 73.
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This is the heart of the doctrine of the Trinity. God exists as the unknowable and 
unspeakable Lord. Yet this same God objectifies himself as ‘Other’ in his personal Word 
of address to humanity, which is also humanity’s word of renewal and recreation. It 
follows that if creaturely response to God’s Word depended on human ability, the Word 
would go unanswered. But this disregards the Spirit, something Barth does not do any 
more than Johnson. Rather, Barth maintains that the fact that Word spoken by God 
obtains a human response depends upon the Spirit’s work of response in and through 
human beings. If we are to receive God’s revelation, then it is necessary for this self- 
objectification to be accompanied by another -  the Spirit -  through whom God indwells 
us directly and creates in us the subjective conditions for receiving the Word that he 
speaks. The Spirit creates in us faith and obedience, the proper relational response of 
humanity to God.
This means that faith is the way of knowing. Faith is neither a static commodity 
given to us, somehow added to our mental faculties which enables us always to have 
access to spiritual realities, nor is it a renewed alteration of our natural state, so that we 
now have a natural capacity to know God whereas before we did not. In short is not an 
‘entitative’ alteration of our essential humanity, as Johnson (and Rahner) would have it. 
Rather, it is a miraculous alteration of our ability to perceive, to hear and know the Word 
as God. This is a gift given by the Spirit as a condition of being made a new creation, 
being ontologically reconstituted ‘in Christ’, participating in the new humanity of Christ 
and in the communion of the Triune God. ‘As the Spirit responds to the Word through 
human beings, human beings participate through the Spirit in the life of the Trinity and 
thus are reborn into fellowship with God (Jn 3:4). Apart from the Spirit’s intervention.
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even accurate knowledge of Jesus is not enough to allow an adequate response to God’s 
Word (Acts 18:24-19:7). This is not to say that the Spirit subverts or displaces our 
humanity, for here, too, the ontological distinction between human and divine is 
maintained’.” ®
Barth insists that in this event God is the Subject from first to last."®^  God acts 
‘from above’,” ® securing what must happen on both sides of the knowing relation. ‘The 
Word creates the fact that we hear the Word .... Up there with Him it is possible for it to 
be possible down here with us’.” ' God personally opens himself to us in order to be 
known as only persons can and must.” ® As wholly other Creator, He is also the one who 
adopts and adapts both us as recipients and the media of revelation, establishing the 
‘analogy of faith’ that enables participation in this knowing relation. When God speaks, 
those to whom he speaks are not left in any doubt about the matter. The Holy Spirit draws 
us in a supremely self-involving way into the presence and knowledge of a wholly and 
holy Other whose reality and claim upon us are self-authenticating within this encounter.
"®® Ian McFarland, “Christ, Spirit and Atonement,” International Journal o f Systematic Theology 3:1 
(March 2001): 83-93, 91-2. ‘God’s action in the Spirit is not to be understood on analogy with a created 
cause that limits our freedom; on the contrary, the Spirit’s action -  as the action o f the God who establishes 
us as creatures with our own integrity in distinction from God -  constitutes our response as a manifestation 
of freedom, in line with Paul’s claim that God’s Spirit bear[s] witness with our spirit that we are children of  
God’ (Rom. 8:15-16)’. In this sense, the doctrine o f the Trinity speaks fundamentally o f God in relation to 
creation without holding a necessary unity between the two. Rather, Scripture, tradition, creedal 
confessions and the historically Trinitarian structure o f worship presuppose just the opposite. God’s loving 
relation to his creation is utterly free and gracious. The Biblical understanding o f God’s covenantal relation 
to his people, and that o f the New Covenant ushering in the renewal o f  all creation through God’s Self-gift 
of grace and reconciliation, only makes sense if  the integrity of God and the world are each upheld. This 
affirmation o f God’s immanence in the world is understood primarily and supremely in and from the 
person and work o f Jesus Christ in the power o f the Holy Spirit. i
"®^C.D. 1.1,296; C.D. 1.2, 1. '
” ® C.D. 1.1,242. i
” ' C.D. 1.2, 247. ‘
492 jg to suggest’, states Torrance, ‘however, that the human concept o f personhood is basic to a |
proper theology. Rather, it is to say that the personal nature o f God, as this is defined for us a posteriori in I
and through the Act of God, is essential to the possibility o f theology. It also leads to the affirmation that |
the liberation, or rather, recreation o f human beings for personhood is the subsequent condition at the I
human level o f the epistemic communion which stems from this free act o f God’s grace’. Persons in I
Communion, 36. |
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Thus, Tn the Holy Spirit we are confronted by what we cannot deny even if we wanted to 
do so’.” ®
Asking what this God must be like who is able to make himself known in this 
particular way, Barth arrives at a doctrine of the immanent Trinity. In other words, God's 
self-revealing in this already differentiated threefold form is not itself t\iQ occasion for the 
self-differentiation. Rather, it is the ‘unveiling’ of a logically and ontologically prior 
self-differentiation in God in which his freedom to be for us in this way is grounded.” " 
Hence we can say that it is out of the free overflow of love for the other that constitutes 
the Triune God as three persons in unique, perichoretic relation that God chose to create 
the world and to draw humanity into relation to himself. ‘Because God in His one nature 
is not solitary but different (verschieden) in His modes of existence, because He is the 
Father who has an only-begotten Son, therefore the fact that He can be free for others, 
that He can be free for a reality different from Himself, is eternally grounded within God 
Himself In other words, God is able to enter history without ceasing to be what 
eternally he is, ‘precisely because there is already hypostatic differentiation within the 
Godhead. Thus the form and content of revelation are utterly integrated. What is 'known' 
is the pattern indwelt by participants in the event of revelation, a pattern which is itself 
grounded in the mystery of God's eternal triune identity’."®®
Hence we have from Barth the original source of Rahner’s axiom (improperly 
equating and thus collapsing the immanent and economic Trinity):"®’
” ® C.D. 1.2, 246.
"®" Hart, “Revelation,” 50.
” ® C.D. 1.2, 34 
"®® Hart, “Revelation,” 50.
"®’ Again, Johnson further alters the meaning o f  this axiom to ultimately equate the economic Trinity with 
one’s personal experiences o f ‘salvation’.
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‘[W]e have consistently followed the rule, which we regard as basic, that statements about the 
divine modes o f being antecedently in themselves cannot be different in content from those that 
are to be made about their reality in revelation. All our statements concerning what is called the 
immanent Trinity have been reached simply as confirmations of underlinings or, materially, as the 
indispensable premises o f the economic Trinity. They neither could nor would say anything other 
than that we must abide by the distinction and unity o f the modes o f being in God as they 
encounter us according to the witness o f  Scripture in the reality o f  God in His revelation ... the 
reality o f God which encounters us in his revelation is his reality in all the depths o f  eternity’
In short, there is no dichotomy between God’s being a se and his ‘becoming’ God 
for us ad extra articulated in Trinitarian discourse. Interpreting God’s work of salvation 
as a process whereby the dialogue ‘among’ or ‘within’ the three Persons extends outside 
the Godhead and includes us as hearers, we can say that
The Word that God speaks eternally within God is spoken outward to creatures in the life and 
ministry o f Jesus, so that the creature may share in God’s life by responding to that Word. As 
God’s own eternal form o f self-expression, the Word is an appropriate means for bringing that 
which is not God into communion with God (Jn 1:3-4, 10-11; cf. Col. 1:15-17) -  and yet the 
biblical witness makes clear that even Jesus’ closest followers were unable to hear and respond to 
this Word adequately on their own ... making it clear that the Word God addressed to human 
beings is beyond the power o f human comprehension.'*^^
The fact that we have no natural propensity toward or aptitude for God would, of 
course, be the end of the story and the ultimate endorsement of the agnostic, pluralist 
point of view that Johnson endorses were it not for the fact that this same God has made 
himself ‘objectively’ known -  in short, he has named himself historically and concretely 
within the realm of human experience. God has spoken concerning himself. It is on this 
basis and this basis alone that the Church may speak about God from its ontological 
reality established in and by God. The mode of theological statements is one in which 
they refer beyond themselves and beyond the particular framework of the belief structure 
of the Christian community to the reality of God himself.^°°
CD. LI, 479.
McFarland, “Christ, Spirit and Atonement,” 91.
For a helpfiil discussion o f Barth’s approach to theological language, see George Hunsinger, “Beyond 
Literalism and Expressivism: Barth’s Hermeneutical Realism,” in Disruptive Grace (see n. 474), 210-225.
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They can do this, however, only because God himself has taken human language 
and commandeered it into the service of his self-revealing and redemptive gospel. In this 
sense, Barth considered the language of Christian speech to be anything but isolated, 
‘higher glossolalia’. Rather, language is ‘shaped in form and content by the creaturely 
nature of the world’; however, it is also ^conditioned by the limitations ofhumanity\ i.e., 
its sinfulness.^ *** Thus, Barth does not argue that it is inappropriate that revelation be 
spoken in this language. His concern is with what creates that possibility. The possibility 
is not inherent in such language. Rather, its possibility is given by God who freely Self­
reveals in the commandeering of such language. In short, language doesn’t grasp 
revelation; revelation grasps human language, and in so doing brings about its true 
essence.
Once grasped, however, this language only makes sense within this particular 
faith community as the place where God has made and makes himself known. To those 
outside, it remains a scandal, an enigma, an oppressive and totalising system, vulnerable 
to rejection and m oc k e r y H e n c e  the Church's proclamation of the Triune God cannot 
be set alongside other alternative models or ways of understanding as ‘one view o f  or 
‘one route to’ God among many. As reflection on what God has spoken, this rules out as 
valid options either agnosticism or the categorical substitution of religious constructs. 
The Church can do only what it is called into being to do; namely, to bear witness to 
God’s Self-revelation. This Self-revealing, when it happens, does not allow itself to be 
treated with indifference, or to be understood as one ‘religious option’ among many. To 
set it alongside human religion, or compare it with the products of human religious
°^* Barth, CD, 1.1, 339-45. See also Eberhard Jiingel, The Doctrine o f the Trinity: God’s Being is Becoming 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976), 7-15.
^  1 Cor 1:18-3:20.
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endeavor, is simply to misunderstand its true nature as revelation of the Triune God 
present among us/°^
Hence, the human experience of the Triune God is ‘conditioned’ experience, as it 
were. It is a miracle of grace, in which the human being is reconciled to God and 
reconstituted to be able to perceive what she could not otherwise perceive. And that form 
of perception is nothing less than koinonia -  participation -  ‘a form of existence 
characterized by an event of recognition and acknowledgement which is identical with 
participation within the church’. T h u s ,  transcendental self-experience of what one 
might call ‘God’ or abstracted experiences (negative and positive) of ‘Spirit’ -  as 
Johnson would have it -  are not considered to be the experience of the Holy Spirit given 
to and thus constituting believers as such.
Trinitarian Doctrine or Relational Ontology?
Barth states, ‘The form here is essential to the content, that is, God is unknown as 
our Father, as the Creator, to the degree that He is not made known by Jesus’ Johnson 
takes to heart the relation between form and content. Thus, in order to be ‘free’ from 
God’s Self-revealing Triune description, she consciously offers different content to 
correspond with her symbolically relational ‘forms’ o f ‘divine mystery’. Hence she starts 
with ‘a knowledge of God which is not mediated completely by an encounter with Jesus 
Christ’; rather, women’s experience mediates an ‘unthematic and anonymous ...
Hart, “Barth, the Trinity and Pluralism,” 131-32.
Torrance, “The Trinity,” 73. C.D. I.l, 214-15. ‘To this end we return again to the beginning. We are 
dealing with the possibility o f knowledge o f God’s Word .. .For the Word o f God is the criterion o f the 
Church, Church proclamation and dogmatics. ... If we cling to what we can affirm and investigate as the 
human acknowledgement o f God’s Word, to what can be experienced in Christian experience, where shall 
we find there the criterion by which to distinguish this experience from others, the authentic from the 
inauthentic? What is there here to stop us interpreting everything in terms of the religious, the cultural, the 
human generally, or finally indeed the biological (C.D. I.l, 217)?’
C.D. I .l, 390.
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knowledge of God’ ®^^ as relational being/**  ^And, since God is first ‘the incomprehensible 
mystery -  which i s . . .  the possibility of grasping and comprehending anything, the all- 
encompassing incomprehensibility of the Whole, no matter how it is named\^^^ Johnson 
feels free to name this relational mystery ‘Sophia’. Sophia exists primarily in threefold 
relation to the world and so can be thought of secondarily and indirectly as being three­
fold in essence.
Agnosticism clearly prevails in Johnson’s thinking -  something she considers an 
asset. Despite her use of terminology that implies knowledge of God with specific 
meaning within the context of her Church tradition, she continually steps outside of that 
belief system and ontological frame of reference -  what we might term ‘Triune, epistemic 
participation’ -  and states that God cannot be known as the Subject and Object of 
Christian revelation. She does this, as we have seen, by equating Kantian unknowability 
with the traditional Christian understanding of divine incomprehensibility or apophasis. 
For instance, she not only interprets Aquinas in this light but Athanasius, Basil, Gregory 
of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus, all of whom ‘saw clearly that God’s unlikeness to
^  However, both Scripture and tradition maintain that we do not have this. Rather, Christians have 
thematic knowledge o f the Triune God through faith by God’s gracious Self-revelation in Jesus Christ. 
‘Christians cannot simply assume that their experiences are experiences o f the transcendent God without 
making the Creator indistinguishable from the creature’. Molnar, “Can We Know God Directly?” 247.
Foundations, 13, 21. God’s name and ‘thematic’ revelation in Jesus Christ are important, but they are 
secondary. They must at all times be ‘sustained by a previous, unthematic, transcendental relatedness o f  
our whole intellectuality to the incomprehensible Infinite’. Rahner, cited by Kelly in Karl Rahner, 36.
Rahner, “On the Theology o f the Incarnation,” 77 4:6. Molnar observes, ‘It is amazing that Rahner, who 
is so famous for having reoriented Catholic theology toward the importance o f the Trinity, has himself 
methodologically ignored the most significant point o f that doctrine completely. ...Clearly, Rahner’s 
abstract understanding o f God as the term o f  our transcendent dynamisms yields a concept of God that is at 
variance with the very heart o f what is or should be understood in light of the trinitarian self-revelation of 
God the Father [of Jesus Christ known in faith through the Holy Spirit]. And although Barth is today 
frequently criticized for overstressing the analogia entis as a problem, the fact is that it is the analogia entis 
or the attempt to find God apart from Christ that really is the problem here’ (“Christology and the Trinity,” 
in Divine Freedom and the Doctrine o f the Immanent Trinity [see n. 195] 51-50).
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the world is total, so that we know best when we affirm that we do not know, which in 
itself is a religious kind of knowing’/**^
This, however, places her either in the position of knowing more than God and the 
witness of the Christian community, or, in Barth’s terms, of not acknowledging 
revelation through participation -  in the sense that Tn the Holy Spirit we are confronted 
by what we cannot deny even if we wanted to do so’/*** Or, perhaps more accurately, it 
illuminates the conflict she faces in having an identity grounded in conflicting 
communities with competing claims and worldviews -  modern feminism, contemporary 
American Catholicism and the traditional Roman Catholic Christian Church.
While this might sound strident, Johnson is writing specifically to ‘reform’ 
Christian doctrine at its very heart -  the doctrine of God as Triune and God’s relation to 
the world. In so doing, she has already made a judgment on the Church’s witness. She 
does not believe that we can say that the Triune God is the One who in Scripture is Self­
revealed and Self-named as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In fact, she believes that (1) this 
is affirmed to be ‘analogically’ impossible in both the Catholic and Protestant 
traditions,^** and (2) such an historical, Scriptural confession is idolatrous.^*  ^ However, 
this kind of statement on her part is illogical since Johnson defines her theological 
identity within the Church -  the ontological being and identity of which is given in and 
by this Triune Reality. It places her outside the claims of the very community that she
^** 5^07, 108.
*^** CD. 1.2,246. Even once this has happened, however, we still cannot lay hold of the creaturely ‘stuff of 
revelation (Jesus, Scripture, preaching) and thereby ‘have’ God's Word, as it were. Precisely because 
revelation is an event, a relationship that “straddles objectivity and subjectivity” and through which we 
effectively participate in the triune life o f  God, it is ever new as God meets us in his free act o f grace. 
^**Sff/, 116-117.
18,36, 40,45.
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purports to be reforming, making the statement meaningless. But what does she offer in 
its place? What can we say about God as ‘Trinity’?
God as a Vestigium Trinitatis
In a strange twist on the vestigia trinitatis (the assumption being that ‘trinitarian’ 
traces in creation hint at God’s Triunity), Johnson somehow makes the Trinity a 
vestigium trinitatis, God is not the Trinity. On the apparent assumption that ‘trinity’ 
represents certain relational concepts (e.g., mutuality, perichoresis) in abstraction from 
their original meaning derived from speaking about God’s being, Johnson argues that 
God is merely ‘like a Trinity’. The presupposition is that something other than the Triune 
God will give form and content to this ‘symbolic concept’, and then it will be imposed 
externally on God. For Johnson, that ‘something other’ is women’s relationality. Women 
become the vessels through which divine relationality is best manifest in the world, and 
thus their relations give form to the content of her relational ontology.
Johnson provides multiple female ‘trinitarian’ images of self-giving love using 
‘perichoretic’, panentheistic language. However, ‘[wjhat is modeled in this language’, 
she explains, is not God. Rather, it ‘is the exuberant dignity and life-giving power of 
women, for here divine mystery, darkly known through creation, salvation, and the 
ongoing dialectic of presence and absence, appears in female gestalt, and divine blessing 
comes as a female gift’.^ *^  Clearly, the personal content given to the triune symbol here 
does not derive first from God’s being except on the metaphysical assumption that 
women participate in being and that their existential relationality reveals divine being as 
such. But on what basis are we to assume this? Why should we believe that this is the
215.
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locus of divine relationality in the world? How does Johnson know that this is true? Are 
all women’s relationships indicative of what Johnson posits to be characteristic of divine 
relationality (mutual, reciprocal, self-giving, equal, ‘perichoretic’)? Surely not, even in an 
ideal world, simply because not all relationships between women are voluntary 
friendships (e.g., a mother and her infant or autistic daughter, two females in a 
psychologically and/or physically and/or sexually abusive relationship). From a 
transcendental perspective, must she not simply assent to relationality as an expression of 
human experience? And if so, this raises the question, what experience becomes 
normative? (This theological conundrum becomes all the more pressing when posed by 
her womanist, mujerista and post-structuralist feminist counterparts who reftise to have 
both divine and human distinction and experience determined by her prevailing 
categories.)
Though she describes classical and feminist thought as ‘vigorously coalescing’ at 
the point of Trinitarian theology precisely because they ‘share’ these concepts of 
mutuality, reciprocity and equality in relation, she fails to recognize that these concepts 
have a particular kind of content already given in the Trinitarian revelation and in the 
Church’s ontological participation in this very communion. She did not find them first in 
feminist thought and then happen upon them in Christian tradition. In fact the opposite 
occurred.^*'* Nevertheless, in order to integrate them (based on both a false communion of 
persons and a false wedding of beliefs) first, she must summarily dismiss both the form 
and the content of Christian Trinitarian theology. Second, she uses what she considers an 
abstract or ‘empty’ form (e.g., threefoldness, mutual interrelation as a vestigium trinitatis) 
and replaces the content with experience.
In Johnson’s early writing she refers to ‘those in feminist theology’ as one still outside its ranks.
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The ambiguity of the symbol surfaces at a critical point in Johnson’s ‘trinitarian 
discourse’ -  just as she tries to distinguish her position as different from both Rahner, and 
Moltmann and Boff. Despite the fact that we cannot know that God is three persons in 
relation in a sense that would support a strong doctrine of the immanent Trinity, hence 
‘the Trinity’ is only a symbol, we can know that relationality is the essential reality, that 
women’s experience reveals it, and that it looks ‘like a Trinity’. ‘The symbol of the 
Trinity thus intends to safeguard the reality o f liberating experience both as given by 
God, and as giving the one true God’.^ *^
Johnson seems to be arguing that, in a transcendentally cyclical sense, women’s 
liberating experience gives content to the symbol of God. Yet it is the unknowable God 
who is also given in their experience. This in turn validates the content of the symbol, and 
so on. On one hand, Johnson implies that the symbol is derived from experience. On the 
other hand, she continually argues that the symbol ‘functions’ in an idealistic way to 
point us toward what we have not yet seen. For instance, she criticises Moltmann and 
Boff s social trinitarian models for being ‘too sanguine’ precisely because they assume 
too much from experience. In short, history has not provided much in the way of 
egalitarian community to model after. Though these models might work in theory -  i.e., 
‘the liberating possibility of the social model of the Trinity points in the right direction’ -  
she nevertheless believes ‘we have not yet had the historical experience of an integral, 
harmonious society upon which this model is predicated’ How is it that the symbol
SWI, 199 (emphasis added).
SWI, 209. If we haven’t yet experienced this, then how do we know the symbol is ‘pointing in the right 
direction’? Or, if  as she claims elsewhere, women have experienced this kind o f  human community, are 
they then the universal referent for divine and human community? Johnson claims that ‘If mutual and equal 
communion is the very nature o f divine mystery, then this sets the norm for a pattern o f relationships 
among persons’ (“God,” Dictionary o f  Feminist Theologies, 130). What is missing from this statement is 
the transcendental link between knowing and being. Technically, the only reason we know this to be the
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(derived from experience) can function both in an a priori manner to shape a future 
experiential reality and a posteriori to reflect that experienced reality? In either case, the 
symbol represents the experiencing community, not God, unless we assume with Johnson 
that God is passively, indirectly ‘given’ in our ontological make-up and thus ‘known’ in 
our existential experience. Again the questions surface, ‘why should one’s self­
experience be assumed to be a concomitant experience of divine relationality?’, ‘how can 
human experience both reveal the ‘relational God’ and ‘point to’ the unknowable God?’ 
and ‘which ‘relational experience is normative’?
In his review of Johnson’s trinitarian theology, Charles Marsh offers a similar 
critique, based on Johnson’s argument that her ‘trinitarian symbol’ has the power to 
evoke ‘the livingness in God’ but only as ‘a secondary concept that synthesizes the 
concrete of experience of salvation’ and the human experience of mutual relation.^*’ This 
leads Marsh to state, ‘Johnson seems unclear on the critical matter of whether mutual or 
agapeic relation is primary to God and secondary to genuine human relation, or primary 
to genuine human relation and then (somehow) metaphorically invigorated by the symbol 
of the Trinity’.^ *® Whether she means to or not, in the end ‘her primary commitment to 
experience compromises her ability to explicate the Trinity as a mystery that patterns 
human social and moral experience. The very reverse is implied: human social and moral 
experience, that is, women’s emancipation from patriarchy and their flourishing in full 
humanity, patterns our thinking about the Trinity’ Marsh continues:
There is no inner logic or grammar in the triune mystery; or, stated differently, whatever inner 
logic or grammar we attribute to the Trinity is given through extrinsic sources, whether these be
‘nature o f divine mystery’ is because we are its existential, symbolic Self-expression. Why then the need 
for a functioning symbol?
198.
Marsh, “Two Models,” 62.
“Two Models,” 63.
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derived from liberation vocabularies, social ontologies or aesthetic categories. In this manner, 
Johnson’s feminist revision is methodologically no less indebted to modern liberal theology than if  
she privileged morality, affectivity, thought, or some other mode o f experience. While the content 
of her revision may be feminist, the form has its systematic origins in Hegel and 
Schleiermacher.^^**
Johnson is compelled to look away from the Triune God of the Christian faith to 
find ways to talk about God’s relationality. Paradoxically, she attempts to use the 
language of God’s Triune being and the being of the Church in abstracto. The result, we 
would argue, is that her Trinitarian relational ontology is never more than a vestigium 
trinitatis. It is a concept grounded in creation and circling back to creation without ever 
being drawn into the circle of God’s Self-knowing and Self-giving. She claims that, in 
particular regard to the Trinity, ‘All of our thinking moves from the world to God, and 
can never move in the opposite direction’ -  and that this has always been the case, both 
for contemporary and first century ‘believers’.
What believers is Johnson referring to here? Surely it is not the Church, whose 
ontological being is derived fi*om the very Triune being and koinonia that she rejects, and 
whose creedal and doxological form and content are shaped by this ontological Reality. Is 
she referring to those who believe in her Trinitarian symbol? This cannot be the case, for 
if ‘unknowable’ mystery is available to everyone in their transcendental experience and is 
ultimately definable by individual creaturely existence, then just as ‘God’ cannot be 
equated with the immanent Trinity of the Christian faith, it cannot be equated with one 
woman’s idea of Sophia-God, despite her insistence on its being a ‘right way to speak 
about God’. Who, or what, then, do these ‘believers’ believe in?
520 “Two Models,” 63.
SWI, 199; here she cites Schoonenberg.
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No ‘Persons’ in Relation
To ask about God as the Subject of Trinitarian theology is, argues Barth, the 
question at the heart of the doxological and confessional life of the Church. It is to speak 
of the tri-personal God of love. Father, Son and Spirit. God is not Father because he is 
creation’s Father but because he is Father to the Son, just as the Son’s identity is given in 
his relation to the Father. Both Jesus Christ and the Father testify to this within human 
experience through the Spirit (Mt 3:17; 12:18; 16:17). In Scripture the Spirit is both the 
‘Spirit of God’ and the ‘Spirit of Christ’, sent from the Father and the Son (Rom 8:9; Phil 
1:19; Gal 4:6; 1 Thess 4:8; Jn 14:16; 16:7; Acts 2:33). The Spirit and the Son are 
homoousion with the Father. As One God, each ‘person’ indwells the other without 
separation and yet without loss of distinction. In Johnson’s relation ontology however, 
the ontological priority of a relational principle replaces the ontological priority of the 
Triune persons in unique, perichoretic relation.
First, Johnson’s Trinitarian names are not reality-depicting metaphors that 
describe the relations between ‘Mother-Sophia’, ‘Jesus-Sophia’ and ‘Spirit-Sophia’. 
These metaphors describe God’s necessary, threefold, emanationist relation to the world. 
For instance, ‘Mother- Sophia’ derives her identity as such not from her relation to Jesus- 
Sophia first as her envoy. Rather, she is ‘Mother-Creator’, ‘the mother of the universe, 
the unoriginate, living source of all that exists’ The Spirit, who can be spoken of 
whenever ‘Mother’ is spoken of (‘friend, sister, mother and grandmother of the world’), 
is not the ‘other hand’ of the ‘Mother’ as it were. The Spirit is the emanation of divine
522
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SWI, 179-181. 
SWI, 146.
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i
relationality from its Unoriginate Source. So, too, Jesus is described as Sophia’s ‘breath’ 
or ‘emanation
Because Johnson uses these kinds of metaphors, and because she has tied herself )
to the concept of relationality in speaking about God, she nevertheless speaks of I
‘persons’ in relation and claims to assume three hypostases throughout her theological 
exploration.^^^ Noting the semantic drift of the word ‘person’ throughout theological I
history, she stresses that analogy frees God from being ‘a person in the modern sense’ so
t
that its use is ‘in fact, improper’ Just like the words ‘one’ and ‘three’, the word I
‘person’ in the trinitarian symbol is ‘not intended to denote anything positive in God, but iI
to remove something’ -  in this case, ‘singleness’, thus affirming ‘a communion in |IGod’.^ ’^ Transcending our understanding, God is not ‘less than personal’, but God is 
‘interpersonal and transpersonal in an unimaginably rich way’.^ ®^ Similar to Moltmann,
Johnson argues that ‘The [triune] persons are persons precisely as mutual relations and j
not as anything apart from their mutual bonding. Relationality is the principle that at once |
constitutes each trinitarian person as unique and distinguishes one from another. .. .Holy j
Wisdom is a mystery of real, mutual relations ... there is no absolute divine person. I
168-9.
^'^^SWI,2\\. I
SWI, 203. I
SWI, 203-4. In Torrance’s critique o f Rahner’s Trinitarian theology, he notes two problems for Rahner -  |
problems that arguably carry over into Johnson’s loss o f Triune personhood. First, the meaning o f the |
Trinitarian phrase ‘three persons’ is derived ‘subsequent to’ our experience o f salvation-history. Second, |
Rahner asserts that ‘there is properly no mutual love between Father and Son, for this would presuppose i
two acts ... there is only one self-utterance o f the Father, the Logos. The Logos is not the one who utters, Î
but the one who is uttered’. Hence within the Trinity ‘there is no reciprocal “Thou”. Rahner, The Trinity, I
105. Torrance states, ‘Rahner’s denial o f the mutual loving and reciprocal personal address within the s
Triunity raises the question as to how seriously he is committed in practice to the two-way identification o f |
the immanent and economic Trinities and what the hypostatic union specifically involves with respect to |
the unique hypostasis o f the Son’. Persons in Communion, 276.
SWI, 203.
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There are only the relative three’ Thus, ‘[t]he category of relation thus serves as a 
heuristic tool for bringing to light not just the mutuality of trinitarian persons but the very 
nature of the holy mystery of God herself. ... At the heart of holy mystery is not 
monarchy but community; not an absolute ruler, but a threefold koinonia’.^ ^^
Her relational ontology, however, seems to subsume the persons into the relations. 
Because her ‘relational’ model is ‘relational’ primarily for the sake of the world and only 
derivatively relational a se (and this is an agnostic hope at best), there are no true 
hypostases whose relational outpouring for and from one another is the basis of creation 
and reconciling communion. While she affirms Moltmann’s social trinity at key points, 
she fails to resist the reduction of the concept ‘person’ to the concept ‘relation’, 
something Moltmann (with Lossky and Zizioulas) fights against as he stresses the 
absolute hypostatic diversity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.^^  ^ If this is so, however, to 
whom is she referring when she speaks of the ‘trinitarian persons’? Is this strictly 
metaphorical language drawn from human experience, and thus univocal, or merely ‘as 
i f  or Hike’ in a thoroughly agnostic sense? Or is there only one divine ‘I’, the 
interchangeable Spirit-Sophia, Creator-Spirit, Mother Creator and Mother-Sophia? Is 
“SHE’ the monistic source of divine-human relationality or part of the larger monistic 
matrix of Relational Being, a word for which Johnson is still waiting?^^^
2^^ 5117, 216, 218.
2^° SWI, 227,216.
2^* See Hart’s discussion in “Person and Prerogative in Perichoretic Perspective,” in Regarding Karl Barth 
(see n. 235) 110-11.
Molnar argues that because God is supremely and utterly independent o f creation and not subject to the 
limitation o f created being, including (per Barth) forms o f “reciprocal presence, communion and fellowship 
between other beings”, ‘he cannot become the predicate in a sentence in which the subject is relationality as 
defined through an ontology which comprehends both divine and human experience’, i.e., one like 
Johnson’s. “Karl Barth and the Current Discussion,” in Divine Freedom, 130.
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‘There is no divine nature as a fourth thing that grounds divine unity in difference 
apart from relationality’/ ”  True, but unity in difference in the Trinity is established 
through the divine persons in relation, not person-less relations in the abstract. If there are 
no ‘others’ to constitute difference, then what constitutes ‘relationality’? If there are no 
persons, what constitutes ‘relation’ -  given that this is understood from the category of 
women’s interpersonal relationships? As Johnson states ‘The ontological priority of 
relation in the idea o f  the triune God has a powerful affinity with women’s ownership o f 
relationality as a way of being in the world’.” '* This lack of personhood in Johnson’s 
relational ontology raises problems for her both as a theologian and as a feminist. Both 
God’s personal, wholly distinct nature and our renewed personhood in relation to the 
personal God are essential to Christian theology.”  ^In feminist theology, it is precisely in 
order that personal distinction is not lost, subsumed or commandeered by the identity of 
the other in relation that mutuality, reciprocity and equality are such key values. This is to 
rob the manifestation or experiential source of relation -  women in relation -  of their 
personhood, and leaves the ^vestigia’ of the Trinity empty as well.
Blurring the God-World Distinction
As Johnson’s agnosticism forces her to replace a doctrine of the Immanent Trinity 
with an ontology of divine ‘immanence’, she describes Sophia’s relation to the world 
using images of gestation-birth-life and perichoresis. Both of these are ultimately models
SWI, 227. 
SWI, 216.
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In Torrance’s discussion o f the use o f the term ‘person’ in Trinitarian discourse, he concludes: ‘our 
judgment here is a contingent one -  there is no ‘absolute’ need to use the term ‘person’ with respect to the 
members o f the Trinity. But there is an absolute obligation, however, for our language-games to participate 
as effectively as possible in the triune dynamic which claims them [including our ecclesial participation]. It 
is this that must be the all-controlling concern o f theological description as a whole’. Persons in 
Communion, 335.
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of interpenetration or mutual coinherence. Johnson posits ‘an intrinsic relatedness 
between God and the world as a loving relationality that belongs to the very essence of 
being a mother and never ends’.” ® Again, the metaphor of ‘Mother’ is grounded in God’s 
necessary relation to the world. This, however, exposes Johnson to an essential monism -  
one that does not seem to concern her, however, as she illustrates her point from process 
thinker Penelope Washbourn:
“...the idea o f ‘oneself as having absolute boundaries can no longer be sustained in pregnancy. ‘I’ 
am the ‘other’ and the ‘other’ is ‘me’. ... In all recent research on pregnancy the dramatic 
interrelationship between fetus and mother is demonstrated and the use o f any drugs, even aspirin, can 
be detrimental ... There is no human experience, even coitus, as able as pregnancy to illustrate what is 
often obscured by our apparent separateness: we are essentially interrelated to one another.”®^’
This apparent celebration of a virtual loss of distinction sets up a serious 
challenge for Johnson’s commitment to maintain that God is ‘wholly other’ in 
transcendent mystery, or that Sophia is ‘radically distinct’ from the world while 
profoundly related to it.” ® This raises the question as to whether she does not expose 
herself to Elizabeth Achtemeier’s critique of panentheistic feminist theology (which 
invariably uses female imagery for God). Achtemeier argues that this theology both 
eliminates the Christian Creator-creature distinction and, by its incorporation of birthing 
imagery, ends up reflecting the ‘circular’ view of creation found in the ancient fertility 
and goddess religions.®”  Indeed, says Achtemeier, ‘when female terminology is used for
®2® ‘Here’, says Paul Molnar, ''relationality has become God while the eternal Father, Son and Holy Spirit i
has been relegated to the domain o f freely chosen metaphor’. “The Purpose o f the Doctrine of the |
Immanent Trinity,” 25. .537 "Yhe Dynamics o f Female Experience: Process Models and Human Values,” in Feminism and Process I
Thought, ed. Sheila Greeve Davaney (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1981), 83-105,93, cited in SWI, 298n27. I
®” 5ff/,168 . ;
Achtemeier explains how such belief is identical to the ‘myopoethic’ thought prior to the advent o f the ;
Judeo-Christian friith: ‘The natural world reflected the life o f the divine, and by harmonizing with that |
world and influencing it through cultic ritual, human beings entered into the “Primal Matrix” o f all life and '
used it to their advantage’. For instance, Ruether’s metaphor o f ‘the Primal Matrix, the great womb within 1
which all thin^, Gods and humans, sky and earth, human and non-human beings are generated’ is not just |
a metaphor, argues Achtemeier, but also ‘divine reality’; ‘the empowering Matrix: She, in whom we live j
and move and have our being -  She comes: She is here’. Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 48-9, cited in I
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God, the birthing image becomes inevitable ... If a female deity gives birth to the 
universe, however, it follows that all things participate in the life or in the substance and 
divinity of that deity — in short, that the creator is indissolubly bound up with the 
creation’: The result is that human beings are so divinized through their ontological 
participation in the divine, says Achtemeier, that creator and creation are undivided.®'**’
The same problem occurs in Johnson’s use of the friendship metaphor, which she 
equates with perichoresis, the mutual coinherence or ontological interpenetration of two 
entities. Here we encounter two problems in Johnson’s use of this metaphor. First of all, 
to speak of perichoresis is to predicate a particular, non-generic level of ontological unity 
between the Triune persons which could never be predicated of human persons in 
relation’.®'** Even were it to have some generic meaning abstracted from these persons, it 
is logically and physiologically impossible, and such a ‘commingling’ of human persons 
would fly in the face of all that it means to be a person whose distinction is in relation. 
Hence, when Johnson states that ‘[pjerichoretic movement summons up the idea of all 
three distinct persons existing in each other ...[as] an excellent model for human 
interaction in freedom’,®'*^ it is difficult to understand how this is not in fact closer to
“Female Language for God,” (see n. 142) 102-4. Roland Frye follows and develops Achtemeier’s argument 
and includes his own critique of the feminist Hokmah/Sophia interpretation in “Language for God and 
Feminist Language.” Johnson rejects Ruether’s ‘recycling scenario’ in favour o f a ‘resurrection’ view, 
though she is agnostic as to its content, in Friends o f God, 195-7.
®'**’ “Female Language for God,” 100. Johnson’s other specific attribute o f Mother-Sophia is that o f justice 
which, ironically but not surprisingly, is devoid o f any sense o f divine judgment. Such activity on the part 
o f Mother-Sophia would place ‘her’ in authority over her creation, a relationship utterly rejected in 
Johnson’s theology (e.g., SWI, 181). This, notes Achtemeier, is part and parcel with the lack o f Creator- 
creature distinction: ‘By eliminating the difference between Creator and creation, and by understanding 
themselves as incarnations o f the divine, many feminists have declared their freedom from any sort of rule, 
including G od’s \  “Female Language for God,” 109.
®'** Hart, “Person and Prerogative,” 113-14. See also Randall Otto, “The Use and Abuse o f Perichoresis in 
Recent Theology,” SJT5A (2001): 366-84.
®'*2 5ff/,221.
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‘women submerged in the “all” of [another]’ which she likens to pantheism and finds a 
‘ suffocating deception ’ / ”
Secondly, Johnson seems to follow Moltmann’s panentheistic view of 
perichoresis in his assertion that God’s perichoretic unity is open to what is not God. 
Likening divine perichoresis to a triple helix, she speaks of it twirling around ‘in a never- 
ending series of moves, which includes human partners and their decisions for good or ill, 
toward the fullness of shalom for all creatures, human beings and the earth, especially the 
discarded’.®'*'* But, as Trevor Hart asks.
Is the union with God in which men and women are drawn in to the very life o f God, being 
granted to share in the eternal relation o f the Son to the Father in the Spirit, really o f the same sort 
as that union in which Father, Son and Spirit perichoretically inhere in one another? Surely not. 
There is a distinction to be drawn here between two distinct strata o f  trinitarian ontology; between 
that in God which is participable by humans and that which is not; between what it means to be 
Son o f God hita physin on the one hand, and kata charin on the other; between koinonia as an 
ontological category and perichoresis. The concept o f perichoresis in its strong form says more 
than the concept koinonia (which it embraces). It is this crucial differentiation that the homoousion 
was intended to safeguard and we must do nothing to weaken it.®**®
Johnson undermines her perichoretic argument in the long run by joining it to the 
metaphor of ‘fi-iendship’ as that which best exemplifies the Trinitarian relations and the 
divine-human relation.®'*® Perichoresis is a description of being, the hypostatic union of
®'*® SWI, 231.
®'*'* This is also a restatement o f  Johnson’s view o f  divine agency which only works actively through human 
agency in the world.®'*5 “Person and Prerogative,” 114.
546 gjYI, 195, 218. Richard Bauckham points out the serious problems involved in trying to hold together 
the very different ideas about the Trinity as (1) an interpersonal fellowship in which we, by grace, 
participate, and (2) a ‘relational prototype’ on which human community is to be modeled. The first idea 
implies that we are invited to experience the Trinitarian relationships fi-om inside, and accounts for both the 
differentiated character o f our relationship with the Trinitarian persons and the differentiated character of  
the relationships o f the Trinitarian persons themselves. The second idea, however, implies that we are 
invited to stand outside this Triune participation and to view the Trinity as an external model o f God that 
humans should reflect. ‘The two ideas would be fairly easily compatible were we to think o f the Trinity 
simply like a group o f three friends who include us in their friendship as yet more friends'. But the second 
idea cannot be combined with the first. It fails to take into account the New Testament concept o f the image 
of God through the Incarnation and to take seriously the reality of koinonia which ultimately flattens out 
Trinitarian difference and reduces our sense o f the otherness o f God. “Jürgen Moltmann's The Trinity and 
the Kingdom o f God and the Question o f  Pluralism,” in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age (see n. 427) 155- 
164.
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the persons of the Trinity who are actually One, which ontologically is impossible for 
humans; logically, it would eradicate their being. As an ontological category, 
perichoresis is also anything but voluntary. Friendship, as Johnson posits it, is a 
voluntary relation between equals and implies no ontological connection (even though 
‘the love of friendship is the very essence of God’).®'*’ However, the reason why this 
metaphor is so important for her is that it implies that while God is asymmetrically ‘other 
than’ humanity, God is not ‘over’ humanity as its Lord. God is alongside, with, in, and 
for the world in reciprocal, equal and mutual relation. In this way, God shares God’s 
‘life’ with the world. As Catherine LaCugna states, ^The [Trinitarian] life o f  God does not 
belong to God af/owe’.®'*® God and the world are different but equal partners in free, 
perichoretic love and unity.
Such language, however, is contradictory. One cannot have a voluntary, necessary 
friendship. For God to enter into voluntarily in relation with creation reinstates the 
theistic view of ‘no real relation’ -  the very relation which Johnson abhors. Thus, the 
voluntary aspect is an illusion. It actually undermines the essential feminist principle of 
necessary interrelation which requires a personal, free ‘I’ and ‘thou’ related only by 
choice. Assuming the metaphysical principle to be in operation, one wonders how 
Johnson believes this metaphor could possibly work in any case. How can God, the 
unknowable ‘other’ intuited only in one’s self-experience, love a person and that person 
love God, as personal friends? How do they exist in a relationship of mutual distinction, 
freely and reciprocally outpouring ourselves for one another as ‘others’ in relation? To
®'*’ SWI, 21S
548 LaCugna, God For Us, 1, 354. Original emphasis. Johnson states that it is precisely here, as women 
understanding themselves as a community o f equals sharing in the being o f God who is essentially this 
way, that feminist insight and classical theology ‘vigorously coalesce’, making for strange bedfellows!
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whom does the human person give her love? How does she know that God loves her? 
Does God want her love? How does she know? How is God respected as a ‘friend’ when 
God has no Self-determining identity or freedom to relate on his own terms, i.e., 
voluntarily, rather than according to the cognitive demands or limitations of the human 
‘other’? How is that a friendship? Is that not ‘lording over’ of the worst kind, placing 
God in the position of the passive, dominated object?
Ultimately, there are no divine ‘friends’ in relation, or in Christian terms, there is 
no unique, perichoretic koinonia of divine persons entirely for one another in love whose 
love extends outward to embrace us and to welcome our loving response in return in 
Jesus Christ by the Spirit. What then distinguishes Johnson’s models of gestation and 
perichoretic interpenetration for the divine-human relation as panentheistic and not 
simply pantheistic? What distinguishes them as Trinitarian?
No Love, No Freedom, No Integrity
For all her language regarding the Spirit’s presence immanently ‘drawing near’, 
divine being is more or less passive or at least wholly conditioned by the natural world 
and human agency. God is not an active Subject. ‘God’ is simply ‘divine relationality’, 
the essence of which is manifest in the created order.®”  As such divine relationality does 
not love human beings or receive (or want) their love in terms o f ‘T and ‘Thou’. Love is 
simply assumed to exist because creation exists and because of the love of human beings 
for one another.
®”  ‘Divine governance involves God in waiting upon the world, so to speak, patiently acting through its 
natural processes including unpredictable, uncontrollable random events to bring about the emergence of 
the new while consistently urging the whole toward fullness o f  life’. Johnson argues that it is not original 
sin but the evolutionary emergence o f brain cells and nerves that produces ‘suffering’ -  a ‘terrifying 
consequence o f the free play o f randomness’ that God’s providential love nevertheless indwells. “Divine 
Providence and Chance,” 17.
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Although Johnson speaks of freedom as an essential element of the non­
competitive, non-coercive relation between God and the world, she actually does not 
allow for it on multiple levels. God is not free from the constructs of the thinking creature 
to name himself, or to reveal or to act outside of Johnson’s metaphysical principles, or to 
truly be the super-'XVdXmdX Creator.®®® God is a conceptual ‘object’ totally dominated by 
every human subject. And since God’s self-sufficiency is on the hand wholly unknowable 
and on the other, replaced by an abstract notion of relationality, God inevitably becomes 
confused with his creatures and their notions.
In short, divine relationality is not understood from the Triune being of God, in 
either an economic or immanent sense. God’s relation to the world is not made manifest 
in his reconciling, incarnational presence in Jesus Christ, who reveals the Father and 
walks in the anointing and power of the Holy Spirit. Nor are the divine ‘persons’ in 
eternal relation to one another as God. With no shared love between them, however, God 
cannot be said to be complete in Triune aseity. This means that God actually needs the 
world to be a relational God.
And yet, it is precisely on the basis of God’s Self-revelation that we know that 
God is eternally the Father, Son and Spirit without the world. The Christian view of God 
as relational is based on God’s free relations in se and ad extra. Hence God is and 
remains freely Self-sufficient even when acting on our behalf. ‘Unless that is true’, states 
Molnar, ‘the content of the concept of God is nothing more than a description of our 
necessary relations with others within the sphere of creation, ... [W]e cannot speak
®®° ‘Being, itself, must be denied any active role in regard to the knowing subject. For if  being has an active, 
causative role in the process by which it becomes known, if  it makes an active witness, this would imply 
that it has a dominating relation to the thinking subject’. Martin, TFQ, 184.
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intelligibly about God’s life with us unless the God of whom we speak is distinguishable 
from us and from our life with each other’/®*
Indeed, if we cannot say more than this, that God does not need the world in order 
to be God, then the integrity of both God and the world are in question. God’s aseity is 
necessary for the integrity of the world, as well, for only a sovereign God who is 
independent of -  while being wholly for -  his creation can allow the world to have its 
own integrity and not simply be a function or extension of divine being.®®^
God is, indeed, our creator, so that we can say that the act o f creation is not foreign to the way that 
he is as Father, Son and Spirit. But it is o f the essence o f God’s ffeedom-in-relatedness that he is 
not bound to create. He would still be God if  he had not created this world or any other. The 
distinction between the immanent and economic trinities implied in such an affirmation is 
important because it enables it to be said that although creation is indeed the work o f God, yet 
because it is the free  work o f  God, the world is by it enabled to be authentically itself.®®®
Gunton goes on to explain that this implies an absolute distinction between 
Trinitarian theism and pantheism, or arguably, panentheism if it implies a necessary 
relation:
Divine action as creation is saved from pantheism and necessitarianism by the way in which the 
action is conceived. Not only is creation through the Son, who is the mediator of God’s self­
relatedness to that which is not himself, but it is in the Spirit, which means by God’s relation to it 
in otherness ... The stress on otherness is important because it reminds us that the immanence of 
God can be conceived in such a way as to deprive the creation o f its independence and freedom.
The more that God is conceived to be identified with the creation, or with parts of it, the more 
danger there is that it will be deprived o f its own proper being. Pantheism is the extreme form o f  
the denial o f otherness.®®'*
Arguing against any emanationist understanding of the divine-world relation,
Robert Jenson makes the point that we do not set up the Creator/creature difference ^
®®* Molnar, “Karl Barth and the Current Discussion,” 136n36; “The Purpose of a Doctrine o f the Immanent ?
Trinity,” 4. A trinitarian theology that fails to recognise this is forced to ground knowledge in some other j
source and to collapse the immanent Trinity into that alternate source, such as experience. Gunton, Molnar ^
and Thomas Weinandy, among others, criticise Catherine LaCugna as well for failing to do this by refusing |
to allow the doctrine o f the immanent Trinity a genuine fiinction in her thinking about God. |
®®2 Gunton, The Christian Faith: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 187. |
®®® Gunton, Christ and Creation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 121. Tt is a terrible burden’, says !
Gunton, ‘for the world to be needed by God, to have to look, so to speak, over its shoulder all the time I
rather than simply being itself This does not at all contradict the fact that the world is only truly itself when |
it seeks to give glory to God, for that is what gives it its final integrity’. The Christian Faith, 187-88. |
®®'* Christ and Creation, 91.
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through any set of our own concepts, e.g., transcendence v. immanence, eternity v. 
temporality, infinity v. finitude. Rather, God maintains the difference between Creator 
and creature ‘by taking action’.®®® To understand the form of action that prevents his act 
of originating from being an event of emanating (so far as it can be understood at all) ‘we 
must start precisely with that one unitary agent who is, just as such, both Creator and 
creature. And we must start with him not in the abstract, as some God-man or other, but 
as the concrete protagonist of the story told by the Gospels’.®®® In Trinitarian theology, we 
must start with Jesus Christ. He is the determining reality of the personal encounter 
between God and humanity, of the unique ‘personhood’ of God, of what it looks like for 
God to be for us and what it looks like to be a human being, recreated in love and free 
relation to God. We start with Immanuel, divine immanence truly personified.
This starting point, however, assumes that Jesus of Nazareth is homoousion as 
God’s Self-revelation, as witnessed to in Scripture and re-articulated in the Chalcedonian 
confession. What then, does Johnson’s Christological position bear witness to and what 
impact does it have on her relational ontology?
B. Christological Critique
Constructing the Christological Ladder
Johnson has attempted to present a relational ontology as contemporary Christian
trinitarian theology without a clear affirmation of both the immanent and economic 
Trinity as the One God in three ‘persons’ whose names are reality-depicting metaphors 
signifying true, if incomprehensible, relations. This leaves questions as to what actually 
constitutes divine ‘relation’, i.e., who exactly is in relation and with whom, both at the
®®® “Creator and Creature,” (see n.355) 217. 
®5® “Cj-ga^ or and Creature,” 221.
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divine and human level. The immediate source of this ambiguity is the rejection of God 
as distinctly ‘Other’ in classically theistic terms. Ultimately, however, it centres around 
Johnson’s understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ, for it is here that God 
himself answers the ‘who’ question. Traditional Christology ‘from above’ assumes that in 
the person of Jesus Christ we have to do with the Son o f God as a human being -  the 
Incarnation of the second person of the Trinity -  and with him the centre of the divine- 
human relation as an act of ultimate reconciliation and recreation.
As Katherine Tanner has aptly stated, ‘The direction in which one’s theological 
inferences run -  from or to Christ -  has important consequences for one’s understanding 
of the world as God’s own’.®®’ For Barth, she notes that Christian beliefs about creation 
and providence are oriented to Christ simply because the world to which the Son of God 
comes is the Son’s own world.®®® Johnson’s theological inferences, on the other hand, run 
from  Jesus Christ -  as the ultimate historical event of human transcendental and ‘salvific’ 
experience -  to the rest of humanity and the world as co-participants in the divine. 
Although paradigmatic and symbolic, Jesus Christ is not God’s necessary, immanent 
presence ‘drawing near’ and indwelling his creation for the sake of its salvation.®®® Again, 
Christology is understood as fulfilled anthropology.®®® From Johnson’s perspective, the
®®’ “Creation and Providence,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (see n. 11) 111-126, 111. As \
Tanner cites Barth, ‘That is what the idea o f creation for the sake o f Christ and the claim that Christ is |
himself the one in and through whom the world is created are designed to make clear -  there is no neutral I
place to stand with respect to the event o f Jesus Christ (C.D. III/I. pp. 54, 67)’. I
®®® Barth contends that to start from a knowledge o f the triune God in Christ (rather than the world) makes |
the world’s existence questionable given the already constituted fullness of a triune God who has no need |
o f it; ‘the fact that it exists can only be the result o f the pure grace o f God’s love for it displayed most fully 1
in Christ’. Tanner, “Creation and Providence,” 111. j
®®® In Johnson’s book Women, Earth, Creator Spirit, - a short treatise that specifically connects the general I
concept o f ‘Spirituality’ to her panentheistic concept of divine-cosmic interrelation ~  she never once refers S
to the Incarnation. I
®®® Colin Gunton states that if  what Rahner means ‘as some o f his language suggests, that the transcendent |
humanity is the basis o f the person o f  Christ, which becomes what it is by some kind o f divine fulfillment |
(“by a free act from above”. ..), then he is indeed arguing strictly from below. Jesus’ uniqueness consists in |
!
192 1
net theological effect of the anthropological turn in Christology over the past century ‘is a 
theology of God from below, with christology forming one of the major sources’/®*
Because of her strong desire to infuse a true sense of Jesus’ humanity into a 
tradition that she considers sorely lacking in this regard and thus bordering on the 
irrelevant, Johnson’s relation to the Chalcedonian confession is ambiguous. Chalcedon 
notwithstanding, the humanity of Christ has consistently proved difficult for orthodox 
Catholicism and thus has been lost or suppressed. Thus, she is reticent to say what the 
confession of the homoousion might mean except that it in no way compromises Jesus’ 
humanity, and that it does not intend an essential connection between maleness and the 
mystery of God.®®^
Nevertheless, her negative critique a decade ago of the then current draft of the 
Roman Catholic Universal Catechism sheds some light: ‘For all its good intentions it 
actually presents a neo-scholastic theology of Jesus Christ and redemption liberally salted 
with Scriptural prooftexts’ with only ‘pretensions toward modernity’/®® Her critique 
centres around the document’s Chalcedonian confession of Christ’s two natures. It
his being a unique and perfect example o f humanity’s openness to God. But to this it may be objected that 
unique and perfect humanity is unique and perfect humanity: the equivalent o f the traditional ‘sinlessness’, 
but hardly equivalent to ‘o f one substance with the Father’. Yesterday and Today, 10-11.
561 ‘‘Christology’s Impact on the Doctrine o f God,” 158-9 (emphasis added). As we have seen, this de­
centralising position is fundamental to Rahner’s Christology as well. Hunsinger notes that in rejecting the 
satisfaction theory attributed to Anselm, Rahner’s transcendental anthropology and soteriology ‘seems to 
establish with no need for direct reference to Christ’. “Baptized into Christ’s Death: Karl Barth and the 
Future o f Roman Catholic Theology,” in Disruptive Grace (see n. 474), 253-78, 262. Or, as Badcock states, 
‘Christ is central in Rahner inasmuch and insofar as he provides for us the definitive expression or 
revelation of the love o f God and o f  the human response to that love in the incarnation, but Christ is neither 
so central that the whole o f God’s loving disposition toward us is encapsulated in him, nor so central that 
the question of our own response to the love o f God becomes effectively peripheral to the theological task’. 
“Karl Rahner, the Trinity,” 148.
®®2 ‘We should observe, however, that, while she is affirmative o f  the christological traditions o f Nicea and 
Chalcedon, Johnson does not feel it is necessary to utilize substance ontology. She explicitly affirms the 
homoousios ... [but] finds it more helpful to speak o f the “two natures” in terms o f relationality. 
Unfortunately, her development o f the two natures is very brief’. Harold Wells, “Trinitarian Feminism,” 
337.
®®® “Jesus Christ in the Catechism,” America 162 (1990): 222.
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supports a Christology ‘from above’ that ‘starts in heaven with the pre-existent Son of 
God, traces His descent into the world of human history in order to die for our sins, and 
ends with His universal reign again in glory ... This becomes the primary filter through 
which His story is told and His significance perceived’.®®'*
The problem is that the Catechism interprets Scripture in line with Nicene 
Christology and uses Scripture (particularly Jesus’ own words) to prove his divinity, thus 
supporting ‘one particular dogmatic view of Jesus Christ, filtering out whatever does not 
support this view and pressing biblical insight into a neo-scholastic mold’.®®® By not 
taking into account modem biblical criticism, interpretation and twentieth-century 
experience Jesus’ divinity is ‘ over-emphasised’, and Chalcedon once again gives way to 
Nestorianism and Docetism.®®®
Johnson considers her Christology to follow Rahner’s ‘corrective’ against this 
‘trend’.®®’ She starts with anthropology and the belief that transcendental experience is 
experience of the divine (the union of grace and nature). In so doing, she starts with a 
different concept of salvation and so a different concept of Jesus. First, people discover
®®"* “Jesus Christ in the Catechism,” 206.
®®® “Jesus Christ in the Catechism,” 208, 222. ‘In the interest o f its own agenda, [the official Catechism] 
does violence to the Gospel’s Christological variety and presents a false uniformity as historical fact... 
Scripture texts are strung together in an indiscriminate manner with little regard for their own integrity; 
e.g., Matthew, Galatians, Acts o f the Apostles, John and 1 Thessalonians are cited as a package to confirm 
that Jesus is the Son o f God in a divine, transcendent sense.... Scripture is pressed onto a procrustean bed. 
It is as though the biblical renewal had never happened’.
®®® “Jesus Christ in the Catechism,” 207.
®®’ Thomas Weinandy classifies Johnson with other theologians following the trend in contemporary 
Christology to ‘rescue’ Jesus from the Chalcedonian threat to his humanity, thereby embracing a form of 
adoptionism. Jesus’ relationship with God differs in degree from our own but not in kind. The ‘human 
Jesus uniquely embodies or incarnates some aspect o f God’s immanent presence in the world, such as the 
spirit o f love or the word o f  truth’ or wisdom. Through his liberating message ‘and his selfless, redemptive 
suffering and death, he manifests his loyal and obedient sonship, and so demonstrates God’s inner stance o f  
love on behalf o f humankind’. The Trinity, by necessity, ‘vanishes’. The Father’s Spirit o f Sonship: 
Reconceiving the Trinity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 114n5, 114-15. We are led to ask why 
adoptionists assume Jesus to be God’s ‘envoy’ and not some other human being in some other time and 
place?
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and participate in their own ‘salvation experiences’. Second, while Jesus’ salvation 
experience is both historically meaningful and universally symbolic, for ‘[a]ll the 
secondary and derivative interpretations which Christians have used to explain the 
saivific significance of the death and resurrection of Jesus (sacrifice, the pouring out of 
blood, etc.) the original experience of this saivific significance is simply this: “We are 
saved because this man who is one of us has been saved by God, and God has thereby 
made the divine saivific will present in the world historically, really and irrevocably.’” ^^*
The need to posit a divine ‘nature’, thus making Jesus Christ the universal 
mediator between God and humanity, is unnecessary since the concept o f  atonement is no 
longer ‘viable’ New conclusions are drawn: ‘Historical studies make three things clear 
about the genesis of Christian belief in Jesus and salvation: its origin lies in lived 
experience; the language used to interpret the experience is narrative and metaphoric; and 
diversity of historical contexts leads to a plurality of interpretations’.
To reduce Christ to the historical individual of Jesus of Nazareth ‘falls short and 
twists the central testimony of biblical and doctrinal traditions’. Moreover, ‘the whole 
Christ is a corporate personality, a relational reality, redeemed humanity that finds its 
way by the light of the historical narrative of Jesus’ compassionate, liberating love’.^ ’^
Rahner, Foundations, 284, cited by Johnson, “Mary and Contemporary Christology,” 167.
A ‘seriously flawed’ aspect o f the Catechism is its satisfaction theory of atonement which (1) casts God 
the Father ‘in the vengeful role o f the executioner’, (2) places an emphasis on the individual person’s 
salvation from sin, and (3) has a ‘peculiar, relentless emphasis on submissiveness’: ‘[Jesus’] ministry is 
held up as an example o f humility, while His death on the cross is the supreme instance o f his submission 
to the will o f His Father. This is what won salvation, and believers are pointed to these examples as the 
model for their own behavior, generically’. ‘Such a picture’, states Johnson, ‘is simply not true to the Jesus 
of the Gospels’. The salvation that Jesus brings ‘occasions liberation, not a new submission’. “Catechism,” 
221-22 .
“Jesus and Salvation,” 3. The historical Jesus is only present with us as a memory o f solidarity (no 
eternal Son and new Adam). Nevertheless, the ‘metahistorical Christ or cosmic Christ’ is universally 
present and active in human history and can even be thought o f as ‘cosmic Wisdom’ or ‘Creator Spirit’ !
“The Maleness o f Christ,” 112.
195
Thus, if we cannot say that the Christ is more than Jesus, then we deny the witness o f the 
New Testament. Ultimately, Johnson believes that
it becomes possible to affirm that all mediations o f the Spirit in the world do not necessarily lead 
to belief in Jesus Christ. For the concrete Jesus o f history is uncreated Wisdom in kenotic form, 
enfleshed within the contingency o f history ... even when the Chalcedonian confession is affirmed 
in all its fullness, the contingent, historical character o f the Jesus event allows for the possibility 
that the divine offer o f salvation finds different concrete form [sic] in other contingent 
contexts.. .To concentrate on Jesus alone in a kind o f Christomonism has led historically to many 
dead ends for understanding as well as to imperialist action toward those who do not believe in 
Christ... But as history goes on after the historical Jesus, salvation is primarily a pneumatological 
phenomenon. It is Spirit-Sophia-Shekinah who provides the connection between the historical 
Jesus and the present community, and who empowers the present experience o f salvation.^^^
Here Johnson highlights the importance, indeed the necessity, of human action in 
salvation. ‘What is first of all God’s gift is ultimately a human task. Even in matters of 
salvation, God’s grace and human initiative do not compete but grow in direct 
proportion.... [Human acts make persons] co-partners with God in the coming o f  
salvation\^^^
In this lengthy but important quote, Johnson summarises her Christological 
approach:
[A]n appropriate christology begins with an analysis o f the human condition, including the 
suffering o f women under multiple oppressions; proceeds by telling the story o f Jesus and his 
disciples in his own time and place (hence the importance I see in Jesus research); then traces the 
plurality o f interpretations generated by first century communities in view o f their experience o f  
salvation; and from there unpacks their theological interpretations o f who Jesus is in relation to 
themselves and God. Experience o f salvation comes first; metaphysics arrives second. The 
encounter with a gracious God in Jesus happens first; the idea that Jesus the Christ is the incarnate 
Logos arises -  chronologically and epistemologically -  second. This genetic approach inevitably 
structures christological thinking in a pattern ‘from below,’ which then partners today’s 
hermeneutical efforts to release the spiritual, theological, and liberating meanings o f Jesus the 
Christ for contemporary communities.
In a word, 1 affirm ascending christology as the abiding basis and necessary criterion for  
descending christology, which in turn has a secondary and interpretive character. Having cleared 
this, I also think, however that once this pattern from below has been established
“Jesus and Salvation” 17, 10 (emphasis added). Johnson exploits Rahner’s understanding of holy 
mystery by grounding it not in the economic Trinity but in ‘threefold’ ‘salvation’ experience. Whatever this 
means to Johnson, Molnar is right to argue that it is misguided to suggest that the original basis for 
Christian theology is the experience o f being saved. Even in its most Biblical sense, ‘[a]ny genuine 
experience of salvation would necessarily point away fi*om itself to its true basis in God’s action ad extra, 
that is, an action o f the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in light o f which our experience makes sense’. “Karl 
Barth and the Current Discussion,” in Divine Freedom, 128-29n7.
“Jesus and Salvation,” 13-14.
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epistemologically, then christological language from above is permissible, so long as it takes place 
within the framework and all-pervasive structure o f ascending christology. ...Christology from 
above points to the fact that God compassionately takes the saving initiative in the coming to be o f  
Jesus; that Jesus exists in history as a divine gift; that his own personal identity is rooted in the 
mystery o f divine being. These are important affirmations for the Christian community to make, 
even though they are not epistemologically first but rather drawn out by the logic of faith as 
implications o f the event of Jesus. It seems to me that, if  this is kept firmly in view, then once you 
have constructed the ladder from below and climbed up, you can run up and down in any direction 
with a clear conscience.^’'*
Though Johnson may run up and down her ‘christological ladder’ with a ‘clear 
conscience’, she fails to recognise three important facts: (1) There are competing claims 
at each end of the ladder, (2) they represent mutually exclusive conditions for the 
recognition and affirmation of truth about Jesus Christ as intrinsic to the ‘revelatory’ 
event, and (3) neither set of claims can be extracted from their epistemic foundations and, 
as neutral ideas, be re-schematized without denying their veracity. Because she fails to 
recognise this, she also fails to recognise that Christology ‘from above’ considers its 
affirmations to be given by the Spirit of God and thus precisely to be ‘epistemologically 
first’. This means that one cannot ‘ascend’ the ladder without severing the Church’s 
confession of Jesus Christ from its ontological identity in Christ and also lose its 
continuity with Christian tradition as the dogmatic articulation of that confession.
Chalcedonian Implications
If one is inclined to think of Christology ‘from above’, this is only to say that a 
Christology grounded in the recognition of Christ as Immanuel will be a Christology in 
which the direction of the pressure of interpretation is ‘from God’ as that Reality. In the 
event of that presence to humanity as such, the Church makes the confessional 
affirmation that Jesus Christ is homoousion. (To think in terms of ‘ascending’ or 
‘descending’ Christology is a rather crude approach.) The question is whether Johnson
“Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 105-6.
197
holds the Chalcedonian view of the homoousion seriously. Without this understanding, 
Johnson loses three critical aspects of Christian doctrine, each of which are vital to her 
own theological concerns: (1) supremely loving divine immanence that maintains the 
divine-human distinction with full integrity, (2) true salvation and thus frill humanity, and 
(3) revelation of God as non-oppressive and wholly for his human creatures. However, 
we would also argue that these are aspects to which her relational ontology will not 
obtain.
a. Immanence with Integrity
Johnson’s attempt to save Jesus’ full humanity assumes that the integrity of the 
human person Jesus, ‘possessing’ a human ‘I’, is compromised when the identity of this 
human ‘F is the eternal Son of the Father, a divine subject (because the divine ‘F will 
dominate the human ‘I’). But if the subject of the human ‘F is not the divine Son, then no 
incarnation has taken place. And yet Jesus’ humanity cannot reveal his divinity, which is 
what is required in Johnson’s ‘realised anthropology’. Jesus differs from us in only 
degree, not in kind.^’^
As George Hunsinger puts it, Chalcedon speaks of two terms and one 
relationship. The terms are ‘complete in deity’ and ‘complete in humanity’; their 
relationship is one of unity-in-distinction within one and the same personN^ These terms 
of ‘deity’ and ‘humanity’ are not understood in abstraction but only in the 
incomprehensible mystery and historical reality of Jesus Christ -  Jesus of Nazareth, Son 
of God -  attested to in the New Testament. In the unity of this one person, these two
As Molnar points out, ‘Jesus’ humanity as such does not reveal because he is veiled in his revelation and 
thus he causes offence. Revelation thus means the unveiling o f what is by nature veiled and it is identical 
with the power of the resurrection. This means it must be understood as an exception and as a miracle'. See 
“Christology and the Trinity: Some Dogmatic Implications o f Barth’s Rejection o f Ebionite and Docetic 
Christology,” in Divine Freedom, 28-9.
“Karl Barth’s Christology,” in Disruptive Grace (see n. 474) 134-5.
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natures find ‘no distinction or separation’, ‘confusion or change’, and yet both natures
have their inviolable integrity/”  This cannot be understood according to a principle, as a
conceptual scheme or cohesive system of thought. The only ‘principle’ is the freedom of
God.”* “‘His being as this One is his history, and his history is this being.’”
Without the Chalcedonian confession of Jesus’ being ‘complete in deity’, there is
no Christian confession of his being God’s reconciling act of revelation in the world -  of
Emmanuel, God with us and for us -  the mystery of God’s act of supreme transcendence
becoming wholly immanent. On the other hand, without the confession of his being
‘complete in humanity’ precisely such that it is not commingled with his divinity, Jesus is
not an authentically free human in his own particular, historical uniqueness, whose life
was lived out in radical obedience to God in the power of the Holy Spirit.
Jesus’ humanity is not different because it is (to use a misleading phrase) ‘the incarnation o f God’, 
that is to say, the rendering or replication o f what God is, scaled down conveniently to dimensions 
of our historical existence. ... Rather, what we have is the hypostatic presence o f God among us 
humanly, and in such a way as to reconcile our fallen and estranged flesh to God, renewing and 
transforming the flesh until it corresponds in terms proper to its own ‘nature’ to who and what 
God is in his. ...it is the firstfruits o f a new, redeemed humanity in correspondence with God. 
When God speaks his Word into the realm o f  flesh, we might say, it results not in an echo, but 
precisely in a reply, a response from the side o f the creature to the Creator’s call.^*°
Without holding to the distinction of both natures in their essential unity, divine 
and human distinction would become blurred at the point when humanity most needs 
Jesus’ choices to be truly free and thus most truly human.
577
whereby they differ in degree only. They share no common measure or standard o f measurement. 
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 286-7nl. See Barth, C.D. III.3,104.
’^* Hunsinger, “Karl Barth’s Christology,” 138. This doctrine also enabled Barth to emphasise how it is 
possible for God genuinely to be known in the world without yet being o f the world. It insists on the 
personal presence o f God in a particular human life while differentiating the content o f  that life at every 
tangible point from God's own existence as God. Hart, “Revelation,” 51.
C.D. II/l, 486; JV/1, 128. Though both natures were actual from Jesus’ conception by the Spirit, Barth 
describes their union as never essentially static, but rather as ‘a state of being in the process o f becoming’. 
“Karl Barth’s Christology,” 141.
*^® Hart, “Was God in Christ?” 22.
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The two natures exhibit non-hierarchical asymmetry because they are not ordered according to a scale |
i
b. Salvation through the Person and Work o f Christ
Salvation is dependent on the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, which inseparably 
involves both the work and person of Jesus Christ. The basic rule of any internally 
coherent Christology, argues Hunsinger, is that the person and work of Christ mutually 
imply each other. In other words, the work (w) presupposes the person {p) just as the 
person conditions the work (if w, then p\ and if p, then w).” * Not only in Christ are God 
and man united in this unique person (hypostasis), but the action of each is united in the 
historical, personal event of the Incarnation. ‘He acts as God when he acts as a human 
being, and as a human being when he acts as God’.^ *^
If the work of Christ is materially decisive for bringing about reconciliation with 
God toward whom we are hostile and condemned sinners, then the person of Christ is 
logically indispensable to this work: “If w, then p.” A  mere human being, ‘no matter how 
fully actualized in no matter what transcendental way, could not accomplish this work.... 
Only a particular person who was at once truly God and yet also truly human could do a 
work of this kind. Both the person and the work are exclusively unique'
Change the value of either w or p, and the corresponding value of the other 
changes as well. In Johnson’s Christology (a modification of what Hunsinger calls 
Rahner’s ‘middle Christology’) the work of Christ has changed. As we have seen, ‘sin’ is 
more a matter of bondage than of guilt, so that what we are saved from is sin’s power, not
Hunsinger, “Karl Barth’s Christology,” 131. 
*^2 CD. rV /2,115.
583 Hunsinger, “Baptized into Christ’s Death,” 264.
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its penalty.Consequently, Christ’s work is still considered materially decisive in that it 
effects our re-empowerment, but not our complete recreation.
Because our plight is one o f estrangement from God [not enmity or condemnation], the solution is 
... our being reunited with God through an inner experience o f spiritual re-empowerment. The 
cross of Christ is significant, not because o f vicarious expiatory suffering, but because it shows 
that Jesus fully took part in the brokenness o f the human condition without forsaking his spiritual 
union with God. We are saved not so much by something fundamentally unique and unrepeatable 
that took place apart from us on our behalf as by a certain communion with Christ which allows 
some measure o f his perfected spirituality and destiny to be repeated or re-enacted in our lives. 
We are saved by the effect in us for which the work apart from us functions as little more than the 
precondition for its possibility.^®^
Because the work is extrinsic, however, then the p  that is entailed by this w is not 
Jesus Christ, the incarnate Savior (fully God, fully human). Rather, it is Jesus Christ, the 
divinely empowered human being who, like us, was ‘saved by God’ (the ‘redeemed 
redeemer’). Although Johnson considers Jesus’ person to be materially decisive, he is 
neither necessary nor logically indispensable. (Hunsinger notes that at least in principle it 
seems that any other sufficiently empowered human being might have or might yet 
accomplish much the same thing.) Again, the person of Christ required by Johnson’s 
Christology "is unique hut not unique in kintfi.^^^ Thus we have what amounts to 
‘salvation by spiritual repetition: what took place spiritually in Christ is what now takes 
place spiritually in us, i.e. the same sort of thing is to be repeated, regardless of all 
differences in degree.... Consequently, at the consummation of all things it would seem 
that the Savior will be little more than the first among equals’.
Thus the easy correspondence in feminist theology to sin as oppressive power inherent in sexist 
structures and freedom or ‘salvation’ as liberation from bondage and ‘conversion’ into selfhood or full 
(arguably autonomous) humanity.
Hunsinger, “Baptized into Christ’s Death,” 264-5.
“Baptized into Christ’s Death,” 265.
“Baptized into Christ’s Death,” 265-6.
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Losing the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, and thus our human distinction, koinonia 
with Christ is essentially our participation in and appropriation of Christ’s 
‘ spirituality’ regardless, says Hunsinger, of
whether it is called his God-consciousness, or the kingdom o f God, or the new being, or authentic 
being-towards-death, or experiential religion, or the hermeneutical privilege o f the poor, or 
womanspirit rising, or the rejection o f violence, or the original blessing, or perhaps simply faith, or 
even faith informed by love. The list goes on and on, but the structure is always the same. What 
took place extra nos is no more than the condition for the possibility of what takes place in nobis. 
The decisive locus o f salvation is not fixed in what took place in the cross o f Christ there and then, 
but in what takes place in us or among us here and now. Salvation essentially encounters us as a 
possibility that is not actual for us until it is somehow actualized in our spiritual and social 
existence, and the process o f actualization proceeds by degrees. Though primarily a divine gift, 
salvation is always also [even only] a human task.^ ®^
Christian soteriology, however, is a matter of human transformation/recreation 
and restored relation (divine-human, human-human, human-earth) and has a basic 
structure; it is inextricably extra nos - pro nobis - in nobis. The loss of any of these 
dimensions means losing the content of the gospel in terms of the initiative and divine 
gift of God’s salvation in the person and work of Christ. God, who is other than us, is 
God for  us in loving relation with us as Creator, Redeemer, Lord, brother. Father, Spirit, 
comforter, Priest, King. His work and love are not extrinsic to his own being or ours. 
Rather, his work in us of reconciliation, ontological reconstitution and koinonia is an 
eschatological reality in our present, historical existence.^^^
®^® ‘Even the immanence o f the Son can be a threat, if  it appears to endanger the otherness and freedom of 
the redeemed. If Christ is, without qualification, humankind or even the church, dangerous consequences 
for human autonomy threaten’. Gunton, Christ and Creation, 91.
®^® “Baptized into Christ’s Death,” 266.
The mode o f salvation is different in Roman Catholic and Reformed thought. Generally, in the 
Reformed tradition the decisive locus o f salvation is the historical event o f the cross, such that our koinonia 
with Christ is with the risen Lord who died necessarily in our place. Salvation on the cross was/is a 
finished, perfected and completed work. Nothing is added to it from our side, nor do its actuality and 
efficacy depend on our acceptance of it (hence they are received as gift). Catholicism generally speaks o f  
salvation as a ‘process’ that continues to the end o f time as the ‘risen life of the Savoir’ communicates itself 
to the life o f the community o f  faith. Sinnere are redeemed as they open themselves to grace, and with the 
‘help’ o f grace carry on and actualise the ‘dispositions’ o f Christ. Redemption is thus not work of God in 
Christ alone. Reformed thought generally (and Barth particularly) considers this view not to take sin or 
grace seriously enough. Hunsinger, “Baptized into Christ’s Death,” 267- 269.
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A Christology that frilly affirms the homoousion also affirms that we are 
constituted as sinful humanity against God apart from Christ, and that we are 
reconstituted as new humanity by the death and resurrection of Christ. Otherwise, the 
person and the work that correspond with the term ‘divine incarnation’ are meaningless,
c. God the Self-Giving Servant
Johnson rightfully asserts that the possibility of love, freedom and life lived in
communion with God and others ‘all depends on the character of God’.^ ^^  And yet, when 
she argues that the ‘deepest core of reality is a mystery of personal connectedness that 
constitutes the very livingness of God’,^ ^^  we are left wondering what ‘personal 
connectedness’ she is referring to. Who loves and is being loved? Without a Christology 
that reveals God incarnate in Jesus Christ, and through him the Father and the Spirit, 
Johnson can only ‘hope’ and ‘trust’ that it really is God that she encounters in her own 
experience. ‘At rock bottom [Trinitarian symbolic description] is the language of hope. 
No one has ever seen God, but thanks to the experience unleashed through Jesus in the 
Spirit we hope, walking by faith not by sight, that the livingness of God is with us and for 
us as renewing, liberating love’.^ ^^
In the Christian confession of the homoousion, however, the Son and the Father 
are One. When we see Jesus, we see the character of God revealed. ‘Anyone who has 
seen me has seen the Father ...The words I say are not just my own. Rather, it is the 
Father, living in me, who is doing his work. Believe me when I say that I am in the Father 
and the Father is in m e...’ (Jn 14:9b-l la). And what does the Father look like? Jesus tells
Johnson, “The Search for the Living God,” 8; Friends o f God, 20; “Between the Times,” 22,27.
SWI, 238, 226. 
^  SWI, 200-201.
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of the lavish character of the Father in various parables, the most notable being the father 
of the lost and found, and embittered older, sons (Lk 15:31).
The Scripture also bears witness that Jesus Christ, precisely as homoousion, 
‘made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human 
likeness’ (Phil 2:6-7). The particular ‘human likeness’ of this man -  who is the true 
image of God -  is cruciform (Phil 2:8). God, who gives himself for us in the Son, takes 
the form of a servant to affect our reconciliation, to be one with us in our suffering, to 
take condemnation upon himself for our freedom and death for our life. He continues to 
be with us and for us, serving as our High Priest, our permanent, universal means of 
access to the Father making intercession for us, baptising us in the Holy Spirit to join us 
to the fellowship he shares with the Father. The Father is the one who gives the Spirit of 
adoption to make us his children, joining us to himself, making us co-heirs with his Son 
(Rom 8:14-17). ‘Both the one who makes people holy and those who are made holy are 
of the same family, so Jesus is not ashamed to call us brothers and sisters’ (Heb 2:11).
This is not dominating oppression from a God who exists in solitary isolation. 
This is the Triune God who has come ‘immanently’ (or ‘Immanuel-ly’) present among us 
as God in Jesus Christ. Unless we confess that Jesus is homoousion, however, divine and 
human, we cannot know divine immanence as non-oppressively, freely for us. ‘As 
kenosis’, states Colin Gunton, ‘the condescension of the Son to the human condition is a 
form of non-coercive yet redemptive and immanent divine action. It is, we might say, not 
a threatening immanence, as all general forms of divine immanence are, but a personal 
one, and of a particular kind. That is to say, it is a form of immanence -  kenotic
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immanence -  which both respects the otherness of the fallen world and reshapes it in a 
redemptive form of relation to God’
Only when (and then every time) divine freedom is abstracted from this reality, 
can it be constmed as oppressive. It means, says Barth, that we have suddenly moved 
outside reality and are dealing with concepts limited by our own human fallenness. In this 
unreality some ‘other god’ is at work than the God who loves in Jesus Christ and some 
‘other creatures’ than those loved by God in Christ.^^  ^ When these unreal concepts are 
tied to ideologies or anthropologies that consider freedom to be the primary domain and 
exercise of the creature, even as the human agent for good and transformation, danger 
lurks, for they inevitably become tied to concepts of power totally foreign to the 
cruciform power of God revealed in the suffering and exalted Son.
Just as the being of God is not known in conceptual abstraction, neither is his 
freedom known in abstraction from his choice to be God for us as Father, Son and Spirit, 
revealed in Jesus Christ. To deny God in this revelation is to deny his Being-Act, to deny 
his freedom to exist and reveal without condition. It is also to deny humanity its identity 
and freedom, for in Christ is humanity’s Word of freedom as well. ‘Where else’, Barth 
asks, ‘can we learn that freedom exists and what it is except in confrontation with God’s 
own freedom as offered to us as the source and measure of all freedom?
Adoptionism and Docetism
Barth emphasises that while it is and always remains God, the Father of Jesus 
Christ who is the unique object that determines our thinking about God, and who comes
Christ and Creation, 91-2. 
C.D. m/3, 114-120.
596 Barth, The Humanity o f God, (John Knox, 1960), 100.
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as God to meet us in our experiences in the power and presence of the Holy Spirit, he 
does so, however, without becoming identical with or dependent upon those experiences. 
This means that thinking about Jesus cannot begin with our ideas or our experiences, 
which would lead to what Barth called, respectively, Docetic and Ebionite (adoptionist) 
Christology. Tn both instances’, observes Molnar, ‘confession of Jesus’ deity would be 
no more and no less than confession of the power of human ideas or the power of human 
experience. Such starting points therefore would necessarily deny the content of Christian 
confession at the outset. They would deny the fact that Jesus is the Son of God, 
independently of what we may think and independently of our experiences, beliefs or 
feelings’
Johnson believes that she escapes a Docetic interpretation of Jesus. Docetic or 
Ebionite tendencies, however, are embedded in her ‘ascending Christology’, not least 
because she so closely follows Rahner’s Christology. On the one hand, Rahner suggests 
that the incarnation is the result of the human achievement of ultimate self-transcendence. 
This view of ‘the apotheosis of a man’ is almost classically Ebionite. On the other hand, 
he seems to conclude that Jesus is the highest instance of anthropological achievement. 
This view is almost classically Docetic. In other words, it is the idea of God as the 
mysterious nameless incomprehensible Whole that determines Rahner’s thought about 
Jesus.^^^
Johnson could not be clearer in her own approach. As she ascends her 
‘christological ladder’ she begins with experience, present and then past (including that
597 “Christology and the Trinity,” 27-8.
Molnar, “Christology and the Trinity,” 52. Torrance also critiques Rahner’s docetic interpretation o f the 
humanity o f Jesus that severs him from identification with the immanent and economic Trinities. Persons 
in Communion, 276-77.
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of the ‘historical Jesus’ and the interpreting communities that succeeded him). Next 
comes ‘the idea’ that Jesus is the Christ, both ‘chronologically and epistemologically’. 
But Molnar disagrees. ‘Jesus’ uniqueness is in no way dependent upon the community’s 
recognition of him to be true and valid. And because this is so, there can be no confusion 
of Christ and Christians and no suggestion of adoptionism or subordinationism in 
Christology or in Trinitarian reflection. Any such suggestion once more implies the 
reversal of divine and human being and action and thus the collapse of theology into 
a n t h r o p o l o g y N o r  is Jesus to be abstracted from the ‘idea’ of the Christ which is then 
confused with the Church, the Spirit or the relationality of being. Ultimately, he argues, 
this confusion in contemporary Christology cannot but lead to a failure to distinguish the 
immanent and economic Trinity, as we have seen.
Concluding Comments
We began this critique by reflecting on the fact that Trinitarian theology is in fact 
‘discourse’ about God based on God’s incarnate and Spirit-given ‘discourse’ concerning 
himself as One God in three persons. To that end, in concluding this critique and in 
prefacing the critique of the next chapter, we consider Johnson’s ‘trinitarian discourse’ to 
fail to enter into the Church’s discourse as reflection upon God as both the Subject and 
Self-giving Object of theological inquiry. Such discourse assumes that God has revealed 
Godself in his Word, Jesus Christ, in testimony of Scripture and in the confessional 
witness of the Church as it stands in the tradition of its creeds. Instead, Johnson 
constructs a way of talking about her ideal concept of God from a feminist ethic of
“Christology and the Trinity,” 28-9.
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gender and power and uses her symbol to promote that ideal while abstracting language 
from the tradition without its meaning, thereby ‘privatising’ her discourse.
Christian theology, if it is done at all, is done only in obedient response to God’s 
gracious Self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Thus, Barth argues, every independent attempt 
by humans to know or speak about God is futile and doomed to failure. However sincere 
it may or may not be, its fruit, as Feuerbach rightly saw, is essentially idolatrous. It is 
merely projection of human needs and desires onto the clouds. Its failure is the failure to 
address itself to the proper place; the place where God has made himself known, and 
continues to make himself known. As Trinitarian revelation, the truth that Christian 
theology refers us to, the arguments and language it uses, are all radically contextual. It is 
the language of faith, which, as ontological participation in the inner life of God, is 
precisely a relation that grants ‘conviction of things not seen’. The Christian theologian 
can neither anticipate a straightforward endorsement or recognition of these truths by the 
intellectual community at large nor hope to make them palatable in the form of vestigia 
trinitatis. Only those who are given to indwell the same ecclesial framework of meaning 
will make any real sense of Christian Trinitarian discourse -  those joined to the Body of 
Christ who ‘see’ and ‘hear’ through participation in the vicarious life of the Son by the 
Spirit in praise of and prayer to the Father.^ ®®
Three-ness, unity, persons, perichoresis, koinonia, homoousion — all these 
linguistic concepts are interpreted out of the Triune revelation itself. Revelation 
‘commandeers’ or ‘reconciles’ the language of the Church such that its terms acquire 
specific and concrete meaning for that community. To start other than with God’s Triune 
being, e.g., with relational analogies from experience, suggests that the creature has both
^  I am indebted to Hart’s “Barth, the Trinity and Pluralism” for his discussion here.
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the capacity to and the warrant and criteria for speaking about God separate from the 
gospel. To endorse thinking about God this way is ‘to risk admitting into the theological 
Ilium a Trojan horse “in whose belly -  we can hear a threatening clank”! {CD I/l, p. 
336) ’.^^
Torrance, “The Trinity,” 80. Tt might be added’, notes Torrance, ‘that recent attempts to counterbalance 
the Augustinian vestigia with communitarian vestigia risk bequeathing to future generations a whole new 
series o f problems’.
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Chapter Four:
'Relational’ God-Talk?
In expressing what is intended to be an integrated relational ontology, Johnson 
makes the following statement about her panentheistic, ‘Trinitarian’ theology:
In She Who Is I draw on themes and ideas from Thomas Aquinas to explore a feminist theology of 
God. .. .1 also make ontological claims and draw references about the way things truly are, but 
these are not beholden to any complete metaphysical system. ... With regard to the Trinity I play 
with multiple models, convinced that pushing only one alone inevitably leads to univocity in 
speech about the divine.®®^
This chapter examines whether Johnson’s God-talk is safeguarded from univocity, 
as she intends. It simultaneously questions whether she is kept from the potential 
equivocity that threatens her agnostic approach. We will analyse whether her theological 
speech is truly ‘analogical’ -  hence, ‘relational’ — Trinitarian discourse.
I. Agnostically Naming the 'Nameless'
A. P roceeding A n a log ica lly ’ Under the Sign ofN ot-K now ing
Assessing Johnson’s ViaAnalogia
As Johnson has stated above, her panentheistic theology and corresponding God-
talk draw from a variety of sources and ‘are not beholden to any complete metaphysical
system’. She uses ‘multiple models’ -  metaphors, images, analogies and concepts -  to
construct her symbol of Sophia-God, drawing from women’s experience and making, as
she says, ‘ontological claims and drawing references about the way things really are’ in
terms of divine reality as ‘relationality’.
I hold vigorously to the idea that theological language always and everywhere proceeds by way of 
analogy — or metaphor or symbol — and this undergirds my use of Sophia. The term does not refer
“ 2 “porging Theology,” (see n. 14) 100-1 (emphasis added).
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to an ontologically distinct object, but to the mystery o f the transcendent God immanently present 
in the world .. .though this can be spoken o f in personalized terms. °^^
It is precisely at this point that Johnson turns to her Catholic tradition to defend 
her theological language. She argues that her transcendental approach employs the three­
fold ‘doctrinal’ pattern of the Thomistic tradition -  divine incomprehensibility (as 
agnostic unknowability), ‘analogy’, and a plurality of names -  and thereby reawakens the 
‘freedom’ and ‘necessary open-endedness’ of theological speech inherent in the 
tradition.^”'* In other words, she defends her Trinitarian symbol through the via analogia.
In review, the basic presupposition of Aquinas’ via analogia is that creatures may 
speak of God -  who transcends their experience -  from  their experience because of their 
participation in God’s being. This is based on the analogous relation of creaturely effects 
to their primary Cause -  the analogia entisf^^ To speak of God from this relation assumes 
that creatures share secondarily but nonetheless intrinsically in the divine perfections, 
which belong primarily, intrinsically, and perfectly to God. °^  ^ It also assumes that it is
<503 n o  (emphasis added). Roger Haight compares Johnson’s use of personification in contrast to 
‘hypostatization’: ‘Personification is a figure o f speech and a common literary figure ... Hypostatization ... 
or reification, is the making into a real thing an idea, or a concept, or an abstraction, or the object o f a 
figure o f speech, such as a personification. A personification becomes a hypostatization when the object is 
not treated as if i i  were a person, but as a real personal entity. The transition occurs in the intention o f the 
user of the language and not necessarily in the language itself. In other words, it may sometimes be very 
difficult to know whether a personification or an hypostatization is in play’. Haight, “Jesus Christ in the 
Work o f Elizabeth A. Johnson,” Things New and Old (see n. 2) 53-54. Johnson argues that this really 
doesn’t matter. ‘The need [for the Wisdom symbol needs the chance to work in our imaginations and 
christological affirmations] ... is too strong to allow a concern for reification to stop it’. And yet, this is 
precisely her critique o f classical theism, that ‘the history o f  theology shows how in practice theism has 
reified GocT thus making the ‘concept’ o f  infinite mystery into a real thing. SWI, 20.
From Rahner, Johnson states, ‘The present ferment about naming, imaging, and conceptualizing God 
from perspectives o f women’s experience repristinates the truth that the idea o f God, incomprehensible 
mystery, implies an open-ended history o f understanding that is not finished’. SWI, 7. Martin notes: ‘I 
doubt whether Rahner would acknowledge the conclusions at which Johnson arrives fi-om [his] principles 
... though he must take some responsibility for them’. TFQ, 181.
Trevor Hart cites this metaphysical principle as first aired by Proclus: ‘Everything which by its existence 
bestows a character on others, itself primitively possesses that character, which it communicates to the 
recipient’. “Speaking o f God’s Love: Analogy, Reference and Revelation,” in Regarding Karl Barth (see n. 
235) 187.
^  Besides Aquinas’s treatment on analogy in ST I, q. 12-13, Johnson refers to David Burrell’s Thomistic 
interpretation in Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), and
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within human capacity to discover what perfections necessarily belong to God and which 
do not. In other words, as a metaphysical ‘principle’, the analogia entis serves to function 
as a foundation for knowledge about God and his relation to the world from  the natural 
world apart from the context of God’s revelation in the event of the Incarnation.
As we have seen, Johnson uses this principle as the metaphysical foundation for 
her relational ontology. She does not, however (as she states above), adhere to the system 
as a whole. As was set forth in chapter two, one of Johnson’s fundamental 
methodological and epistemological adjustments is to equate ‘divine 
‘ incomprehensibility’ with Neo-Kantian ‘unknowability’ and experience of the 
‘Nameless’. She not only disregards the distinction between them that prevents the fall 
into agnosticism; she reinterprets Aquinas and the tradition to argue for precisely that: 
‘Ultimately, the highest human knowledge about God is to know that we do not know, a 
negative but entirely valid knowing ... The triune God is not simply unknown, but 
positively known to be unknown and unknowable ~ which is a dear and profound kind of 
knowledge’.^ ”
In her interpretation, analogy and agnosticism go hand in hand. Analogy 
safeguards ‘divine mystery’ and ‘otherness’ through its moment of negation, reminding 
us that God is ultimately unknowable. Revelation, no matter by what model it is
Nicholas Lash’s explanation o f the positive value o f negative knowing in analogy in “Ideology, Metaphor 
and Analogy,” in The Philosophical Frontiers o f  Christian Theology, ed. Brian Hebblethwaite and Stewart 
Sutherland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 68-94.
SWI, 110, 205. Alan Torrance challenges this kind o f feminist claim. Why does God-talk require a 
‘silence’ o f agnosticism at this point in Christian history to ‘lead us’ to ‘the Mystery who is God’? What, 
asks Torrance, sets the controls for such an approach? Who or what creates, and breaks, the silence in the 
divine-human relation? Who ‘leads’ and when is it determined that the destination ‘Mystery’ is arrived at? 
‘On what basis are we entitled to believe that there is a God who will speak through this silence and thus 
bring us to theological resolution at all? Is this something we know in advance -  and if  so, on what 
grounds?’ “Theology and Political Correctness,” in Harmful Religion: An Exploration o f  Religious Abuse, 
ed. L. Osborn and A. Walker (London: SPCK, 1997), 101-121, 113.
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‘interpreted’, does not and cannot dissolve unknowable mystery - ‘God remains wholly 
other, blessedly present but conceptually inapprehensible, and so God’ even when 
speaking ‘analogically’ from one’s experience/"*® By making this affirmation, Johnson 
contends that God’s essential unlikeness to the finite world remains complete/"*  ^She also 
uses this affirmation to distinguish her panentheistic position from pantheism and from 
process theology. Though process thought has ‘fertilized’ her thinking, it does not 
‘sufficiently honor the difference between God and the world’. Why? Specifically 
because ‘it does not radically employ the negative moment in analogy\^^°
Thus, while Johnson affirms the threefold, analogical motion of affirmation, 
negation, and supereminence, analogy still needs ‘a strong shot of the negative’. She 
(along with Catholic theologians Rahner, Erich Przywara and David Tracy)^“ argues that 
every God-concept and symbol must go through this ‘purifying double negation, negating 
the positive and then negating the negation, to assure its own legitimacy’.®*^ Analogy 
breaks open the concept of God ‘in the affirming movement of the human spirit that 
passes from light into darkness and thence into brighter darkness’.®*® The double moment
®°®5')T/, 105.
®°® “The Theological Case for G o d -S h e 10; “The Incomprehensibility of God and the Image o f God Male 
and Female,” Theological Studies 45 (1984): 441; SWI, 104-112, and passim. Again, with Rahner, 
Johnson’s arguments for ontological distinction are predominantly noetic and epistemic rather than strictly 
ontic.
®*° “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 102 (emphasis added). She is speaking directly o f Joseph Bracken’s 
engagement with her thought in SWI.
®* * SWI, 105, 115-116. Johnson argues that they have instigated a recovery o f the ‘complexity o f analogy’ 
by stressing its negating moment or ‘its movement through negation toward mystery’. Torrance, however, 
sees it as an open question ‘as to whether analogy, as interpreted by Przywara, is really representative o f  
Catholic orthodoxy ... [and] is as central to Catholicism and Catholic theology as he suggests .... Karl 
Rahner seems nervous about the degree o f prominence that it came to acquire — something for which he 
blames Przywara’. Persons in Communion, 123n6.
®* 5^fJ7, 113.
®*® SWI, 115. Robert Jenson rejects this kind o f ‘apophatic’ permission-giving. He offers Luther’s comment 
that faith perceives God who is ‘hidden’ in our hearts more as a ‘darkness’ like that over Sinai than a ‘light’ 
as a way o f warding off what he considers to be the ‘bowdlerized apophaticism’ popular with approaches 
like that o f Catholic reformism. ‘That God is unknowable must not be construed to mean that he is but 
vaguely glimpsed through clouds o f metaphysical distance, so that we are compelled -  and at liberty -  to
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of negation moves it even farther: ‘it does not shut down thought but corrects the 
inadequacy of the positive affirmation, compels it to transcend itself, pushes it to its term: 
God who is always ever greater. The negation does not deny or revoke the affirmation, 
leading to an agnostic void, but powerfully invalidates its limits, in the end giving off 
some light’.®*"* Thus, it is in the negating moment that we ‘intuit’ what we do not know 
(cannot apprehend?) through the self-affirmation of our ‘spirit’ which participates in the 
Spirit of divine relationality -  ‘rightly’ named by Johnson as Sophia-God.®*  ^(Or is it only 
women who intuit this accurately?)
Certain of Johnson’s Catholic colleagues disagree with her agnostic interpretation 
of Aquinas, however. Francis Martin defends Thomistic consideration of analogy as 
properly taking place at the level of epistemic discourse -  and that this is the discourse of 
the Church based on God’s revelation in which we ontologically participate. Therefore, it 
is ‘a systematic reflection on the validity of what is already known'\ it is not an effort to 
establish the a priori conditions for agnostically naming the Nameless based on the 
experiencing subject as source and norm:®*®
devise namings and metaphors guided by our religious need. It means on the contrary that we are stuck 
with the names and descriptions the biblical narrative contingently enforces, which seem designed always 
to offend somebody; it means that their syntax is hidden from us, so that we cannot identify synonyms or 
make translations. It means that we have no standpoint from which to relativize them and project more 
soothing visions’. “The Hidden and Triune God,” The IntemationalJournal o f Systematic Theology vol 2 
(March 2000), 6-7.
®*'* SWI, 115. Johnson views analogical language here to be akin to Judaism’s reverential abstinence from 
the use o f God’s name. ‘YHWH is a limit expression, not a defining name but an unnameable one....We 
are left in salutary darkness’ (241). Here she seems to ignore YHWH’s own ‘character description’ given to 
Moses in Exodus 34 that echoes throughout the Old Testament.
®*® In Fergus Kerr’s negative assessment o f Rahner’s explication of human experience as the jumping off 
point into ‘unknowable mystery’, he states: ‘In other words: we are drawn out beyond wherever we actually 
are by that which enables us to see what is what in our world but eludes our sight all the time that it does 
so. Some philosophers might be inclined to say that, if  you are going to talk in this sort o f way at all, then 
this must surely be language. Rahner, however, thinks that it is Go<T. “Rahner Retrospective,” 371.
616 fj^Q 224, (emphasis added). Martin cites Colman O’Neil (“Analogy, Dialectic and Inter-Confessional 
Theology,” The Thomist 47 [1983]: 43-65), who states that analogy “‘has to do with the linguistic 
expression o f a knowledge about God that is held, whether rightly or wrongly, to be already acquired and 
to be true, even though necessarily imperfect... All that the theory o f analogy is meant to do is to account
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[0]ur predecessors [the believing community o f the Church] had no doubt at all that they 
possessed knowledge about God, that they knew God, and that they understood his plan revealed 
in Jesus Christ. They were equally clear that God is incomprehensible, that he is the one “who 
alone has immortality, who dwells in unapproachable light, and whom no human being has seen or 
can see” (1 Tim 6:16).... The theory o f analogical predication is precisely an attempt to validify 
the two extreme tenets o f faith-knowledge, namely that there is genuine knowledge o f God [given 
by the Holy Spirit], and that God is radically beyond all knowing.®*’
Catherine LaCugna has also emphasised that apophasis and analogy are based on 
what we do know and can say about God. God is ‘wholly other’ but as such is 
nevertheless the self-revealing God of Jesus Christ and the Spirit. Our theological 
concepts, systems, and language must correspond to the fact that (indirectly) we do know 
God by means of God’s being manifest in the works of creation and in personal self- 
revelation.^^^ Janet Soskice also argues that Aquinas’ theory is ‘logico-linguistic’ as well 
as metaphysical, and is more concerned with ‘determining how we can speak of God than 
with devising crude ontological linkings between finite creatures and infinite Deity’.®*^
Aquinas himself declares that ‘there is no sound theology if the negative and 
positive are not used together. The positive way alone leads to anthropomorphism, to 
idolatry, to blasphemy. The negative way alone leads to agnosticism and atheism’.®^®
for the oddities o f linguistic expression which result from this conviction (232).”’ Martin argues that while 
analogy involves judgment, it is a judgment o f objective and ‘appropriate’ correspondence rather than one 
of interior subjectivity. Here analogy differs from metaphor: ‘Analogy always includes a judgment 
concerning this objective correspondence. Metaphor, on the other hand, while it expresses a perceived 
similarity, is directed more to creating the correspondence than to asserting the multiple possession o f the 
reality so imputed. Failure to make this distinction is the source of some of the greatest confusion in the 
talk about metaphorical theology. ... When what is intuited or disclosed is based on an objective 
correspondence, there can be that judgment o f something shared which is the heart o f analogy’. Martin 
notes that while Janet Martin Soskice and Richard Swinburne would agree, they would not accent the role 
o f ‘judgment o f objective correspondence’ as he does.
®*’ ‘To approach this witness with an a priori need for an epistemic foundation and thus to interpret this 
witness to mean that these people were speaking not o f God, but merely of their subjective experience, is to 
reveal our present ignorance, not theirs’. TFQ, 224-25.
®*® God For Us, 332.
®*^  Metaphor and Religious Language, 65.
®^® Battista Mondin, The Principle o f  Analogy (see n.220) 98-99. Not presuming to present a full view of  
current Thomistic discourse, we are following Mondin’s reinterpretation o f Aquinas’s via analogia. In 
brief, Mondin reintroduces Suârez’ interpretation o f the category o f ‘intrinsic attribution’, a direct challenge 
to Cajetan’s traditional interpretation and that o f his contemporary exponent, Gerald Phelan. See, e.g.. Saint 
Thomas and Analogy, The Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee: 1941). Torrance presents a concise engagement
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While Johnson would argue that she holds the positive and negative together, the moment 
of ‘supereminence’ is one of double negation in her thought, rather than a qualified 
restatement of what (arguably) we can say. This leads her, by her own acknowledgement, 
into an agnostic position -  which she in turn wants to attribute to Aquinas/^* Hence, in 
her attempt to preserve God’s transcendence, her theology runs the risk of degenerating 
into ‘wild and empty conceptual acrobatics’®®® and collapsing into equivocal 
meaninglessness.
What keeps Johnson’s ‘naming the Nameless’ from empty speculation, with no 
epistemic access to God’s being, despite her transcendental, ontological claims to the 
contrary? From her perspective, it is attentiveness to God-talk’s basic ‘rootedness in 
experience’.®®® The counter-balance to God’s unknowability is the ontological assumption 
that experience of self is the experience of God. Language has an ‘analogous’ nature, as 
do human beings: ‘The “knowing” of God accomplished in the analogical process is a 
dynamic of relational knowing.... We exist analogously, in and through being grounded 
in holy mystery which always surpasses us’.®®"* This leads Johnson to conclude that (1) 
‘all speech about God is analogical’,®®® (2) that analogy ‘shapes every category of words 
used to speak about God’, be it ‘metaphoric’, ‘relational’, ‘negative’ or formally
with Mondin’s thought as well as critiquing the underlying assumptions o f Mondin’s position in Persons in 
Communion, 142-48, to which we are indebted.
®®* SWI, 109.
®®®5fJ7, 198.
®®® SWI, 198.
SWI, 114, 116.
®®® Johnson acknowledges that there is no uniform agreement regarding the meaning or function o f analogy 
among those Catholic theologians who still employ it. Her own ambiguity surfaces when she speaks of 
‘appreciating’ Frederick Ferre’s view that ‘even though analogy may not be any longer metaphysically 
credible, it still remains linguistically useful for speech about God’ (SWI, 117, 292n32, emphasis added). 
Neither is there unanimity regarding the ‘symbol’. In fact, says Johnson, its range o f meaning is so vast ‘as 
to appear beyond profitable discussion’, though its use may still disrupt ‘the flow o f logical positivism’ and 
‘credit religious language with meaning’. Her use o f metaphor supposedly aligns with McFague’s. “The 
Right Way to Speak About God: Pannenberg on Analogy,” Theological Studies 43 (1982): 673; “The 
Symbolic Character,” 320; “Forging Theology,” (see n. 14) 110.
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‘substantive’ (describing the divine perfections)/®® and (3) that every category holds a 
degree of agnosticism: ‘Whether expressed by metaphorical, symbolic or analogical 
theology, there is basic agreement that the mystery of God is fundamentally unlike 
anything else we know of, and so is beyond the grasp of our naming’.®®’
This opens the way to speak of God using any and all names available from 
created reality without being tied to Biblical and doctrinal language.®®® All names are not 
only legitimate but ‘religiously necessary’ because each provides a different perspective 
on ‘divine excellence’.®®^ In fact, God is ‘positively misrepresented’ if any one image (the 
One Name, Father, Son and Spirit) is thought to be adequate: ‘The bible and Christian 
tradition as well as the world’s religions give evidence of a revelry of symbols for the 
divine that nourish the mind and expand the spirit... a concrete term balances an abstract 
one, and so forth, each operating as a corrective to any other that would pretend to 
completeness’.®®®
The question is, are these conclusions in agreement with Aquinas? Does Johnson 
‘draw on themes and ideas from Thomas Aquinas’ in support of her God-talk to the 
extent that she is free from univocity?
“Aquinas on Johnson”
a. Does Aquinas consider all God-talk to be analogical as Johnson claims?
Johnson believes that through ontological participation women can ‘analogically’,
‘metaphorically’ or ‘symbolically’ name God from any source as long as it reflects their
®®® SWI, 114.
®®’ 5'fJ7, 116-117.
®®®5117, 108-109,113-114.
®®^ SWI, 109. ‘All names’ technically includes patriarchal and abusive names, something she surely does 
not mean.
®®®5r/, 118.
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transcendental experience®®* As was discussed in chapter two, the principle at work in 
Johnson’s thought is that of efficient causality. Effects (creatures) are Tike’ their cause 
(God), This means that God can abstractly be called ‘relationality’, ‘wisdom’ or ‘being’, 
or be called ‘mother’ or ‘friend’ or any other name from human experience, and Johnson 
assumes there to be a kind of ‘likeness’. (The safeguard is simultaneously to maintain 
God’s essential unlikeness negation.)
There is a problem with this general, broad-stroke approach, however. Not only 
are analogies different from metaphors or symbols (especially as defined by McFague or 
Tillich, as we shall see).®®® For Aquinas, there are also different kinds o f  analogies.^^^ 
More importantly, Aquinas considers only one kind of analogy to speak truthfully of God 
and creatures with any ‘real’ similarity. That is the analogy o f ‘intrinsic attribution’. And,
even more specifically, it applies to only one set o f  names -  the divine perfections. 
Thus, Thomistic analogy does not in fact allow that every category of words can be used
634 Î1
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SWI, 117.
®®®Johnson’s indiscriminate use o f analogy, symbol and metaphor forgets these to be distinct tropes with 
different functions in their contexts. She applies them randomly, synonymously and ultimately without 
recognising theological description as the language o f ontological participation in the being o f the Triune 
God who nevertheless remains ontologically distinct and has named himself in the revelation o f Jesus 
Christ. Soskice calls this kind o f indiscriminate definition and usage o f terms a key ‘defect’ in current 
religious language. Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), x. Linda 
Woodhead concurs in “Spiritualizing the Sacred,” 194.
®®® According to Mondin, Aquinas considers there to be two general kinds o f analogies that designate the 
relation o f one thing to another. The first are analogies of intrinsic denomination, which include (a) the 
analogy o f intrinsic attribution based on a relation o f  efficient causality between God, the primary 
analogate, and creatures, in whom God causes the property as secondary ‘imperfect imitation’; and (b) the 
analogy o f intrinsic proportionality based on a similarity o f relations (e.g., ‘the wisdom o f God is to God as 
the wisdom of a human person is to the person’, where wisdom is predicated o f  God and the person not 
because there is something similar in their natures with respect to wisdom, but because the relations 
Wisdom/God and wisdom/person are similar). There are also analogies o f extrinsic denomination, which 
include (a) the analogy o f extrinsic attribution according to proper signification (e.g., ‘Peter is healthy’ and 
‘food is healthy’, where ‘healthy’ is a univocal concept but ‘is’ varies in meaning), and (b) the analogy of 
(extrinsic) improper or metaphorical proportionality (e.g., ‘Achilles is a lion’ and ‘the beast is a lion’, 
where Achilles ‘acts like’ a lion but the beast ‘is’ a lion, signifying the unqualified perfection o f intrinsic, 
formal ‘lioninity’). Names like ‘mother’ or ‘friend’ fall into this last category. The Principle o f Analogy, 
51-61.
®®"* A phrase originating with Suarez in describing Aquinas’s approach. The Principle o f Analogy, 34-35.
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to speak o f God. As Soskice reiterates, ‘Aquinas restricts what can literally be said of 
God to a few, bare predicates -  the so-called perfection terms’/®® Thus, Aquinas uses 
analogy in an attempt to preserve God’s absolute, distinct transcendence while 
simultaneously expressing divine immanence in relation to creation.
In one sense, Aquinas considers all human talk of God to be analogical, insofar as 
it is neither univocal nor equivocal. He considers analogy -  which relies on some sense of 
similarity as well as difference between God and creatures -  to be the only way to speak 
of God that avoids anthropomorphism, provide real meaning and preserve God’s 
transcendence. Aquinas assumes God’s a priori reality at the heart of analogy. Thus, 
although “‘we come to a knowledge of God from other things, the reality in the names 
said of God and other things belongs by priority in God according to his mode of being, 
but the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority.'" Because creatures relate to 
God as effects to their cause, ‘we can be led from them so far as to know of God whether 
he exists, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him as the first cause of 
all things, exceeding all things caused by Him’.®®® In other words, by analogical 
predication, we name perfections which belong properly to God. Drawing our language 
from imperfect and fallen creatures, the mode of signification, however, will fall short. 
Thus, the thus names will be inadequate -  but only from our side.^ '^^
Two universal principles are recognised to be at work in Aquinas’s thought; first, 
that ‘every agent acts in a way similar to itself and second, correspondingly, that there is
®®® Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 65; See also “Can a Feminist Call God “Father”?” in 
Speaking the Christian God: The Holy Trinity and the Challenge of Feminism, ed. Alvin F. Kimel, Jr. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 81-94, 83.
®® Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.12.12.
®®’ This differentiation between the perfectio significata and the modus significandi is crucial, says Trevor 
Hart, for it allows Aquinas to avoid appearing to subsume Creator and creatures under a common category 
o f being. “Speaking of God’s Love,” 186.
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a likeness between cause and effect (the principle of efficient causality). Only analogies 
ontologically grounded in efficient causality can meaningfully speak of both God and 
creatures ~ and only based on what Aquinas calls the analogy of one to another. The 
analogy of one to another is according to divine priority and creaturely posteriority.®^ ® 
(Because the perfections belong essentially, intrinsically and perfectly to God, they can 
be predicated ‘truthfully’ o f  God using human speech. They are also ‘true’ of creatures by 
participation but only in a secondary, derivative and imperfect way.)®^  ^ The thing 
signified of God is perfect not because we’ve described it perfectly, but because it is 
essential to God and thus perfect in God.
Aquinas asserts that when applying a perfection like the term good to God and 
human beings, we must attend to three things; what is said of God and the human being 
(res significata, the goodness they both possess^, the meaning of what is said (ratio 
nominis), and the way in which it is said (modus significandi, in this case a positive 
predication ‘goodness’).®'*® With respect to the perfection signified, God is the first or 
primary analogate; with respect to the mode of signification God is the secondary 
analogate. Names in their mode o f  signification apply primarily and properly to creatures
®^® Aquinas makes this analogical distinction o f one to another, says Mondin, out of ‘deep respect for 
God’s absoluteness and uniqueness’, but not, ironically, ‘at the expense o f other beings’, i.e., not without 
real reference to the creature as well; ‘[T]heir safeguard cannot be a mode of predication which empties the 
name of its meaning when it is predicated o f finite beings. This is the danger o f extrinsic attribution, which 
in some respect is as pernicious as equivocity: it leads to agnosticism either with regard to creatures or with 
regard to God’. The Principle o f Analogy, 34-35. We would argue that in Johnson’s case, it is the latter.
Mondin, The Principle o f Analogy, 19-67.
®'*® Martin, TFQ, 227. Johnson seems not only to recognise the inadequacy o f human speech as the modus 
significandi, but deems the res significata and the ratio nominis to be inadequate as well by abstracting 
them from their reference, hence opening them up for reconstruction and renaming. With no truth or 
objective reality in themselves, women supply meaning to the divine ‘names’ from their ‘burning 
agnosticism of experience’.
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since ‘we cannot understand the meaning of the name of any perfection without thinking 
of some particular mode of realization of the perfection in a creature’.®'**
Thus, Aquinas contends that it is ‘true’ that God is ‘good’ and that human beings 
are ‘good’. Grounded in efficient causality, the eminent meaning of this term derives 
from God and so speaks of something intrinsic (though utterly different) in God and 
creatures. In other words, it is true because in God it is ultimately, originally true.
To speak of God as ‘mother’ or ‘friend’, on the other hand, is to employ, 
ironically, what Aquinas calls a ‘metaphorical’ or ‘symbolic’ form of analogy. This kind 
of analogy applies ‘truthfully’ only to c r e a tu r e s Why? Because names like ‘mother’ 
are intrinsic to creatures since they are only realised finitely in creation. As such they are 
extrinsic to God.®'*® They derive ‘from below’ and thus are not based on efficient 
causality. Metaphorical or symbolic analogies only ‘belong’ to God in a subjective, non- 
intrinsic way and so cannot be ‘true’ of God in se. In short, to say that God is ‘mother’ or 
‘friend’ is not ‘true’, according to Aquinas.
It is precisely the Creator-creature distinction that analogies of efficient causality 
try to preserve. It is precisely this distinction that metaphorical or symbolic analogies
®'*' Mondin, The Principle of Analogy, 34, 95-96. Martin elaborates this point, stressing the truth content 
and objective reality o f such analogical statements, in TFQ, 228.
She asserts that Maimonides’ concept o f negation is a good way to think ‘analogically’ about all 
categories of words for God, not only metaphorical or relational but substantive terms (perfections) like 
‘God is good, living, wise; God is personal; God exists’. Clearly this assertion shows that Johnson does not 
ground true analogies in a real causal relation o f one to another, nor does she choose the name Sophia 
because it is a proper perfection. From this standpoint, it seems any name will do based on her ontology of 
being. iSfF/, 114.
®^*® Mondin, The Principle of Analogy, 94. Aquinas calls these names o f ‘mixed perfections’: ‘[TJhere are in 
creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God, and which the creature owes to its being made 
from nothing .... These are falsely ascribed to God: and whatsoever terms imply such like conditions 
cannot be ascribed to God otherwise than metaphorically, for instance, lion, stone and so on, inasmuch as 
matter is included in their definition’ (De Potentia, 1, 5, ad 8, cited by Mondin, 22-23).
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grounded in creaturely reality cannot uphold.®'*'* Hence Aquinas argues that ‘names’ for 
God like ‘mother’ and ‘friend’ have no ontological ground for speaking about God, 
These extrinsic analogies, so common to feminist theology, are analogies of ‘improper 
proportionality’. The irony is that in these kinds of analogies, there is no ontological 
likeness o f  nature or relations between creatures and God! (Analogies of improper 
proportionality are ontologically grounded in ‘a likeness of action’, not efficient 
causality.)®'*®
Therefore, Johnson cannot argue from Aquinas that to speak of God using 
metaphorical or symbolic analogies is a credible interpretation of the analogia entis or 
the via analogia. Neither can she speak analogically of God in this manner and assume to 
uphold the distinction she understands to be necessary to the Christian faith.®'*® This leads 
her directly into the problem of univocity that she is concerned to avoid. She is speaking 
only from creaturely reality about creaturely reality, and not about God. On the one hand, 
her agnosticism prevents her from considering God to be the primary analogate of only 
the divine perfections, as her tradition maintains. On the other hand, her agnosticism 
prevents her from being able to say that any name is inapplicable from creaturely reality 
when applied to God. Surely this not only puts her outside her tradition but threatens to 
be ‘univocity run rampant’ with no controls and no ability to argue for ‘the right way’ to 
talk about God.
®'*‘* When speaking from creatures about something that originates in creatures, it is impossible to 
distinguish between the mode o f signification (always creaturely) and the thing signified (in this case, also 
creaturely). This distinction is critical to true analogies that speak o f both God and creatures. Mondin, The 
Principle of Analogy, 93.
®'*® Mondin argues that the mind works much more arbitrarily in constructing extrinsic analogies of 
improper proportionality because there are no definite rules for deciding whether an analogy o f improper 
proportionality is legitimate: ‘It is then clear that the relation o f action, which is the ontological ground of 
improper proportionality, is something very vague and indefinite"' {The Principle of Analogy, 71-4, 
emphasis added).
®'*® See her statement to this effect in the Introduction.
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b. What impact does Johnson’s interpretation of the analogia entis have on her attempt to remain free from 
univocity?
Johnson relies on what is referred to as a ‘proportional’ interpretation of the 
analogia entis, rather than the principle of intrinsic attribution.®^’ In this approach, the 
analogia entis serves as a kind of unifying cosmological principle grounded in the 
universal participation of all things in ‘being’, according to their proportionate ‘share’. 
This also serves as the basis for the diversity of each being: ‘Their ‘share’ in being is 
proportionate to the ‘being-ness’ of each.®'*®
This concept of proportionality is applied analogically in speaking of God and the 
world. As such, the analogy of proportionality makes two important claims: First, the 
perfections intrinsically and perfectly exist in and hold analogously for both God and 
creatures, and second, they are intrinsically and analogously proportionate in each 
according to a different ‘mode’.®'*® Using, for example, the perfection ‘goodness’, 
goodness is ‘common to’ or belongs to God, angels, and humans, but each also has 
goodness in a unique way, i.e., in proportion to their ‘being’. God is good in proportion to 
God’s being, and angels and humans are good in proportion to their different way of
®'*’ This kind o f analogy applies only to perfections as well, though Johnson applies it to all ‘names’. This 
position reflects that o f Cajetan and Phelan, which is also Rahner’s leaning. See Nature and Grace: 
Dilemmas in the Modern Church, trans. Dinah Wharton (1964), cited by Kelly, Rahner, 99. Ironically, this 
view seems to advocate the kind o f closed ontology that Rahner rejects outright. Cf. Torrance, Persons in 
Communion, 143n52. J. A. DiNoia contends that Suarez was influential in Rahner’s thought. See “Karl 
Rahner,” in The Modern Theologians (see n.28) 119.
®'*® Torrance, Persons in Communion, 132,134 (emphasis added).
®'*® Torrance, Persons in Communion, 132, 133. For Rahner, ‘[Tjhat which is expressed is ontologically 
identical with that which expresses it, since the appearance (symbol) is constitutive o f the reality 
symbolized (the essence)’. Here we see the influence on Rahner’s first ontological necessity -  “the 
necessity for all beings to express themselves in order to realize themselves.’” If, however, God must 
express himself this way like all other beings so that ‘symbolic’ reality is common to God and humans, 
then, states Molnar, human being only differs in degree, not in kind. “Can We Know God Directly?” 251, 
258.
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being.®®® These claims, however, raise inherent problems when it comes to asserting that 
God is outside any genus in an attempt to preserve God’s transcendence and the 
necessary Creator-creature distinction.
Aquinas (and Johnson!)®®* constantly emphasises that God cannot be subsumed 
under a genus or class. This is why he specifically rejects what he calls analogies of 
‘many to one’ or ‘two to a third’ in favour of the analogy of ‘one to another’ in speaking 
of God and creatures. He recognises that the first two types of analogy put God on the 
same level as finite beings. In other words, they subsume Him under categories, and, 
therefore, ‘annihilate His uniqueness’.®®^ ‘Good’, for instance, is predicated of God and 
creatures as an abstracted tertium quid in which they both share. This implies, however, 
that something other than God is prior to God and big enough to include God in its 
limits.®®® For Johnson, this tertium quid is ‘relational being’ itself. Thus, despite her 
declaration that ‘being’ is not a genus or category, she also states that ‘the ontological 
language of being has the advantage of providing an all-inclusive category for reality at 
large, leaving nothing out’, which includes God.®®'* Hence their proportionate share in 
‘relational being’ is the ground for speaking of God and creatures in the broadest sense.®®®
®®® There is not a direct equivalence between these proportions but rather ‘a proportion o f proportions’. In 
Phelan’s words (referring to the perfection ‘knowledge’), “‘the proportion between knowledge and angels 
holds ... and the proportion between knowledge and man holds ... (and finally) there is proportion between 
the way the first proportion holds and the way the second proportion holds.”’ Saint Thomas and Analogy, 
cited by Torrance, Persons in Communion, 132-33. In the analogy o f intrinsic attribution, on the other 
hand, ‘Names applied to God and to other beings are predicated according to the analogy o f one to another. 
The ground o f  this analogy is the causal relation that things have to God. With respect to the perfection 
signified God is the first analogate; with respect to the mode of signification God is the secondary 
analogate’. Mondin, The Principle o f Analogy, 34.
®®* E.g.,5IF/,240.
®®^ Mondin, The Principle of Analogy, 34-35.
®®® Mondin, The Principle o f Analogy, 24, 34.
®®'*5'If7. 237.
®®® Mondin, The Principle of Analogy, 41. Mondin argues that Suarez opposed Cajetan at this critical point
when he stated that ‘Aquinas refuses to recognize any analogy o f proportionality between God and
creatures’.
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Perhaps it is in this context that she awaits a new word that will include within its scope 
‘holy mystery’, the reality of women and all of creation.
This understanding results in God being not only integral to but ultimately 
integrated with the ‘analogical whole’ of Creator and creation such that a necessary 
relation seems inevitable in both directions.®®® God is intrinsically connected to the world 
so as to be somehow conditioned by it. In other words, God creates the world out of 
necessity and ‘natural order’ rather than absolute freedom. Aquinas seeks to avoid this 
relation by assigning an exclusive position in theological language to the principle of 
‘one to another’ based on efficient causality, indicating a ‘causal nexus’ between God and 
creatures and maintaining God’s priority over creatures in ‘absoluteness and 
uniqueness’.®®’ As we have seen, however, this is not a problem for Johnson; rather it is 
fundamental to her relational ontology. Thus, it does not seem to be a problem in terms of 
speaking of God from experience as the concomitant experience of God, ‘proportionally’ 
speaking.
The problem seems to have more to do with her use of the via analogia in 
general. As an appeal to certain metaphysical and philosophical principles to ground 
one’s understanding of the God-world relation and God-talk, does it not inherent 
subsume God under these categories? For instance, even though Mondin critiques 
Phelan’s interpretation for subsuming God under a genus, Mondin makes a similar move 
by espousing that for Aquinas, intrinsic attribution rests on the principle that ‘every agent 
acts in a way similar to itself.®®® As Torrance observes, Mondin’s entire thrust is to show 
that the roots of Thomistic analogy are found in this cosmological principle -  the
®®® Persons in Communion, 135.
®®’ Torrance, Persons in Communion, 139. Mondin, The Principle o f Analogy, 35, 50. 
®®® The Principle o f Analogy, 67.
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‘universal’ similarity between agents and that which they cause to exist or produce -  
believing that Aquinas holds this principle and that of efficient causality to be ‘self- 
evident’.®®®
If, however, God as Creator is transcendent and fundamentally different from all 
created participants in being, how is the integration of God with ‘the analogical whole’ 
true to God’s nature?®®® The principle of likeness between agents and between causes and 
their effects is applicable to God and God’s relation to the created order. This means that 
God is necessarily subsumed under a kind of generic category, namely, the class of 
‘agents’ to whom it universally applies that their actions bear some likeness to 
themselves.®®* Though Johnson fails to follow the principle of analogy carefully, it is the 
inferences she draws from this general, metaphysical principle that eventually lead her 
think of the God-world relation as an ‘analogical whole’. Moreover, she is led to ask
®®® Mondin defends his interpretation from these principles. E.g., he states that by saying that God and 
creatures share intrinsically in the thing signified, Aquinas is not speaking univocally o f  a ‘third thing’ 
( ‘goodness’) that they each hold in proportion to their way o f being. Rather, ‘good’ is intrinsic primarily 
and perfectly in God as first cause or agent -  God is ‘good’. Creatures are ‘good’ became God is good and 
as his effects they bear similarity to him in a secondary way. Ibid., 34, 67. In either case, notes Torrance, 
the underlying problem exists. Persons in Communion, 143. The lack o f objective reference is precisely 
Barth’s difficulty with the via analogia and its foundation in the analogia entis as a natural theology: It 
runs the same risks as any other natural theology -  the criteria and controls for knowledge and speech about 
God are external to God as he has made himself known and spoken his own Word in Jesus Christ. The 
basis for human talk about God is independent o f God’s Self-talk in the realm o f humanity. Thus it falsely 
subsumes God’s revelation under a fallen, human rubric o f knowing and speaking. Barth insists that God is 
simply not available to us this way. That we can only speak o f God analogously is true, but the ground of 
our speech is not based on some natural cause and effect relation to God. Rather, it is because God has 
commandeered our words and concepts through his revelation and has given them a capacity which 
exceeds their natural semantic range.
®®® Persons in Communion, 135. Torrance raises Barth’s question, namely, ‘whether the very different 
ontological identification with the created order which stems from the affirmation o f the homoousion, as 
this safeguards divine freedom, does not render inappropriate and unnecessary any such universal 
ontological framework as a means o f undergirding theological description’. As we noted in the last chapter, 
this identification is anything but necessary for Johnson’s theological description or relational ontology.
®®* ‘Put simply’, says Torrance, ‘the argument involves projecting on to God a conception o f agency formed 
in the context and deriving from finite experience, and doing so in a manner that subsumes God under a 
category with respect to whose members certain rules must apply’ (Persons in Communion, 143-44).
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whether it is ever appropriate to speak of God in the singular, i.e. without including ‘the
world’ in every sentence!
Despite the presupposition of ontological distinction, one that Johnson believes is
inherent in the ‘negating moment’ of agnostic analogy, the integration of God with ‘the
analogical whole’ under a larger rubric blurs that distinction. As Torrance states:
If we are to project anthropomorphic models or formulas rooted in human 
experience on to the Being of God then the Transcendence and Pre-eminence of 
God that Aquinas was so eager to safeguard is put at risk. By the same form of 
reasoning we cannot ground human talk about God in a principle of the form 
‘every agent acts in a manner similar to itself where such a principle is grounded 
in a conception of the world rooted in human observations operative within that 
world. A cosmology which sees God as forming part of a whole characterised by 
such principles (and which are in turn, therefore, the product of human 
speculation) cannot do justice to the God who is deemed to be Infinite and 
Transcendent -  let alone, as traditional Thomism requires. Absolute.®®^
Johnson’s relational ontology makes her susceptible to this charge. God and
humanity are governed by the same rules as members of the category of being. This
threatens to limit divine freedom to the conditions of the finite subject. Transcendence is
further compromised if Johnson’s claim that ‘the experience of self is the concomitant
experience of God’ ultimately means that ‘God’, or that to which ‘God’ refers, is
assimilated into our own being. Either God’s transcendence is effectively denied or else
the creature is potentially deified. This not only leads down the road to pantheism -
somewhere Johnson is loathe to go because it is all-subsuming, but the concept of
analogy -  either of intrinsic attribution or proportionality -  is lost.®®® At the very least, we
®®^ Torrance, Persons in Communion, 145,
®®® In Torrance’s critique o f theological language, he reminds us that, in any case, ‘[i]t becomes 
inappropriate to think in terms o f the traditional tidy distinctions between intrinsic attribution, extrinsic 
attribution and the various forms o f analogy. There are fuzzy boundaries between terms and a semantic 
openness which must not be ignored i f  one is to avoid misinterpreting what one is doing when one engages 
in theological affirmation’. His emphasis is that theological approaches and terms should be ‘reverently a 
posteriori’ and thus have a willingness to acknowledge that, with respect to the theological uses o f its 
terms, the various contexts o f their use demand a degree of flexibility and open-endedness. The subject-
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are only speaking of our own experience on the assumption that we are agnostically 
‘naming’ the Nameless.®®'* This, again, seems to risk leading Johnson into a univocal, as 
opposed to analogical, form of God-talk. Ironically, this movement exposes the link 
between univocal predication and agnosticism.
B. Symbolic, Metaphorical God~Talk
Tillich and the Instrumentalist Use of the Symbol
In a statement that reveals the instrumentalism inherent within Catholic reformism
Rosemary Ruether boldly asserts:
Feminist theology starts with anthropology, rather than deducing male-female relations from an a 
priori definition of God. The definition o f God as patriarchal male is presumed to be a projection 
[upon God] by patriarchal males o f their own self-image and roles .,. Thus it is not ‘man’ who is 
made in God’s image, but God who is made in man’s image ... Feminist theology ... assumes that 
all o f our images o f God are human projections. ... The question is: what are worse projections 
that promote injustice and diminished humanness, and what are better projections that promote 
fuller humanness?®®®
This pattern follows that of Tillich, Kaufman and Geertz, where the adequacy of a 
religious symbol is judged according to an a priori ethic.®®® As Kaufman insists, "all 
concepts of God ..., including that of scripture and faith, must be understood as creations 
of the human imagination; the ‘real’ God is never available to us or directly knowable by
matter will then instigate the semantic shifting or ‘commandeering’ necessary to allow for objectivity in 
semantic reference. Persons in Communion, 332.
®®“* For this reason, says Francis Martin, ‘the feminist interpretation is not theology in any sense of the term 
[when read against the understanding o f the early Christians]; there is no thinldng with assent, if  assent 
means consenting to the light of revelation. It represents a capitulation to the Enlightenment refusal to 
accept any interventions o f God in this world. There is no revelation, and there is no body o f  texts that 
expresses the church’s interpretation o f  the life, death and resurrection o f Jesus Christ [as a matter o f  
faith]’. TFQ, 205.
®®® Ruether, “Christian Tradition and Feminist Hermeneutics,” 286 (emphasis added). Describing this as 
‘instrumentalist’ rather than ‘realist’ theology, Janet Soskice argues that in this approach to God-talk, 
religious symbols are second order predications pointing to a particular kind o f mediated experience and 
referring to the state of the experiencing subject, not to what is being experienced. Instrumentalist 
metaphors are ‘convenient fictions for the ordering o f  observables’, she states, rather than referring in a real 
sense to something other than the speaker. ‘By theological instrumentalists I mean those who believe that 
religious language provides a useful, even uniquely usefijl, system of symbols which is action guiding for 
the believer, but which is not to be taken as making reference to a cosmos-transcending being in the 
traditional sense. ... By theological realists I mean here those who, while aware o f the inability o f  any 
theological formulation to catch the divine realities, nonetheless accept that there are divine realities that 
the theologians, however ham-fistedly, are trying to catch.’ Metaphor and Religious Language, 120.
®®® Johnson references and cites all three in support of her method. Cf. SWI, 3-4,37,45-6,210.
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us’.®®’ In Johnson’s words, ‘Just as we know the world only through the mediation of 
imaginative constructs, the same holds true for human knowledge of God’ .®®*
Along this vein, Johnson asks, ‘what is the right way to speak about God that 
promotes co-equal human flourishing’? This, she argues, is a question of unsurpassed 
importance: ‘What is at stake is the truth about God, inseparable from the situation of 
human beings, and the identity and mission of the faith community itself.®®® In other 
words, ‘what is the right way to speak about God’ as a symbolic construction of our own 
devising that promotes our own worth and values? This, however, is theologically 
apropos, since it is ‘clear’ there has never been ‘timeless speech’ about God in the Jewish 
or Christian tradition: As cultures shift so does the ‘specificity’ of God-talk.®’® By failing 
to acknowledge this, traditional Christian theology has failed both in what it says and 
how it says it. It not only uses the wrong words but also uses them wrongly.®’*
®®’ God the Problem (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 113. Kaufman asserts that our 
choice of language for God should be based on its usefulness toward encouraging human (and nonhuman) 
flourishing. Specifically, ‘Theology also serves human purposes and needs and should be judged in terms 
of the adequacy with which it is fulfilling the objectives we humans have set for it ... all religious 
institutions, practices and ideas -  including the idea o f God -  were made to serve human needs and to 
further our humanization’. In the Face of Mystery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 28. 
See also. An Essay on Theological Method (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975), 72. For a discussion 
o f Kaufman’s anti-Realism tendencies, see Plantinga, The Twin Pillars, 16.
In Geertz’s formulation of the power o f religions to structure the world, ‘There is an interdependent relation 
between a religion’s symbol system, the moods and motivations it establishes, its concept o f the general 
order o f things, and the aura of factuality that surrounds both the moods and the concepts’. “Religion as a 
Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 90 (emphasis added). 
Garrett Green refers to this approach as ‘role-model theology’, in “The Gender o f God and the Theology o f  
Metaphor,” in Speaking the Triune God, 48.
For a specific treatment o f how Tillich’s thought has been incorporated into Catholic feminist theology, 
particularly in the work o f Ruether, Daly and Carr, see Mary Ann Stenger, “Paul Tillich and the Feminist 
Critique o f Roman Catholic Theology,” in Paul Tillich: A New Catholic Assessment, ed. Raymond F. 
Bulman and Frederick J. Parella (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 174-188; and Linda 
Moody, Women Encounter God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996).
®68 4 6  Words about God, she maintains, (6) ‘are cultural creatures’, entwined with the mores and
adventure o f the faith community that uses them.
669 4  ^ 6; “A Theological Case for God-She,” 12. Johnson echoes Pannenberg (Basic Questions in
Theology 1 [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970], 211) at this point. ‘A crucial, if  not the most basic question of 
theology is the question about the right way to speak o f God’.
®’® 5'r/,6.
®’* Reno uses this language to describe Johnson’s critique o f the tradition in “Feminist Theology”, 170.
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Johnson takes the view that Christianity is, in the end, a religious symbol system. 
She therefore claims to hold a ‘symbolic realist’ position, one that incorporates Tillich’s 
theory of religious symbols.®’^  Here there is an inseparable dialectic between symbol and 
experience based on Tillich’s understanding of correlation. Although he asserts that the 
primary correlation is the divine/human relation, or the relation between the reality of 
God as the ‘ground of being’ and human finite reality, Tillich argues for correlation as an 
expression of the relation of the ground of being and every finite reality. ‘Where the finite 
is correlated to the infinite in such a way that every finite participates in the infinite and 
everything points to the ground of being, it is natural that anything is capable of being a 
symbol of the ultimate, a medium for revelation’.®’®
Religious symbols are actually non-literal representations of a transcendent reality 
disclosed by, communicated through and experienced in them. In short, this view ‘allows 
for a transcendent reality beyond the human to which the symbols ultimately refer’.®’'* 
Tied to ‘graced’ human nature, they have an ‘unconstructed’ dynamic character through 
their ontological participation in that to which they refer (transcendent ‘being’).®’® Just as
672 «Yhe Symbolic Character,” 20. Of the three approaches summarised by Lonnie Kliever (“Alternative 
Conceptions o f  Religion as a Symbol System,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 27 (Winter, 1972): 91- 
102), Johnson defends this option over the symbolic ‘reductionism’ of Feuerbach and Freud or the 
‘formism’ o f  Cassirer, Langer, et, al. It is important to remember that these assumptions are also imbedded 
in Rahner’s symbolic ontology to a significant degree as well.
®’® Mondin, 133, citing Tillich (emphasis added).
6’4 «Yhe Symbolic Character,” 319.
®’® SWI, 46. Johnson argues that although Tillich never satisfactorily explains how the notion of symbolic 
participation works, he ‘obviously intended to indicate ontological relationship or “belonging” between the 
symbol and what it represents’ (cf. Systematic Theology, vol. 1,177; vol. 2, 9). “The Symbolic Character,” 
321. Johnson also refers to Ted Peters’ vigorous defence o f this relationship between symbol and referent, 
though she parts company with Peters when it comes to making reference too objective. “The Problem of  
Symbolic Reference,” Thomist 44 (January, 1980): 72-93. Even as Johnson refiises to objectify 
transcendent reality, says Kliever, her approach is critiqued precisely for its ‘objectivist’ bias. ‘In basing 
[religious symbols] on a transcendent reality, the symbolic realists variously argue that symbols which are 
real in their consequences must be real in their components. Real effects must follow from real causes’. But 
their claims for this transcendent reality ‘rest on appeals to privileged access or to self-confirming 
presuppositions’. “Alternative Conceptions,” 99-100. We take this up in the next section on conflicting 
appeals to experience.
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the changing experience of God is mediated ‘primordially’ through the changing history 
of oneself, so too is the changing but ‘intrinsic’ relation between the self and the symbol 
of God.®’® Hence the ‘nature of symbols for divine mystery’ is ‘rather plastic’. There is no 
direct one-to-one correspondence or direct reference involved between a symbol and 
what it signifies.®”
‘Tillichian’ symbolism in its many forms shares certain commonalities with 
Thomistic analogy. God is the ground of being in which everything participates; nothing 
is identical with God so there can be only symbolic manifestations from finite reality 
which supposedly only God can actively turn into actual religious symbols. However, 
they are two different interpretations of theological language, despite Tillich’s claim that 
his theory means “‘exactly what St. Thomas means with analogia e n t i s When Tillich 
says that everything can (and can only) be predicated of God symbolically, this does not 
mean analogically, Aquinas contends that in analogy some names are predicated literally, 
some symbolically, and some neither way. In analogy, a kind of ‘literalness’ is also 
preserved in the names of God by distinguishing between the mode (creaturely) and the 
thing signified (predicated ‘literally’), attempting to uphold transcendent distinction.®’®
^®S%% 65, 67.
®”  “The Symbolic Character,” 322.
®’  ^ Mondin believes that part o f this identification is due to Tillich’s indiscriminate and equivalent use of 
the terms ‘metaphorical’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘analogical’ in his theory. Mondin, 144. In his essay “Symbol and 
Analogy: Tillich and Thomas,” in Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, ed. Thomas F. O’Meara and Donald M. 
Weisser (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1969), 228, George McLean reaches the same conclusion 
regarding Tillich’s equating symbol with analogy and symbolic participation with Aquinas’s analogia 
entis. Tillich equates analogy with symbolic language through the use o f his principle of correlation, 
arguing that anything is capable o f being a symbol or medium of revelation. Without the principle of 
intrinsic attribution, however, which limits proper analogies for God, the thing signified (God) and the 
mode (human being and language) become intermingled, thus breaking down the God-world distinction. 
Mondin argues that correlation denies the infinite distance between God and man by making them 
interdependent, such that Tillich is unable to safeguard God’s transcendence. Mondin, 127-132.
®’® Soskice also speaks of the literalness o f  analogy which she says is not concerned, as metaphor is, with 
expanding descriptive powers: ‘Analogy as a linguistic devise deals with language that has been stretched
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In what seems a rather loose amalgamation of these two systems, Johnson claims 
to follow Tillich’s view of religious symbols by asserting first, that they participate in and 
point to "something beyond themselves’ which at the same time ‘cannot be objectified', 
and second (under the influence of Rahner), that they open up two levels of reality -  
ultimate transcendence and the transcendental depths of our self-awareness which would 
otherwise remain closed.^^^ Tillich, however, actually claims to move away from such 
wholly subjective ‘negative’ theories like Johnson’s.®** Maintaining that true symbols 
‘function’ in two ways, Tillich asserts an essential relation in the symbol to both its 
subjective reference and its objective reference. Symbols operate subjectively by opening 
up levels of human interiority. They also operate objectively by opening up levels of 
objective reality otherwise ‘hidden’. In this way symbols involve a subjective relationship 
to the ‘user’ (or constructor) and they ‘participate’ in the ‘object’ to which they refer.®*^
Although Tillich maintains that religious symbols require this kind of correlation, 
a definite one-sidedness comes into play when determining the ‘truth’ or ‘adequacy’ of 
the symbol. Suddenly the objective reference disappears and the criterion for the ‘truth’ 
of the symbol is solely its subjective acceptance by the finite subject. The objective 
correlation is entirely disregarded in favour of the subjective. If the symbol is ‘accepted’
to fit new applications ... without generating for the native speaker any imaginative strain’. Metaphor and 
Religious Language, 66, 64.
680 «jjjg Symbolic Character,” 321. Does this mean that the ‘graced Spirit’ only brings us to awareness of 
that which we are and what is beyond us via symbols? Though this understanding is culled primarily from 
Tillich and Ricoeur, Rahner’s influence is also clear. Johnson draws from several o f Tillich’s works, 
including Systematic Theology, vols. 1-3; “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” and “Uie 
Religious Symbol,” in Sidney Hook, ed.. Religious Experience and Truth (New York: New York 
University Press, 1961), 3-11 and 301-321. Also Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics o f Symbols and 
Philosophical Keüecûon,” International Philosophical Quarterly! (1962): 191-218; The Symbolism of Evil 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 347-57; and Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Siuplus of Meaning, 
(Fort Worth: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976).
®** I am indebted to Mondin’s analysis o f Tillicfr See The Principle of Analogy, 118-146.
®*^  Mondin, The Principle of Analogy, 125.
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by the subject, it is deemed ‘alive’ and ‘true’; if ‘rejected’, it is ‘dead’ and ‘false’.®*® In 
Johnson’s words, ‘truth’ is tested by the extent to which the current ‘idea of God’ and its 
symbolic expression takes account of ‘accessible reality’ and integrates ‘experience’ into 
itself. ‘If the idea of God does not keep pace with developing reality, the power of 
experience pulls people on and the god dies, fading from memory’.®*'* As Ruether asserts, 
‘if a symbol does not speak authentically to experience, it becomes dead or must be 
altered to provide a new meaning’.®*®
In a sense, then, Johnson, Ruether and their colleagues do in fact incorporate 
Tillich’s actual theory, despite his defense of an objective ‘referent’. That incorporation, 
however, is the problem. On the one hand, Johnson argues ‘transcendentally’ that the 
symbol’s own inner structure ‘guides’ interpretations in specific directions by pointing to 
something identifiable as ‘valid’ or ‘true’ (i.e., whose reality content derives from and 
points to one thing and not another).®*® On the other hand, the privatised subjectivity of
®*® Mondin points out that it is actually meaningless to speak of ‘dead’ symbols if  one follows Tillich’s 
theory faithfiilly. False symbols may fail the adequacy test -  which technically should mean they fail to 
open up the subjective dimension that corresponds to the reality o f their objective reference -  but they are 
still ‘alive’. ‘Dead’ symbols aren’t symbols at all. Furthermore, Tillich’s original theory does not even 
consider this a viable test for symbols, which, unlike signs, are non-arbitrary. The Principle of Analogy, 
122,125-27.
®*“* SWI, 15-16. Johnson regularly echoes Ruether’s repristination of Tillich at this point in rejecting 
Christian symbols as patriarchal. And with it a Schleiermacherian line of thought in regard to revelation: 
‘We must postulate that every great religious idea begins in the revelatory experience. By revelatory we 
mean breakthrough experiences beyond ordinary fragmented consciousness that provide interpretive 
symbols illuminating the means o f the whole o f life’. Such revelation always starts with a breakthrough in 
an individual consciousness and is mediated to and embraced by the collective consciousness o f the 
community. Ruether claims that a religious tradition remains vital so long as its ‘revelatory’ symbolic 
pattern can be generationally reproduced and continues to speak effectively and redemptively into the 
present individual and collective experience. Using the criterion o f ‘subjective acceptance’, women judge 
the ‘truth’ or vitality o f the tradition. Sexism and God-Talk, 12,13.
®*® SWI, 12-13. Tillich contradictorily claims that it is not the task o f theology ‘to create religious symbols’ 
(which should actually be impossible i f  they have a necessary character deriving from their objective 
referent), nor ‘disregard traditional Christian symbols’, while simultaneously arguing that symbols are 
“‘creations o f the human mind’” or “‘created ... by the collective unconscious.’” Systematic Theology I, 
240. This contradiction carries through in Johnson’s approach. See, e.g., “The Symbolic Character,” 321.
6*6 4-7 Witliout some level o f objectivity, she could neither identify the direction being taken nor the
right ‘destination’.
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the symbol, Its pliability, even its ‘extinction’ implies that the ‘thing’ to which it points 
has no objective reality or distinct self-definition apart from the subject or from a 
function designated by the subject,®*® Its ‘reality’ is based on its meaningfulness to the 
human subject rather on any reality inherent in the thing itself. If, as Johnson asserts, this
Iincludes symbols for God, then God has no inherent, ‘objective’ reality, and language for j
God has no ‘public’ meaning. Knowledge of and language for God all comes down to the
‘private’ source and criteria of the human subject. This, as has been argued from the IIbeginning, is illogical and invalid. (Even the above sentence implies that we are engaged j
in the same ‘language game’ at some level to have this debate.) |
At this stage, we simply ask how, by this method, Johnson can claim that her !
‘symbol’ for ‘God’ (or rather the God-world relation) maintains the asymmetrical j
distinction and freedom she deems necessary to fit the ‘contours of the Christian faith’? ;
Ï
i
McFague’s Influence j
A basic agnosticism and protectionism can be found in McFague’s ‘metaphorical’ |
approach, aspects of which Johnson wholeheartedly endorses and incorporates.®** Like j
Johnson, McFague argues that one’s awareness of ‘being’ requires a ‘symbolical I
!sensibility’ regarding cosmic interconnectedness. Worldly beings are analogously related I
to divine Being-Itself in ‘a silent ontological web’.®*® This silence is so profound, j
®*® Mary Ann Stenger notes that Catholic feminists are quick to absorb Tillich’s critique o f ‘idolatrous’ 
(exclusive, literalised) symbols but not so quick in holding to his understanding of the essentially 
paradoxical nature o f the symbol; that as ‘reality’ it manifests the ‘ultimate’ without being the ‘ultimate’. 
“Paul Tillich and the Feminist Critique,” 175. Mondin notes that the danger of symbols is not an 
identification o f the symbolic meaning with the symbolic material, ‘but with a misplacement of the 
symbolic meaning either by putting a symbolic meaning where there is none or by attributing to an object a 
symbolic meaning different from the one it has’, e.g. the adoration of Moses (or, we would argue, the 
adoration/reification o f ‘Sophia’). Mondin, 142-43.
®** McFague describes her ‘metaphorical’ approach as ‘the creative activity o f  the human imagination 
seeking to provide more adequate orientation for human life, essentially by way o f the act o f imaginative 
construction’.
®*® McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 6 (emphasis added).
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however, that McFague describes her metaphorical approach as ‘precisely the refusal to 
identify human constructions with divine reality’.®®® This is not to say that the ‘real’ god 
does not exist or is not like our constructs; it is to emphasise that our only access to 
knowledge of God is limited to metaphorical thought and speech.®®* Only our reflection 
on metaphor or story provides the epistemological and methodological foundations for 
‘processive’, ‘tentative’ knowledge of God. ‘[H]ow language, any language, applies to 
God we do not know, what religious and theological language is at most is metaphorical 
forays attempting to express experiences of relating to God’.®®® The meaning and 
meaningfulness of the metaphor is its proven effectiveness, i.e., its ability to ‘function’ as 
a tool of persuasion or ready assimilation into the ‘Christian’ consciousness.
McFague does something similar to Johnson’s use of the via analogia against the 
backdrop of transcendent unknowability to create multiple possibilities for naming God. 
She contends that metaphor consists in both the assertion and the denial of a proposition, 
thus creating innumerable possibilities of meaning in the tension between the two.®®* 
Thus, no metaphor can be excluded from consideration. Her instrumentalist-projectionist 
approach is explicit: ‘We are not dealing, on the one hand, with ‘reality as it is’ and, on 
the other, with views of it, but solely with the latter’.®®'* In other words, our language is 
not descriptive of what is. Rather, we are dealing with the innumerable perceptions and
®®® McFague, Models of God, 22.
®®* Like Johnson, McFague argues that such constructions speak not of God but o f ‘God concepts’. At its 
core, says McFague, theology is ‘mostly fiction: it is the elaboration o f key metaphors and models’. It’s just 
that ‘some fictions are better than others’. Though she has not ‘found it possible as a contemporary 
Christian to support an incamational christology or a canonical Scripture’, she nevertheless maintains that 
her approach is both Christian and contemporary, though ‘surely, not the only contemporary or Christian 
way’. Models of God, xii, viii. For an on-point critique o f McFague’s understanding o f ‘Christian criteria’ 
and her linguistic approach, see Colin Gunton, “Proteus and Procrustes: A Study in the Dialectic o f  
Language in Disagreement with Sallie McFague,” in Speaking the Christian God (see n. 636) 65-80.
Models of God, 39.
®®* Gunton, “Proteus and Procrustes,” 65.
Metaphorical Theology, 134.
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interpretations of innumerable thinking subjects rather than the revealing object, or in the 
case of God, the revealing Subject.
McFague considers her approach to use from both traditional analogy and the 
metaphysical principle of ‘interrelationality’. She assumes that God is dependent upon 
and intrinsically related to the world. (The doctrine of the Trinity simply gives dogmatic 
status to this inherent relational principle.)®®® Thus, the ‘truest’ conceptions we can image 
to speak of God are images of relationships. What God is apart from them, ‘we do not 
know’.®®® Though ‘we do not know God’s “nature,”’ our images of God refer to ‘the 
power with whom we are aware of being in relationship’.®®® In short, we are somehow ‘in 
relation with’ as well as ‘related to’ a metaphysical concept (‘God’) through the symbols 
or metaphors we construct to express our relational experience. Whereas we do not know 
the divine reality of which we speak, we do know the symbol of our relational 
experience. Thus the metaphor ‘refers’ to our relational awareness or to our
Models of God, \\2A 3. |
Models of God, 166. In Metaphorical Theology, McFague ties Luther’s insistence that we can only know |
God pro nobis and not dens absconditus to Tillich’s distinction between the symbol ‘God’ and God as 1
‘Being-Itself: ‘the former is the God in relationship to us to whom our images refer, while the latter is |
beyond our knowing’ (96-97). !
®®® Metaphorical Theology, 97. Responding to the critique o f  arbitrariness regarding her metaphors o f !
loving relationships ‘m God’ (‘are these loves descriptive of God as God isT), McFague presses the |
ontological point: ‘[I]t seems to me to be a Christian is to be persuaded that there is a personal, gracious I
power who is on the side o f life and its fulfillment, a power whom the paradigmatic figure o f Jesus of ;
Nazareth expresses and illuminates; but when we try to say something more, we turn, necessarily, to the j
“loves” we kuow {unless one is a Barthian and believes that God defines love and that all human love only !
conforms to the divine pattern) ... I do not know who God is, but I find some models better than others for !
constructing an image o f God commensurate with my trust in God as on the side o f  life. God is and remains |
a mystery’ {Models of God, 192n37, emphasis added).
McFague argues that her view is not pantheistic because God is not reduced to that which we speak o f ,
metaphorically but is always ‘more’. She does not explain, however, what ‘persuades’ her to trust that !
‘God’ is a personal power ‘on the side o f life’ nor why, as such, God cannot define love accordingly. As |
Daphne Hampson aptly states: ‘[W]hen all is said and done it is unclear to me whether in fact [McFague] is i
speaking o f  God, or rather an attitude o f life’ {Theology and Feminism, 158, 170). Uiis tendency, and ;
McFague’s denial o f the particularity o f Christ, leads Hampson to ask why McFague calls herself a |
Christian rather than simply a humanist or whether (like Ruether) she is even a theist. Evangelicals Ray I
Anderson, Colin Gunton and Leslie Zeigler raise the same conclusions and questions in each o f their essays i
found in Speaking the Christian God (see n. 636). !
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cognitive/intuitive ideal of human and cosmic relationships. McFague is concerned to 
choose relational metaphors that speak of God and the world reflect a mutual valuing and 
need for love in order to value the world properly. ‘We need to feel that value [that God 
needs a lover] in the marrow of our bones if we are to have the will to work with the 
divine lover toward including all the beloved in the circle of valuing love’ and ‘attaining 
an ecologically balanced, nuclear free planet.®®*
Paul Molnar critiques trends in contemporary theology regarding the role of 
experience and the locus of Trinitarian theology. In so doing, he looks specifically at the 
influence that McFague (and Kaufinan) have on Johnson. Molnar believes that McFague 
makes it impossible to speak of the immanent Trinity and thus reduces speech about God 
to our human attempt to give meaning to our existence using theological categories. Since 
all that can be known is our experience, our supposed knowledge of God is simply 
protectionism (something McFague would probably not deny). This, in Molnar’s view, 
leads McFague ‘directly to the pantheism, modalism and dualism that mark her 
reflections’.®®® He finds this same trend in Johnson’s Trinitarian thought. She has an 
abstracted understanding of God, grounded neither in the immanent nor economic Trinity 
but in a general concept of relationality explicitly grounded in experience. In the end, 
says Molnar, ‘it is the creature who defines the creator based on experiences of suffering 
within history.... It goes without saying that whenever God’s relations to the world are 
thought to belong to his essence, then his creative function has absorbed his essence in
®®* Models o f God, 133.
699 « Purpose o f the Doctrine o f  the Immanent Trinity,” 7.
237
typically Cartesian fashion. Pantheism implies that God cannot exist without the world. 
Johnson’s position clearly bears that out’.®®®
This is the difficulty that Johnson continually faces in her project -  to hold to a 
panentheism that does not ultimately result in pantheism. With it is the increasing 
difficulty of keeping her God-talk from being merely univocal and projectionistic. When 
language for God is used instrumentally -  to serve an idealistic purpose ~ its meaning is 
in one sense already ‘in play’ (which is why it ‘functions’). The term is recognisable as 
representing a human ideal Johnson argues, however, that if we change the symbolic 
God-talk of a community to reflect a ‘new truth’ (a different set of values) the community 
will change: ‘Neither effect can be addressed in isolation ... Structural change and 
linguistic change go hand-in-hand’.®®* Where does meaning for the ‘Trinity’ come from in 
this case? How is this not ultimately univocal?
Colin Gunton describes the perils of McFague’s ‘Protean’ view of language -  
those of projection and a weakening of criterion and control. Though this kind of 
metaphorical speech is capable of describing aspects of the scientific realm,®®® when it
700 Purpose o f the Doctrine o f the Immanent Trinity,” 25.
®®* SWI, 40.
®°® ‘A word is used, as a metaphor, to refer. It then comes in time to refer literally to the same phenomenon, 
after which it takes on new metaphorical meaning when transferred to a new reference’ (Gunton, "Proteus 
and Procrustes,” 72). Gunton may have in mind Soskice’s critical realist argument. She maintains that 
metaphors are not reality producing but reality-depicting. Comparing the use o f metaphors in scientific 
language, she argues that to make sense o f the way that metaphors do fimction, we must assume that they 
do refer and provide us access to ‘powers and structures’, ‘real entities, relations, and states o f affairs’ that 
exist independently o f  us. Even if  such metaphors are never open to direct observation or if  they do not 
provide direct or inexhaustible description (remaining ‘transcendent’), those who use them still assume that 
they provide epistemic access to the real world: ‘Scientific explanation, even in its reliance on models and 
analogues, is considered reality depicting’. In terms o f reference, Soskice also considers the contextual 
speaker as an essential element, since ultimately it is not words that refer but speakers o f  those words, who 
understand their sense or meaning within a communal, historical context. With this in mind, she says, ‘The 
meaning o f  terms in a language, or as we prefer, their sense, does have a part to play at one level of 
reference, but at another, reference is determined by speakers in contexts o f use, and not simply by 
individual speakers but by communities o f speakers whose language provides them access to the states and 
relations that are of interest to them. Reference, then, o f the kind that interests us is social and is concerned 
with access. Senses o f terms are important not so much for determining references as for guiding access’.
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comes to theological speech, Gunton observes that a naïve idealism and agnosticism 
prevail. Similar to the way Johnson believes the Triune symbol has the capacity to make 
God’s absolute unknowability ‘knowable’, McFague speaks of metaphors making ‘the 
unintelligible intelligible’. In turn, Gunton asks, just what does McFague mean? Is it that 
by the metaphor we make intelligible that which is intrinsically and essentially 
unintelligible? Surely not, for this is logically impossible, as the case with Johnson’s 
argument.
On the other hand, if she is speaking metaphorically in a way similar to the 
sciences, then, if we hold to the belief that science involves discovery and provides 
metaphors that are a ‘genuine but partial reflection o f  its reality''^^ ,^ does this not require 
at least some form of knowledge of what is, however inadequately it is expressed through 
language? ‘Always’, says Gunton, ‘the distinction between critical realism and 
projectionism or constructionism is the question of God -  namely, whether we are 
concerned with the articulation of the intrinsic intelligibility of the God who names and 
makes himself known in specific forms of relatedness to us, or simply with a less definite 
matter of naming God through certain experiences of self-reflection taken to be |
normative’.®®'* j
McFague and Johnson contend that we live in a relational universe as a network |
of particularities in dynamic interrelation that is contingent, marked by rich plurality, but j
is nevertheless is a unity. But, says Gunton, this view is no support for a relativist theory î
i
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  j
Soskice draws the connection to theological language. The realist, she maintains, ‘can coherently claim that \
his language is referential or, as we prefer, reality depicting, without claim to definitive knowledge’
{Metaphor and Religious Language, 120, 132). Torrance critiques this ‘world-transcendent’, ‘visual’
approach as falsifying the relationship between language and the world by undermining the essence of i
language ‘as an indwelt tool’ {Persons in Communion, 347-349).
®®* Metaphorical Theology, 99 (emphasis added). s
®®'* Gunton, ‘‘Proteus and Procrustes,” 66-67. |
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of knowledge; in fact it is quite the reverse. To believe that we can say what we like as 
long as it expresses our ‘relation’ to that of which we have no true knowledge comes, he 
notes, from a dualistic view that in some way makes an absolute or near-absolute 
distinction between the unity-in-relatedness of reality and the apparently irreducible and 
incurable pluralism of the human response to it.®®®
Ultimately, these feminist theologians depend upon a distinction not between the 
ways in which words are used but between ways in which they are related to their objects 
of reference. This comes clearly into focus at the point of feminist rhetoric about 
traditional theological language. What Johnson and McFague argue against is ‘literal’ 
imagery in favour of metaphorical (or analogical, symbolic, etc.) imagery, where ‘literal’ 
equals ‘picturing’ and metaphor or ‘analogy’ is more allusive and indirect. Gunton 
elucidates:
McFague’s trading upon a mistaken conception o f the distinction between the literal and the 
metaphorical generates an unbalanced view of the relation between language and reality. The 
stages of the argument are basically as follows: 1. We interpret our world metaphorically. 2. 
Metaphor, in contrast to literal language, does not attempt to picture reality directly. 3. Therefore, 
metaphor is a form o f indirect characterization of a kind that does not really speak o f reality at all. 
Accordingly the way is open to project onto the deity any forms o f relationality o f which we 
happen to approve.®®®
If Johnson also makes this loose association between metaphor and ‘divine 
reality’, then, given her agnosticism, one is left wondering why (or how) she either would 
or could ‘make ontological claims and draw references about the way things truly are’ 
and/or write a treatise concerning ‘the right way to talk about God’.
®®® Gunton, “Proteus and Procrustes,” 70. 
®°® “Proteus and Procrustes,” 73.
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il. Addressing the Probiem of Distinction: irigaray in Conversation with 
Barth and Johnson
A. Loss o f the ‘Other’ and God-Talk as Projection: Irigaray and Barth
Given that problems that Barth raised concerning the oppressive potential of 
theology based on human experience and dominating philosophical principles, it is 
intriguing that some of these same methodological concerns are now being raised from 
within the feminist community itself. Despite Johnson’s claim to have moved beyond 
Barth in her modern anthropological approach, postmodern and post-structuralist 
feminists in particular echo Barth’s concerns regarding the controlling effects of 
universal principles to make claims for women or their experience. Serene Jones’s essay 
on French feminist post-structuralist and psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray and Barth 
addresses this issue directly.®®® According to Jones, Irigaray and Barth share two common 
traits: First, they both reject universal philosophical principles and controlling conceptual 
systems; second, they both constructively attempt to secure the ‘identity in difference’ of 
‘the other’. The ‘other’ for Irigaray is ‘woman’; for Barth it is God, Each essentially 
argues that the systematic logic of philosophy -  or any totalising cultural framework -  
excludes the possibility of admitting true difference. This is particularly the case when 
trying to identify subjects that are ‘asymmetrical to’ or ‘incommensurable with’ the 
subject in control o f the principles at work in the system.
Ultimately, they both agree with Feuerbach; in this system modern theological 
language speaks only of humanity as a projection of itself. ‘God’ is merely ‘the mirror of
70® ( c p h i s  God Which is Not One: Irigaray and Barth on the Divine,” in Transfigurations: Theology and the 
French Feminists, ed. C. W. Maggie Kim, Susan M. St. Ville and Susan M. Simonatis (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1993), 109-141. While acknowledging that Barth and Irigaray would reject each other’s 
underlying assumptions and conclusions, Jones nevertheless makes a compelling case for comparing and 
contrasting their thought.
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man’.®®* In this way Irigaray and Barth share in the same indirect critique of Catholic 
reformist theology -  that as a modern enterprise it inevitably undermines its own ethical 
project by falling prey to the same dominating methodology, having merely changed the 
subject and value content. Our focus will stay on Irigaray for the moment.
Jones first compares Irigaray’s critique of the ‘phallocentricism’ of Western 
philosophical thought and its ‘logic of the same’ with Barth’s critique of liberal or natural 
theology and its subjective narcissism. Irigaray critiques the universal assumptions of 
historical. Western, philosophical thought (specifically its ‘texts’) which have tended 
toward a ‘logic’ or ‘story of the same’. She believes this to be the male quest for identity 
(as the controllers of thought and text). All conceptual systems (axioms, ontologies, 
cosmologies, and epistemologies) revolve around a central, a priori ruling principle that 
consumes all ambiguities or bends them toward its ‘center’.®®®
Philosophers attempt to achieve identity by placing the central principle in 
relation to its binary opposite. This way definition is marked off by developing 
boundaries to separate the conceptual space of the given identity by that of the non­
identity or negativity around it -  the ‘other’.®*® Irigaray calls this way of conferring 
identity ‘the play of difference’. In this process, the ‘difference’ of the binary opposite is 
only a negative reflection o f ‘the one’: ‘The “other” or the “opposite” finds its being or 
nonbeing, its shape and form, its meaning and function conferred only to the degree that 
it either mirrors back the attributes of the center or, in its negativity, provides the center
®®* Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 
63. ‘Man ... projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected 
image o f himself thus converted into a subject’. As Garrett Green has also noted, the irony o f Eliot’s 
(female) rendering aîMensch (human being) as ‘Man’ would not be lost on Irigaray or feminists in general. 
See “The Gender of God and the Theology o f Metaphor,” in Speaking the Christian God (see n. 636) 47n3. 
®®® Irigaray describes this as a ‘proclivity for monadic totalization’. Jones, “This God,” 113.
®*® Jones, “This God,” 113.
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with the edge that marks its own defining contours’.®** In this economy of relations, 
woman is the opposite ‘other’ to the degree that she plays the role of the ‘mirror’ that 
confers man’s identity (or that of the central principle) by reflecting him back upon 
himself. In other words, the woman becomes a reference point not in her objective 
difference but in her existential demarcation of what is not the man as a matter of his own 
self-definition and self-limit. The identity of woman, or God, can never be rendered as 
anything other than that of ‘man’.®*®
Shifting to a model of psychoanalytic embodiment, she explains that women are 
only different to the degree that their ‘otherness’ serves the male phallus, or the central 
“phallocentric” principle. She generates and validates male identity and systems through 
her own lack of central identity as the ‘systematic servant’ to his sexuality. Her difference 
is not only suppressed but its possibility is annihilated. Man will never be the ‘other’ who 
serves the development of her self-identity or sexuality. If and when her identity is 
construed as more than just a ‘little man’, it is as the regenerative ‘mother’ whose 
difference generates his identity. In each of these roles, woman has no autonomous self- 
identity but exists in the realm of ‘non-being’ as a necessary reference point for male 
being.®**
What is really happening in this process, claims Irigaray, is an obsession with the 
identity of ‘the one’ driven by a ‘logic of the same’. In essence, this process eliminates 
the possibility for true difference. In short, when the identity quest is combined with a 
proclivity to subsume all things under a central principle (‘monadic totalization’).
®** Jones, “This God,” 114.
®*® Jones, “This God,” 128. This repression o f female identity in God is intentionally aimed at hiding 
women’s generative power ‘as the ground or body in which divinity originates’ (122, emphasis added).
®** She is subsumed under the logic o f ‘the same’, exiled to the ‘blind spot’ o f symmetry in Western 
historical thought. Jones, “This God,” 115-116.
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difference is suppressed, because all elements of the system only come to identity insofar 
as they mimic the ‘primal identity’ of the a priori ‘master’. Difference in this system, 
argues Irigaray, is not real', in other words, it does not belong essentially to the ‘other’.
Also, this system assumes God to be passive, just like the woman.®*'* God has no 
identity independent of man. God is merely ‘an imagined screen against which man 
projects his own identity and thereby secures the perimeters of his own subjectivity’.^ ^^  
Thus, Irigaray agrees with Feuerbach -  and Barth -  that God-talk is merely self­
projection onto what we believe connotes ‘the divine’.
Contrary to Irigaray, however, Barth does not consider it improper for a 
conceptual ‘system’ to determine the identity and freedom of the ‘elements’ within it. In 
other words, the subject matter should control the discipline. Where Barth is absolutely 
immoveable is in his contention that this holds true for theology as well. And the Subject 
of theology is God. The formal and material content, the ‘rules’, the organising and 
governing criteria, are given by God in God’s Self-gift of the Incarnation. If any other 
system is used to determine the identity and nature of God, then the system would try -  
improperly and impossibly -  to subsume God as one of the elements within that system. 
The identity attributed to God would be one that drew its defining borders from rules that 
were inappropriate to its subject matter -  namely, God himself. The logic internal to the 
system would govern the analysis, but the procedural rules would not properly be 
governed by the subject matter. In Jones’ summary, ‘When this occurs, the distinct 
identity of God as the self-generating, self-motivated subject is repressed and replaced by
®*'* Irigaray relies on the negative dualisms (spirit-nature, male-female) inherent in the philosophical 
systems she rejects to make this comparison.
®*® Jones, “This Qod,’T23.
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an identity appropriate to the systematic mastery of the found and yet foreign conceptual 
scheme’.’’®
For Barth, the truth of the gospel is self-authenticating and self-involving for 
those to whom it manifests itself. They cannot deny it once they have encountered it. 
They can only point others to it in the hope that they too may see, and hear, and obey, and 
thus enter into the community of faith, living life in accordance with the gospel. The 
gospel does not commend itself to some inherent sense of truth and goodness in humans. 
Rather, it is received as scandal, a word that contradicts accepted norms and mores. Barth 
insists, however, that the gospel is not scandalous to some supposed ‘human reason’. 
That is an abstract fiction. ‘Rather we are dealing with a clash between the faith 
commitments of the Christian community and those of other communities as they find 
articulation in contextually normative canons of rationality and credibility. It is unbelief 
to which the gospel is a scandal; a commitment to other truths, other gospels, other 
gods’.’” Once this is seen, then it becomes clear how ridiculous it is to seek to afford the 
gospel warrant by appealing to prior canons of acceptability.
Barth specifically argued that by taking human experience as the starting point of 
theological reflection, God’s identity is circumscribed by a conceptuality that originates 
from somewhere other than God’s own self. If theology starts with subjective human 
introspection, the divine Word is nothing more than human self-talk. It is Feuerbach’s 
projection of human desire falsely inscribed on a lifeless ‘divine screen’ ruled, in
” ® Jones, “This God,”127.
’”  Hart, “Truth, the Trinity and Pluralism,” in Regarding Karl Barth (see n. 235) 131-32.
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Irigaray’s terms, by a ‘logic of mimicry’. God mirrors back the narcissistic gaze of the 
philosopher/theologian.” ®
For both Barth and Irigaray, what is essential is recognition of the 
‘incommensurable difference of the other’.’” Of course, who they recognise as the 
primary ‘other’ -  God for Barth, and ‘woman’ for Irigaray -  affects every aspect of their 
thought. Irigaray contends that the violence of the philosophical game of universalising 
women’s experience costs women their voices, their individual agency and their very 
identities as incommensurable ‘others’. Barth, on the other hand, saw that the violence 
can cost lives -  paid for at the expense of the truth of gospel. When projected ideology is 
universalised and used oppressively in the name of theology -  to destroy Jews or blacks 
or women, etc.- the reality behind the violence is that the identity of God -  the 
incommensurable Other -  is obscured. The Word has been falsely spoken. This is the 
ultimate idolatry and the imprint of human fallenness.’^ ® Moreover, without knowledge of 
the One who loves in freedom, the creature cannot know itself as loved and embraced in 
non-coercive communion.
B. Otherness, Projection and the Question o f Distinction: Irigaray and Johnson
Irigaray’s pragmatic goal as a feminist is to influence the emergence of new 
ethical and socio-political systems that recognise and promote women’s difference in 
terms other than gender polarity. While she believes that language plays a constitutive 
role in the construction of the human subject, she also acknowledges that she can neither
Jones, “This God,’T28. This process also involves ‘blind spots’, explains Jones. To render its own 
subjective reflections divine, liberal theology represses or hides ‘by sleight o f hand’ its own projective 
moment, ‘In doing so, it falsely attributes an objective otherness to a divinity that in fact wears the face o f  
its generative subject, “man.”’
’”  Jones, “This God,”129.
Jones, “This God,” 129.
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jump out of her historical, discursive context nor its logic. To do so would be tantamount 
to jumping out of language itself.’ ’^ Thus, if she cannot leave ‘the game’, as it were, her 
solution is to ‘change the rules’. She wants to disrupt the system by using her own 
‘constructive ontology’. This ontological orientation will ‘create space’ for women to 
carve out their own identity. Interestingly, this process of identity formation has a 
religious component.
First, Irigaray posits a different ‘story’ in the form of an alternative morphology 
derived from the female body. In her rhetorical strategy, women’s bodily experience 
serves as the metaphor for their differential self-knowledge. Difference and ‘otherness’ is 
first contrasted anatomically and then in terms of the notion of the self. To ‘throw a 
spanner’ in the phallocentric system, she goes on to describe women’s essential 
relationality and self-identity in terms of sexual pleasure. Whereas the man needs an 
external other to ‘touch’ himself, woman ‘touches herself all the time without mediation 
(the ‘two-lips’ of her vulva in continual contact). She embodies her own alterity: ‘She is 
indefinitely other within herself.’^ '’
In short, in Irigaray’s ‘logic of the other’, women establish an internally self-related 
identity. Paradoxically, rather than establishing true otherness through an ontology of 
relation, Irigaray’s female ‘other’ defines herself from herself -  self-referentially -  rather
Irigaray criticises Mary Daly and Hélène Cixous for ignoring this fact in their idealised critical stance. j
Jones, “This God,” 117. Johnson, on the other hand, fails to account for the fact that the system she |
condemns is the same one in which women have experienced ‘ideal’ relationality. If the construction o f the }
morally excellent ‘female way’ is inextricably bound to its social context, it is highly ironic that the j
‘context’ out o f which ‘the ideal’ has emerged is ‘hopelessly patriarchal and androcentric’. |
Both Johnson and Irigaray are criticised by other feminists for the essentialism inherent in their |
‘ontological’ constructions. But, says, Jones, even the most pragmatic approaches recognise that Irigaray I
must ‘run the risk o f essentialism’, if  only ‘momentarily’, in order to argue for women’s real identity as j
essentially and physically distinct from men. Jones, “This God,” 120. ]
Women’s bodies are the source o f jouissance -  their pre-Oedipal, pre-Symbolic innocence and thus |
unrepressed and authentic gender identity. Graham, Making the Difference, 175-78. j
Jones, “This God,” 119, citing Irigaray from. This Sex Which is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: "
Cornell University Press, 1985), 15-16.
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—than in external relation to ‘the one’ as an other/^^ The female self doesn’t need an 
objective other.’^ ® ‘Woman’ can inherently be both the relational subject and object.
Second, Irigaray develops an image of God that reflects this idealised self-in-self- 
relation.^^^ She summarily rejects the Christian ‘notion’ of God as a primary example of 
the male ‘logic of the same’. Nevertheless, she believes that ‘religion’ plays a critical role 
in the construction of women’s cultural identity. She draws freely upon Feuerbach and 
Levinas at this point, assuming their assessment of religion to be correct, but in a positive 
sense. Religious discourse is merely projection. However, it represents the process 
whereby humans project an ideal self or subject into the future as that goal toward which 
they move in the dialectic of becoming. The ‘conceptual system’ of religion is even 
necessary, because it provides ‘the discursive horizon of being’ within which humans 
give shape to their identity and are drawn ‘into the infinite plane of the future’.™ God 
functions as the ‘other’ or ‘the form of alterity’ which both constitutes and affirms the 
human.’^^  Women ultimately need the idea of ‘God’ to communicate with each other and
™ Jones, “This God,” 115-119.
’ ®^ It is not within the limits o f this thesis to engage in an extended critique o f Irigaray’s morphology 
(which Jones does more than adequately!). Let it be sufficient to state that her description o f women as 
intimately ‘self-related’ is hardly ‘disruptive’ o f  the ‘logic of the same’. Rather, it seems to perpetuate it in 
a different form. In her new configuration o f the ‘self-other’ relation, Irigaray seems to present an extreme 
sublimation o f distinct ‘otherness’. As she wrestles with the possibility o f ‘knowing’ the female self from a 
different story than that o f historical ‘sameness’, she arguably perpetuates divine-human ‘sameness’, 
consuming and bending everything to the ‘female’ centre, frigaray eliminates the basic need for a distinct 
‘other’ ^  a relational ‘partner’ -  that which constitutes true human relation and personhood.
Jones, “This God,” 125.
™ Jones, “This God,” 124.
™ Jones, “This God,” 124. We are reminded again o f Martin’s comment regarding this ultimate irony of 
feminism which considers any form o f passivity to be the same as inertia; that it treats God as the totally 
passive object o f our intellectual and moral strivings. ‘God does nothing, he is merely sought or 
interpreted’. TFQ, 263.
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to ‘become’.™ In a voice reminiscent of Schleiermacher, Ruether and Johnson, Irigaray 
states:
Only a God can save us [from division and tearing apart] ... The feeling or experience o f a 
positive, objective and glorious existence for our subjectivity is necessary for us. Such a God who 
helps and guides us in our becoming, who holds the measure o f our limits ... shows the 
way....God holds no obligation over our needs except to become. No task, no obligation burdens 
us except that one: become divine, become perfect, don’t let any part o f us be amputated that could 
be expansive for us.’ ’^
In the end, Irigaray’s self-projection of God ends up looking like her arguably 
unitary ideal ‘woman’ -  the ‘subject in relation to itself -  which is ‘perfect’.
Johnson also understands the symbol of God to function subversively, to change 
the structures of Church and society. It is interesting that, like Irigaray, Johnson also 
offers an image of God as a ‘self-relating’ female figure, even as she also attempts to 
symbolise a ‘relational’ ontology. Ironically, Johnson does this in the midst of present 
‘triune’ imagery, and in particular, a description of the ‘divine friendliness’ of the 
hypostases: Reaching for a ‘trinitarian’ analogy, she states: ‘The image of a woman being 
herself, expressing herself and befriending herself in an inclusive moment that issues in 
care for the world forms one remote human analogue’
Thus, on the one hand, Johnson’s ideal is a unitary, self-befriending ‘God’. On the 
other hand, her God includes the world as an element of divine ‘self-hood’. This means.
Martin reflects on the result o f a loss of historical and linguistic ‘mooring’ in feminist theology and 
hermeneutics. Insistence on multiple valid symbols and multiple readings o f Christian texts following their 
‘deconstruction’, he notes, finds the linguistic subject unmoored in a sea o f language with no stable reality. 
Meaning is postponed indefinitely. Theological speech is merely an instance o f ‘discourse’, referring to 
nothing, with no corresponding identity or meaning. It is like, he remarks, a narrowly restricted photograph 
o f  a moving train. Not only are other angles o f ‘observation’ or interpretation possible, but the whole is on 
the move toward an indeterminate goal which makes any ‘reading’ as good as another. ‘When language is 
considered to be only a means o f reinforcing power, then we have abandoned not only any possibility of 
communication but have also embraced a theory o f knowledge that traps the thinking subject within her or 
himself, and we deny that any real knowledge o f reality is possible’ (“Feminist Hermeneutics,” 118-19, 
129).
Irigaray, “Divine Women,” trans. Stephen Muecke (Sydney: Local Consumption Occasional Papers 8, 
1986), 9, cited by Jones, “This God,” 125-6.
™ a w . 218.
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one of two very different things, however. Either (1) ‘God-She’ is like ‘a woman being 
herself, expressing herself and befriending herself, in which case Her alterity is 
internally derived as She functions as the object of Her own subjective being and action. 
This means that She is essentially non-relational', there are no hypostases in relation nor 
is she essentially related to the world. Or (2) She is ontologically constituted by the world 
as Her inclusive, necessary ‘other’ in order to be Herself, express Herself and befriend 
Herself. This means that distinction is eliminated for both Creator and creature; the 
world is simply a monistic emanation of the divine ‘Self.
Either of these possibilities does serious damage to Johnson’s feminist vision of 
relation as ‘radical equality’ -  not between ‘half selves’ but between ‘whole persons’ -  
where ‘suppression and projection cease to distort the encounter’ It does even more 
damage to her Christian understanding of the necessity of distinguishing between God 
and creation. Finally, it raises serious implications for God-talk. How does Johnson 
refrain from univocity when the ontological distinction between God and creation is no 
longer meaningful, when God’s transcendence and immanence are ultimately collapsed 
in a way similar to God’s Triune immanence and economic action?
In placing Johnson’s ontological-theological project in close proximity to that of 
Irigaray, two similar issues rise to the surface. The first has to do with Johnson’s concepts 
of selfhood and relationality -  and the over-arching question of the divine-human 
distinction as it comes to bear on these concepts. The second stems from her use of 
language, arguably theological language, to articulate or ‘construct’ these concepts.
Irigaray’s morphology of women’s ‘embodied alterity’ -  being the ‘other to 
oneself -  is explicit. Though Johnson’s terms are different, she also seems to hold to the 
™ SWI, 218.
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view that women must first be a ‘self-to-oneself before one can be a ‘seif-in-relation’. 
Like Irigaray, Johnson believes that women are involved in ‘constructive ontology’ 
through language. As ‘active agents’ they are ‘creating themselves’ through identity 
formation. Though feminism ‘eschews the vision of the isolated moral agent’, Johnson 
applauds women for ‘constructing a moral universe’ based on feminist relationality. 
Feminism abhors (male) ‘nonrelational autonomy’ as ‘deficiently human’; Johnson, can 
thus affirm women’s ^autonomy in relation’. The ideal is ‘the coinherence of autonomy 
and mutuality’, such that women’s freedom and self-identity are not ‘given over’ but 
given ‘to’ an ‘other’ on a voluntary basis.’^ '^  (Paradoxically, her ideal is based on 
voluntary rather than necessary relationships, despite the necessary interconnectedness of 
relational being.)
Thus, fundamental ‘otherness’ is not developed in terms of ‘personhood’ -  either 
between human beings or God.^ ^® Rather than thinking in terms of ‘personhood’, Johnson 
speaks more of women as ‘selves’, ‘subjects’ and ‘beings’. The autonomous ‘self is 
prior to any relation. In a sense, she brings herself as a ‘self to another ‘self (the 
‘other’) and they ‘have’ a relation (a thing constituted by them but which does not 
constitute them) as whole’ persons. This negates the understanding of being and 
becoming a person in relation -  that persons are not persons apart from  relation. Here, it 
would seem, are ‘whole selves’ rather than ‘whole persons’.
Nor we will adequately be able to address the distinction between selfhood and personhood here. A 
recommended text is Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory o f the Individual in 
Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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As we saw in chapter two, Johnson’s anthropological assumption is that it is 
individual, transcendental, pre-cognitive and cognitive self-awareness as God- 
awareness that makes one a subject and a ‘person’7^  ^This means that the individualistic, 
rational self is formed, at least at some level, independent of the essential relationality at 
the ‘heart of all reality’. Even as she claims that women’s relational experience is the 
determining source for truth about God and humanity, she ultimately appeals to women’s 
individual ‘conversion’ experience as the fundamental experience of women’s self- 
actualisation. What constitutes ‘conversion’? It is a woman’s ‘awakening’ to her own 
sense of worth and identity, to her true selfhood and potential for self-naming as an active 
subject.
This, she argues, ‘is a deeply religious event, the coming into being of suppressed 
selves’ Moreover, a woman’s self-identity is shaped by her ‘self-awareness’ as 
awareness of her share in divinity and her ability to ‘name toward God’. Women can say 
‘i found god in myself m d  i loved her, i loved her fiercely'.^”  In the end, says Johnson, ‘In 
the ontological naming and affirming o f ourselves we are engaged in a dynamic reaching
She notes the criticism Rahner received for his concentration on the individual ‘in isolation from the 
constitutive relation to community, which provides the very tools o f experience o f self-including language’. 
We are not sure what she means by these ‘tools’, but in any case, she does not seem to make this corrective 
in her own thought. SWI, 66.
Kerr challenges this assumption o f human ‘transcendence’ -  that one can somehow position oneself 
outside one’s physical world to observe that world. Kerr observes that at the heart o f Rahner’s Spirit in the 
World is the belief that whenever I know anything I also know that I do so and I know myself as I do so. In 
fact, says Kerr, ‘Rahner switches from “knowledge” to “consciousness” words with no apparent difficulty. 
He thinks primarily of “knowledge o f an object presenting itself from without” and is claiming that in all 
such knowledge one has an implicit awareness both of one’s knowing and o f one’s own being. It is difficult 
to make out what this means’. From a perspective shaped by Wittgenstein, Kerr contends that it should not 
mean something more substantial than that we talk about our world. “Rahner Retrospective,” 375,378.
SWI, 64.
SWI, 67, citing Ntozake Shange from her play, fo r  colored girls who have considered suicide/ the 
rainbow is ewMf (New York: McMillan, 1976), 63 (emphasis added).
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out to the mystery of God in whose being we participate’.™ Ultimately, her model of the 
mature female is the autonomous self-in-relation, not a person in relation. Because this 
model stems from concerns around domination, in a sense Johnson’s model of ideal 
human love is not without condition -  it is not truly free even at its most ‘mature’.
This is a ‘unipolar’, non-relational approach to self-discovery, however. It relies 
on the modern philosophical principle of the human capacity to know and name one’s 
subjective self as the object of self-reflection.^"*  ^The self attempts to know the self as its 
own objective self-referent, in isolation -  rather than in true relation -  to the other. Both 
Johnson and Irigaray follow this assumption, while attempting to develop a relational 
ontology, so that the ‘self is never out of the ‘control’ of the female subject -  even in her 
essential relationships.
The problem, as Torrance points out, is two-fold. First, it assumes, with Kant, that 
we each stand in passive relation to ourselves. The result is that the mind only intuits 
itself ‘as it is affected by itself, and therefore as it appears to itself, not as it w’.™ Given 
the dichotomy between the noumenal and the phenomenal, the self cannot be known as it 
really is but only as it appears. There is always an interpretive dimension between 
appearance and reality. Consciousness of the ‘self (interpretive awareness) cannot be 
knowledge of oneself. ‘Appearance’ is always just that -  appearance. It requires 
interpretation through ‘the eye of the beholder’. To follow the metaphor, the eye that 
beholds cannot also be the eye which it is beholding. In this non-relational, ‘ever-
740 67. Given Johnson’s agnosticism, one wonders how she knows that it is the mystery o f God and not
simply Irigaray’s projected ideal self or ‘discursive horizon o f being’ toward which she is reaching. And is 
this analogical God-talk?
Torrance shows how this premise has at least been questioned since David Hume’s attempt to think it 
through in A Treatise o f Human Nature and his conclusion that ‘I cannot discover any theory which gives 
me satisfaction on this level’. Hume, 328, cited by Torrance, “The Self-Relation,” 485, 500.
Critique o f Pure Reason, 68-69.
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transcending’ model, it is impossible to ‘see’ or know our ‘true selves’ or God.™ States 
Torrance: ‘In Kantian language, God and also the self exist in the realm of the noumenal 
and therefore transcend the categories of knowing such that man’s relation between the 
self and God ... can have no epistemic content. Faith and knowing inhabit different 
spheres. It follow therefore, that, just as there can be no Icnowledge’ of God, there can 
also be no true ‘knowledge’ of the self as it really is - nor indeed of other selves’.™
Second, as we have stated, it does not take into account the understanding of 
knowledge of the self deriving from being in relation. To be a human is not to be an 
unencumbered, autonomous self nor to be merely an inter-related ‘self. To be human is 
to be a creature in relation to God as well as to other human and non-human beings. This 
relationality and this network of relations is wholly ontological, in Christ by the Spirit in 
the true koinonia that constitutes humanity as fellow-humanity in the Triune God.™ It 
finds its particular ground of being in the particular life and being of the incarnate Son of 
God, Jesus Christ, the truly human Son of God.
In spite of her relational ontology and Trinitarian symbol, Johnson certainly runs 
the risk of projecting this individualised self onto God. As we have argued, she does not 
seem to hold to a sense of ‘personal’ distinction in the Triune God. She makes the 
statement, ‘The ontological priority of relation in the idea of the triune God has a 
powerful affinity with women’s ownership of relationality as a way of being in the world 
... Since the persons [of God] are constituted by their relationships with each other, each
The problem as Gilbert Ryle sees it, is that in attempts to ‘self-reflect’ one is ‘always a day late for the 
fair’. Ryle, “The Systematic Elusiveness o f “I,” in Concept o f Mind, 186, cited by Torrance, “The Self- 
ReIation,”498.
744 Self-Relation,” 489. In Kantian fashion, Bultmann states that God ‘is beyond the world and 
beyond scientific thinking. At the same time, it calls man to his true self. For the self o f man, his inner life, 
his personal existence is also beyond the visible world and beyond rational thinking’. Jesus Christ and 
Mythology, 40.
™ Barth, CD. III.2,285.
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is unintelligible except as connected with the others. Relation is the very principle of their 
being’.™
And yet, in the end Johnson is agnostic about the immanent Trinity. There is also 
no economic Trinity. In Jesus Christ there is no divine Son to reveal the Father and to 
send the Holy Spirit, no Immanuel who in his humanity is empowered by the Spirit to 
walk in true cruciform obedience to the Father. In short, there is no divine ‘encounter’ 
through the divine-human person of Jesus Christ who reveals God as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. God is simply ‘relationality’ as a unified concept -  God is, expresses and 
befriends herself- which ‘in an inclusive moment’ issues in care for the world. What that 
‘care’ looks like, Johnson does not say, other than to imply that it is to let the world ‘be’ 
in God.
This conflicting sense of the self in relation brings us back to Woodhead’s 
different models of the modem ‘self discussed in chapter two. It was our sense that 
Johnson’s transcendental self in relation bears most similarity to Woodhead’s definition 
of the ‘boundless self -  the amalgamation of the individualistic, ‘rational self and the 
‘bestowed self. Again, the boundless self refuses to see itself as differentiated from God, 
other humans or the natural order while it continues to manifest the traditional ‘turn to the 
subject’. This self-centring usurps God’s freedom and self-determination such that the 
creature’s identity and relationality are necessary to God’s relationality and ‘otherness’. 
Relationality, defined from the creature, subsumes distinction.
Here again, Irigaray and Johnson’s view of the self, and ideas and models of God, 
are similar. Jones expresses similar concerns regarding Irigaray’s sublimation of 
difference in the very model that is supposed to accentuate it. ‘[I]f the difference between 
™ SW I,2\6.
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God and humanity cannot be affirmed, then how can difference between human persons 
be fully embraced? It seems that theology ... at the very least must grant to God the same 
integrity and recognition of incommensurable difference that it grants to human 
persons’.^ "*''
Is Johnson’s symbol of God terribly different from that of Irigaray? Both models 
effectively eliminate the ‘other’ from any definition of relationality, despite each of them 
being models of the divine fashioned after women’s ‘essential’ relationality. Johnson and 
Irigaray actually share a number of similarities in aim and method. Both desire to see 
women afforded a sense of identity and place that is not sublimated by male-dominated 
systems, passively or aggressively. Both critique the philosophical systems of which they 
are a part. On the other hand, both rely on the underlying assumptions of those systems to 
develop their alternative ‘constructions’; i.e., both adopt and make use of a general 
epistemology, metaphysics and phenomenology of identity. In so doing, however, they 
rule out the possibility for taking true difference into account.
Both end up making essentialist claims for women’s way of being human in the 
attempt to highlight individual distinction. Both rely on a concept of infinite being as a 
connecting ‘reality’. Both give shape to that concept of ‘divine being’ from their own 
concept of women’s relationality. Both reject, in Johnson’s words, the God of ‘classical 
theism’ and with it a realist account of the Triune God made manifest in Jesus Christ by 
the Holy Spirit. (In Johnson’s case, she argues that she does not necessarily reject this 
God if it is the one revealed in ‘salvation experience’. But she generally empties the 
immanent and economic Trinity of the content of the Scriptural, Church and creedal
™ Jones, “This God,” 140-41.
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traditions of which she is a part and in so doing rejects the exclusive content of the
Christian revelation.)
Both rely on God’s being as ultimately ‘passive’ so that God can ‘mirror’ their
own image. In other words, both completely sublimate any sense of God as other,
different, free, active and self-determining. In what ends up being simply another kind of
‘symmetry’, God is limited to women’s self-reflection and to their perception of their
own ‘limitless horizon’. Both believe that the idea of ‘God’ can and should function as
the alternative political, ethical and aesthetic ideal of the emerging female subject.’"*®
Where they part company is in their definition of terms. Irigaray calls this ‘religion’ as
idealised ego projection. Johnson calls this alternative Christian Trinitarian theology.
Serene Jones recognises in Irigaray’s construction the same dangers that we have
suggested in Johnson’s relational ontology. In ‘fending off hierarchy by dissolving
difference’, observes Jones, the necessary distinction between God and the world is lost.
The difference between human beings then becomes a threat instead of a cause for
celebration and community. Because this new ‘logic of the same’ has the potential to be
terribly oppressive, Jones is led to ask:
‘[H]ow can Irigaray maintain an ethic o f difference in human relations if  the normative model of  
the God-human relation is one in which difference is reduced to a function o f the subject and 
thereby dissolved as true difference? If theology actually carries the high degree o f normative 
cultural power that Irigaray suggests it does, then what are the social consequences of figuring 
God as a purely aesthetic, ethical and political ideal? The consequences would seem to be the 
réinscription, at the theological level, o f the very idealised “logic of the same” that Irigaray 
correctly identifies as having repressive social consequences when it serves as the norm for the 
movement o f thought in general.
’"*® Jones, “This God,” 125.
™ Jones, “This God,” 139. Despite the vision that may be shared between Barth and feminism, which 
Jones clearly recognises, she believes they leave us ‘caught in a confounding theological tension’ with the 
as-yet-undiscovered answer lying somewhere ‘between’ them. Jones believes that if  there is relational 
hierarchy rather than unilateral, mutual and reciprocal equality between the two ‘terms’ or persons of any 
relation, even divine-human, then ‘this Godhead will ultimately devour difference by virtue o f its 
privileged position’. What about Jones’s repeated use o f Barth’s description o f God throughout her essay -  
‘the God who loves in freedom’?
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Her conclusion is that the consequences are of the same repressive sort that 
Irigaray initially critiques. In Johnson’s use of dominating universals both for women’s 
experience and for God-talk, can she avoid the same consequences?
Ultimately, we are led back to Johnson’s statement regarding univocity and 
‘models’ of the Trinity. First, Johnson argues that her Trinitarian discourse will be based 
on an ontological concept of the God-world relation with radical asymmetry between 
God and the world. It would appear, however, that ultimately this radical asymmetry is 
preserved only by (1) Johnson’s belief that somehow God remains ‘other’ within her 
unified ontological construction that posits a necessary relation between God and the 
world, and (2) her declaration of God’s absolute unknowability as a preamble to her own 
naming of God. Second, she argues that her discourse will remain free of univocity. What 
she actually states, however, is that as regards the Trinity, she believes in using ‘multiple 
models, convinced that pushing only one alone inevitably leads to univocity in speech’. 
Having multiple models is not the way to protect against univocity, however. This is 
particularly so if the models are generally ‘univocal’ -  that is, if they all derive from 
women’s experience and do not have epistemic access to or ‘analogical’ content that 
comes from ‘faith-filled’ participation in Christ by the Spirit.
Johnson argues that the symbol of God ‘functions’ to change social and ecclesial 
structures. And yet, in her critique of the Trinitarian language of the Church’s creeds, 
Johnson states that ‘like a drowned continent, it bends all currents of trinitarian thought to 
the shape of the model used’.’®® Remarkably, Johnson never addresses the fact that her re-
’®® SWI, 196, 212. Ruether says something similar when claiming that male systems of authority try to 
‘make received symbols dictate what can be experienced as well as the interpretation o f that which is 
experienced. In reality, the relation is the opposite’ (Sexism and God-talk, 12).
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interpretation of doctrine and her introduction of new religious symbols into the 
community is expressly for the purpose of changing the community’s ‘experience’. It is 
precisely in order to make ‘received symbols dictate what can be experienced’. She can 
only make such a statement by assuming traditional Trinitarian God-talk to be 
instrumentalist rather than revelatory, reflexive and participatory. By suspending the 
Christian concept of truth and of theological speech as ontological participation in the 
koinonia of the Triune God, she ends up critiquing her own methodology and its 
dominating effects.
Jones argues that, given Irigaray’s interest in preserving the incommensurable 
otherness of woman, it would seem that she would show a similar respect for difference 
in her doctrine of God. As the idealised, projected other of women’s subjectivity, God’s 
otherness is reduced to a function of the idealised role God fills. There is finally no room 
for alterity -  true otherness in terms of personal distinction is utterly eliminated. ‘[I]t 
would seem that female desire has consumed God. Caught once again in the old game of 
symmetry, God is merely the screen necessary for self-knowledge, the mirror that reflects 
the narcissistic gaze of the subject ’. Johnson’s God-talk must not play the game of 
symmetry or she will not only be susceptible of eliminating the distinctions essential to 
feminism as well as providing a potential source of religious oppression. She will have 
failed to hold to the essential distinction between God and the world that she knows is 
necessary in Christian discourse.
If, as Johnson argues with McFague, we really cannot know of whom we speak 
when we say ‘God’, then ‘it would mean that all theological statements were purely 
mythological, the arbitrary projection of human images and concepts onto that which
Jones, “This God,” 138.
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transcends the created order’ She would fall prey to Pannenberg’s worry; ultimately 
‘we end up presiding over the reality of God in our concepts’.’®® If, on the other hand, 
Johnson’s God-talk is to ‘fit within the contours of the Christian faith’ as ontological 
language that reflects the experience of the Christian whose relational life really is in 
God, it must be in continuity with the language of the Church as epistemic and 
ontological participation in the Triune life of God, which is the life of the Church, its 
faith and its witness.
’®^ Torrance, Persons in Communion, 128.
’®® Having assessed the concept o f analogy to be ultimately uni vocal, Pannenberg (Johnson’s other mentor) 
states, ‘Analogy, then, can never become the basic thought-fonn in Christian theology’. Johnson, “The 
Right Way to Speak About God,” 678-80.
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Conclusion
The purpose of the thesis has been to examine and critique the transcendental 
feminist methodology and ‘trinitarian’ theology -  what we have described as the 
relational ontology -  of Elizabeth Johnson. In chapter one, we set forth her methodology 
in its specifically modern. Catholic Reformist context in opposition to the ‘idolatry’ of 
Christian Trinitarian theism. In chapter two, we analysed her two sets of experiential 
assumptions -  transcendental and feminist -  and noted the difficulties she has in 
sustaining them both. Chapter three analysed and critiqued her ‘trinitarian’ relational 
ontology and Christology. This was specifically in relation to Barth’s description of 
Trinitarian theology, Chalcedonian Christology and experience of God conditioned by 
the Holy Spirit. Finally, in chapter four, we examined her claims for ‘analogical’ God- 
talk and compared her symbolic use of language for God to other trends in contemporary 
theology, feminist and otherwise.
What we have demonstrated in these four chapters is that the foundational, a 
priori principles at work in Johnson’s panentheistic, feminist concept of God make it 
virtually impossible for her to honour the necessary freedom and radical distinction of the 
Triune God in relation to the world. This includes the divine freedom and distinction 
inherent in God’s Self-revelation and in the Church’s ‘analogous’ language for God a 
posteriori, as it were. In the end, her concept of She Who Is significantly changes the 
form and content of Christian doctrine and language such that it is barely ‘recognizable 
within the contours of Christian faith’ as the language of the ontological Body of Christ, 
if at all.
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A. Inherent Conflicts
As Johnson develops her relational ontology, she makes three significant claims.
First, in appealing ontologically and methodologically to women’s ‘experience’, she 
claims to avoid universal ‘sameness’ among women and reverse sexism.^ "^  ^ Her second
claim is that in her theological discourse, she ‘names toward a relational God who loves i
in freedom’, prizing ‘a genuine dialectic between God and the world that safeguards j
jdifference while preserving conn ec t io n F in a l ly ,  arguing from her own, constructed j
metaphysical system ‘about the way things truly are’, she claims that her use of multiple j
Trinitarian models keeps her from ‘univocity in speech about the divine’ j 
In each case, the priority Johnson recognizes to be necessary, both as a feminist j
iand as a Christian theologian, is that of ‘distinction’, especially as it pertains to women’s i
I
particularity. As a feminist she must honour human distinction and diversity to avoid the j
pitfalls of androcentricism, patriarchy and Western imperialism. As a Christian she must j
honour divine-human distinction; without it she falls into the monistic, ‘suffocating \
!deception’ of pantheism. Finally, as a Roman Catholic ‘Thomist’, she must honour divine i
transcendence and distinction regarding the God-world relation; only this prevents her |iI‘analogical’ God-talk from falling into univocity. Without the necessary distinction in the 
Christian tradition between Creator and creature -  and the distinct identity given to both |
in the Incarnation -  feminist God-talk is merely human protectionism. Johnson would j
end up talking only about herself^ or her three-fold ‘salvific’ experience, or her thrice- j
named female ideal. Technically, she would also open the field for anyone to speak of
™ 5'lf7,32.
’®® SWI, 226.
756 "Forging Theology,” 106. Social theorist Linda Alcoff critiques this feminist approach: ‘The bottom line 
criticism o f metaphysics has been that metaphysics defines truth in such a way that it is impossible to attain 
and then claims to have attained [it]’. “Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: the Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory,” in The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, 346.
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God out of his or her own experience without being able to contest the resulting 
‘symbol’, at least not according to her own methodological principles.
It is our contention that despite Johnson’s best efforts -  and her laudable 
compassion for the real suffering of women in history -  what happens in the end is just 
this: She is left with only her self-talk and self-experience, not with Christian theological 
speech or ontological participation in the Triune God. Her transcendental and feminist 
principles are neither metaphysically nor logically compatible. They also put her in 
conflict with the Roman Catholic and feminist communities she represents. Finally, they 
make it virtually impossible for her to ‘safeguard difference while preserving connection’ 
in her own explication of God’s relationality and relation to the world, let alone in 
continuity with the reality of the Church and its language, embedded in and expressing its 
relational life in God.
As we have argued in the preceding chapters, there are a number of internal 
inconsistencies in Johnson’s approach. The first arise when her seemingly neutral, 
‘essentialist’ assertions come into conflict with her gender-based assertions at what are 
foundationally ontological and epistemological levels. For instance, on one hand she 
argues from a ‘creative anti-realist’ position that language has creative power and that all 
human beings are ontologically equal, active subjects with the capacity to ‘name’ their 
reality. On the other hand, she states that ‘male’ language ‘dominates’ and that the way 
men ‘name’ reality is ‘wrong’ (this is feminism’s most basic tenet!). All humans are 
transcendentally, existentially open to and experience the divine as an element of their 
self-experience. However, ‘male’ experience of God is ‘patriarchal’; because men 
construct the world ‘wrongly’, their names for God are ‘idolatrous’. They are not ‘true’ to
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the relationality that is divine reality. Hence, men do not in fact have the ability to 
adequately name God from their own transcendental experience. Either their 
transcendental experience is in question, or their ontological reality. Johnson talks in 
terms of men’s ‘defective’ experience. What exactly is she alluding to? If men as human 
beings are ontologically grounded in ‘relational being’ like women, would they not also 
experience relationality and image it thusly?
This leads to the second set of internal inconsistencies. Johnson’s argument for 
feminist God-talk -  in fact, any God-talk from experience -  is based on a fundamental 
agnosticism. As we have seen, she equates divine incomprehensibility with Kantian 
unknowability so that she is intentionally left with an ‘agnosticism of definition’ when it 
comes to God. (This, she posits, is an affirmation of God’s ‘radical otherness’.) She goes 
so far as to say that God is ‘inapprehensible’, i.e., beyond human awareness\ This is 
logically impossible for a transcendental philosophy that posits self-awareness as 
awareness of God. God is also beyond all ‘thematizing’, and yet Johnson’s whole project 
is to ‘name’, i.e., ‘thematize’, the ‘Nameless’. If in fact we can apprehend but cannot 
‘know’ God because God is absolutely unknowable, then how do we know that it is 
‘God’ that we have apprehended? And how do we know that we have named God 
‘rightly’? One must finally ask, if at first all humans can directly know the unknowable, 
and know that it is God, and know that ‘God’ is necessarily related to the world Hike a 
Trinity' (and know what a Trinity is like without God as the antecedent!), why is it that 
suddenly only women can know and name this God in the '’right way'I
And yet, if individual human experience is the determining factor in theology, 
then knowledge of God cannot contradict knowledge gained from one’s own
264
metaphysical reflections about God and the world. This makes it impossible for Johnson 
to know whether the ‘God’ another individual -  male or female -  apprehends and 
experiences is the same ‘God’ she experiences. It also makes it impossible to judge 
whether that male or female person’s apprehension of and symbolization of God is ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’. Technically, since God has no objectivity in Johnson’s theology, she is 
making judgments about the symbols such an individual constructs out of his or her own 
reality -  something that Johnson defends her own right to do and sees as a pluralistic, 
postmodern privilege.
This leads to the question of implausibility. How does Johnson even begin to have 
dialogue with other women about ‘God’? In the postmodern dialogue of self-projected 
images for the divine, to what are these women referring? The term ceases to have any 
public meaning by Johnson’s own definition of how one ‘symbolises’ God. One is led to 
ask how she can write a book arguing for ‘the right way to speak about God?’ given the 
sensitivities of feminist pluralism. How too, can she argue for the ‘universal claim to 
Christian truth’? Neither of these kinds of statements is permissible, either by a 
postmodern feminist standard or an individual transcendental standard. An ‘ethical’ or 
‘moral’ claim to God’s ‘identity’ is illogical in either a feminist or transcendental context. 
So too, is the idea of making this kind of claim for God-talk when one is agnostic.
There are also the hosts of ontological questions that attach to Johnson’s 
assumptions and beg the question of distinction, both divine and human. Among the 
many raised in the last two chapters, we simply ask what constitutes the ‘en’ in Johnson’s 
panentheism so that it is not ultimately pantheism? How can one tell where ‘God’ begins
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and humanity ‘ends’, as it were, and vice versai What are the implications for human and 
divine freedom in this ontological relation?
In sum, Johnson’s adoption of Rahner’s neo-Kantian, Hegelian and 
Schleiermacherian principles make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for her to 
hold a ‘distinctive’, Christian asymmetrical view of God and humanity in divine-human 
relation. Her relational ontology functions as what Barth calls a tertium quid; the 
universal structure of ‘relational being’, as a predefined, a priori category of human 
knowing, is more foundational than the Being of God. As such, it prescribes the 
conditions for the divine-human relation in terms of being and action. By making 
women’s experience the only epistemic condition by which God’s ‘relational being’ can 
by known, Johnson fails to demonstrate that her concept of God’s transcendence and 
‘radical otherness’ corresponds with anything other than the content of women’s 
‘experience’ of absolute ‘Spirit’ or ‘Being’. In the end, this category sets the norm for 
‘full humanity’ and gives form and content to the ‘right’ concept of God, despite 
Johnson’s transcendental claims. Furthermore, by incorporating her feminist principles 
into her relational ontology she (unwittingly to be sure) finds herself falling into the worst 
kind of sexism -  that of ontological inferiority -  for which she rightly criticizes her own 
historical tradition and which she elsewhere tries to avert.
S. 'Beyond’ Barth’s Critique of Experience?
Robert Jenson has observed that what is often considered to be ‘new’ and
‘radical’ in Anglo-American theology is simply a repristination of ‘some nineteenth- 
century German bright idea’ -  one that generally has not gone through the radical 
challenges of Barth’s thought that sent theological shock waves throughout continental
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Europe in the early twentieth-century/^^ This seems especially to be the case regarding 
Johnson’s Catholic reformism and particularly her ‘trinitarian’ relational ontology/^®
In contradistinction to Barth, Johnson states that in today’s agnostic, even 
atheistic climate, ‘for the Christian claim to universal truth to be taken seriously, the 
logical force of the argument for the reality of God must be asserted’ That ‘logical 
force’ is not derived from God himself as the ultimate ‘Active Subject’, the concrete 
Reality in light of which all other realities are to be reconceived. God is not a Subject in 
Johnson’s theology. Rather, it is the sphere of human anthropology, specifically women’s 
individual experience that reveals the ‘Christian claim to universal truth’ about ‘divine 
mystery’ -  the all encompassing yet radically distinct ‘other’
In Johnson’s case, this is not the wholly, holy ‘Other’ who supremely, 
miraculously becomes one with humanity in the Logos, but ‘otherness’ in its most 
abstract, agnostic sense. She is determined to go ‘beyond’ Barth’s view of Trinitarian 
revelation into the more ‘accessible’ realm of contemporary experience with its agnostic 
‘openness’. A s  she develops her panentheistic, ‘trinitarian’ concepts, she finds Piet 
Schoonenberg particularly helpful. Schoonenberg affirms that the scholastic doctrine of
Jenson, “Karl Barth,” in The Modem Theologians (see n. 28) 34.
’®® John Webster notes that these nineteenth-century traditions are still authoritative in the liberal Protestant 
and revisionist Catholic expressions o f Western Christian theology. Where they have waned, a more 
constructive engagement with Christian orthodoxy is gaining momentum, and, states Webster, a recovery 
o f Barth’s thought has often been either ‘a precipitous cause or a significant consequence’. “Introducing 
Barth,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (see n .ll) , 11.
759 Legitimacy o f the Question o f God,” 289-90.
™ In a lecture given by John Macquarrie in honour o f Rahner’s 80*** birthday, Macquarrie follows 
Johnson’s line o f argument in her essay on Pannenberg. He states that although ‘the theme o f theology is 
and must remain God’, classical theology’s -  and specifically Barth’s -  placement o f the doctrine o f God at 
the forefront o f theology is neither valid nor appropriate in the current environment. The ‘necessary starting 
point’ is the doctrine o f humanity. Macquarrie, “The Anthropological Approach to Theology,” Heythrop 
Journal XXV (1984): 272-273; Johnson, “The Right Way to Speak About God: Pannenberg on Analogy,” 
Theological Studies 43 (1982): 673-692.
“The Legitimacy o f the Question o f God,” 289-90.
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participation and modem forms of panentheism are related/^^ He too claims to go 
‘further than Barth’, arguing that the question of whether God would be choose to be 
trinitarian apart from salvation history is purely speculation and impossible to determine 
on the basis of revelation/^^
Johnson thus appeals to the ‘logic’ of ‘inductively’ speaking about ‘the triune 
God’ starting with the ontological principle/experience of ‘Spirit’. This approach 
‘corresponds with certain broad streams of existential, historical, religious, logical, 
theological and feminist wisdom’ and is ‘more intrinsically intelligible to many 
contemporary minds’. B a r t h ’s ‘appeal to the authority of the revealing Word of God’ 
must be left behind, she argues, ‘if such speech is not to be dismissed as the arbitrary 
expression of a pious heart (even the heart of a theologian)
Johnson’s rejection of Barth on the grounds of ‘arbitrary pietism’, however, fails 
precisely to recognise the essence of his critique against ‘theological’ appeals to 
experience -  that is, that theology is not ‘individual’ or ‘private’ in any sense.^^  ^
Theology is the language o f the Church about God, given by God. One can no more be 
engaged in ‘privatised’ theological discourse -  even as ‘personal pietism’ -  than one can 
draw the hermeneutical circle starting from oneself and hope to capture God in the 
process. For Barth, both are logical, and ontological, impossibilities. The great irony is
™ 5'r/,302n l8 .
™ Schoonenberg states: T myself am convinced that the idea o f God becoming triune through his salvific 
self-communication is possible. I can go further than Karl Barth, who refers God’s Trinity to a decision of 
God which, however, is a “primordial decision”... I can see God becoming triune by a historical decision 
o f himself. This is what we know about God’s Trinity’ (The Christ, 86n 16(c), (emphasis added)). LaCugna 
defends Schoonenberg for this assertion (See God For Us, 238n33), while Walter Kasper criticises him for 
it (The God o f Jesus Christ [New York: Crossroad, 1984], 275).
123.
765 "Yhe Legitimacy o f the Question o f God,” 289-90.
’®® Barth considered even Pietism (though well intentioned) to look elsewhere than to the Word of God to 
measure truth. C.D, 1.1,250-51.
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that Johnson would criticise anyone on these grounds, for this is precisely her Catholic 
reformist approach: In Linda Woodheads terms, it is an individualistic form of modern 
spirituality which purports to have ‘privatised’ Christian God-talk/^^
C. Theology as the Language of the Church in Trinitarian Participation
Barth could not be more specific in the opening pages of the Church Dogmatics -
that by its very nature it is Church dogmatics. Theology is a function of the Church and 
dogmatics ‘is the self-examination of the Christian Church in respect of the content of its 
distinctive talk about God’.^ ^^  As talk about God, theology stands under the Church’s 
judgment and ‘lives by the promise given to the Church’. W h y ?  Because the Church 
speaks out of its own ontological existence and identity, individually and corporately, 
given in Christ. As God personally encounters, addresses and speaks his reconciling 
Word to humanity in the revelation of Jesus Christ — from his virgin birth to his exaltation 
at the right hand of the Father and outpouring of the Spirit -  the Church is given its own 
being and joined to the fellowship of the Triune God.
Johnson’s experiential approach, on the other hand, is a profoundly non- 
ecumenical. In her theology, the pressure of interpretation comes from her view of 
‘women’s experience’, both as a ‘universal’ and individual concept imposed upon those 
in and outside the Church. Hence she fails to account for the experience of the Church as 
truly ‘catholic’ and truly diverse -  both aspects of which derive from its being in the 
Triune God.
™ Woodhead, “Spiritualizing the Sacred,” 198. Thus, says Woodhead, Johnson replaces ‘church and 
sacraments with an imagined global community and the importance of prayer, worship and formation by 
tradition is simply ignored’ (205).
™ C.D. 1.1, 11.
1.1,3.
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Theologically, the Church as the Body of Christ assesses its language from the 
criterion of its Head, Jesus Christ, whose Spirit continues to bear witness to this Word 
alone. The Church discerns the Word as from the Holy Spirit and not the ‘spirits’ of the 
age through the testimony of Scripture and the confessional witness of its creeds.^^® It is 
for this reason, says Paul Hinlicky, that ‘the canonical biblical narrative and the 
eschatological community of the ecclesia imply one another’: ‘This same Spirit [that was 
in Jesus Christ] is bestowed on his community, not, of course, like some impersonal fluid 
mechanically injected into the ecclesiastical machinery but rather as the final Person, 
whose self-impartation consists in calling believers forward “to the glorious liberty of the 
children of God.” The transcendence of God to which believers infinitely advance is 
designated this way, not as something beyond or behind the triune God’s life but within 
this very life of the Spirit, the Son and the Father’
This, states Linda Woodhead, is just what feminist theologians like Johnson fail to 
understand. By reducing Christianity ‘to the thin reality of a set of dogmas standing over
against the individual’,
[feminist theology] ignores the discourses o f Christianity itself. It occludes the thick reality o f the 
Trinitarian God and o f those communities which are caught up in His life. In the language which 
is so privileged in the church’s self-understanding, the church is the ‘body of Christ’. This 
language shows clearly that the believer, the church and its teachings are not separate objects. The 
church is not an institution which threatens the autonomy o f the individual but the community in 
which human beings are formed and shaped as faithful and loving creatures
Thus the Church, as this community of human beings, speaks its own reality as
the new creation in the process of proclaiming the truth about God’s love for creation in
the Incarnation. Theological speech, when it is understood in the context of the revelation
‘The Church’, says Barth, ‘is the one particular spot which corresponds to the particularity o f the 
incarnation. It is there that revelation is really subjective, for there Jesus Christ the Head has His own 
people His body, there the only-begotten Son o f God has in them His brethren’. C.D. 1.2, 247.
Paul Hinlicky, “Secular & Eschatological Conceptions o f Salvation,” in This is My Name Forever, 228. 
Woodhead, “Spiritualizing the Sacred,” 195.
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of God’s Triune Personhood, is speech about personhood and humanity in the image of 
the God, Through epistemic participation in Christ, human identity must be reconsidered 
not just in terms of gender with its positive understanding of Gen 1:27. i.e., of human 
beings together constituted as male and female in relationship, but christologically and 
trinitarianly as the ‘new humanity’ through the new human, Jesus Christ.
What it demands of us and itself creates in us is obedience: an obedient hearing 
and speaking on the part of the Church that is triune in structure out of its koinonia in the 
Triune God. Because God is made known to us as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, this is the 
Church’s only answer to the question "Who is the God in whom we believe?" And the 
‘who’ question precedes any kind of ‘what’ question by the very the nature of God’s 
Self-giving revelation.
It is in this light that what Barth says about the vestigia trinitatis makes sense. The 
doctrine of the Trinity is given to the Church in both the form and the content of the 
divine Word that is spoken in its midst and that it is in turn commanded to speak. As 
reflection on what God has spoken, this rules out as valid options either agnosticism or 
the categorical substitution of religious constructs. To allow the term ‘God’ to be defined 
differently for the sake of some apologetic argument or in pursuit of some common 
denominator of shared understanding, is simply to capitulate once again to the very 
idolatry from which revelation seeks to deliver us. Furthermore, because the doctrine of 
the Trinity is also God’s reconciling Wordfor us, ‘Trinity’, ‘Incarnation’, ‘salvation’, or 
"imago DeV are not ‘words’ or categories based on some alleged ethical or experiential 
‘common ground’ abstracted from the gospel. Ironically, Barth believed that if in fact 
God is in revelation what he is in himself, then any attempt to say otherwise, particularly
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on the basis of agnosticism, would be to succumb to subjectivism, dualism, pantheism, 
or, worst of all, panentheism !
D. The Church's Life and Language Grounded ‘in Christ’
God-talk is not a matter of continuous agnostic or equivocal disclaimers which,
while devoid of shared meaning, rest on the hope that we really are speaking of God (or 
as Johnson also puts it in the language of encounter, that ‘God comes to meet us’) in our 
attempts to describe ‘divine mystery’. Neither is it a matter of univocal, Feuerbachian 
reduction, where theological statements are merely anthropological ones limited to the 
confines of human capacity. Whereas Johnson attempts to ‘throw a hermeneutical span’ 
for women to cross back and forth between the Christian and feminist views of God and 
humanity, Barth contends that only God can and does span the gap between himself and 
his creation in his personal Word. Only this Word of truth can both call forth and enable 
an adequate, meaningful and still indirect analogical response from the side of and within
i
creation. i
Our terms refer to God in and through their being grounded in the Logos, just as I
I
the incarnate Logos constitutes the community of the Church. Our participation in the
Body of Christ is koinonia (and not, emphasises Alan Torrance, the Platonic methexis j
[participation]). It takes place by the Spirit in Christ, encountering human beings again I
through the Holy Spirit who conditions their experience to receive this Logos as God’s
own Self-Revelation.
Torrance reminds us that Athanasius first highlighted the difference between i
i
anthropomorphic projection of our opinions (epinoiai) onto the divine (what he termed j
mythologyzing) -  and theologein or analogein. In theologein (God-talk proper), our 1
™ c a i l . l , 3 1 2 .  I
i
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terms are extended to project {ana-logein) beyond their ordinary context of use in such a 
way that they refer to the reality of God. These terms cease to be mere epinoiai (arbitrary 
human opinions or ideas projected mythologically on the transcendent) and become 
dianoiai -  concepts that project through {dia) to the reality and being of God. They are, 
says Eberhard Jiingel, ‘commandeered’ by God in his own reality. The condition of this is 
meta-noia, as Paul interpreted it -  that is, the transformation of our thinking and concepts 
(noiaf) and thus our terminology. The implication is that there is a semantic shifting of 
our concepts in parallel with the “reschematization” of our minds (Rom. 12:2) so that 
they might truly and appropriately refer to the divine. In sum, theologein -  that is, valid 
or truthful reference to God -  requires a reconciliation of our hostile, alienated noiai so 
that we might have that mind which is in Christ Jesus. We thereby participate in the new, 
transformed semantics (or “language games”) of the Body of Christ -  where our logoi 
participate in the Logos, who is God concretely present within the created o r d e r . j
Thus, we are enabled to hear God’s Word by the Spirit, and to refer to God to the !
!iextent that our concepts of God are reschematized by the one who took the ft)rm of a |
1
servant, commandeering not only our language but radically commandeering our Î
Iunderstanding of love, power, sacrifice, freedom and relation as true to the very Being of |
God in Christ.^^  ^God commandeers the term ‘Father’ by revealing himself as the Father IItof Jesus Christ and of those who encounter his Son and follow him by their Spirit. In j
“Is Love the Essence o f God?” in Nothing Greater Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of 
God ed. Kevin Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 114-137,123-124. ‘The ontological ground of 
analogein and theologein is not some universal, ontological likeness (i.e., a homoi-ousial) between cause 
and effect -  so absolute and universal that it includes God. Rather, it is the oneness o f being o f the Son and 
the Spirit with God the Father. The homoousion becomes, in other words, the sine qua non o f the analogical 
functioning of our terms where, by the Creator Spirit, our minds and our conceptualities are reconciled and 
united with Christ as the One in whom we have the fullness o f the Being o f God with us’ (136). See also T. 
F. Torrance’s discussion of Athanasius in Theology and Reconstruction (London: SCM, 1965) and 
Theology in Reconciliation (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1965).
“Is Love the Essence o f God,” 124-5.
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Jesus Christ, God redefines being ‘for the other’ not on the basis o f ‘mutual equality’, but 
rather by not considering ontological ‘equality’ with God something to be grasped, taking 
the form of a sacrificial servant for the sake of the ‘other’. In him, freedom and power are 
inseparable from mercy, grace and love, and vice versa.
Because Johnson does not have an adequately Chalcedonian Christology, 
however, Jesus Christ is not ‘God’ for women this way. Ultimately, without the 
homoousion -  such that in Jesus Christ God is truly for us -  Johnson is also without the 
centre of Christian doctrine and without a Trinitarian theology. Inadvertently, she ends up 
with a potentially oppressive religious ideology.
E. inadequate Christoiogy
Christianity attempts to hold in highest regard the reality of personal uniqueness
and difference between God and human beings, and between human beings themselves, 
based on the relational fi-eedom given in and by God as Creator. Nowhere is this more 
dramatically realised than in the Incarnation. In Jesus Christ, God is not only Lord of 
creation but part of it by his own free action and being.
In Johnson’s ontological and theological concepts there is a confusion and 
reversal of the Creator-creature relation based on the following: (1) beginning theology 
with experiences of self-transcendence, (2) failing to distinguish the Holy Spirit from the 
human spirit, (3) making God in some sense dependent upon and indistinguishable from 
history; and (4) a lack of precision in Chris tology.This  final element affects all the 
others.
Molnar describes these trends in “Toward a Contemporary Doctrine o f the Immanent Trinity: Karl Barth 
and the Present Discussion,” SJT 49 (1996): 312.
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Johnson does take Jesus’ humanity with utmost seriousness -  a positive 
contribution to Christology. It is precisely this important point that she stresses by 
recognising the Nicene affirmation that Jesus "homo factus esf.  If the stress was on "vir 
factus esf stressing male sexuality, then ‘What is not assumed is not redeemed, but what 
is assumed is saved by union with God’ leaves the female half of the human race 
unredeemably outside of God’s salvation.^^^ What Johnson does not take seriously is sin 
as a human condition and thus the need for redemption by God in Jesus Christ, Thus, she 
fails to take seriously the homoousion -  that ‘what is assumed is saved by union with 
God\ In Hunsinger’s terms, the person and work of Johnson’s Christology do not 
correspond with that of Chalcedon, and if she changes one, she changes the other. The 
result is that Johnson does not leave half but the whole human race ‘outside of God’s 
salvation’.
Without holding a view of both a divine and human nature in Jesus Christ, it is 
impossible to affirm the claims of the Christian faith regarding God, humanity and the 
salvific content of the divine-human relation. Without a Chalcedonian Christology that 
takes the homoousion seriously, there is no criteria by which to speak of God as triune. 
Only if Jesus is divine does she have access within human experience to God among us, 
revealing the relationality of God, the love of God, the sacrificial, reconciling action and 
being of God for us. Furthermore, Johnson’s trinitarian assumptions blur the God-world 
distinction by collapsing the immanent and economic Trinity and making God utterly 
dependent on creation for the expression of his own Being and action.
As a Catholic reformist, Johnson is committed to theology as ‘corrective’, 
emancipatory praxis. Her prime directive is to reinterpret and systematically ‘reform’
Johnson, “Redeeming the Name,” 119. The axiom attributes to Gregory o f Nazianzus.
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Christianity as a socio-religious conceptual and linguistic system, ‘reshaping’ the 
‘symbols’ of the Christian faith with a feminist agenda. The assumption is that the form 
and content of Christian theology can be separated and ‘reformed’ according to criteria 
external to the tradition itself. By assuming that the ‘Trinity’ is a concept in abstraction 
from God’s own Triune Being, she changes both the essential form and the content of 
Christian theology according to the a priori of women’s experience.
She describes this endeavour as ‘braiding a footbridge between the ledges of 
classical and feminist wisdom’.A lth o u g h  her metaphor implies that these ledges hold 
equal weight and influence, clearly ‘feminist wisdom’ -  which incorporates liberation 
feminist ethics, contemporary theology and modern methodology -  far outweighs 
‘classical wisdom’. Ironically, Johnson argues from  classical tradition that her theology 
and method is orthodox while simultaneously debunking tradition as the source of sexism 
and idolatry (the Father, Son and Spirit in Triune aseity). Hence she rejects Barth and his 
regard for God’s wholly and holy ‘otherness’ based on Scripture and its witness to Jesus 
Christ as Immanuel.
Barth, on the other hand, is uncompromising:
The Christian religion is the predicate to the subject o f the name o f Jesus Christ. Without Him it is 
not merely something different. It is nothing at all ... Because it was and is and shall be through 
the name o f Jesus Christ, it was and is and shall be the true religion: the knowledge of God, and 
the worship o f God, and the service o f God, in which man is not alone in defiance o f God but 
walks before God in peace with God. ... The Christian religion is simply the earthly-historical life 
o f the Church and the children o f God.^’^
Ironically, the criticisms against Catholic reformism that most closely resemble 
those of conservative Christian orthodoxy come from post-Christian feminists like 
Daphne Hampson. Sounding very much like Barth, Hampson states that to change the
12.
C.D. 1.2,347-8.
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basic tenets of the faith, particularly in regard to the Incarnation and thus the Trinity, is to 
no longer to have to do with Christianity. Criticising Ruether’s ‘Christian feminist’ in 
particular, Hampson argues that if ‘reformism’ involves changing meaning as well as 
praxis, then it ceases to maintain continuity with historical tradition. Since Christianity is 
historical, as is Jesus’ particular divine-human reality, ‘to be a Christian is not simply to 
preach Jesus’ message [as a moral vision]. It is also to proclaim a message about Jesus -  
and therein for a feminist lie all the problems’ Hampson’s general criticism of the 
relational theology of Johnson’s colleagues (Ruether, Keller, Daly, Fiorenza and 
McFague) is ‘how profoundly secular it is. It is as though [modern] theology has lost its 
moorings. In the case of feminist theology, what seems to have replaced talk of God is 
largely talk of women’s experience. ... In all this, what I miss is ‘theology’: talk of 
God’7*‘
F. The Oppressive Potentiai of Experientiai God~Taik
At issue in part is whether Johnson really does go ‘beyond Barth’ by addressing
his critique of human experience as an a priori for Christian theology and sufficiently 
resolving the issues he raises in an approach like hers. Does she make a case for an 
experiential feminist theology that maintains an understanding of divine transcendence 
and immanence -  and with it, divine and human distinction and freedom -  framed by the 
reality of Jesus Christ? Is her theology non-individualistic, non-dominating and 
doctrinally orthodox? These issues should belong to any serious feminist theological 
debate. As Trevor Hart has suggested:
Theology and Feminism (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990), 65. Francis Martin notes that 
‘Daphne Hampson correctly sees that the Christian claim is realist, and she rejects i t . ... Ruether wrongly 
considers all the language o f Christianity to be “instrumentalist,” and she proposes adapting it to a 
“redemptive future,” which, rather than past events, “is ultimately normative.”’ TFQ, 179.
Theology and Feminism, 170.
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The loss o f any genuine sense of transcendence (and thus of a proper understanding of  
immanence) in much contemporary theology suggests that the problems which Barth faced are just 
as live at the end o f the twentieth [and the beginning o f the twenty-first] century as they were at its 
outset, and that the emphases which he adopted and the categories upon which he drew in facing 
these problems may well be worthy o f further careful consideration/^^
Though Johnson wants to talk of God, even to speak ‘the right way’ about God,
her agnosticism would no doubt leave Hampson in the same position -  ‘missing
theology’. Because God is posited as pure Spirit rather than given in the Incarnation, this
is not surprising. What would be surprising, says Linda Woodhead, even unthinkable,
would be ‘that such a God could ever address us, surprise us, shake us up, condemn us,
forgive us, transform our lives, love us, redeem the world, and raise to new life our
embodied reality. Rather God merely becomes a symbol of our highest aspirations, and a
motivation for us to realise our true potential’
And yet these are Johnson’s best hopes for her model of God. SHE WHO IS or
‘Sophia-God’, she says, is theologically legitimate and existentially, religiously necessary
for the Christian faith ‘if speech about God is to shake off the shackles of idolatry and be
a blessing for women’ -  ‘idolatry’ being understood as the Church’s doctrine of and
language for the Triune God -  Father, Son and Holy Spirit.^ '^^  Her belief is that if we
‘create reality’, i.e., ‘God’ in our image, the result will be the eschatological
transformation of all human beings into ‘a liberating community of all women and men
characterized by mutuality with each other and harmony with the earth’ It will give
782 God in Christ?” in Regarding Karl Barth, 27. In his Gifford Lectures, The Knowledge of God and 
the Service o f God according to the Teaching of the Reformation (Aberdeen, 1937 and 1938), Barth himself 
stated that when natural theology loses its adversary it becomes ‘arid and listless’. Thus, Barth gives the 
natural feminist theologian a position against which to sharpen her thought; furthermore, she cannot avoid 
his views which are ‘the direct opposite o f [her] own tenets and therefore o f necessity extraordinarily 
interesting and profitable for [her] own particular undertaking’. Cited by Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain 
of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001), 143n6.
“Spiritualizing the Sacred,” 205.
SWI,243.
Johnson, She Who /s, 31.
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power and dignity to the oppressed, who, given the chance, will execute justice fairly 
(despite history’s record of the oppressed often being the worst oppressors). It will be the 
‘role-model’ (Garrett Green’s term) after which we fashion our view of the world and 
force everyone to conform. This is the foundation for religious ideology -  the most 
oppressive weapon in history.
Scripture and history tell us, however, that God made us in his image and in our 
fallenness we have forever been trying to return the compliment. We continue to re-enact 
the original idolatry that defines human sinfulness by assuming that we know God apart 
from his own ^ e^revelation, i.e., that we the creatures know more than our Creator.
Garrett Green observes that the original temptation in the Genesis narrative was the
human urge to model oneself after God: “You will be like God, said the serpent” (Gen 
3:5). As Green aptly states:
One o f the deepest ironies o f the creation story is that the very human creature who has just been 
formed in the divine image (Gen 1:26-7) succumbs to the temptation to become “like God”! 
Evidently there is more than one way to be like God, and everything hangs on recognizing the 
difference. The crucial principle is that the logic o f  the imago Dei is not reversible. When God 
fashions us after his image, it is called creation; when we fashion God after our image, it is called
idolatry. It is precisely this distinction that role-model [Catholic feminist] theology
misunderstands.^®^
Johnson’s Sophia-God does not go beyond Barth, or even leave him behind. 
Rather, she ‘retro-fits’ her theology by going ‘behind’ him. In a manner reminiscent of 
Schleiermacher, she can make no profession of God as such but appeals only to her 
‘gendered’ experience of God; thus, her Trinitarian symbol functions no more effectively 
than Schleiermacher’s ‘appendix’ in terms of its Christian form and content. She also 
goes around Barth by failing to engage with and account for the criticisms that he raised. 
In short, she ignores him, as well as those voices in and outside her tradition who are
‘The Gender o f God,” 54-55.
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critical of her totalising approach -  which, apart from its lack of orthodoxy, is particularly 
unfortunate in light of the century of human oppression that has just passed. Without both 
the proper warrant and critical controls upon God-talk that come from within the 
reconciled Body of Christ,^*  ^ God-talk becomes an inconceivably dangerous activity. 
Johnson has not succeeded in generating sufficient clarity as to how one conceives its 
warrant, and thus (1) how such God-talk is viable for the Church or (2) how following 
her method, one would avoid falling prey to such tremendous dangers.
As Barth placed himself in active resistance to forms of injustice throughout his 
career, it was in light of God’s self-revelation and determination of humanity in Jesus 
Christ. Barth was utterly convinced that the ‘grace and nature’ or ‘gospel and ...’ 
approach of natural theology compromised the faithfulness of the gospel into a false 
synthesis of, in his case, Kulterprotestantismus. For Barth, the same modern 
philosophical presuppositions at work in Catholic reformism were partially responsible 
for the economic oppression of uncontrolled capitalism, oppressive German imperialism 
and finally, the attempted annihilation of the Jews in a drive toward world domination 
based on ontological superiority!^*^
Theologically, they compromise the essential aspect of God’s being and action in 
and for the world -  his absolute freedom. As George Hunsinger explains in light of
This is what Alvin Plantinga calls the appropriate ‘cognitive environment’ necessary for truth claims to ;
have warrant. This is always a social, communal environment. Ecclesiologically, this implies that there is !
neither private knowledge o f nor private language or reference for God, It always takes place within and as î
a function o f  the reconciled community o f the Church. See Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). I am indebted to Alan Torrance for this discussion. J
In his Epistle to the Romans, Barth dialectically challenged liberal theology’s attempt to somehow make i
a direct link between the gospel and the “Declaration o f German Intellectuals.” This document, signed by |
such theological giants Herrmann and von Harnack (Barth’s teachers), called for loyalty above all to Kaiser |
Wilhelm II and to the German nation at the outset o f World War I. Later Barth vehemently refuted the |
kinds o f syncretistic statements issued in 1933 by certain national church leaders in line with National !
Socialism. For a concise discussion, see Hart, “The Capacity for Ambiguity,” 146-147.
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Barth’s involvement in drafting the Barmen Confession in opposition to 
Kulterprotestantismus -  the ‘reforming’ of the gospel through its marriage to cultural 
ideology: ‘No other voice apart from the one, necessary and sufficient voice of Jesus 
Christ, as conveyed to us by the witness of Scripture, or nor any voice alongside the 
authentic, scriptural voice of Jesus Christ may become the authority for what the church 
proclaims and teaches’/®^  This is Barmen’s rejection of natural theology in the form of 
culture-religion. As Barth emphasises, where Jesus Christ “no longer speaks the first and 
last word, but only at best an additional word”, the inevitable result will be “assimilated 
and domesticated theo logy .L ordsh ip  is eliminated and humanity as covenant partners 
and respondents is eliminated.
Such domesticated theology may emerge in apparently agreeable and sophisticated forms, but 
once allowed in principle, it relativises Christ’s voice so that it is no longer understood as 
necessary, sufficient, and supreme. This relativizing is fatal partly because is undercuts any 
decisive defence against culture-religion in its more tribal and barbarous forms. The logic o f one 
admits the logic o f the other. The Christ o f natural theology is always openly or secretly the 
relativized Christ o f culture. The trajectory o f natural theology leads from the Christ who is not 
supreme to the Christ who is not sufficient and finally to the Christ who is not necessary. Culture- 
religion, relativization, and domestication or assimilation indicate that the Lordship of Jesus Christ 
is no longer believed or understood.’ *^
Ultimately, God can use whatever he chooses to speak outside the church -  things 
beautiful or otherwise. None of these things, however, can have epistemological 
symmetry with the Word, nor independent revelatory or epistemological status. They 
must line up with what the one voice -  the Word -  is attesting to in Scripture to know if it 
is God speaking through them.’^ ^
We can only know what we know because of whom we know -  God -  and this 
knowledge is given in his own self-disclosure and our received gift of metanoia. In other
Hunsinger, “Barth, Barmen, and the Confessing Church Today,” in Disruptive Grace, 80. 
C.D. II.1 ,163.
Hunsinger, “Barth, Barmen, and the Confessing Church Today,” 80.
Hunsinger, “Barth, Barmen,” 82.
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words, knowing God as Triune is because of a living encounter between two subjects,
divine and human, but only one Subject, God has the ability to establish the encounter. In
our sinfulness we simply cannot, says Barth, draw the hermeneutical circle from below
and hope to catch God within it. We are utterly dependent on God to establish the
conditions for encountering him within our experience by his own gracious Spirit. The
Spirit, who alone knows the mind of Christ, is given to those who are in Christ as a
‘deposit’ guaranteeing their final, glorious consummation as the new creation in
communion with the Triune God. This, says Barth, is the mystery of God’s ‘Sophia’:
In I Cor. 2 cf. we are told that the wisdom o f God in Christ is a cro<t)ta ev puaxripiG) unknown to 
the rulers of this world, not seen by any eye, not heard by any ear, having entered into no man’s 
heart, accessible only to the Ttvsopccof God Himself. It is not, then, accessible to the (puxiKoç 
, av0po7ioç who as such does not have the Tiveupa and who cannot know what is accessible only 
to the Tivsopa and through the Tcveupa: ou Ôe^exai yvcovai. Man must receive (Xappavsiv) not 
only the Word from Christ but also the Tuveupa by which it is known, or he will not know it at 
all.’^
C.D. I.l, 195.
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